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Abstract of Ph.D. Thesis.
The British attitude to French colonisation, 1875-1887.
After the Franco-Prussian War, France acquired many 
colonial territories. In all these areas, Britain’s position 
as a colonial power was affected. This thesis describes the 
attitude and policies of successive British governments towards 
French colonial development from 1875 to 1887, and the effect 
of overseas difficulties with France on British foreign policy.
Anglo-French colonial rivalry in this period was far 
greater than has usually been supposed. In West Africa, French 
expansion conflicted with Britain’s commercial interests and 
brought about the Oil Rivers and Niger Protectorates. On the 
Somali Coast, Britain’s concern for the route to India 
dictated counter-measures to French activities. Partly for 
the same reason, Britain disapproved of the French campaigns 
in Madagascar, though the English public was more concerned 
with the missionary factor. British interests were not 
immediately affected by the French protectorate in Tonkin, 
but the prospect of overland trade with China and the need to 
safeguard Lower Burma and India made Britain sensitive about 
French influence in Indo-China and hastened the annexation of 
Upper Burma. In the Pacific, there were constant Anglo-French 
difficulties for which Australian policy was largely responsible; 
the convict settlement in New Caledonia caused irritation, and 
Australian pressure prevented an exclusively French regime in 
the New Hebrides. Only over Tunis was the British Government bound 
to acquiescence, because of Salisbury’s assurances in 1878. The 
manner in which the Protectorate was achieved,however, provoked 
strong criticism in England, and the subsequent negotiations 
regarding consular jurisdiction reveal Granville’s determination 
to protect British interests.
The Anglo-French ’alliance’ of the ’seventies broke 
down not only because of Egypt, but because of incompatibility 
of colonial aims. For Britain, the Mediterranean Agreements of 
1887 substituted involvement with the Central Powers for the 
lost entente with France.
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Supplement
I N T R O D U C T I O N  
”The sudden development of the passion for 
territorial extension on the part of the French Republic is 
one of the most striking phenomena of modern politics.”
So the Pall Mall Gazette informed its readers shortly after 
the French acquisition of a protectorate over Tunis in the 
summer of I88I. "Alike in Asia, Africa, and in the Pacific 
Ocean,” the journal continued, "the French are displaying a 
craze for colonization which is somewhat startling to those 
who have complacently assumed that the experience of Algeria 
would suffice to deter our neighbours across the Channel from 
undertaking a costly and unprofitable task for which we are 
accustomed to say they are but ill-fitted. ' It would seem, 
however, as if the craving for action which has so frequently 
manifested itself in Europe with disastrous consequences both 
to France and her neighbours was now finding a safer and more 
"Imperial” vent in the subjugation of savage races and the 
establishment of French ascendancy over distant islands and 
decaying Kingdoms." ^ This editorial is typical of the 
innumerable analyses of French colonial policy that were made 
in England in the eighteen-eighties, not only in the Press, 
but in public speeches, in political literature, and even in 
parliament. After the acquisition of Tunis - the first
^ 9 June 1881.
spectacular colonial success of the Third Republic, French 
colonisation became one of the leading topics of the day.
The interest was not merely academic. The universality of 
Britain’s overseas commitments meant that large-scale 
expansion on the part of another Power was bound in almost 
every instance to affect British interests to some degree.
In fact, after 1875 France and Britain came into contact all 
over the world. French colonisation was seen first as a 
challenge, then as a threat, to the colonial supremacy Britain 
had maintained ever since her victory over France in the strug­
gle for India and North America in the eighteenth century.
The overseas policy of the Third Republic differed 
from that of previous French governments not in its general 
aims, nor in the areas chosen for development, nor in the 
methods of territorial acquisition it sanctioned, but in the 
scale and pace of its initiation. After the settlement of 
1815 France had hoped gradually to recapture her lost position 
as a colonial power, but her efforts had been spasmodic and on 
a small scale, partly owing to her domestic instability, partly 
to her diplomatic weakness. Occasionally her activities had 
run counter to those of Britain. There had been colonial 
crises in Anglo-French relations - the Pritchard affair of 
1841 being one of the best known- but they had been rare.
They had had no lasting diplomatic effect. Even in the time 
of Napoleon III, British colonial supremacy remained 
unchallenged. A mild rivalry rather than a serious conflict 1
of interests formed the colonial background to Anglo-French 
relations. Between I815 and I870 colonial questions were 
never a determining fantor in the relationship between 
London and Paris. In the last quarter of the nineteenth
ft
century, however, Anglo-French relations depended to a greater 
extent than at any previous period since the eighteenth 
century on colonial issues.
The object of this study is to describe the 
attitude of the British Government towards French colonisation 
between the years l875 and I8 8 7 . The period is a convenient 
one for several reasons, political, colonial, and diplomatic. 
1875 is an obvious starting-point for any study relating to 
the colonial movement of the Third Republic. By 1875 France 
had recovered both politically and economically from the 
disasters of 1870-1. The new Constitution was framed in that 
year. The five milliard war indemnity to Germany had already 
been paid off. With the return of internal stability, public 
attention started to turn overseas. Private investors and 
the new ’geographical* societies in the big industrial centres 
were enthusiastic about colonial expansion as a means of 
opening fresh markets to French manufacturers. "There has 
been in France," the Journal Officiel remarked in July l875i 
"decidedly a return towards ideas of exploration, colonization, 
foreign commerce, which we cannot applaud too much." The 
colonial movement had received the government’s blessing. 
Already in 1874 8n official exhibition of colonial products
4had been held in Paris.^ The Ministry of Marine had for 
months been contemplating the extension of French possessions, 
especially in South-east Asia and in West Africa.
The resumption of French colonisation at once 
concerned Britain directly. The first clash of interests 
came in the Far East: the exclusive nature of the French
treaties of 1874 with Annam granting France a virtual 
protectorate and special commercial privileges in the eastern 
side of the Indo-Chinese peninsula led to a British protest 
and subsequent Anglo-French negotiations. During the Eastern 
Crisis of I876-8 , French expansion almost came to a standstill, 
but locally the ground was being prepared, notably in Tunis and 
in West Africa. In 1879 overseas development was resumed, and 
and era of colonisation began which gathered momentum and 
intensity with each success - first in West Africa and in the 
Pacific, then in Tunis, then in Madagascar and Annam and on 
the Somali Coast. By I8 8 3, British and French interests had 
conflicted in each of these areas, and though in Tunis and in 
Madagascar a settlement had been reached in favour of France, 
in other regions British and French aims seemed irreconcilable. 
Constant difficulties created a degree of tension between the 
two countries which was largely responsible for the Franco- 
German rapprochement of the following year. "It is not,"
^ Donald Vernon McKay: "Colonialism in the French Geographical 
Movement, I87I-I88I," The Geographical Review (New York), 
vol.XXXIII, 1943; p. Zll.
5the British Ambassador in Paris told the Foreign Secretary, 
"that I suppose that France has any deliberate intention of 
going to war with us. But the two nations come into contact 
in every part of the globe. In every part of it questions 
arise which, in the present state of feeling, excite mutual 
suspicion and irritation. Who can say vhen and where, in 
this state of things, some local events may not produce a 
serious quarrel, or some high-handed proceedings of hot­
headed officials occasion an actual c o l l i s i o n ? B y  I8 8 7 , 
however, the pace of French colonisation had again slackened, 
and in that year Britain and France were able to come 
temporarily to terms in two regions - in the Pacific and on 
the Somali Coast.
Diplomatically, too, the period I8 7 5-I887 is of 
particular interest, especially with regard to the development 
of British foreign policy. The War Scare of 1875 found 
Britain decidedly on the side of France against Germany. For 
the next five years the Anglo-French ’alliance*, as 
contemporaries called the alignment, seemed fundamentally 
secure, despite Deca.zes’ s proclivities for a Franco-Russian 
understanding during the earlier stages of the Eastern Crisis. 
Relations were particularly good in the immediate aftermath of 
the Berlin Congress i^ hen Salisbury and waddington were in
Lord Lyons to Lord Granville, 3 June I8 8 4 ; Lord Edmond 
Fitzmaurice: The Life of Granville George Leveson Gower,
Second Earl Granville", K.G. , I8 1 3-Ï8 9I (2 vols. , London,I9 05) 
vol. II, p. 3 3 3 .
6office. After I88I, however, the entente weakened and 
finally collapsed altogether. In I887 Britain signed the 
Mediterranean Agreements, which brought her nearer to the 
Central Powers than she was afterwards to be at any time.
It has long been realised that the cause of the 
alienation of Britain and France was not only the British 
occupation of Egypt in 1882 but colonial antagonism. Yet 
historians have isually given insufficient weight to Anglo- 
French colonial issues. Doctor Crowe has justly remarked that 
undue historical prominence has been given to the temporary 
Anglo-German colonial quarrel of 1884-5 the expense of "the 
far more serious and far-reaching Anglo-French colonial rivalry 
that existed at the same time all over the w o r l d . T h i s  
is particularly so in the case of Professor hanger’s 
"Dinlomacv of_ Imperialism."^  There has been a tendency to 
write the diplomatic history of the ’eighties in terms of the 
struggle of 1 9 1 4, and to regard colonial problems between 
Britain and Germany as of greater significance in international 
relations than those between Britain and France. There can 
be no greater falsification of events in the * eighties than to 
describe them as a prelude to a war thirty years later. Those 
who do so would seem to have ignored the intrinsic importance
S. E. Crowe: The Berlin West African Conference 1884-5 (The
Royal Empire Society, Imperial"Studies No. 19, hondon,I?4^) > 
Appendix XIII, p. 221.
2
W. L. Langer: The Diplomacy of Imperialism 1890-1902 (2 vols.
New York, 1935) •
of overseas issues in the late nineteenth century. The 
indispensable foundation of the entente cordiale of I904 was 
a colonial understanding. Without that there could be no 
agreement on diplomatic aims. As Professor Penson has 
pointed out, colonial interests dominated British foreign 
policy from 1 8 8 5 onwards and were certainly paramount at the 
turn of the century until about 1906.^
Contemporaries did not make the same mistakes of 
judgment as those looking back. Lord Lyons, who m s  British 
Ambassador in Paris throughout the period under consideration 
until his retirement in November I8 8 7 , was most painfully aware 
that Anglophobia had developed in France simultaneously with 
French expansion. Anglo-French friction was the basis of 
his unswerving disapproval of the * spirited colonial policy* 
of successive French governments. The misgivings he had 
expressed to Granville in I8 8 4 he felt even more two years 
later. He attributed Britain’s difficulties with France 
"more to the inevitable consequences of our coming into 
contact with the French in all parts of the world, than to 
any ill-will on either s i d e . H i s  correspondent. Lord 
Rosebery, had placed the blame squarely on French shoulders:
L. M. Penson: The Colonial Background to British Foreign 
Policy (Londoi^930) .
^ Lord Lyons to Lord Rosebery, 17 August I886; Lord Newton: 
Lord Lyons. A Record of British Diplomacy (2 vols., 
Lonaon, 1913) ,“voi . Ïl7 p. 374V
8as the Queen once shrewdly observed, "he did not care very 
much for F r a n c e : b u t  he had been equally convinced of the 
seriousness of colonial issues, "My six months experience," 
he wrote after his tenure of the Foreign Office in 1886,
"has led me to the conviction that our relations with France 
are really more troublesome than with any other Power...
She is quite oblivious of the fact that she never loses the 
opportunity of playing us a trick. Witness the secret 
expedition to the New Hebrides.. . A year later, Salisbury 
was faced with the same problems. Whereas in I878-80 the 
basis of his foreign policy had been Anglo-French solidarity, 
to vhich he had tried to subordinate overseas difficulties, 
which were then comparitively trivial, in I887 French 
antagonism, not only in Egypt but in Newfoundland, in West 
Africa, on the Gulf of Aden,and in the Western Pacific, wrung 
from him his famous remark: "Can you wonder that there is, to
my eyes, a silver lining even to the great black cloud of a 
Franco-German war?"3
Despite the evident importance of the subject, there 
has been no comprehensive attempt hitherto to analyse the
^ Extract from the Queen’s Journal, 6 February I8 8 6; G. E. 
Buckle (editor) : The Letters of Queen Victoria, Series III 
(3 vols., London, 19ÿo)> vol. I, p. 4 8.
P
Rosebery to Lyons, 10 August 1886; Newton: Lord Lyons.
op,Pit.. II, p. 3 7 4.
^ Lord Salisbury to Lord Lyons, 20 July 1887; Lyons, II,
p. 4 0 9.
9nature of Anglo-French colonial differences in the 
•eighties. There is a brief résumé in The British Empire 
since 1783, but though valuable as a generalisation, it is 
intended as no more than an introduction to the history of 
British colonisation after I870 and is moreover confined to 
Africa.^ The lacuna is partly due to the departmentalisation 
of historical writing; the subject falls neither strictly 
within the province of the colonial historian nor of the 
diplomatic. Thus Professor Langer, in discussing the state 
of Anglo-French relations in I8 8 7, dismisses colonial issues 
in a sentence: "Leaving aside the tension that had arisen
from conflicting interests in Madagascar, the New Hebrides, 
Indo-China, etc., it was, as usual, the Egyptian question that 
had served as an index for relations between the two powers.
In the main, diplomatic historians have recognized the 
existence of these •conflicting interests’, but, not 
enquiring into their nature, have not fully realised their 
relevance to nor their effect upon the development of British 
and French foreign policy in the ’eighties. (They have
A
given more attention to the antagonism of the ’nineties which
^ A. P. Newton and J. Ewing: The British pnpire since 1783^ 
Its Political and Economic Development (LondonV third 
edition, 1939) , ppT 108-9','" 13Ü-I4I, ^16-7.
W. L. Langer; European Alliances and Alignments I87I-I890 
(New York, second edition, 1950), p. 396.
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preceded the Fashoda crisis, but the issues involved in this 
later conflict of interests cannot be appreciated without an 
understanding of earlier British and French colonial aims.) 
Colonial historians, on the other hand, ha.ve tended to treat 
Anglo-French colonial relations almost entirely from the point 
of view of their immediate effect on imperial expansion in 
particular areas. Through the very limitations of their 
subject, they have been more concerned with the local results 
of conflicting interests, expressed, for instance, in boundary 
disputes, than in the attitude of either side towards the 
other which created that conflict. The standard work on 
French colonisation edited by Professors Hanotaux and 
Martineau provides numerous illustrations of this approach.^ 
What is needed for any study of the attitude of 
one Power towards the colonisation of another is a combination 
of ’diplomatic’ and ’colonial* historiography. Professor 
Harlow has recently called attention to the need for such 
integration. Referring to the influence of foreign relations 
on colonial affairs and "the converse... imperial interests 
as a factor in British foreign policy," he said: "The
connexion in many fields of colonial activity between colonies, 
trade and diplomacy is evident enough; but one usually finds
1
Gabriel Hanotaux et Alfred Martineau (eds.) : Histoire des 
colonies françaises et de 1 ’expansion de la France dans le 
monde IParis . b vols. , 1929 - 1934) . '
11
in such cases that the historian tends to concentrate upon 
one of these aspects, giving only cursory attention to the 
other two, instead of examining them as closely relented 
c o m p o n e n t s . S o m e  writers, it is true, have successfully 
combined these elements of policy - several of those who have
been concerned in a general way with a particular region;
2
for example, Miss Howe in her book on Madagascar. But in 
general these 'regional* historians have devoted little 
space to the inter-relations of European Powers (whether 
diplomatic, commercial, or colonial) as a factor in regional 
development, since imperial policy is only one aspect of their 
subject among many - geographical, ethnographical, and the 
r e s t M o r e o v e r ,  a large proportion of these studies were 
written before the national archives' of' late nineteenth 
century documents were opened, so that in so far as they deal 
with the motivation of policy at all, they are derived from 
published material o n l y.4 The number of serious studies
1 Vincent Harlow: The Historian and British Colonial History. 
An Inaugural Lecture delivered in the University of Oxford 
on l6 November 1950 (Oxford, 1951) > P* 14.
2
Sonia E. Howe; The Drama of Madagascar (London,1938) .
 ^ E.K. W.E.F. Ward: A History of the Gold Qoast (London,1948)
4 E.g. Guy Scholefield: The Pacific (London,1919) •
12
dealing specifically with the colonial relations of European 
Powers after I870 is extremely small. There is no work on 
the Pacific, for instance, comparable to Miss Brookes*s 
account extending to 1875> which was based on unpublished 
material in the British and United States archives.1 The 
one outstanding example of an analysis of European relations 
in the * eighties over a particular area which blends the 
colonial, diplomatic, political^ and commercial interests of 
the various Powers into a satisfying whole is Doctor Crowe's 
Berlin West African Conference.^
The present study attempts a similar integration 
in the case of British policy towards France. It is 
designed to fill a gap in the history both of Anglo-French 
relations and of British colonial development. Fundamentally, 
it is concerned with the impact of French colonisation on 
British imperial and foreign policy. The subject is divided 
regionally, in order to show the various considerations on 
which British policy was based - diplomatic, strategic, 
commercial, and domestic, as well as colonial. But the 
British attitude towards French colonisation as a whole in 
the period 1875-87 has been investigated, so that the 
relative importance of each issue in Anglo-French relations
Jean Ingram Brookes: International Rivalry in the Pacific
Islands 1800-1875 (University of California Press, 
Berkeley, 19^) .
2
Op.cit.
’ 13
can be estimated. With regard to French colonisation in 
Tunis, Madagascar, and Indo-China, the general course of 
British policy has been described in numerous works, so that 
here the method has been to survey the published sources and 
to re-consider the British attitude in the light of new
material. The latter consists mainly of British Foreign
Office
Office and Colonial^ records and the private correspondence 
of English Ministers, and on the French side of documents from 
the Quai d'Orsay which had not before been available for 
inspection beyond I8 7 8. In the case of West Africa, the 
pacific, and the Somali Coast, British policy has been 
described in greater detail, since there is no existing 
published account^ based on any of the documentary sources 
mentioned, of Anglo-French relations in these areas.
Relevant published material is indicated in each chapter.
14
PAI^T 1. BRITAIN'S STRATEGIC INT]iKESTS AND
PRËNCH COLONISATION.
C H A P T E R  I
THE ABANDONMENT OF A TRADITION: 
Britain. France and Tunis. 1874 - 1884
15
1• THE t ra d i t i o n OF ANGLO-FRENCH HOSTILITY AND THE 
ATTEMPT AT DIPLOMATIC CO-OPERATION.
It seems now inevitable that the great 
maritime and colonial struggles of the eighteenth 
century between Britain and France, and more particularly 
the Napoleonic V/ars, should have left suspicion and 
mistrust between the two countries. From the end of 
seventeenth century to the close of the last war against 
Napoleon, Anglo-French rivalry had been the main theme in 
British foreign policy. "In all the changing alliances 
of the period, one between England and France seemed the 
most unstable and unnatural. It was impossible for 
either country to ignore this legacy of hostility.
Yet after I815 a new European situation 
demanded and produced a new outlook. A recurrence of 
revolutionary Imperialism and expansion was inconceivable 
with the return of the Bourbons. There was much to 
draw the two countries together. Common problems of 
internal policy at a time of almost universal popular 
unrest produced a feeling of solidarity between the two 
governments. This was a transient enough factor, but 
it contributed towards a new conception of Anglo-French 
relations - towards an assumption of common interests as 
a necessary corollary to the Vienna Settlement. More
^ Penson: The Colonial Background to British Foreign
Policy, op. cit. " '    —
16
permanent were the social and cultural ties that united 
the English and French aristocracies in a ws.y that was 
unique until the middle of the century, when improved 
communications were tending to make European Society 
less dependent on circumstances of proximity, and 
therefore more cosmopolitan.
In the diplomatic sphere, England fully 
realised the importance of a good understanding with 
France. The basis of co-operation, from the Congress 
System till the mid-'thirties, when the entente wore 
thin, was Non-intervention. The French attitude towards 
those problems to which the principle was applied was not 
always acceptable to Britain, nor was French assistance 
indispensable - as was shown by Canning*s successful 
handling of the Latin American issue in the * twenties.
But Non-intervention remained an idea, though varyingly 
interpreted, to which the two western Powers were 
committed and which provided a common ground of defence 
against the policies of the other Powers. Without
France, Britain was always, in this period, liable to 
diplomatic isolation. After 1830, the understanding 
seemed securely founded in constitutionalism, and it was 
Palmerston, who was fond of proclaiming his belief in 
"the maintenance of a firm and strict alliance with France,"^
Hansard's Parliamentary Debates, 3rd Series, vol.XI, 
col. 882, 26 March 1832.
17
who first used the phrase entente cordiale to 
characterise Anglo-French relations.^
Interest, no less than principle, drew 
Britain towards France. In the » thirties the growing 
antagonism between Britain and Russia became evident, 
after being obscured by their partnership over the Greek 
Revolt. With the mounting tension in the Near East, 
the western entente became more than ever necessary to 
Britain. "It must not be forgotten that the one great 
danger to Europe is the possibility of a combination 
between France and Russia," Palmerston observed in I8 3 8.
The danger was temporarily averted, and Franco-Russian 
disputes in the Near East made possible the wartime 
Anglo-French alliance of 1854* The defeat of Russia, 
however, in destroying one of the greatest potential 
threats to Britain's position, at the same time removed 
one of the strongest planks in the foundations of Anglo- 
French co-operation. It helped to weaken the entente 
in the 'sixties.
Up to that time, the desirability of the 
entente with France had remained, as it had done since 
1 8 1 5, an almost permanent axiom of British foreign policy. 
Yet the entente was often broken by crises when war
^O.K. Webster; Palmerston, Metternich and the European
System^.., Raleigh Lecture, Proceedings of the British Academy 
2 1034, p. 126. .--------- -^---------- ------------
Palmerston to Granville, 8 June I8 3 8, quoted in Sir H.
Bulwer: Life of Palmerston (London,1870), vol.II, p.268. I
18
itself seemed impending. At these times, public 
opinion undoubtedly increased the tension. The popular, 
traditional belief, held on both sides of the Channel, 
that a kind of natural hostility existed between England 
and France, continued long after its validity had been 
disproved. It complicated the task of diplomacy and 
affected the day-to-day decisions of policy. Statesmen 
were not immune from its influence. In 1833> when 
Anglo-French relations were particularly good, William IV 
referred to the French as "the natural enemies of England." 
Palmerston wa.s always notoriously apt to voice his 
suspicions of French policy in public.
The fluctuations of the entente - the 
tensions and crises, were largely the result of British 
opposition to the most permanent element in French policy; 
the desire to escape from the confines of action the 
other Powers had imposed in I8 1 5* Charles X asserted 
his independence by the expedition to Algiers; Louis 
Philippe by plans to dominate Belgium and Spain and by 
supporting Mehemet Ali; Napoleon III, the most obvious 
exponent of a policy of prestige and expansion, by armed 
assistance to Piedmont against Austria, by the Mexican 
adventure, by territorial agreements with Prussia, by 
the development of French influence in Syria and North 
Africa, and by intervention in every diploma.tic issue 
that seemed likely to provide an opportunity to promote
19
French interests. One of the main tasks of British 
diplomacy was to prevent the success of separate French 
action of this nature, at the same time preserving the 
entente. It is significant that with no other Power was 
Britain's relationship so much analysed and discussëd —  
by English diplomats, in Parliament, in the correspondence 
of English statesmen',, and so deliberate and self- 
conscious, as with France.
A classic expression of a view widely held 
in Britain by the time of the Franco-Prussian War was put 
forward by Sir Robert Morier in I8 7 1. Examining Anglo- 
French relations during the forty years of peace from 
1815 to the Crimean War, he recognised that in many 
instances England and France had acted together; ”as 
long as France restricts her action to legitimate objects 
(as in the creation of the Belgian Kingdom in I83I) we 
go heartily with her and stand together as the 
representatives of Western Progress versus Eastern 
reaction." Yet "the moment she shows the cloven foot 
and attempts to assert her claim to a privileged 
position we at once throw our weight on the side of the
Northern Powers  England becomes the regulator by
which the expansive force of France is utilised 
beneficially and productively, but always kept in check 
whenever it threatens to become destructive."^ This
1
Mrs. Rosslyn Wemyss; Memoirs and Letters of Sir Robert
Morier 1826-76 (I9II) ~ v o m i ' , '  p. 21^. ' ------------—
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was the kind of analysis of French policy, for the entire 
period since I8 1 5, that had gained wide currency by iBjO 
and is to be found scattered through memoirs and letters 
of the time.
Some writers have maintained that the
instability of the entente was due to a large extent to
causes outside Europe. They have held not only that
overseas rivalry existed between the two countries but
that it conditioned their general relations. Plausibility
is given to this view by the fact that between I815 and
1870 Britain and France were the only two European Powers
that were expanding in the colonial field. There were
several crises that originated in colonial disputes - the
most notable being the Pritchard affair. Jean Darcy in
his Cent années,de rivalité coloniale took an extreme
stahd-point:
"Toutes nos tentatives d'expansion," he wrote, 
"provoquèrent de la part de la Grande-Bretagne 
une opposition charactéristique. Parfois
cette opposition se traduisait par un simple 
déplaisir par d'âpres polémiques de presse, 
des protestations diplomatiques ou parlementaires, 
mais souvent aussi le gouvernement anglais dirigea 
contre nos projects tout l'effort de sa politique: 
certains jours même, on put croire qu'il ne 
reculerait pas devant la guerre pour arriver à 
ses fins.
Depuis 1815, ce conflit s'est perpétué 
sans interruption.
^ Jean Darcy: France et Angleterre. Cent Années de 
rivalité coloniale (Paris, 1$Q4) . ^
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Rivalry of a sort certainly existed, 
especially before I8 4 8 . The French forward movement - 
in West Africa, in Madagascar, and in the Pacific - 
under Charles X and Louis Philippe produced territorial 
difficulties between English and French representatives 
in these areas which occasionally became the subject 
of diplomatic discussions. More often, however, 
colonial action produced reprisals in kind. Rarely were 
colonial disputes considered of sufficient importance to 
alter the diplomatic relationship between England and 
France. 'Colonial rivalry' was largely a matter of 
rivalry between agents on the spot, who h.a,d a traditional 
attitude of mutual hostility, backed by the Press at home 
Moreover, in the mid-nineteenth century, anti-Imperial ism 
in England often meant acquiescence in French colonial 
expansion, - if gradual, and not conflicting with 
established British interests. Even when serious 
difficulties arose, there was a large body of opinion 
in England which regarded what was happening in some 
distant part of the world as far less important than 
current European issues. Many people, especially those 
whose political outlook approximated to that of Cobden, 
would have agreed with Brougham's dictum of I8 0 3: "Two
nations, who would commence hostilities on account of 
their colonies, would never want occasions for 
quarrelling, had they no such possessions   We do
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not find, that France and Spain, or Britain and Portugal, 
whose interests in Europe incline then to an alliance, 
are apt to separate on account of the proximity of their 
colonies."^ If "Britain" and "France" had been 
substituted for "Spain" and "Portugal", they would have 
felt the analogy to be complete.
2. ANGLO-FRENCH ANTAGONISM IN THE MEDITERRANEAN PRIOR 
TO 1875T
There was one area, however, where French 
activities were constantly opposed by successive British 
governments: the Mediterranean. Britain's position in
India and her commercial interests alike dictated 
opposition to any Power who might seek to disturb the 
existing balance of power there.
The tradition of Anglo-French rivalry in the 
Near East had been established in the eighteenth century, 
when the interests of English and French merchants began 
to conflict seriously. The main sphere of rivalry had 
been then in the Eastern Mediterranean - in Egypt and in 
Syria, and on the coasts of the Red Sea. Towards the 
end of the century the French had a virtual monopoly of 
Egyptian trade, but it was largely due to the East India 
Company that the Suez route was first opened up to 
commercial traffic. The strategic and commercial
^ Henry Brougham: An Enquiry into the Colonial Policy 
of the European Powers (Edinburgh, l8o3) , p. 119.
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importance of the route was obvious, and British 
influence, particularly in the Red Sea area, rapidly 
increased. Egypt was one of Napoleon's first military 
objectives. With the rise of Mehemet Ali, Anglo-French 
rivalry in the Eastern Mediterranean became intense. 
Politically, France was in the stronger position in 
Egypt, but by about I830, British commercial interests 
there had become greater than those of any other country 
In the 'twenties and 'thirties, uncertainty 
as to future developments in North Africa provided a‘ new 
source of friction between England and France. There 
was the disturbing possibility that Mehemet Ali might 
extend his rule westwards, as well as through Syria.
The first major diplomatic conflict of interest in North 
Africa occurred over the French expedition to Algers, 
when Aberdeen made a series of strongly worded 
representations to paris. "If we so far forget what is 
due to our sovereign and to ourselves," he wrote, "as to 
rest satisfied with vague explanations in a matter so 
deeply affecting the interests of British commerce, as 
well as the political relations of the Mediterranean 
States, it is certain that the people of this country 
would not hesitate to pronounce the most unequivocal 
condemnation of our conduct. "1 Aberdeen's government.
^ Aberdeen to Stuart, 21 April I830, quoted by W.F.Lord; 
England and France in the Mediterranean I660 to I830
(1901) , pp. 99-100. Stuart was~authorised to read 
this despatch to polignac.
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however, felt themselves unable to go beyond verbal 
protest, since the other Powers favoured the expedition. 
There was a good deal of criticism in England of 
Aberdeen's failure to take action. The policy of 
Thiers, who was in power in 1836, did not tend to improve 
Anglo-French relations. He was strongly anti-British, 
felt that the Western Mediterranean wa.s a legitimate 
field for French expansion, and referred to the conquest 
of Algeria as being in the true spirit of the Napoleonic 
Legend,^ 'Russia and England', he said, 'are supreme
p
in the East, but the West invites French colonization.'
The military victories of France in Algeria 
during the 'thirties aroused alarm in England, and the 
Cabinet was determined that Algeria should remain the 
limit of French territory in North Africa. From this 
period onwards, Tunis, as the neighbouring state to 
Algeria, became a source of concern. Palmerston made 
his attitude clear as early as I836: "The English
government had intentiona.lly abstained from saying 
anything to that of France with regard to Al^rs, because 
we know how delicate the position of the French government 
is upon that subject, with respect to the popular feeling
^ J.E. Swain: The Struggle for the Control of the
Mediterranean priofto Ï848 (Boston, Mass., I'^ TT) , pp.lû2-3.
2
Ibid., p.103. (Campbell to Palmerston, 30 October I836.) ,
25
and public opinion in France, but any attack of
France upon Tunis would give rise to a new and different 
question... It would be irapossible for England to see 
with indifference the occupation of Tunis by France."^ 
During the Eastern Crisis of 1840, Palmerston's fears of 
French expansion in the Mediterranean became almost an 
obsession.
"The French Government", he wrote, "is labouring 
to establish an independent state consisting of 
Syria, Egypt and Arabia to be placed under the 
protection and to be subject to the influence of 
France; to be in short what the cabinet of St. 
Petersburgh wishes Turkey to be to Russia.
If these claims were accomplished, it is 
easy to see that Tunis and Tripoli would soon 
be absorbed in the same political system, and 
France would be practically mistress of the 
Mediterranean.,.. Undoubtedly the full execution 
of such a vast plan would be attended with 
difficulties hardly to be surmounted, and when 
once its nature and extent came to be generally 
seen and understood in England, any British 
Government would be compelled by public opinion 
to resist the further progress of such a scheme « 
by war if remonstrances should prove.ineffectual,"
By the 'sixties the political situation in 
Tunis revolved round a clear-out struggle for influence 
over the Bey's government between English and French 
interests. From I855 the British Consul-General was 
Richard Wood. He had spent a lifetime in the Near East, 
and was an ardent disciple of Palmerston. One of his
^ Ibid., p. 106. Palmerston to Granville, 1 November I836.
p
Ibid., p. 120. Palmerston to Granville, I6 December I840.
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deepest convictions was that French policy had always been 
detrimental to Britain. He felt that the attitude of France 
towards the development of British interests in the 
Mediterranean went beyond "the limits of a generous rivalry 
between the two neighbours,"^ He believed the geographical 
position of Tunis to be vital to the balance of power in the 
Mediterranean, and his despatches constantly urged the 
government to resist any attempt by France to extend her 
influence over the Regency. For over twenty years he 
strenuously promoted British commerce in Tunis, and lost no 
opportunity of advancing his own influence over the native 
authorities. He was a vigorous advocate of reform, which 
he held would diminish the likelihood of France's obtaining 
control over the Bey. He could not have wished for a more 
sympathetic appreciation of his own views than from 
Palmerston. During the crisis of I864, the French Government 
W8.S warned that "England has interests to take care of in
p
Tunis and would not admit French claims of supremacy there," 
Views which Palmerston expressed in 1865 were exactly Wood's 
own; "The standing Policy of France is to make the 
Mediterranean a French lake, and they steadily pursue it on 
every favourable occasion. If we maintain our Superiority 
at Sea which we must do in spite of Economists and Radicals,
^ M. M. Safwat: Tunis and the Powers I8.78 to I88I
(Alexandria, 1943) , 'PP-9 -^
2
Ibid., p. 92..
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we should probably be able, in the Event of War to drive 
them out of most of the Positions they might acquire; but 
to do so would cost us great efforts, many lives and much 
money and therefore Prevention is better than Oure, Our 
Business consequently ought to be to unravel their Plots, to 
see through their Intrigues, and to defeat their Schemes by 
Counteraction Steadily and Systematically applied.
3. THE TEMPORARY ECLIPSE OF FRANCE AND THE_SUBSEQUENT 
RE-EMERGENCE OF FRENCH AIvîBITION IN TUNISV ïdYl-b.
For Anglo-French relations, the year 1871 was 
the end of an era. After that date, it was no longer France, 
but Germany, #10 appeared to be a menace to the European 
balance of power. From the British standpoint, the outcome 
of the Franco-Prussian War seemed to have destroyed 
Bonapartism, only to create it in a new form. "Really another 
old Bonaparte" who "ought to be bridled," was Disraeli's
o
description of Bismarck in 1875» The change in the
international situation not only brought about a new 
conception of. British foreign policy towards France, but made 
possible the partial abandonment of Palmerstonian doctrines 
regarding the Mediterranean.
After the War, Anglo-French relations were good.
^ Palmerston to Layard, Private, 8 January 1865; Harold 
Temperley and Lillian M. Penson; Foundations of British 
Foreign Policy from Pitt (1792) to Salisbury (1902)
( Cambridge, I938) , p. É93/
^ G.E. Buckle: The Life of Benjamin Disraeli, Earl of 
Beaconsfield. vol. V. (1920), p. 421. Letter to Lady 
Chesterfield.
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Britain's part in resolving the war scare of 1875 showed 
that the government headed by Disraeli was not disposed to 
see France eliminated as a Great Power. Though they did 
not desire a separate understanding with France which would 
arouse German hostility, they wished to encourage "confidence 
and goodwill."^ Between I87I and I876, friehdly co-operation 
between London and Paris became firmly established.
The old fear of separate French action in the 
Mediterranean disappeared. Little activity was expected from 
France in that area. British domination of the Suez Canal 
was secured in 1875 a.nd the Egyptian issue was still to come.
In Tunis, the struggle between English and French interests 
appeared to have been decided in favour of Britain. Wood's 
policy of friendship with the Bey had resulted in large 
concessions to English capital. By I876, English companies 
had monopolised the control of railways, and much land was in 
their hands. In July l875 ' Anglo-Tunisian Treaty was
signed, which confirmed all rights enjoyed by British subjects, 
and opened Tunis unreservedly to British capital.
In the early 'seventies in Tunis, the Italians 
were as much the rivals of the British as the French had been. 
As soon as the unification of Italy was finally achieved in 
1871, the Italian Government, faced with an acute population
^ Lyons to Adams, 21 April 1875 (after a talk in London with 
Disraeli); Newton: Lyons, op.cit., II, p. 73*
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problem, turned their attention to Tunis as a field for 
colonisation. Italian influence in Tunis had been strong 
ever since the French occupation of Algeria had opened North 
Africa to European immigration. Many Italian traders had 
settled there, Italian schools and institutions flourished, 
and Italian had become the principal foreign language of the 
Regency, since many British residents, being Maltese, spoke 
Italian too. (There was considerable solidarity between 
the two groups.) Italian nationals in Tunis agitated for 
annexe.tion with the sympathetic backing of their government.
In 1871, after an alleged viola.tion of Italian property by 
the local police, a crisis developed, and it looked as if a 
naval expedition would be sent. Owing to English and 
Turkish intervention the threatened invasion never took place. 
After this episode Wood's reports home contained warnings 
increasingly urgent in tone about the development of Italian 
influence. He no longer felt, as he had done after the 
International Financial Commission had been set up in I869 
when the representatives of British and Italian creditors had 
generally joined together against French interests, that he 
could reply on Italian support against France. In 
September I874, he reported with entire approval that the 
Bardo felt that "the policy of Italy offered no sure guarantee
^ Safwat, op.cit. , p. 127.
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of its being less aggressive now than it was in I864 when
the Italian Cabinet conceived the project of occupying the
Regency. Italy was anxious to establish a large colony in
Africa...."^ The Foreign Office seems to have shared Wood's
apprehensions, so much so, that long after the revival of
French influence. Lord Derby, then Foreign Secretary, felt
that it would be Italy that would retaliate by' taking Tunis
2
if Britain took over Egypt.
Nevertheless, growing mistrust of Italy's 
Mediterranean policy did not entail British support of 
French interests in Tunis. As France recovered her position 
in Europe her influence in Tunis revived. In 1873, & French 
Minister Plenipotentiary was appointed to the Bey's government 
for the first time, - a significant step, for it implied 
recognition of the Bey's independent status, whereas the 
British had always held Tunis to be under the Suzerainty of 
the Turkish Sultan. Through the energetic efforts of Roustan, 
who was appointed Consul in 1874, French influence replaced 
British at the Bardo. The Prime Minister, Khair-ed-Din, was
a protégé of France. Most of the Tunisian Debt was in French
hands and the entire finances of the Regency were controlled 
by Roustan through the vice-president of the International 
Financial Commission. Roustan also secured a concession for
^ I'bicL.. p. 99.
2
Derby to Lyons, 6 December 1875; Lyons. II, pp. I04-5.
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a railway to link Algeria with Tunis.^ In I876, the French 
Foreign Minister, Décazes, felt confident enough to declare: 
"Tunis is the very entry to Africa,and is the opening of our 
Algerian possessions. We could not tolerate the establishment 
of any European Power there without danger to the security of 
our colony.... ,|2
4. BRITAIN ABANDONS HER TRADITIONAL POLICY TOWARDS THE 
OTTOMAN EMPIRE.
Much of Roustan*s successful policy was carried
out during the Eastern Crisis of 1875-8• The momentous events
of those years were accompanied by the equadly momentous
change in British policy towards the Ottoman Empire. The
change was directly responsible for the abandonment of the
traditional British attitude towards the French over Tunis in
1878.
In January 1877 the British representative at the 
Constantinople Conference, Lord Salisbury, was already 
contemplating a radical change in policy. Despite personal 
aggravation at the failure of the Conference, he felt that some 
good had been achieved. "It has, I hope, made it impossible 
that we should spend any more English blood in sustaining the 
Turkish Empire", he wrote to a colleague in the Cabinet.
"And I hope it will make English statesmen buckle to the task
^ Safwat, p>117*
p
Langer: European Alliances and Alignments, p. 218.
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of devising some other means of securing the road to India."^ 
Although after his return to England the Cabinet refused to 
consider his suggestion that the Ottoman Empire should be
P
partitioned, events had shown that the traditional 
Palmerstonian-policy of supporting the Empire even at the cost 
of war, was completely outdated. A new solution to the
Turkish problem had to be found. Both Cabinet dissension
and the Russo-Turkish War which broke out in April l877 made 
partition out of the question. The Russian a.dvsnce during 
the early summer of 1877 end again in the antumn when the 
invading armies were advancing on Constantinople, forced the 
Cabinet to consider how to offset the prepondera.ting position 
Russia might hold at the Straits, Britain's position in the 
Near and Middle East, even in India as Beaconsfield and the 
Queen thought, was felt to be in danger. Moreover, British 
public opinion was by the end of 1877 strongly anti-Russian. 
The end of hostilities did nothing to alleviate the situation, 
the Peace of Ban Stefano being unacceptable to the rest of 
Europe. It was largely through the efforts of Salisbury, who 
became Foreign Secretary after Derby's resignation in March, 
1878, that a suitable solution to the Crisis from the British
^ Salisbury to Carnarvon, 11 January 1877; Lady Gwendolyn 
Cecil; Life of Robert Marquis of Salisbury, vol.II (1921), 
pp • 121— È .
^ Ibid.; pp. 133-4. 0. 23 March 1877.
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point of view was found.
Salisbury's new watch was "Protection".
There was to be no return to the old formula of "the 
independence and integrity of the Ottoman Empire." Instead, 
the Sultan's dominions were to be protected by a system of 
guarantees that were intended to stabilise the situation in 
the Balkans and Asia Minor and at the same time to stop the 
encroachment of Russia. The vital and highly secret part of 
the programme was an acquisition of Turkish territory by 
Britain to offset Russian gains in the Near East and to serve 
as a place d'armes to guard the route to India. This was the 
policy that was carried out in the short space of three months 
from April to July, I878. On 8 July,, a few days before the 
plenipotentiaries at the Berlin Congress had signed the final 
Treaty, the Cyprus Convention between the British Government 
and the Sultan was announced in the English Press.^
To Salisbury, the acquisition of Cyprus was not 
merely dictated by the apparent necessity of safeguarding 
British interests vis-a-vis Russia. It was part of his answer 
to the whole Eastern Question. It was the outcome of his
earlier ideas about partition. As far back as the beginning
of 1877 be had been considering the advantages of Cyprus 
becoming British, if Bulgaria were occupied by Russia, and
For further details vide Dwyght E. Lee: Great Britain
and the Cyprus Convention Policy of I878 (Harvard 
University Press, 1934) •
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Bosnia by Austria-Hungary. "The time has come", Salisbury
told the Viceroy of India, "for defending English interests in 
a more direct way by some territorial re-arrangement." A 
'pied-a-terre' would have to be found 'in place of that which 
we should infallibly lose at Constantinople.'^ Cyprus, or 
an equivalent, in other words, was to be Britain's compensation 
for the transformation of the Ottoman Empire. Yet Salisbury 
realised that this might be a difficult matter to arrange, 
since Britain was not the only Power with Mediterranean 
interests. The attitude of Italy and of France had to be 
considered. %
Italy's policy during the Eastern Crisis had 
been closely watched by Britain. In I876, the diplomatic 
situation was still fluid, and there was no Power Britain could 
count on for support. Efforts made in London and in Rome to 
bring about a good understanding between the two countries were 
partially successful. Yet any idea of compensation for Italy 
arising out of the Russo-Turkish war was discouraged by Britain. 
Crispi's mission in autumn 1877 to the various European 
capitals to press Italian claims met with no more response 
in London than elsewhere. One reason for the British 
attitude was that it was not certain that Italy was or would 
remain on the side of Britain against Russia. There was little 
solidarity in the Italian Cabinet, and even the Foreign Office
^ Salisbury to Lytton, 9 March 1877; Salisbury, 00.cit., II.,
p. 130.
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in Rome w&6 divided in its .counsels. Ambassadors were 
left with a large measure of independence; Menabrea in 
London worked for co-operation with Britain, while Nigra in 
St. Petersburgh was pursuing a pro-Russian policy. Leaving 
aside the question of compensation for Italy in the Balkans, 
to which Austrian opposition was an insuperable difficulty, 
there was a further reason why Britain was able to ignore 
Italy after the acquisition of a place d'armes ha,d been 
decided. France was hostile to any increase of Italian power 
in North Africa, whether in Tunis or in Tripoli. In December 
1877> Derby went so far as to tell the French Ambassador, who 
had alluded in conversation to Italian ambitions in North 
Africa,^ that if Italy made an attempt to take Tunis, the 
French could rest assured that he would put all the obstacles 
in her way that were in his power. In any case, by the end 
of Spring I878, the question of Itadian compensation had 
resolved itself. In the first place, there had been a change 
of government in Italy ; in March I878 the Depretis Cabinet 
fell and was succeeded by that of Cairoli, with Corti as 
Foreign Minister. Corti stood above all for strict neutrality 
in the Eastern Crisis; he was against binding engagements which 
might lead Italy into war, and against a policy of compensation.
D'Harcourt à Banneville, 10 décembre 1877> no. 77» Archives 
du Ministère des Affaires étrangères, Angleterre, Direction 
politiqueV'tomé 773.
2
Ibid. Derby's reply, but not the full document, is printed in 
Documents diplomatiques français (1871-1914-)» séries I, 
tome ii, no. 217.
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He was even reluctant to support Britain in demanding that 
the whole of the Treaty of San Stefano should be submitted to 
the forthcoming European Congress. In these circumstances, 
Britain's final attempt to secure Italian co-operation - the 
proposal in March I878 of a Mediterranean League to provide a 
counterv^ght to Russia, came to nothing. In the second place, 
Britain was no longer isolated. Since the Russo-Turkish war, 
and more particularly since San Stefano, a large measure of 
solidarity existed between Britain, Germany, Austria-Hungary, 
and France with regard to Near Eastern problems. Neither 
Germany nor Austria favoured Italian territorial compensation. 
Salisbury was thus able to dismiss possible Italian opposition 
to the Cyprus Convention as a factor of little importance.
The case of France was altogether different. By
1878, she was co-operating with Britain in the Near East and 
enjoying good relations with Germany. Bismarck was willing 
to see France secure Tunis as compensation for any new 
territorial arrangements in the Near East that might be made 
at the Berlin Congress. It was Britain's anxiety to secure 
French acquiescence in the Cyprus Convention that led directly 
to Salisbury's "offer" of Tunis to the French Foreign Minister 
in July 1878.
Up to the end of l877> Britain had felt uncertain
of French co-operation in the Near East. Thr British
Ambassador's reports on Decazes's policy were disturbing. 
Despite the Foreign Minister's pro-Russian tendencies, however,
37
French diplomacy appeared in 1875-6 to be at least directed 
towards peace. France was not yet confident enough of her 
military strength to wish for European complications which 
might lead to another war with Germany. But in October 
1876 Lyons had pointed out that though French hopes of a 
Russian alliance had been temporarily abandoned, "still if at 
any future time there should appear a hope of obtaining 
assistance from Russia for the recovery of Alsace and Lorraine, 
Western interests would be unhesitatingly sacrificed to a 
Russian Alliance. A few weeks later the British military 
attache in Paris reported that the French Army w^ould not 
regard a European War within the next year involving Germany 
as a calamity, for to the French the Rhine was more important 
than the Nile. On the other hand, he remarked, England and 
France might be drawn together in the event of war, for both
p
Powers were diplomatically isolated. In the summer of 1877» 
when Russia was pursuing a victorious course in the Balkans, 
Decazes was trying to convince Lyons of the menace of Germany 
and the potential danger to Holland. Surely, he said, Holland 
was "of more vital importance to England than Armenia or even
Lyons to Derby, 31 October I876, No. 91A, Secret, (.seen 
by the Queen and Beaconsfield) ; F.O. 27/2169.
2
Conolly to Lyons, 25 November 1876, No. 4^9 » Confidential, 
enclosed in Lyons to Derby, 28 November I876, No. 991, 
Confidential, (endorsed "very interesting" by Derby and 
Tenterden); F.O. 27/27IC.
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the Bosphorus and the Dardanelles."^ Lyons felt that 
Decazes was genuinely afraid of Germany, but that he wished 
to keep the British Fleet in the West for a different reason - 
namely, to prevent any extension of British power in the 
Mediterranean.^
After the fall of Decazes on 22 November 1877, 
however, French policy in the Eastern Crisis became more 
accept8.ble to Britain. "The Marquis de Banneville,,,. and 
M. Waddington," Lyons wrote, "...have pursued a different 
course. They have frankly stated to me in conversation, that 
they regard French and English interests in the Levant as 
nearly identical; that the interests of both are imperilled 
by Russian ambition, and that so far as the peculiar condition 
of France will admit, the two countries should act together for 
the defence of those i n t e r e s t s . F r i e n d s h i p  with Britain was 
supplemented by cordiality with Germany. The discussions 
relating to German participation in the forthcoming Paris 
Exhibition of I878 provided an opportunity of expressing 
Franco-German good-will. In Berlin, the French Ambassador 
told Holstein that closer intercourse between the two nations
^ Lyons to Derby, 13 May 1877, No. 383, Secret; F.O. 27/2238.
^ Ibid.
^ Lyons to Derby, 12 February I878, No. 145» Secret;
F.O. 27/2305,
39
was moving substantially nearer fulfilment, although "je ne 
parle pas d'alliance, parce, que selon moi ce serait verfrüht."^
5. BRITAIN CONSIDERS COMPENSATION FOR FRANCE IN TUNIS.
Thus by the spring of I878, when the Cabinet in 
London were discussing the project of a place d'armes in the 
Near East, it had become essential to take into account the 
French attitude towards this new departure. England could 
not afford to sacrifice French offers of moral support in the 
Near East, and the current Franco-German rapprochement w^ould h&ve 
made it even dangerous to alienate France. The French were 
now militarily and diplomatically in a strong position, and 
their Mediterranean interests forced Salisbury to find them 
some quivalent for Cyprus. He had foreseen the difficulty as 
far back as March 1877; he had felt then that Britain should 
start to prepare the ground at once, for he feared that "when 
we come to do the same thing some years later, one of two 
thihgs will have happened. Either France will have recovered 
her position and be jealous of any extension of our power in 
the Mediterranean - or Germany will have become a naval power.
When the place d'armes became a Cabinet question,
^ Holograph memorandum by Holstein, 5 March I878; Die 
Grosse Politik der Europaischen Kabinette, 1871-191^ , 
band III (Ï92'2y/No. '652,' p. 584.
^ Salisbury to Lytton, 9 March l877; Salisbury, II, p. I30.
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after 27 February 1878, a further problem had to be
considered in the light of Anglo-French relations - that of
a choice of territory. Mytilene, Acre, and a post on the
Persian Gulf, were first considered. Mytilene would have
been perfectly acceptable to France, and in fact a temporary
occupation was discussed both by Beaconsfield and the French
2
Ambassador in London, and by Lyons and Waddington in Paris.
This idea was however abandoned, doubtless because Mytilene 
was not considered of sufficient stra,tegic importance. The 
choice narrowed down to Cyprus or the port of Scanderoon on 
the Syrian coast. The Cabinet of 27 March 1878 decided to 
occupy both places, Salisbury, according to Beaconsfield, 
urging the utility of Scanderoon and saying, somewhat 
surprisingly, that it gave as little offence to France as any 
occupation could, while commanding the route to the Suez Canal. 
By May, however, Scanderoon had been dropped, and on the 24th 
the British Ambassador in Constantinople was instructed to 
bring before the Sultan the main points of 8. Convention 
respecting Cyprus. From Salisbury's correspondence it is 
clear that the*main objection to Scanderoon had been that it 
would be a direct affront to the long-standing interests of
^ Disraeli, VI, p. 252.
^ Lyons to Salisbury, 8 April I878, No. 336, Secret; F.O.27/2308
^ Disraeli, VI^ pp. 263-276.
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France in Syria. "You will see," Salisbury told Lyons,
"that we have deferred to your views in turning the eyes of 
desire away from Syria.
Still the question of compensation remained.
V/hen Lyons was called to London in March for consultation with
the Cabinet, he had warned the Prime Minister and the Foreign
Secretary of the certainty of French objections to the
2
acquisition of Cyprus. After his return to Paris, he 
continued to impress Salisbury with the dangers inherent in 
separate British action in the Mediterranean, Waddington's 
own difficult position as Foreign Minister had an important 
bearing on the situation; as Lyons pointed out, his English 
blood and education were in one way a disadvantage, for "he 
feels strongly the necessity of guarding against the tendency 
in France to suspect him of an English bias." His attitude 
in one direction was clear; "He is most strongly opposed to 
any change in the relative position of the Great Powers in the 
Mediterranean, and he would, I am afraid, be quite as 
unwilling to see England extend her influence in that Sea as 
he would be to see Russia do so. Salisbury therefore 
arranged that the Cyprus Convention should be announced at the 
end of the Berlin Congress, when French opposition would be
^ Salisbury to Lyons, l6 May 1878; Salisbury, II, p. 270. 
2
Lyons to Salisbury, 4 June I878; Lyons, II, pp. 145-7-
3 Ibid.
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practically useless, and to ensure that the occupation,
carried out with naval support, should be a fait accompli
when the announcement was made.^
Meanwhile Salisbury had already made his first
soundings into the question of an equivalent for France.
Secure in the knowledge that Tunis would be acceptable in the
eyes of Germany - for Mtoster, the German Ambassador in London,
2
had in April suggested a free hand for France in the Regency 
Salisbury turned to Lyons for advice. He had heard from 
M&ister, he wrote, that France wanted Tunis. "Do you hear 
anything of the sort? It is of course an extension of French 
territory and influence of which we should not have the 
slightest jealousy or fear. But I am not assuming in any way 
that the Porte would wish to give it up. I should only like 
to have your opinion on how far France would wish to have it."^ 
Lyons's reply was purposely discouraging and reflected his usual- 
fears about the whole policy of territorial rearrangement: 
"Bismarck's mention of it (Tunis) at this moment is probably 
only one of his usual devices to sow distrust of France. I
Salisbury's humorous forecast of Waddington tearing 
his hair over the Convention and the French despatching ships 
from Toulon to Cyprus, in Salisbury to Northcote, 6 June I878; 
Salisbury, II, pp. 276-7*
p
W. L. Langer: "The European Powers and the French Occupation 
of Tunis, 1878-1881," American Historical Review, vol. XXXI, 
October 1925*
3
Salisbury to Lyons, 11 May 1878; Lyons, II, p. 139*
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have never found that the acquisition of Tunis recommended 
itself to French imagination, and I don’t believe it would 
be taken as anything like a set-off against English 
acquisitions in Egypt or S y r i a . S a l i s b u r y  however, 
refused to be influenced by Lyons’s advice or by 7/addington’ s 
professed disinterestedness in Mediterranesji expansion, for he 
was aware that Tunis would be a popular acquisition with large 
sections of the French public and that Waddington could not 
afford to ignore French financial and economic interests in 
the Regency.
6. THE BRITISH "OFFER" OF TUNIS TO FRANCE.
Neither Salisbury nor Waddington seem to. have 
written any official report of their famous conversations at 
Berlin until after the Congress was over. • The main sources 
of information are still the accounts they each gave when 
Waddington was seeking written confirmation of Salisbury’s 
"offer" of Tunis, Although these documents are coloured by 
the purpose for which they were written, the two men agreed 
substantially on what had passed between them. Even the 
"general tenour" of Waddington’s despatch of 21 July, the first 
of the French communications with the Foreign Secretary on 
the subject and unacceptable on account of its undiplomatic 
form,^ Salisbury held to be correct.^  He also agreed to the
^ I M d . Lyons to Salisbury (no date given) ,
^ DoC" üipl. fr., I, ii, no, 332, confidential.
^ Salisbury to Lyons, 24 July I878; Lyons, II, pp. 158-9 *
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account of the conversations Waddington gave Lyons, "though 
the lurid touches about war have been filled in afterwe-rds."^ 
The general purport of the Salisbury-Waddington
conversations is well known. But their sequence has not been
2
made altogether clear hitherto. It seems that Salisbury
actually proceeded as follows. On 6 July he announced the
conclusion of the Anglo-Turkish Convention of 4 June to 
Waddington privately. His confirmatory letter put the 
occupation of Cyprus in the best possible light, and ended 
with a typically graceful turn of phrase; "It would have been 
inconsistent with the feelings of friendship existing between 
our two countries, and with my gratitude for your courteous 
procedure towards me personally, to have allowed you to hear 
it first from any other source."^ He apparently waited a day 
before suggesting that France might take Tunis if she wished, 
thus heightening the effect made by his "offer." This was on 
Sunday the Yth, for a few days latter he was able to report to 
a colleague at home that Waddington had been "squared" on that
^ Salisbury to Lyons, 20 July I878; Lyons, II, p. 154*
2
Professor Langer’s article on "The European Pov/ers and the 
French Occupation of Tunis" (o£. cit.) was written before the 
Documents diplomatiques français were published. His 
European Alliances and"A1ignments (first edition, 1931, second 
edition, 1930) cdhtains a summary' of the conversations (p.160) 
Doctor Safwat’s Tunis and the Powers does not give as full 
an account of the conversât ions a,s ïs possible from the 
sources available.
^ Lyons.II, pp. 150-1. The letter is dated 7 July. Vide also 
V/addington I Dufaure, 8 juillet I878, télégramme, très 
confidentiel; Doc. dipl. fr., I, ii , ho. 325.
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day,^ He also saw Waddington on Monday and gave him further
p
explanations about Cyprus. These conversations were 
friendly and informal, and went far beyond the agreement over 
Cyprus and Tunis; Mediterranean and Near Eastern affairs in 
general were discussed. As usual, when they were in private, 
the two men spoke in English since Waddington was a perfect 
bilinguist.^ Salisbury’s proposal about Tunis was made in 
colloquial language appropriate to the occasion. "Take Tunis, 
if you wish. Do what you like there. England will not 
object," he said. Later he argued that France would in fact 
become obliged to take Tunis, "for you cannot leave Carthage 
in the hands of the Barbarians."^
One explanation of this latter much-quoted 
phrase is that though originally Salisbury had conceived the 
idea of Tunis as compensation for France from a purely r '
diplomatic point of view, during the-summer of I876 and more 
particularly during the Congress, he had come to believe in a 
French occupation of Tunis as having a value in itself. He 
agreed with Waddington that England wa.s now an Asiatic Power,
^ Salisbury to Cross, 12 July I878; Salisbury, II, p. 295.
p
W. N . Medlicott: The Congress of Berlin and After (193^),pJI2.
^ Waddington gives the words of Salisbury’s "offer" in English 
in his despatch to d ’Harcourt (without number) of 21 July 
1878, Doc, dipl. fr. , I, ii, tic. 330, p. 362.
^ Ibid, Also Waddington à d’Ha.rcourt, dépêche no. 102, Doc.
dipl. fr., I, ii, p. 367.
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while French interests were primarily Mediterranean.^ ”We
had no Mediterranean aspirations," Salisbury reflected 
afterwards, "and did not desire to disturb the balance of 
power in that sea. Our eyes were bent wholly on the East."^ 
The Congress provided for the protection of the Ottoman 
Empire: Austria-Hungary was to occupy Bosnia, England was
to supervise reform in Asia Minor - and what was there against 
France being given a free hand in Tunis? The French had had 
several decades* experience of North African problems in 
Algeria - they could be trusted to carry out reform, and a 
French occupation of Tunis would put an end to Franco-Italian 
rivalry there, and give stability to that part of the 
Mediterranean. Austria in the Balkans, England in Asia Minor, 
France in North Africa,-this constituted Salisbury’s three-fold 
i , conception of the new policy of Protection for the Ottoman
‘ ./ Empire.^ This may explain why Salisbury, who in the spring 
had been against any form of compensation for Italy, was ready 
to discuss the idea of Italy acquiring Tripoli with Waddington 
I at Berlin,4 and even spoke, somewhat vaguely it is true, with
<     _
 ^ Waddington à d’Harcourt, 21 juillet I878 , dépêche no. 101, 
conf., Doc. dipl. fr., I, ii, no. 331, p. 365*
2
Salisbury to Lyons, 24 July I878; Lyons, II, p. 159*
3
This view is put forward by Professor L. M. Penson in "The 
Foreign Policy of Lord Salisbury I878-80" , in Studies in 
Anglo-French History, ed. by A. Goville and H. Temperley, 
(London,1935):----
^ Waddington à d’Harcourt, 21 juillet I878; Doc, dipl. f r. , I, 
ii, no. 330, p. 362.
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one of the Italian representatives at the Congress about an
■)
equivalent for Italy for the British acquisition of Cyprus. 
Tunis in France, Italy in Tripoli, would satisfy French and 
Italian ambitions in North Africa, and at the same time 
increase the elements of stability and security in the 
Mediterranean.
On the other hand, Salisbury’s purpose was undoubtedly 
diplomatic firjt, Mediterranean afterwards. There is no need 
to doubt the existence of a grand design on his part - a plan 
for the future protection of Turkey-in-Africa as well as in 
Europe and in Asia. But the most vital part of'the design to 
Britain was that which concerned the balance of power in the 
Eastern Mediterranean. Tunis was subordinate to the main 
pattern in Salisbury’s mind. His picturesque words about 
"Carthage" and "the Barbarians" were most probably simply an 
appeal to Waddington the classical scholar. One fact is 
clear; in I878, France had become the dominant foreign 
influence in Tunis, and it was likely that sooner or later 
the French would attempt to take over the government of the 
country. Salisbury was offering what would have seemed to 
many observers in I878 a foregone conclusion. The success 
of his policy at Berlin, however, depended on a proper 
appreciation of his proposal about Tunis, and it was fortunate 
from his point of view that Waddington did not regard the
 ^Langer; article in Am. Hist. Rev., 1925, op. cit.
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ultimate issue in Tunis as- being all certain.
At the Congress, Beaconsfield renewed Salisbury's
p r o p o s a l . and Bismarck supported it. On 21 July, after
Waddington had left Berlin, the Prince of Wales confimed
2the original "offer" when he was in Paris.
Great indignation was felt in France with regard to 
the Cyprus Convention, which was held to be an unjustifiable 
evasion of the principle laid down by Waddington to which all 
the plenipotentiaries had agreed, that the subjects of Syria 
and Egypt should be excluded from the competence of the 
Congress. The Salisbury-Waddington conversations, however, 
though they were not made public until three years later, 
served their purpose. Round about 11 July the French 
Republican press started to change its tone about the Cyprus 
Convention; the^ Journal des Debats, for instance, no doubt 
under instructions from Waddington, became conciliatory 
towards England, and pointed out that the Convention would 
have laudable results, such as reform in Asia Minor.3
By the time Waddington left Berlin on the l^th, he 
himself had become most enthusiastic about Salisbury's 
proposal On the 19th he telegraphed to the French
^ Waddington à d'Harcourt, 21 juillet I878, dépêche no. 102,
Doc. dipl. fr., I, ii, p. 367*
V/addington à d'Harcourt, 21 juillet I878; Doc. dipl. fr. , I,
ii, no. 330, p. 362.
^ Safwat, p. 210.
^ Medlicott: The Congress of Berlin, p. II5.
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Consul-General in Tunis to find out whether they Bey could be 
persuaded to agree to a French protectorate.^ Roustan 
foresaw some difficulty, but on the whole was fairly confident 
of success if armed force were sent.^ The idea of a Franco- 
Tunisian agreement was, however, premature, and the political 
situation in France would have made it difficult to carry out 
at that time, Waddington realised that some time must 'elapse 
before definite steps could be taken.^
7. SALISBURY'S INTERPRETATION OF HIS PROPOSAL ABOUT TUNIS.
In London, the general feeling in the government was 
that everything had gone extremely well in Berlin. On 23 
July, however, a small cloud appeared. D ’Harcourt, the 
French Ambassador, presented two despatches from Waddington 
setting forth the main points of the salisbury-Waddington 
conversations - one on Syria and Egypt, the other on Tunis - 
and Salisbury was asked to assent to Waddington’s account of 
what had been said, in writing."^ To the despatch on British 
and French interests in Egypt and Syria, Salisbury appeared to 
agree. As to the other despatch, he objected strongly to
Doc, d i d , fr. , I, ii, no, 328.
2 /
Roustan a Waddington, 20 juillet 1873, 1bL; Doc. did. fr., I, 
ii, no. 329.
3
Waddington à Roustan, 1 sept^embre I878, tél.; Doc. did. fr., 
I, ii, no. 339.
^ Waddington à d ’Harcourt,21 juillet I878; Doc, dipl. fr., I, 
ii, no. 330. D'Harcourt à Waddington, 24 Juillet I878; ibid. 
no. 334.
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seeing his own highly colloquial words about Tunis reproduced
in a diplomatic document. He could not be said to have
"offered" to France, he pointed out to d ’Harcourt, territory
which did not belong to Britain; his words would have to be
reproduced in a more suitable form. He would have to
consult the Cabinet, which was due to meet the following
Saturday,^ and he would give the Ambassador an answer on the 
2
Monday after, Waddington’s despatch, he complained to Lyons, 
had made it appear as if Tunis were his own personal property
3
and as if he were giving away "a liberal wedding present."^
There were two reasons for Salisbury’s hesitation. In
the first place, he had had no intention of giving binding 
assurances. "The contingencies under which these assurances 
would receive a practical application are difficult to foresee," 
he had told Lyons. "If France occupied Tunis to-morrow, we 
should not even remonstrate."^ But supposing France attempted 
to occupy Tunis, not at once, but at some unknown future date, 
when circumstances might be altered; England could not thartfore. 
possibly bind herself to promising definite support for France.
1
Ibid., no. 334' Vide also Salisbury to Lyons, 24 July 1878; 
Lyons, II, p. 158.
^ D ’Harcourt à Waddington, 23 juillet I878, tél. (4*59 P-m,), 
conf.; Affaires étrangères, tome 777'
3 Salisbury to Lyons, 24 July 1878; Lyons, II, p. 158.
^ Salisbury to Lyons, 20 July I878; Salisbury, II, p. 333.
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"What I told him (Waddingtor^, " Salisbury explained, "vms that 
if a state of things should arise in which there was no other 
obstacle to his occupying Tunis but our objection, tha.t 
objection would not be made. That was very different from
giving an unqualified promise of support.
In the second place, the attitude of Turkey - the.'
2
suzerain power, and of Italy, would have to be considered.
If Turkey got wind of an Anglo-French understanding for the 
occupation of Tunis, British influence at Constantinople would 
be- doomed. Moreover, 'it wa.s no business of ours to pronounce 
beforehand on the considerations which Italy would probably 
advance, '3 Since the Congress, Italy had assumed a much more 
important place in Salisbury's calculations - which accounts for 
his discussing the question of Itedian compensation in Tripoli 
with Waddington two months later in September, There was a 
grain of truth in d'Harcourt's view that Salisbury might have 
modified his ideas about Tunis since Berlin, and he was 
entirely right in supposing that Salisbury was afraid of Italy^s 
getting to know the content of the Salisbury-Waddington 
conversations
 ^ Salisbury to Lyons, 24 July I878; Lyons, II, p. 158.
^ Ibid.
3
Salisbury to Lyons, 20 July I878; Salisbury, II, p. 333*
^ D'Harcourt a Waddington, 24 juillet I878; Doc, dipl. fr., I, 
ii, no. 334, p. 370.
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waddington acted quickly. On 25 July he explained
to the French Ambassador that he understood by Salisbury's
■proposal that the British government "déclarait par là même
qu'à l'avenir aucun obstacle venant de sa part ne serait opposé
à la libre expansion de nos intérêts dans la Regence de Tunis,
quelque forme qu'elle dût prendre au gré de nos convenances."^
He sent a second despatch, modifying his previous dramatic
account of Salisbury's "offer", which was to be substituted
for the original despatch d'Harcourt had presented to the
2
Foreign Secretary on the 23rd. D'Harcourt was also 
instructed privately to give Salisbury "les assurances les plus 
formelles que nous n'avons aucune intention de les publier [i^e. 
these accounts of the Sadi sbury-Y/addingt on conversations] ni de 
faire quoique ce soit qui put lui causer un embaÿs ou le gêner 
dans son action."-^
On 28 July the Ambassador saw the Prime Minister. They 
had a long conversation on the general state of Anglo-French 
relations, in the course of which d'Harcourt gave Beaconsfield 
waddington's assurances regarding non-publication of Salisbury's 
Tunis proposal. The prime Minister was careful to go no
^ waddington à d'Harcourt, 25 juillet I878, conf.; Doc. dipl. 
fr.. I, ii, no. 335, P- 371.
 ^ waddington à d'Harcourt, 26 juillet I878, très conf.; Doc. 
dipl. fr., I, ii, no. 336.
^ Waddington à d'Harcourt (copie), 26 juillet I878;
Affaires étrangères, 777.
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further than Salisbury had done, in expressing the British 
attitude towards a French occupation of Tunis, As usual, 
however, his language was most friendly.^
After the Cabinet met, Salisbury confirmed his 
understanding with waddington at Berlin in a despatch to Lyons 
dated 7 August I8 7 8. The despatch agrees wdth the final 
French account of the conversations regarding Tunis, with one 
important exception. Whereas there is no mention in 
7/addington's despatch of 26 July of Italian claims, Salisbury's 
despatch reserves at some length the British attitude towards 
the objections which Italy might raise against a French 
occupation.
On the same day, in reply to an urgent telegram from 
the British Consul-General in Tunis, enquiring as to the truth 
of a local rumour that Britain had abandoned her traditional i
attitude about the integrity of Tunis, Salisbury telegraphed 
briefly; "I have to inform you that no offer of the 
annexation of Tunis to France has ever been made by Her 
Majesty's Government to the French Government.
1
D'Harcourt à 7/addington, 28 juillet I8 7 8; ibid.
^ Accounts and Papers, (I88I) , XCIX, (0.2886) , px>4-, No.4,
 ^ Penson; "Foreign Policy of Salisbury", op.cit., p. 139- Glad­
stone later regarded Salisbury's assurance to Wood with 
particular indignation; vide his annotations oh the corres­
pondence printed for the Cabinet, 12 May 188I; B.M. Add, MS. ,
4 4 6 2 6. He told a colleague: "Salisbury wall certain [sicQ have I 
to say or do something in the Tunis affair. He has I fear 
sensibly suffered in character within the last 3 years. One 
used to regard his good fame as part of the national estate...";*^ 
Gladstone to Harcourt (copy), 13 April I88I , B.M. Add. MS. h
44544. "
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In October he told Wood that he was glad to hear that the 
Bey was now reassured as regards French plans for annexa,tion.
8 . SALISBURY'S POLICY OVER THE FUTURE OF TUNIS. I878-8O.
After Berlin up to the time when he went out of office
in April 1 8 8 0, Salisbury's attitude to an eventual occupation
of Tunis by France remained the same. Wood was repaid for his
too great devotion to the English cause by dismissal. Left
entirely without instructions on the new departure in British
policy, and knowing nothing of the Salisbury-?/addington
conversations except from the current rumours of an Anglo-French
arrangement that had originated in the French and Austrian Press,
his activities became the subject of repeated ranonstrances by
Waddington to Lyons. In January 1879 Salisbury received a
direct request for his withdrawal. By that time Wood had been
conveniently discredited in a Franco-Tunisian dispute over the
Bancy concession. It was only at the conclusion of this affair,
however, that the Foreign Office learnt of the strenuous support
Great Britain had been giving to the Bey in the dispute, for
Wood had retaliated against the Government's appa-rent lack of
confidence in him by silence as to his own recent activities,
2
and thus had "not behaved very loyally" to his superiors.
Shortly afterwards a new superannuation rule for members of the
^ Salisbury to Wood (drafted by Salisbury himself) , 19 
October I8 7 8, No. 2 5; F.O. 102/111.
Salisbury to Beaconsfield, Pte., 17 January 1879;
Beaconsf ield pe.pers, Box XIII.
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Foreign Service was introduced "partly in imitation of the Army,
but also influenced by the hope of getting rid of h i m , a n d
Wood, being well over seventy, had to retire. His successor was
2
told to act with complete reserve.
Nevertheless, although Salisbury was anxious to maintain 
the spirit of the understajnding arrived at with Waddington, his 
interpretation of the extent of British obligations to France 
over Tunis was narrow. To France, the value of Salisbury's 
assurances continued to be negative rather than positive, and to 
lie in the abandonment of Britain's own political interests in 
the Regency. The despatch of August 7 had been something of a 
disappointment to Waddington, in its specific reservation of 
British policy towards Italian ambitions. waddington knew that 
Salisbury was prepared to see a French protectorate established 
in Tunis, but he also realised that Salisbury would take no step 
to bring it nearer. Wood's withdrawal did not mean that 
Salisbury would swing right over to support French claims to 
political predominance. His insistence on the secrecy of the 
Berlin conversations was inflexible.
This policy of reserve was primarily dictated by the 
danger of alienating Turkey. Had it been known at Constantinople 
that Salisbury was willing for what the Turks still regarded as 
part of the Ottoman Empire to come under European rule, his whole
^ Ibid.
^ Safwat, p. 244-.
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policy of 'Protection and Reform' would%o 11 an8ed. The
Sultan'B willingness to undertake reform rested ultimately on
a belief in Britain's deterniination to maintain his Empire
within its existing limits - as. expressed in the Cyprus
Convention. The British had never recognised, unlike the
French, the sovereignty of Tunis; as recently as December 1877
1Derby had described the Bey as a "vassal" of the Sultan,
British influence at Constantinople, which would have been
jeopardised had the Berlin conversations become common knowledge
at the Porte, Salisbury felt was "one of the most important
objects of English policy, - perhaps the most vital of all,"
and only to be maintained by "constant labour and vigilance on
2
the part of the ambassador."
In practice, Salisbury's policy over Tunis was also 
conditioned by purely diplomatic considerations, especially 
with regard to Italy. Salisbury's attitude to Italian 
ambitions in Tunis passed through two phases - discouragement 
and then impartiality. During the first few months after the 
Congress, when Salisbury was relying mainly on French support 
in the diplomatic sphere, he felt confident enough to give
^ In a conversation with the French Ambassador in London; Doc. 
dipl. fr., I , ii, no. 217. During the Russo-Turkish War 
Derby approved Wood's advice to the Bey to fulfil his obliga­
tions to the Sultan over the question of sending military aid 
to Turkey, See F.O. Memo, on "The dependency of the Bey of 
Tunis on the Sultan. The views of the British end French 
Governments in November 1 8 7 7 1 9  April l88l; F.O. 102/137*
2
Salisbury to Layard, 18 September I8 7 8; Salisbury, II, p. 135*
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the Italians a hint that they could expect no help from
England over Tunis. It was the nearest he ever got towards
revealing v/hat had occurred at Berlin. When Menabrea spoke
of French designs on Tunis, Salisbury made light of the
Ambassador’s information, -telling him that ’from some
observations dropped at Berlin by M, Waddington with respect
to similar rumours, he gathered that France had no present
intention of interfering with the Existing Government of Tunis.’
He went on to say that, apart from the question of British
trade interests, a French occupation would not "cause serious
anxiety to Her Majesty’s G o v e r n m e n t . A  few days later
Salisbury told Wood, who had sent him information obtained
2
from the Tunisian prime Minister about the Mussi mission, 
that any Italiem acquisitions in Tunis would almost certainly 
lead to war between France and I t a l y I n  October I878 
Salisbury still upheld French claims to predominant influence: 
although he denied that Britain had suggested France should 
take Tunis, he again warned Menabrea that British interests 
would not be affected by an ultimate French occupation.
It was during this period, when Salisbury v/as trying
^ Salisbury to Macdonell, 21 August I8 7 8, No. 299; F.O. 170/2 6 3*
^ V/ood to Salisbury, 26 August I8 7 8, No. ^1; F.O. 102/111,
Vide infra, p. 61,
Salisbury to 7/ood (draft) , I8 September I8 7 8, No, 20, 
Confidential; Salisbury himself suggested the form this 
despatch was to take, later widening the meaning by adding 
the words "of territory or special privileges" after "(Italian] 
acquisitions"; F.O. 102/111.
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to act in accordance vdth the French view of hie
obligations, that the question arose of compensation for
Italy. Salisbury had already suggested to Waddington at
Berlin that Tripoli might be given to Italy. When they met
in Paris on 4 September 1878 they again discussed general
Mediterranean problems. waddington’s report of this
conversation to Roustan^ conflicts with Salisbury’s account to
2
the British charge d ’affaires in Paris. According to 
Waddington, Salisbury, accepting the notion of compensation, 
suggested that it might be found in the course of drawing the 
new Greek frontier. Salisbury's account, by contrast, makes 
waddington rather than himself responsible for locating this 
compensation, names Tripoli but not Greece, and casts himself 
for a dissuasive role. Waddington’s language, however, was 
attuned to his correspondent’s aversion to the establishment 
of Italian influence in North Africa generally, and this may 
be the reason for his omitting Tripoli. Moreover had he urged 
Tripoli and urged it in vain, he would not perhaps have found it 
necessary or expedient to recount his failure to a subordinate. 
Salisbury may well have mentioned Greece and done so as a means 
to discourage the putting forward of Tripoli. For
^ Waddington à Roustan, 7 Septembre I8 7 8 , secrete; Doc. dipl. 
fr,, I , ii, no. 3 4 2.
2
Salisbury to Adams, 10 September I8 7 8 , No. 5 8 4, Confidential; 
F.O. 146/2 0 4 2. No mention of the conversation can.be found 
among Salisbury’s despatches to the British representative in 
Rome during the last four months of I878 (contained in
F.O. 1 7 0/264) .
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compensation as part of Greek arrangements already provided for 
in principle by the Treaty of Berlin was less likely to 
alienate Turkey than the cutting into her Empire at a new point. 
While the French occupation of Tunis was still a remote chance, 
it was safe to pay more attention to the susceptibilities of 
Constantinople than to the ambitions of Rome: to put the need
to keep Turkey’s good-will to England before the desirability 
of winning Italian acquiescence in a French occupation of Tunis 
through an equivalent in North Africa. Thus Salisbury 
explained to Beaconsfield that Waddington had "got no 
encouragement" from him to offer Tripoli to Italy, though 
Waddington had urged it "for a considerable time," because he 
"saw no probability of our urging the Sultan to give up 
Tripoli: or of his consenting to do so if we did. The
objections to cessions of territory, which was most felt at 
Constantinople was not so much the loss of revenue tha,t would 
result, as the subjection of a Mussulman population to a non- 
Mussulman Power: and this in the case of Tripoli would operate
strongly on the Sultan’s mind.
No doubt if Salisbury had believed a French 
occupation of Tunis to be imminent, his views would have been 
different, and he would have been prepared to take up his 
original proposal for the cession of Tripoli to Italy. At 
this time, however, he still doubted "whether - except in the
1
Salisbury to Beaconsfield, Pte., 5 September 18/8 ; 
Beaconsfield Papers^ Box XIII.
bO
matter of dresiTiing - you have much activity to expect from
1
him [V/addington) ." During the remainder of Salisbury’s
term of 'office events seemed to justify this conclusion. The
mounting rivalry between France and Italy in Tunis seemed to
preclude any likelihood of a French occupation in the near
future. Moreover, Lyons’s reports consistently minimised
2
the possibility.
But by 1879 Salisbury could no longer afford to 
#
run the risk of alienating Italy. The attitude he expressed 
towards an eventual occupation of Tunis nov/ entered the phase 
of impartiality between ItaGian and French claims. The 
uncertainty of the diplomatic outlook wo.s reflected in the 
grouping of the powers in the Near Eastern Commissions. The 
temporary revival of the Dreikaiserbund, in the autumn of 
1 8 7 8, was replaced by a Russ o-I tali an. rapprochement in the 
following spring, Salisbury was aware that the new alignment 
could easily become permanent if Italy were given tangible 
proof that England intended to ignore Italian claims in North 
Africa. On their return from Berlin the Italian representatives 
at the Congress had been denounced by their own colleagues and 
in the Italian Parliament end Press for their failure to secure 
for their country, alone among the Powers, any territorial 
acquisitions. In October I878 Corti ha,d been forced to
 ^i6id.
^ E.g., Lyons to Salisbury, 28 July 1879, No. 80I, Secret; 
F.O. 2 7/2 3 7 1.
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resign. His fell and that of the Ministers of War and Marine 
who resigned with him, because they considered Italy 
insufficiently prepared for overseas activity, marked a 
significant change in policy. The government went ahead with 
plans for future expansion, and Oairoli made every effort to 
re-assert Italian influence in Tunis and to prevent what he 
feared would otherwise be an imminent French occupation. An 
Italian deputy, Giuseppe Mussi, had already gone on a special 
mission to the Bey, and may have attempted to secure a treaty 
giving Italy special privileges in Tunis. He certainly 
proposed 1;hat Bizerta should remain a free port if it were not 
possible to hand it over to Italy.^ The Mussi mission and 
the subsequent rivalry between the new Italian Consul, Maccio, 
and Roustan, were symptoma,tic of claims, now officially 
encouraged, that could not be ignored. British policy over 
Tunis, reflecting this revival of Italian activity, became 
considerably modified in practice.
By January 1879 Salisbury had become more 
cautious in his support of France. The recall of V/ood was 
imminent and he wished to forestall the suspicions this step 
would arouse by trying to show that Britain’s attitude was one 
of disinterestedness - that Wood’s removal did not necessarily 
imply hostility to Italian claims, but merely the final 
renunciation of Britain’s own political interests in the
^ Wood to Salisbury, 2b August 1878, N 0 .5L; F.O..lOE/111.
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Regency. Menabrea was therefore given the rather ambiguous
assurance that with respect to the conflicting claims of
France and Italy, Britain "could express no opinion adverse
to Italian v i e w s . T h e  British Ambassador in Rome was told
to use the seme phraseology if he'were questioned on what had
2
been arranged at Berlin. On the seme day that these 
instructions were sent, Salisbury wrote privately to the 
British Ambassador in Constantinople to tell him that if it 
were true that France was seeking a protectorate, as he had 
heard from Berlin, Britain would not "meddle", even though 
France might be faced with Italian opposition.^ By March 1879 
Salisbury’s determination not to be involved should the 
Tunisian question lead to an open breach between France and 
Italy had become even stronger. • "I think the French will find 
difficulties enough with Italy," he told Lyons, "if they ever 
try to increase their influence in Tunis, but that is no affair 
of ours. We have hot water enough elsewhere without desiring 
to boil any in T u n i s , I t  is not surprising that after a new
^ Salisbury to Paget, 6 January 1879? No. 19; Safwat, p. 256. 
2
Salisbury to Paget, 6 January 1879? No. I6 ; Safwat, .p. 2.56.
^ Salisbury to Layard, Pte., 6 January 1879; B.M. Add.
MS. 3 9 1 3 9*
 ^ Salisbury to Lyons, 6 March 1879; Lyons, II, p. 174*
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pro-British Italian government under Depretis had come to 
power in December 1879? Salisbury was strictly non-committal 
over Tunis. England’s attitude, he told the Italian 
Ambassador, was that of complete neutrality.^
9* THE LIBERAL GOVERI#ENT AMD TUNIS. I88O-I.
There was considerable continuity in I880 between 
Conservative and Liberal policy. When Granville became 
Foreign Secretary, he continued to emphasize Britain’s 
reservations with regard to Italian policy whenever the French 
questioned him on his altitude to the Tunisian question. Yet 
the intention of the two Foreign Secretaries was entirely 
different. Salisbury’s reservations were designed to prevent 
England being drawn into conflict with Italy or Turkey. 
Granville used the same reservations in a vain attempt to 
preserve the status quo. Salisbury had remained convinced of 
the ultimate expediency of French predominance in Tunis. 
Granville wa,s against any extension of Frenph influence in the 
Mediterranean. Salisbury withdrew Wood to prove British 
good-will to France. Granville allowed Wood’s equally anti- 
French successor, Thomas Reade, to remain, though he had little 
confidence in him, and in the Enfida case he supported the 
claims of a British subject against a French company knowing 
that they rested on dubious legal foundations. Vliereas 
Salisbury’s policy was directly related to the general
^ Langer; "European Powers and... Tunis", op.cit., p. 7 8 -
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diplomatic situation, Granville appears to have tried to act 
without reference to wider issues in Europe. Like his 
colleagues, Granville was opposed to the basic principles of 
Salisbury’s Mediterranean policy - to the distribution of 
territory through diplomatic agreements and to the idea of 
compensation embodied in the Cyprus Convention. Characteristi­
cally , since he disliked arbitrary arrangements to meet future 
contingencies, he seems to have had no plan of his own for the 
future of the Mediterranean beyond the maintenance of the 
status quo. He preferred to deal with events when and not 
before,they arose. Such methods could only succeed when other 
Powers were of the same disposition. In the face of careful 
planning for overseas expansion and of determined action on 
the part of France, he was almost powerless. His ha.ndling of 
the Tunisian question was bound to be ineffectual.
The British attitude to the occupation of Tunis
in 1881 is well known. The Cabinet eventually decided that
they were bound by Salisbury’s assurances to Waddington at
Berlin to take no action against the French expedition, and
unwillingly acquiesced in the Treaty of May 12. It was not
so much the esta.blishment of the French protectorate which
lessened the cordiality of Anglo-French relations as the
1
manner in which it had been carried out. The Khamir raid 
was regarded as an altogether insufficient excuse for a
This spelling was adopted by Dr. Safwat in his Tunis and 
the Powers (op. c i t .). It is apparently a more correct 
phonetic transcription of the Arabic than the contemporary 
term ’Kroumir.'
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military expedition, which was criticised as an unwelcome 
precedent in colonial expansion. Both Conservatives and 
Liberals disapproved on moral grounds. There was also 
considerable anxiety over the future effect on Britain-’s 
strategic position in the Mediterranean, and Gladstone’s 
government'was attacked in the Press for not having taken any 
decisive diplomatic action against France. The Government 
replied by publishing Salisbury’s despatch to Lyons of 7 August 
1 3 7 8, which ha,d already appeared in the Times on 11 April, and 
other documents bearing on the policy of their predecessors at 
the time of the Berlin Congress. The opposition gradually 
collapsed, for it seemed that the Government’s hands had in 
fact been tied. Since the Franco-Italian rivalry of the 
previous two years had been largely eclipsed or forgotten owing 
to the publicity given to the Enfida affair - primarily a 
local conflict between French and British interests Salisbury’s 
proviso as to the attitude Italy might adopt towards France 
in Tunis appeared to have little value.
Mew sources of evidence do not alter the existing 
picture of Anglo-French relations during the Tunisian crisis, 
but rather confiim and strengthen its composition. In 
particular, they enable a more complete estimate to be made 
first of Granville’s defence of British interests in Tunis 
early in 188I , and secondly of the gradual clarification of 
British policy during the French military campaign of April 
to May.
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10. GRANVILLE’S POLICY OVER THE ENFIDA ESTATE CASE.
Granville’s conduct of policy during the Enfida
dispute^which preceded the main crisis^was based on a curious
mixture of determination to support what he conceived to be
British and not merely private interests and of increasing
suspicion about the validity of the claims he upheld. Despite
his misgivings, he felt that a British subject had to be
supported against unjustifiable opposition from the French
government. The Queen and Prime Minister took the same
attitude. Gladstone referred to the Enfida affair as a
"foolish escapade" on the part of France, and approved
Granville’s decision to send a warship to Tunis after the
1
French had despatched the Friedland. The Queen was
characteristically outspoken; to her French policy was
2
"extremely disgraceful."
When the Enfida Estate case was first discussed 
between the English and French governments, Granville, following 
his usual practice, wished to obtain expert legal ad.vice. This 
was not the first time he had had to deal with the rights of 
British subjects in Tunis; in 1873 there had been protracted 
negotiations over the establishment of the London-Tunisian Bank, 
a legal question which Granville had not been disposed to see
^ Gladstone to Granville, Pte., 4 February l88l; G.D. 29/124. 
2
Queen Victoria to Granville, 8 February l88l; G.D. 29/31.
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in diplomatic terms. The latest problem did not at first
show signs of being anything more than a local affair in which
he could afford to be impartial. He therefore arranged
privately with the French Ambassador to postpone their
discussions on the subject until he knew more about the right
1
of pre-emption claimed by Levy.
On 4 February, however, he spoke to Ohallemel-Lacour
on other disturbing matters connected with the dispute: the
forcible expulsion of Levy from the land he claimed by French
agents, and the despatch of the Friedland in ^ support of the
Compagnie Marseillaise. The Ambassador’s reply was that
Granville’s information on the latter point was incorrect;
Lyons had been mistaken in reporting that St. Hilaire had told
him that the Enfida affair was the reason for the Friedland’s
presence at Tunis; it was in fact, he said, the danger of
2
intervention from Turkey which was responsible. Granville 
rejected this explanation. A few days later the Ambassador 
read him a telegram from the French Foreign Minister 
admitting that "by mistake" he had at first told Lyons that the 
Enfida question had necessitated the despatch of a French ship 
to Tunis.^ This episode created considerable unpleasantness,
^ Ohallemel-Lacour à St. Hilaire, 2 février l88l, tél.;
Affaires étrangères, 789*
2
Granville to Lyons (draft), 5 February l88l, No. 112, 
(endorsed "seen by the Cabinet"); F.O. 27/2483- Ohallemel- 
Lacour à  St. Hilaire, 5 février l88l, no.9 ; Affaires 
étrangères. 789.
5 Granville to Lyons (draft), 7 February I88I, No. 126A;
F.O. 27/2483.
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and British confidence in French policy was badly shaken.
Granville proceeded to support Levy with great 
energy. On 5 February the Thunderer was ordered to go to Tunis, 
for it was agreed in London that "we could not have ironclads 
used to force Tunisian law courts into giving decisions hostile 
to British s u b j e c t s . L y o n s  was given the legal baas of Levy*s 
claims, and instructed to persuade the French Foreign Minister
2
to agree to the case being submitted to a Tunisian local court.
He was also provided with a precis of correspondence on the case, 
that had been printed for Cabinet use. This document based 
Levy*8 claims on information from Reade and from Broadley,
Levy * 8 legal representative in London.^ On the 6th Granville
sent Ghallemel-Lacour a series of extracts from Reade* s reports
A
implying that Levy* s claims were well-founded, and in another 
private note he quoted a letter from Wood testifying to Levy* s 
financial and commercial integrity.^ During February 
Granville had many conversations with the Ambassador about 
Levy* s case, and thou^i he never discussed the legal merits 
of pre-emption, he maintained that the case should be decided
Stephen Gwynn and G.M. Tuckwell: The Life of the Right Hon.
Sir Charles W. PiIke Bart., M.P. (2 vols., IglT), vol.I, p.jSO.
2
Granville to Lyons (draft) , 5 February iBBl, No. 120;
F.O. 27/2483.
•2
Enclosure in Granville to Lyohs, No. 139> Confidential,
10, February IB8I; F.O. 146/231I.
4 Granville to Challemel-Lacour, Pte., 6 February iBBl; copy 
enclosed in Granville to Lyons, 7 February I8BI, No. 121;
F.O. 146/2311.
5 Challemel-Lacour a St. Hilaire, 7 février iBBl, tél..
Affaires etranpr^res. 789.
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by the Tunisian courts and not by the French Consular Court.^ 
The local courts, as the French pointed out, were well known 
for their anti-French tendencies.
Although Granville made use of Reade*s reports in 
order to provide a basis for his arguments, he was well aware 
of the Consul*8 bias. He was suspicious of Reade * s activities 
in the Enfida affair and confided his misgivings in several 
revealing letters to Lyons* He doubted whether he ws.s any 
more "conciliatory" towards French interests than Wood had been
p
in Salisbury*s time. Moreover he became increasingly 
doubtful about Levy himself. "We are not very strong in our 
belief of Levy having right on his side," he told Lyohs, "but 
it was essential that he shd. have fair play. His 
colleagues in the Cabinet were even more disturbed. Their 
views must have been considerably influenced by the opinion of 
the legal expert among them, the Lord Chancellor. Having 
examined the case in detail, Selborne found himself unable to 
share Reade*s confidence in the right of pre-emption.^ He 
also felt that St. Hilaire*s objection to a settlement by a 
Tunisian court might be valid. "The whole is, evidently, a
^ Granville to Lyons (draft) , 31 January l88l. No. 89; 5 Feb­
ruary l88l. No. 112; 7 February l88l , No. 127; 15 February 
l88l, No. 159; F.O.27/2483. Challemel-Lacour a St. Hilaire,
31 janvier 1801, 5 février I88I, 16 février I88I; Affaires 
étrangères. 789.
2
Granville to Lyons, Pte.; 2 February I88I; G.D. 29/202.
^ Granville to Lyons, Pte., 9 February I88I; G.D. 29/202.
Memo, by the Lord Chancellor on the Enfida Estate Question; 
copy enclosed in Granville to Lyons, No. 139, Conf.,
10 February I88I; F.O. I46/23II.
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game of chess," he remarked in a memorandum on* the case, "and
it is not clear to me that M. Rous tan, on the one side, is a
more zealous partisan in it, than Mr. Reade in the other.
Lyons held much the same views. He hardly disguised
his opinion that Granville*s efforts were misplaced. He
always maintained that the chief value of Tunis to Britain was
2
as a source of supplies for Malta, and he tried to persuade
Granville that * certainly that interest was not worth a
quarrel or even a coolness with France.*^ He felt Levy was
not a bona fide purchaser, that he had been put up by
Apolitical interests, and that Reade^like Wood^was probably 
contending for local influence.^ When St. Hilaire proposed 
that arbitration should decide Levy* s case, Lyons appeared to 
be personally in favour of the suggestion.^
In March I88I Granville ceased to give diplomatic 
support to Levy. He had made a final stand by refusing to
Selborne*e Memo, on Enfida Estate question, 11 February 188I; 
copy enclosed in Granville to Lyons, No. 148, Conf., 12 
February I88I; F.O. 146/231I.
^ Lyons to Salisbury,? May 1878 ; Lyons. II, p. 139.
Lyons to Granville, Pte., 11 January I88I; G.D. 29/171,
^ Lyons to Granville, Pte., I8 January 188I; G.D. 29/171.
^ Lyons to Granville, 11 February I88I; Safwat, p.Jll.
^ Lyons to Granville, Pte., 11 February I88I; G.D. 29/171.
6
St. Hilaire a Challemel-Lacour (draft) , I8 février I88I, 
no. 44; Affaires étrangères. 7o9.
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aooept arbitr8.tion as a mode of settlement, after consulting
pilke, who had become extremely anti-French by this time. For
some weeks, Grenville had felt that Anglo-French relations were
2
being seriously imperilled by the Enfida "mess" , and finally 
decided that the game was not worth the candle. The 
departure of the Friedland and the Thunderer from Tunis had been 
a great relief to him. "It would not pay England and France 
to go to war," he told Lyons. "If both ships had remained I 
do not know when they could have left a g a i n . , He was not 
altogether content, however, with his own volte-f_a.ce after so 
many weeks of strenuous effort, and he asked Lyons, "How are we 
to make the most of our submission to the French about Levy?"^ - 
a question which his correspondent appears to have thought best 
left unanswered. It is somewhat ironical that at the end of 
the year, when Granville had come to believe once more in taking 
a firm line with France, he proposed, in an attempt to stop the 
judgement in favour of the Marseilles Company from being carried
g
out,5 that the case should be submitted to arbitration. By 
then, the local courts before which Levy had brought his case 
were virtually in the hands of the French, — a complete
^ Dilke Political Diary, 14 March 1881, B.M. Add. MS, 43934.
^ Granville to Lyons, Pte., 9 February l88l; G.D. 29/202.
^ Granville to Lyons, Pte., 10 February l88l; G.D. 29/202.
^ Ibid., 12 March l88l.
5 St. Hilaire a Challemel-Lacour, 1 décembre l88l, fdraft tel.), 
Affaires étrangères, 793*
^ Granville to Lyons, 2 December l88l, No. 1180, F.O. 146/2341*
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reversal of the situation at the beginning of the year.
11. BRITISH POLICY OVER THE FRENCH OCCUPATION OF TUNIS.
The Enfida case throws light on Granville*s 
subsequent attitude during the French expedition to Tunis. He 
had never felt bound by Salisbury’s assurances to Waddington 
not to oppose French supremacy in Tunis to the same extent as 
some of his colleagues. He supported Levy in order to uphold 
British against French interests. The idea he put forward in 
April 1881 - to join with Italy in threatening war against 
France, his plan to raise the Concert of Europe against the 
French expedition, his proposal of British mediation in J/&y, 
reflected the same attitude he had displayed in the earlier part 
of the year. If he could have secured diplomatic support, he 
was ready to threaten war rather than allow the balance of 
power in the Mediterranean to be upset.
The formulation of policy was not, however, in 
the hands of the Foreign Secretary alone. Nor was it left to 
formal meetings of the Cabinet. It was largely owing to the 
fact that Gladstone and Granville consulted each other, often 
daily, over foreign affairs and that the Prime Minister’s 
influence was one of restraint, that the idea of force was 
abandoned. Northbrook, the First Lord of the Admiralty, also 
tried to exercise a moderating influence. He did not share 
Granville’s fear (to which the Foreign Secretary’s hostility
73
to the establishment of the French protectorate was largely
due^) of Bizerta being developed as a part that would make the
possession of Malta of no account. He refused to be swayed
by the opinion of a naval expert, although Granville found it
convincing. This expert, "a surveying officer of distinction,"
was Admiral Spratt, who in I864 had warned the government
against French designs on Bizerta. Northbrook found this
strategic argument insufficient, and based his views on a code
of international behaviour. "I do not see what riÿit we have,"
he objected, "to interfere with the French in Tunis,
2
especially after the Cyprus episode." Granville remained 
unconvinced, however; the cession of Cyprus, he argued, had 
been carried out by a voluntary transfer of territory;^ the 
case of Tunis was entirely different. Northbrook returned to 
the charge when the Cabinet of 13 May decided to publish 
Salisbury’s despatches of August 1878.4 He felt that the 
assurances contained in them as to the British attitude to the 
Tunisian question .seemed "to cut the ground from under you more 
completely than I supposed possibleC;] .... what you say [in 
communication with the French Government) must be most guarded
^ Granville to Gladstone, 21 April I88I; Granville,op.cit.. II,
p. 235.
^ Northbrook to Granville, Pte., I9 April I88I; G.D. 29/137*
^ Granville to Gladstone, 23 April I88I; Granville. II, p. 234,
4
Dilke Political Diary, 13 May I88I, B.M. Add. MS. 43934-
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and m i l d . L a t e r ,  when the danger of open conflict between
England and France had passed, Northbrook was still advising
caution. He was satisfied with the naval arrangements that
had been made (two British ships only off the coast of Tunis,
no large vessel at Malta, and the main squadron in the upper
Adriatic four or five days* voyage away from Tunis) and thought
that "to send more ships of war to Tunis would look as if we
had it in our minds to help or oppose the French, neither of
2
which is in our programme."
Northbrook and Gladstone were not alone in 
their attempts to guide Granville. During the crisis of April 
to May, the Cabinet was divided. Only after the French 
protectorate had been established was Granville able to give 
France a definitive statement on the British attitude. He 
himself had no comprehensive policy to offer his colleagues. 
Lacking Salisbury’s conception of British obligations over Tunis 
and yet at the same time wishing to avoid the rupture in Anglo- 
French relations that would have been inevitable had Britain 
opposed France alone without European support, it was only as 
the crisis developed that his policy was worked out. His 
instructions to Lyons during April to maintain reserve as to 
the British attitude to the French expedition reflect the
Northbrook to Granville, Pte., 13 May l88l; G.D. 29/137. 
Safwat (p.358 ) wrongly ascribes this letter to Granville’s 
authorship, thereby maintaining that Granville felt bound 
by the Cyprus Convention. This was not the case.
2
Northbrook to Granville, Pte., 2 July I88I; G.D. 29/137.
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hesitations and disagreements that existed in the Government. 
Granville’s own ideas were being re-shaped under the pressure 
of his colleagues.
The indecisiveness of the Government in the 
initial stages of the crisis was emphasized in the reports of 
the French Ambassador. The first news of the fighting between 
the French troops and the Khemirs found the Cabinet devoid of 
any plan of action. When on 5 April Challemel-Lacour met 
Gladstone at a social function and spoke to him about the news 
from Tunis, the Prime Minister assumed complete ignorance and 
said that owing to Granville’s illness he had not known for the 
past ten days what was going on. On the same day the 
Ambassador saw Dilke on his way to the House of Commons to 
reply to questions. The Under-Secretary was characteristically 
free with his confidences, saying that since the Government had 
not yet received information from Lyons nor Reade,he was going 
to give only evasive answers in Parliament as to their 
attitude. Challemel-Lacour concluded that the Cabinet had. not 
decided on their future policy - a fact, he pointed out, which 
ought to give France some advantage.^ After a conversation 
with Granville on 7 April, he came to the conclusion that the 
British government had no intention at the moment of inter­
vening in the crisis, although Granville had betrayed "une 
certaine defiance, sinon un peu d ’aigreur." When the
Challemel-Lacour a St. Hilaire, 5 avril l88l, tél.; 
.Affaires étrangères, 790.
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A/nbassador mentioned Italian intrigues iii Tunis, Granville said 
he had always tried to be impartial with regard to French and 
Italian interests.^ The unsatisfactory nature of his present 
attitude was, the Ambassador felt, partly due to the pro-Italian
p
sentiments of the Cabinet, particularly of the Prime lîinister.
The justice of this analysis was borne out by Granville's threat 
of Anglo-Italian action at the end of April.
• The Foreign Secretary felt frequently obliged to revise
3
his plans. Gladstone was against joint naval action with Italy,
4
and Granville had already decided not to act alone. In Parliament 
the Government disclaimed any intention to intervene unless they 
were asked to do so by both France and Tunis. Granville therefore 
turned to the idea of trying to raise the Gone ert of Europe against 
the French. His plan to secure preliminary help from Austria and
S'
Germany came to nothing, however. This was partly due to the 
refusal of Tenterden (the Permanent Under-Secretary at the Foreign 
Office) and Dilke to co-operate.^ Tenterden had for some time 
been alarmed at the turn of events. He was not happy about the
British ship Monarch having been sent to Tunis ostensibly to 
protect British lives and property, and believing that Reade was
Ghallemel-Lacour a St. Hilaire, 7 avril 1881, no. 31; Doc. diol. 
fr.,1, iii, no. 432.
2
Ghallemel-Lacour a St. Hilaire, 18 avril 1881, no. 34, conf., 
Affaires etranp^eres. 790.
^Paul Knaplund: Gladstone's Foreign Policy (Hew York,1935), p.122. 
^Safwat, p. 360.
Dilke Political Diary, 6 May 1881, BM.Add. MS. 43934.
Ike.op. cit.. p.
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"all on the wrong taok," he suggested that he should be warned
"not to get us into an Imbroglio.
It was not until the Cabinet of 13 the day after
Tunis had signed av;ay her independence by the Treaty of the 
Bardo, that British policy clarified. One subject of discussion 
was the previous government's assurances to France. Salisbury's 
despatch of 7 August 1878 had already been published in the
Times on the instigation of the Quai d!Drsav. It is not known
whether Granville had previously informed his colleagues of 
Salisbury's assurances - to which he of course had had access 
since April 1880. It seems likely that he had done so, although : 
on 16 March 1881 he told Lyons that one member of the Cabinet,
Northbrook, probably did not know or recall Salisbury's assurances j
*  p  I
that "Carthage ne doit pas rester aux Barbares." What had
probably happened was that Granville had mentioned the
Waddington-Salisbury conversations in general terms on some ,
j
previous occasion to the Cabinet, when Northbrook was perhaps | 
absent. On 13 ÎÆay, however, all the relevant despatches of 
July and August 1878, as well as Granville’s despatch to Lyons of 
17 June 1880 pointing out the discrepancy between Waddington's 
account of the Berlin conversations and Salisbury’s subsequent
reservations with regard to Italy, were presented to the Cabinet
3
in the form of a printed memorandum. From English sources
Memo, by Tenterden, 1 Ifety 1881; G.D. 29/193.
^ Granville to Lyons, Pte., 16 Ivlarch 1881; G.D. 29/202.
0
Memo. of 12 îfey; G.D. 29/143.
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little is known of the discussion that followed apart from the 
decision to publish some of Salisbury's despatches, in order to 
show that the freedom of action of the Liberal administration 
had been curtailed by their predecessors. The French Ambassador, 
however, managed to find out what had taken place. The Cabinet, 
he reported, had been held after Lyons's despatch giving the 
main points of the Franco-Tunisian Treaty had been received.
The idea of making some kind of protest,"de reserves, de 
representations," was put forward and discussed. He felt 
certain that if such a protest were made it was to be purely 
f0 rmal.^
This protest was made on 20 May. Her Majesty's 
Government, Granville informed the French Ambassador, could not 
allow St. Hilaire "to remain under the impression that the 
proceedings of the Freiiôh in Tunis have produced a favourable 
effect on public opinion in this country.".. "It can hardly be 
doubted that the Treaty with Tunis goes far beyond any question 
of the security of the frontier, and amounts practically to a
2
Protectorate, which they understood to have been disclaimed." 
Lyons had already been instructed to obtain assurances from 
France about British commercial and other interests \n Tunis, 
and the maintenance of Bizerta as a commercial, non-naval port.
The Cabinet of 13 May had finally given a direction to 
British policy.: Granville was now entirely convinced that no
^ Ghallemel-Lacour a St. Hilaire, 14 mai 1881, no.46%
Affaires étrangères. 791.
 ^A. &P., [1881], XOIX, [0.2887] , Np,6,p.H.
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effective action could or should be taken against France. 
Opposition from his own colleagues, as well as his failure to 
secure diplomatic support owing to Bismarck’s attitude, had 
made him abandon the idea of intervention. Although he himself 
had not felt bound by Salisbury’s policy in 1878, he found that
his own colleagues regarded it as an insuperable objection to
any action beyond the purely formal protest. He tried to allay 
the Queen’s dissatisfaction with his policy by hinting that he 
could not have taken further measures on account of Cyprus.^
He may have genuinely believed in this argument by this time,
since he explained to Lyons that in view of Cyprus and Salisbury^
B
assurances about Tunis, "we could not have been more vigorous.” 
But this was wisdom after the event. Granville had, however, 
stretched his toleration of French expansion in the Mediterranean 
[ , to its limits. After the*l\îay Crisis he concentrated on
' \ obtaining assurances from France with regard to Tripoli. He
believed that both Britain’s strategic interests and the 
maintenance of Anglo-Italian friendship necessitated a firm 
stand against a French advance on Tripoli. He felt that he
could afford to speak plainly in view of his "friendly" attitude
3
over Tunis; something in the nature of a bargain might be 
struck. The Cabinet was almost unanimous in his support. 
Kimber]^, who regarded French activities in the Mediterranean
 ^Queen’s Journal, 17 May 1881; Letters of Queen Victoria, o p . 
oit., II, iii, p. 219.
Granville to Lyons, Pte., 21 I%y 1881; G.D. 29/202.
3
Memo, by Granville, 15 July 1881; G.D. 89/143.
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"with considerable apprehension,” believed in "frankness with
the French now" to "prevent a serious misunderstanding
hereafter.Chamberlain entirely agreed: ’ "If we do object
to the extension of French influence in Tripoli, we should say
2
so before the French are further committed." Only Northbrook 
demurred; bwe rejected the idea that French interference in 
Tripoli would be a blow to the British position in Egypt, and he 
urged that in any case Brtain should adopt an attitude as far as
rz
possible identical with that of the other Powers. Despite
his restraining influence, however, the proposed note to Prance
4
was sent. The answer completely satisfied Granville. The 
British charge d ’affaires in Paris also felt that French 
assurances could be given every confidence.*^
By the autumn, Granville had given up any intention of
opposing the French in their efforts to make the Tunisian
protectorate a reality.^ He told the Italian Ambassador in 
August that it seemed to him personally that it might be 
better "that the French should annex Tunis at once, and that, 
as they had virtually the whole authority in their hards, they 
should also assume the responsibility for its exercise."*^
Cabinet Memo, by Kimberley on a proposed note to France 
concerning Tripoli, 14 July 1881; ibid.
^ Cabinet Memo, by Ohamberlain on the proposed Tripoli note; ibid
 ^ Cabinet Memo. by Northbrook, 15 July 1881; ibid.
^ Vide d ’Aulnay à St. Hilaire, 21 juillet 1881, no. 68;
Affaires étrangères, 792.
 ^Adams to Granville, Pte., 21 July 1881; G.D. 29/175.
 ^ Tenterden to Sanderson, 21 October 1881; F.O. 363/5.
Granville to Macdonnell^, 22 August 1881, No. 357,
Most Confidential; F.o 4 . * ) / 4 A 5.  i
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In November he again put forward this view, remarking that 
"it was not very material whether the French did or did not 
resort to annexation."^
A residue of bitterness in Anglo-French relations 
remained after the Tunisian crisis. Challemel-Lacour had 
felt that the British public was not much concerned about
p
French action, but Grahville did not share his confidence.
The Conservatives had been pc evented from bringing the full 
weight of their denunciation against him only by Salisbury’s 
defence in Parliament of his own policy in 1878. In the 
debate in the House of Lords, the former Foreign Secretary had 
ignored party interests and expressed his belief that the 
Tunisian question should not be allowed to come between England 
and France. But a great deal of ill-feeling lay under the 
surface of the public mind. Granville wished the French 
Foreign Minister to realise that "however anxious we are not to 
squabble about little points.... public opinion will be very 
watchful here, and that it will be absolutely necessary for us 
to pay great attention to each detail." "It would be a bad 
return for the conciliatory attitude we have maintained if the 
French Government multiplied these difficulties. They have 
got what they desired and they should in their own interests, 
avoid as much as possible irritating measures." He hoped that 
Roustan would be recalled, and that France would abandon her
Granville to Page1^ 23 November 1881, No. 469 B; F.O. 45/4^5"^
Challemel-Lacour k St. Hilaire, 18 avril 1881, no. 34,
Affaires étrangères. 790. Ibid., 16 mai 1881, no.47;
ApfairQs étrangères, 791.
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claim to protect Tunisians throughout the Ottoman Empire.^
These remarks were rather in the nature of personal suggestions 
than the expression of a considered policy. After the French 
protectorate was established, Tunis ceased to be a problem, in 
diplomatic relations. No conceivable advantage from the 
British point of view could be derived from opposition to the 
new regime, and after îvüay 1881, Granville was content that a 
particularly unpleasant chapter in Anglo-French relations, should 
be closed. Although he remained mindful of British commercial 
interests in Tunis and intended to safeguard the rights and 
privileges of British subjects, he had no desire to add Tunis to 
the mounting list of difficulties with France. He saw no point 
in questioning the justice of a fait accompli. His new policy 
was therefore one of reserve; so long as the French administered 
their Protectorate with due regard for British interests, he 
would offer no criticism. There were minor problems, such as 
the claims of British subjects for compensâtionjfor damage done 
to property, particularly at Sfax, during the French.bombard­
ments, and the recurring Enfida Estate case. But they were 
all matters of routine negotiation, and did not constitute in 
any sense a rational issue.
12. THE ABOLITION OF BRITISH CONSULAR JUHISDIOTION IN TUNIS.
When France embarked upon th^'modification of the 
Capitulations, however,as Britain had already done in Cyprus,
Granville to Lyons, Pte., 22 June 1881; G.D. 29/202.
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and Austria in Bosnia, the Tunis question again became a 
possible source of diplomatic tension. Granville characteris­
tically postponed an answer to the proposal put forward by the 
French Ambassador on 13 September 1882 that consular 
jurisdiction should be replaced by new French law courts, until 
he had taken legal advice,^ and had consulted the other 
governments concerned. Duclerc, Foreign Minister since August, 
regretted the opportunity consultation would give to Italy.
The relations between England and Frame, he explained to the 
British chargé d ’affaires, were on a very different footing 
from those between France and Italy; he would be very much 
disappointed, ’’if England were not more willing to oblige France 
than Italy would be.’’ He added, somewhat jocularly; "You 
know, we are, and shall continue to be your friends; but, on 
condition that you also do something for us." ^
Despite Granville’s cautious consultation of the other
rz
Powers, the Foreign Office found no reasonable ground for 
opposition to the French proposal. There was no question of 
abandoning the Capitulations as a whole. It had always been 
agreed that consular jurisdiction existed solely to protect 
European residents in Tunis from arbitrary decisions in the 
native courts; it would have ceased to have a raison d ’être
Granville to Plunkett (draft), 13 Sept. 1882, No.1077;
FoO. 102/159.
Duclerc à Tissot, 1 octobre 1882, no. 145; Affaires étrangères.
79 7. Plunkett to Granville, 2 October 1882, No. 1059, Conf.,
(seen by the Queen and Gladstone); F.O.27/2570.
3
The relevant draft despatches are in P.O. 102/159.
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once properly constituted French courts were established.
Granville therefore told the French that he had no objection
1
to their proposal, on the understanding that Britain kept all 
her remaining rights and privileges, commercial and otherwise, 
guaranteed by treaties. He referred to the French assurances 
of 14 and 16 May 1881 regarding British interests in Tunis as
2
"an internat ional engagement binding upon the French Go vernment.".
3
Granville’s answer created an excellent impression in Paris.
"If we can continue to discuss our many difficulties in the same 
friendly spirit," Duclerc told the British charge d ’affaires.
"we shall soon have settled them all.
Although the Italian Ambassador in London put forward 
several objections to the proposed arrangements, Granville was 
not disposed to listen to him. If any real "risks or 
disadvantages" were entailed, he would be willing to discuss then^
R
he said. The Italians tried hard to persuade him that 
Britain and Italy should act together in this matter, but 
without success. Since the Anglo-Tunisian Treaty of 19 July 
1875 had guaranteed to British subjects most-favoured-nation 
treatment and had defined the special privileges of British - 
consuls, Granville believed there could be no substantial
1
Safwat, p. 4a.
 ^ Granville to Plunkett, 16 October 1882, No.1170; F.0.146/2439. 
Copies of this despatch were sent to all British Embassies;
F.O. 102/159.
Plunkett to Granville, Pte., 20 October 1882; G.D.29/175.
^ Plunkett to Granville, 19 October 1882, No.1107, (seen by the 
„ Queen and Gladstone); F.O. 102/159.
Granville to Fraser (draft), 18 October 1882, No. 327, (seen 
by Gladstone);F.O. 102/159.
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objections to the French proposal.^ He refused to encourage
Italian irritability towards France.
From February to May 1883, the conditions on which
Britain would finally accept the new judicial system were being
worked out in London, and it seemed likely that an amicable
settlement would be reached. The only questionable provision
2
in the Bill to establish French jurisdiction seemed to be 
contained in Article II, which provided that the competence of 
the new courts "s’étendra à toutes autres personnes dans les cas 
que détermineront les décrets rendu par Son Altesse le Bey avec
rz
1 ’assentiment du Gouvernement Français." The position of 
consuls under the new régime needed to be clarified, and their 
privileges specifically provided for. The status of "Consuls
in the Levant" had "always been exceptional" and ought not to be
4 1
"impaired unnecessarily by the proposed change." A further 
technical difficulty was mentioned by Reade: as a considerable
amount of British property in Tunis was held under local law, 
the application of French law to property litigation could have
5
created confusion. Granville was anxious not to make 
difficulties with France by asking for an undue number of
^ Minutes by Hertslet and Pauncefote, endorsed by Granville, on  ^
Nigra to Granville, 16 January 1883; Granville to Nigra (draft 
13 February 1883; F.O. 102/159.
 ^ Copy enclosed in Lyons to Granville, 3 February 1883, No.
Il2; F.O. 102/159.
^ Minute by Pauncefote on projet de loi enclosed in Lyons’s 
despatch of 3 February 1883; vide preceding footnote.
^ Minute by Pauncefote on d ’Aulnay to Granville, 10 May 1883;
, F.O. 102/159.
Reade to Granville, 29 March 1883, No.18; F.O.'102/159.
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exceptions to French jurisdiction,^ hut decided to consult the
o
Law Officers to the Grown on the whole matter.
The French were pressing for an answer to their
3
proposals, and several other Powers had already accepted the
abolition of their own consular jurisdiction. alfter Granville
had ascertained the opinion of the Law Officers, he replied to
France in June: the Government would agree to suspend British
consular jurisdiction as soon as they were satisfied on certain
points. Three main subjects needed elucidation: the effect of
the new Laws on the tenure of property, the position of
British-protected subjects, and the position of consular 
4
officers. The French were glad to note that these were all
5
matters on which they could give satisfaction.
At the end of June, however, the tranquil flow of 
negotiation was suddenly impeded. Issues that Granville had 
regarded with detachment now took on a new significance when he 
learned from Reade that in several instances the rights of 
British subjects had been infringed by violent and arbitrary
^ Minute by Granville on d ’Aulnay to Granville, 10 Tvlay 1883;
F.O. 102/159.
^ Minute by Granville on Reade to Granville, 29 March 1883,
No. 18; F.O. 102/159.
^ D ’Aulnay to Granville, 10 May 1883; F.O. 102/159. Granville to 
Lyons, 4 June 1883, No. 569; F.O. 146/2525, Tissot a Ministre 
(bs Affaires étrangères. 4 juin 1883, tél.*. Affaires étrangères, 
800. Granville to Lyons, 12 June 1883, No. 584, Gonf.; F.O. 
146/2525. Tissot 'h Ministre des Affaires étrangères, 12 juin 
1883, tél.; Affaires étrangères/ 800. Lyons to Granville, 13 
June 1883, No. 386; F.O. 102/159.
^ Granville to Tissot (draft), 20 June 1883, with enclosed 
Memo. ; F.O. 102/159.
Lyons to Granville, 27 June 1883, No. 404, (seen by the Queen, 
Gladstone and Dilke); F.O. IO2/159.
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actions on the part of the Tunisian government. Legal cases
had arisen which led him to reconsider the conditions on which
Britain could agree to a new judicial system. Reade, who
seemed to be in continual conflict with the French authorities,
felt that the proposal that consular jurisdiction should be
abandoned was open to the gravest suspicions. The first and
the most serious case he reported was the confiscation and
forcible occupation of land belonging tolajTunisian under British
protection, General Ben Ayad. Reade had managed to obtain
possession of the original title deeds.^ Granville accordingly
2
asked for redress. Reade was anxious that all such pending 
cases between British subjects and the French authorities should 
be settled before consular jurisdiction was abandoned,^ but the 
Foreign Office felt that though an arrangement of this kind 
might well be made, it would hardly be possible to make the 
abolition of British jurisdiction conditional in its acceptance.^ 
Soon after Granville heard about the Ben Ayad affair, however, 
other cases were forced on his attention. One concerned a 
î'üaltese named Mangano, who had been accused of an attack on a 
French soldier, and arrested.^ From the information at his
g Reade to Granville, 19 June 1883, No. 32; F.O. 102/170. 
Granville to Lyons, 27 June 1883, No. 635; F.O. 146/2526.
^ Reade to Granville, 3 July 1883, Cypher tel. No. 12;
^ F.O. 102/160.
Minute by Pauncefote on Reade’s telegram of 3 July; vide 
preceding footnote.
5
Seade to Granville, 9 July 1883, tel.No. 13; 12 July 1883, 
tel. Bo. 14; 13 July 1883, tel. Bo. 15; F.O. 102/160.
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disposal, Granville felt that Lîangano had been wronged, and
he pressed for an immediate enquiry. He hinted that this "gross
infraction of military discipline" had made him revise his
attitude to consular jurisdiction.^ Although Mangano was
2
subsequently released," the incident had created a new problem 
in London, for Granville was determined that before British 
jurisdiction was abolished, French martial law would have to go, 
too. Pauncefote*s letter of 25 July to the Law Officers.makes 
Granville’s attitude clear. In asking for a report on the 
implications of the Mangano case, the Under-Secretary pointed 
out that
"even if martial law should be held to override the 
©x-territorial jurisdiction secured to foreigners in 
the Regency during actual hostilities or resistance to 
the military occupation, the reason of martial lav; has 
now ceased, and its continuance is inconsistent with the 
Establishment of the French protectorate and of French 
Tribunals, and of civil government by the French 
authorities.
If the plea advanced in the present case is admitted 
there seems to be no reason why military jurisdiction 
should not prevail in numerous cases so long as the 
French have troops in Tunis, and, judging from the 
treatment received by I%ngano, the question assumes 
considerable importance.
The Lav; Officers agreed in the raain."^  The charge d ’affaires
in Paris was therefore instructed to tell the French Government
Granville to Lyons, 19 July 1883, No. 704; F.O. 146/2527.
^ Reade to Granville, 19 July 1883, tel.; F.O. 102/160.
^ Pauncefote to Law Officers (draft), 25 July 1883; F.O. 102/151 
^ Law Officers to Granville, 16 August 1883; F.O. 102/151.
89
that Britain would not give up her judicial rights until the
exercise of martial law had been confined to its proper limits.
Since the Ben Ayad and Mangano cases, Granville had
reconsidered his whole policy. He was determined not only that
military jurisdiction should be put on a satisfactory footing,
but that Reade’s plea for the settlement of outstanding cases
should now be allowed, before he gave his consent to the French
proposals. Granville’s usual faith as a Liberal in the
susceptibility of every question to a negotiated settlement
stood him in good stead here. He asked for a list of all
relevant claims by British subjects in Tunis against the French 
2
authorities, and decided that once again the principle of
2
arbitration should be employed. He took the first step 
towards a settlement in pressing for arbitration in the Ben Ayad 
case.^ His hand was strengthened when Reade reported other 
cases in which the rights of British subjects had been infringed.
On 16 November Granville gave the French his final 
answer: British consular jurisdiction would be abandoned on
five conditions, the last two directly related to the recent
Granville to Plunkett, 22 September 1883, No. 918;
F.O. 146/2532.
 ^ Granville to Reade (draft), 5 September 1883, No.14;
 ^F.O. 102/160.
^ Granville to Fraser , 19 September 1883, No. 206,
conf.; F.O.170/33^.
^ Granville to Plunkett, 19 September 1883, No. 902;
F.O. 146/2532.
Reade to Granville, 10 November 1883, tel. No. 25; ibid.,
H  November 1883, tel. No. 26; F.O. 102/150.
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disturbances in Tunis. The reservations were as follows
"First. The right of British subjects to challenge 
assessors in the new courts.
Second. The admission of duly qualified British 
Advocates to practise before the courts,
Without this privilege being limited, as at 
present proposed, to those who are now 
established in Tunis.
Third. The extension to Great Britain of all
privileges reserved to any Bower, in connexion 
with the new system of Jurisdiction in Tunis.
Fourth. The immediate settlement by arbitration, or 
otherwise, of outstanding claims of British 
Subjects in Tunis.
Fifth. The cessation of military Jurisdiction over
British subjects in cases cognizable by the
Civil Tribunals."!
The French demurred to the suggestion of arbitration,
but soon saw that Granville was inflexible on this point. Many
of the minor cases were, as it happened, settled "otherwise" -
by private arrangement. On 29 December Granville’s conditions 
2
were accepted. On the 31st an Order-in-Oouncil was issued 
abolishing British consular jurisdiction in Tunis from 
1 January 1884.^
In lîarch arbitrators were appointed. By ÎÆay they had 
completed their task. Reade took exception to their decision 
in the case of Ben Ayad, complaining to Granville that the 
French had deliberately worked for an adverse judgementlon his
^ Granville to Waddington (draft), 16 November 1883;
F.O. 102/160.
3
 ^ Waddington to Granville, 29 December 1883; F.O. 102/160.
All H.M. Reps, abroad were informed on 31 December 1883; 
draft despatches are in F.O. IO2/I6O.
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claims, that he had been financially ruined, that he feared
for his personal safety, and that he felt obliged to leave
the country.^ Granville’s reply was brief: ’’I M v e  to
observe that General Ben Ayad still enjoys British 
2
protection. ’’ Once again he showed his déterminati on to 
leave dead issues to the past.
^ Reade to Granville, 31 August 1884, Ho. 41, P.O. lOS/lVi.
2
Granville to Reade, 23 September 1884, Ho. 37; P.O. 102-/171.
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C H A P T E R  II
THE m i N  TEN ANGE OF STRATEGIC CONTROL:
The British attitude to French Colonial Activity 
on the Gulf of Aden. 1875 - 1888.
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Britain had abandoned her traditional policy of the 
integrity of Tunis in order to secure French acquiescence in 
the occupation of Cyprus. The ultimate acquisition of Tunis 
by France was part of Salisbury's contribution to the defence 
of British interests in the Near East. Although Granville . 
had at first been unwilling to accept the legacy of his 
predecessor, he had eventually recognised the new order in the 
Mediterranean for the sake of good relations with France.
Neither the Conservatives nor the Liberals, however, were 
disposed to make a similar concession in the case of French . 
territorial ambitions towards the coasts south of the Suez 
Canal. Britain regarded French colonisation both in Tunis and 
on the Gulf of Aden in strategic terms. But whereas Tunis was 
not considered to offset the value of Malta, Britain feared that 
French activities on the Somali Coast might, if unchecked, 
prove a threat to the preponderance she had hitherto enjoyed 
through the possession of Aden.
Long before the opening of the Suez Canal, Britain had 
both a commercial and a strategic interest in the Bed Sea and 
Gulf of Aden. During the sixteenth century European trade with 
the southern coasts of Asia had been largely diverted to the 
Cape of Good Hope route, but the eclipse of Portuguese power in 
the seventeenth century made the ports of the Middle East more _ 
easily accessible to those traders who used the caravan route 
across the Isthmus of Suez from the Mediterranean. Later, with 
the decline of the Ottoman Empire and of the Sultan's ability
■to control hia outlying provinces and hence the anciafc overland
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routes to the East, the Red Sea became an increasingly 
important artery of commerce. In the nineteenth century, 
Britain's determination to suppress the slave trade which 
flourished between the ports of East Africa and Arabia was 
partly due to a desire to protect and foster legitimate trade. 
The strategic interest was of more recent origin. It was an 
immediate consequence of Britain's acquisition of Indian 
territories. Fundamentally it meant ensuring that the 
connection with the East would be maintained even in time of -
war through the maintenance of naval supremacy around the
shores of the whole region between Suez and India, Cas well as 
in the Mediterranean and along the coasts of Africal
• Britain consequently strove for influence on both
the African and Asiatic shores of the Red Sea and Gulf of Aden.
The focus of her, attention was Bab-el-Mandeb, the narrow 
Straits at the southern extremity of the Sea. In 1799 the 
East India Company temporarily gained control of Périra Island.
In 1802 Britain secured a treaty from a local ruler giving her 
harbour facilities at Aden. Subsequent attempts to consolidate 
her influence culminated in the capture of Aden in 1839.
1. BRITISH POLICY TOWARDS THE GULF OF ADEN PRIOR TO 1875.
Until 1839 British interests in the region had been 
primarily external. The occupation of Aden automatically 
created a dual territorial interest, however. First, it 
appeared necessary to prevent other Powers establishing naval 
bases. Secondly, it created a new, though for some years.a 
minor, problem: that of safeguarding Aden's food supplies.
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The infertile Arabian hinterland was incapable of ne eting 
the demand, but on the African coast the nomadic Danakil and 
Somali tribesmen were mainly engaged in stock-rearing, and at 
the chief roadsteads - Zeila, Bulhar, and Berbera, - fresh meat 
could be procured. Thus from the eighteen-forties onwards, 
Britain had a direct interest in the north-east African coast.
The strategic aspect is illustrated by the East India 
Company's treaties of 1840 with the Sultan of Tajourrah and 
the Governor^ of Zeila. Both these dignitaries agreed not to 
enter into treaty relations with foreign powers and ceded 
islands (the îvîussa group and Ivat) which lay off their respective 
territories. ' The second aspect led to a concern with the 
economic potentialities of the Somali hinterland. Two years 
after the capture of Aden Britain signed a Treaty with Shoa, 
one of the eastern states of the loosely knit Kingdom of 
Ethiopia, designed to open up a trade route into the reputedly 
rich interior. A few years later a similar treaty was made 
with Ethiopia itself. But economic penetration was a long­
term policy; until 1854,\when the explorer Richard Burton made 
his first African journey into the Somali hinterland, very 
little was known of Ethiopia; the political and economic 
treaty with Shoa that France had secured as a result of three 
expeditions between 1835 and 1842 had proved abortive. Until 
the 'sixties, when Egyptb hostility towards her southern 
neighbour demanded British intervention in her behalf (which 
led to Napier's punitive expedition of 1867), Britain was 
comparitively little interested in the interior. Indeed, until
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the very end of the nineteenth century when Somaliland was 
opened up - she was preoccupied with the coast. The tendency 
was confirmed by the responsibilities Britain assumed vis-à-vis 
the slave trade. Her role as naval police officer was largely 
responsible for the establishment of a British consulate at 
Massawa in 1849.
On the coast British activity was stimulated by the re­
appearance of France as a rival for influence. When the first 
British representative at Massawa took up his appointment he 
found a French consul already installed. In 1852 there were 
rumours that France intended to seize Obock^although British 
enquiries in Paris produced a firm denial. With the deteriora­
tion of Anglo-French relations after the Crimean War, however, 
France no longer had a diplomatic incentive to refrain from 
action in north-east Africa. A French squadron patrolled 
Bab-el-i%ndeb and a French consular agent for the Somali Coast 
was appointed. These and other moves confirmed Palmerston's 
suspicions that France intended to supplant Britain as the 
dominant Power in the region, and strengthened his opposition 
to the Suez Canal project. Britain started to consolidate her 
territorial interests. She regularised her position at Aden 
by a new local agreement. In 1857 she re-occupied Perim and 
the Mussa islands. She also took Burton's advice that Berbera 
was the key to the Red Sea and made a Treaty of friendship with 
the Habr Awal tribe round that part. This was a new departure 
in that Britain was asserting for the first time a political 
interest on the mainland. France was not lono: in followinq-
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suit. In March 1862 Napoleon III secured from the Sultan of 
Tajourrah a treaty granting territorial rights at Obock. This 
was the origin of French Somaliland.
By the mid-'sixties British influence in the Gulf of 
Aden was still supreme. Obock, with an impressive position 
on the map, was practically worthless as a harbour for large
ships - a fact which the Aden authorities soon discovered. No
1
occupation followed the 1862 concession. Nevertheless the 
treaty had created a precedent for foreign acquisitions, of 
which the Italians soon took advantage. The traditional “•
Palmerstonian policy still held good, however, since it had 
been designed to meet such an eventuality. It had three / :
components: first, unrelenting opposition to any suspected
attempts by foreign powers to acquire suitable positions for 
potential naval bases as distinct from purely commercial 
settlements; secondly, the maintenance of influence over the 
native authorities on both shores of the Gulf; and thirdly, S
resistance to Turkish claims to suzerainty over the Arabian |
shore, in order to safeguard Britain's absolute control of |
Aden: as Edward Hertslet pointed out, if the Sultan's claim J
to sovereignty were admitted at all, "it would include half the g
world, whilst the Pope, on the same ground, could claim a large § 
portion of the remaining half."^
Memo, of 6 March 1874 on "The Turkish claim to Sovereignty 
over the Eastern shores of the Red Sea and the whole of .Arabia," 
F.O. Confidential Print enclosed in Derby to Lyons, 13 April 
1876, No. 354B; F.O. 146/l868.
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The opening of the Sues Oanal made the Bed Sea and the 
Gulf of Aden the life-line between Europe and the East. The 
recent development of the steam ship made Britain's position on 
the Gulf even more important, for after 1869 Aden automatically 
became one of the principal coaling stations of the world.
But Britain did not immediately become as concerned for the 
protection of the short route to India as might have been 
expected. This was partly because the Liberal Government of 
1868-74 did not regard the route, as Miss Hamm has shewn,^ in 
the same light as the Palmerstonian Liberals and the Conserva­
tives who carried on the Palmerstonian tradition; Gladstone 
tended to think more in terms of Britin's responsibilities than 
of her interests, and of European interests rather than of 
British. Hence his indifference to the ofdcially-backed claim 
to Assab Bay put forward by the Italian Rubattino Company in 
1870. It was also due to the disappearance of France as a 
serious rival. Obock had failed,,as a commercial as well as 
a naval venture, and with her defeat in 1871, France seemed 
doomed to years of overseas inactivity. Sheikh Seyd, on the 
Arabian coast, which had been bought by a Frenchman in 1869,was 
officially abandoned two years later.
THE ANGLO-EGYPTIAN CONVENTION OF 1877.
The Conservative Government of 1874-80, however,
1 ,
A. Ramm:"Great Britain and the Planting of Italian Power in 
the Red Sea 1868-1885," English Historical Review,1944. p.213
tm
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accepted the legacy of the past willingly. In a sense a new 
situation confronted Disraeli, in that his administration 
coincided with the Eastern Crisis, which was a measure of the 
internal weakness of the Ottoman Empire. The Conservatives 
believed Russian ambition made it imperative to safeguard the 
Suez Canal route by some other means than the maintenance of 
British influence at Constantinople. The acquisition of a 
place d 'armes in the Eastern Mediterranean was one way. But 
the territory south of Suez rerùained a problem. Although 
Russian activity in the Red Sea was unlikely, there was great 
uncertainty about future ownership of the''African coast. The 
Sultan's rights of suzerainty had become purely formal, and it 
seemed useless to attempt to make Turkish control a reality. 
Between Egypt and Ehtlopia, who were carrying on sporadic 
hostilities in the mid-'seventies, Turkish claims looked like 
being squeezed out altogether. Moreover France had made a 
surprisingly rapid recovery. As early as 1875 she reminded 
th^Khedive of her rights at Obock. In view of Decazes's 
attempted alignment with Russia, it seemed especially necessary 
to take up the cudgels once more against French influence in 
the Gulf of Aden.
Egyptian policy provided Britain with a temporary 
solution to the problem of control. Under Ismail, Egypt had 
made a determined advance southwards. In 1866 Massawa was 
purchased from the Porte, and the administration of Suakin was 
also given into Egyptian hands. By 1870 Egypt had occupied
2eila, Bulhar^ and Berbera^with the proviso that she should
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pay annual tribute to the Sultan. The British decided to 
use this expansionist movement for their own purposes. In 
September 1877 Britain and Egypt signed an agreement, 
conveniently but inaccurately called subsequently the "Somali 
Coast Convention",^ which provided for Egyptian annexation of 
the whole African shore of the Red Sea and the Gulf of Aden 
and beyond to Ras Hafira. British consular agents were to be 
established in this territory. Anglo-Egyptian co-operation 
was thus established. Egypt had already started to administer 
the coast round the Gulf of Tajourrah, and Britain, for her 
part, had in 1876 occupied the island of Socotra. Early in 
1879 Britain attempted to extend the controlled area still 
further by making a treaty with the Mijerteyn Somalis, a tribe 
inhabiting the region immediately south of Ras Hafim.
The Convention required Turkish assent. This was no 
mere legal for&ality. In view of the local chiefs' willingness 
in the past to make over territory to foreign nationals for cash 
down, it appeared highly desirable to put the new status of the 
coast beyond dispute. Moreover, the work of British consular 
supervision might have been hampered by the necessity of 
reference to Constantinople where quick decisions had to be 
made. But although the Sultan agreed that Egypt should be 
responsible for administration, no amount of pressure would 
induce the Porte to give up Turkish claims to suzerainty by
^ The Somali Coast was only part of the coastal territory 
provided for in the agreement.
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ratifying the Convention. In üeu of ratification (which was 
never granted) Britain asked for an undertaking from the Sultan 
not to alienate any portion of the African coast or that part 
of the Asiatic shore under his suzerainty to any foreign Power 
other than Egypt.^ As usual, only a vague response was 
forthcoming. After 1877, then, Egypt occupied and administered 
the African coast of the Red Sea and of the Gulf of Aden, hut 
did not have sovereign rights.
Salisbury, who became Foreign Secretary a few months 
after the Convention was signed, saw Britain's interests in 
straightforward terms of strategy, and not in rivalry with any' 
particular Power. In this he departed from the Palmerstonian 
tradition of special watchfulness against France. He tried to 
balance strategic with diplomatic considerations,and to make 
purely colonial issues subordinate to European. - He was 
particularly-anxious not to aggravate overseas diffecences with 
the French. Happily, despite renewed reports of foreign 
movements round the Gulf of Tajourrah, the pabential danger to 
British influence from French activities now seemed negligible.
So far, every French attempt to secure a.permanent foothold on 
the Coast had failed. But France was not the only Power with 
overseas ambitions. Siic e her attainment of nationhood, Italy 
had revealed a growing interest, which was as much strategic as
1
Salisbury to Bayard, 8 July 1879, tel. 145; vide draft of 
extending despatch No. 875 in P.O. 78/3191.
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colonial,in the Red Sea. Salisbury's determinate on to 
safeguard British interests resulted in his warning to the 
Italian Government about their future use of As sab Bay after 
the Rubattino Company had established a post there in January 
188Ô. His warning was significant in that the Italians had 
acted at a time when Britain was beginning to doubt the efficacy 
of the Anglo-Egyptian Convention. General Gordon's Governor- 
Generalship of Egypt's southern provinces had been recently 
ended by the new Khedive. This fact and the political weakness 
of Egypt made the maintenance of Egyptian control over the Coast 
seem more precarious than it had a few years before. Gordon 
felt the Convention had been a mistake and that Egypt should no 
longer be allowed to administer the Coast. Salisbury did not 
agree, believing that British influence would become stronger as 
Egyptian power waned - provided other Powers were excluded.
3. THE GRO'/üTH OP ANGLO-FRENCH ANTAGONISM, 1880-3.
When the Liberals returned to power in 1880, there was 
no immediate break with Conservative policy. In June and in the 
following January, Granville repeated to Italy the arguments 
Salisbury had used against the establishment of a naval station 
at As s a b T h e r e  was no return to the complacency the Liberals 
had displayed during their previous term of office. But during 
1881 British policy turned in a new direction: Granville's
attitude to the Gulf of Aden became pro-Italian and at the same
^ Ramm; E.H.R. 1944, op.cit., p.221.
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time anti-Prenoh.
The new departure owed something to local developments. 
With Jules Perry in power from September 1880 Prance became 
increasingly active overseas. At Obock, a 'commercial 
establishment' was set up with secret government backing.^ 
Although it consisted merely of two houses in a sandy waste 
near a few herdsmen's dwellings, it was a symbol rather than a 
measure of French determination to gain influence in the area. 
Subsequent visits by French cruisers, including a five days' 
stay in the autumn of 1880,^ rather belied the Journal Officie^Vs 
announcement of 25 December that firms setting up at Obock did 
so on their own responsibility because the precise extent of the 
1862 concession was not clear. A few months later, there were 
rumours in Aden that Obock was to be a coaling station for the 
Messageries Maritimes when the new line between France and
4
Australia had been opened in February 1882.’ Other minor 
indications of French policy included the attempt made by the 
Vice-Consul at Zeila to install a notorious, but pro-French,slave- 
dealer, Abu Bekr Pasha, as Governor in the pPace of Egyptian 
and British opposition,^ and a scheme to erect a lighthouse at 
the highly strategic point of Cape Guardafui. Far more
^ India Office to Foreign Offioe, 1 October 1880; F.O. 78/3193. ■
o ^
Letters from Admiralty to Foreign Office (copies) enclosed in ■ 
Granville to Lyons, 5 February 1881, No. 113; F.O. 146/2310. |
® Ibid.
British Resident at Aden to Secretary of the Bombay Government,' 
23 May 1881 (copy), enclosed in India Office to Foreign Office,'’ 
8 July 1881, F.O. 78/3305.
® Granville to Lyons, 30 October 1880, Ro. 853; F.O. 146/2730.
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disturbing to the British, however, was the news that an 
expedition, nominally a commercial one, had left Marseilles in 
the hope of extending French claims over the coast west of Obock 
towards Ghubbet Kharab. Wiereas Obock with its exposed road­
stead was useless as a port for several months in the year, 
Ghubbet Kharab was an enormous natural harbour with deep water 
where "the whole fleet of England ten times over could anchor to 
the shore... No fleet in the world could disturb ships, stores, 
and coal depots when once they were collected in the basin. 
Granville at once asked the British Ambassador in Paris to find 
out what he could about the intentions of the French Government. 
Whatever her immediate aims were, France evidently had a settled 
policy - to build up her influence round Bab-el-Mandeb so that 
she would ultimately command a position rivalling Aden in 
strategic importance. Her recent coup in Tunis underlined the 
reality of her colonial ambitions.
Italian activities were regarded by Granville as 
comparatively harmless. Since Britain's representations to 
Italy, an independent report had shown Assab Bay to be 
surrounded by marsh and hemmed in by mountainous infertile
Gapt. G. îvlalcolm (formerly Chief of Police employed by the 
Egyptian Government in suppressing the Slave Trade in the Red 
Sea) to Adml. Sir Alexander Milne, 19 September 1881, Foreign 
Office Confidential Print, Section 41; F.O. 78/3497.
2
Granville to Lyons (draft), 18 Ootober 1881, Slave Trade 
Ho. 39, Confidential; P.O. 84/1589.
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country, while the harbour itself was not ideal.^ To 
Granville, this was important. By temperament he was interest­
ed more in existing facts and probabilities than in future 
contingencies. He liked to be guided by information rather 
than by theories. Policy, however, deals with the future,not 
with the present, and Britain's position vis-à-vis other Powers 
in the Bed Sea and Gulf of Aden was a matter of broad policy — 
which concerned not only the Foreign Secretary but the whole 
Cabinet. Several Ministers disagreed with Granville. Nor 
were his own subordinates at the Foreign Office inclined to 
break with Salisbury's policy of resisting foreign colonisation.
Tenterden in particular was against tacitly acquiescing in
2
Italy's assumption of authority round Assab Bay. But as early 
as August 1881, Granville had already decided not to make a 
stand against Italy. % e n  the Egyptians sent a ship to 
investigate Italian activities at Raheita and the Indian
Secretary urged him to support Egypt, unless he was prepared to
3 4see Italian influence spread, he refused to act. ^
There were other reasons for Granville's decision. He
was greatly, influenced by Gladstone's pro-Italian sympathies,
 ^ Capt. Malcolm to Sir A. Milne, 19 September 1881, F.O. Conf. 
Print; F.O. 78/3497.
 ^Ramm: E.H.H. , 1944, p. 220.
 ^Hartington to Granville, Pte., 29 August 1881; G.D. 29/131.
^ Granville to Hartington, Pte., 31 August *1881; G.D. 2^131.
/■ .
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Which, in the context of Franco-Italian colonial rivalry,
necessarily implied an anti-French bias. His own methods in
foreign policy had à great deal to do with his support of Italy.
Rather less concerned than his predecessor with the protection
of the Red Sea route, he was also far less inclined to tackle j
problems radically. He was content, as Salisbury had not been, ;
•1
to accept the fact of foreign settlements and to make the best 
of an existing situation. Thus he resolved to support the
I
Power who appeared less dangerous. Inevitably he became , I
opposed to France.
One of the most important factors in the development of  ^ Î 
Liberal policy, was the Egyptian situation. The disorders and 
political uncertainty that had become a permanent feature of 'j
Tewfik's reign since 1879 weakened the Khedive's authority in 
the southern provinces. In September 1881 came the first 
serious nationalist demonstration in Egypt. A month before, 
the Mahdi had proclaimed himself saviour and leader of the 
Sudanese. Expeditions were sent against him, but without 
success. With the Ethiopian-Egyptian frontier still a matter 
of dispute, (Ethiopia still claimed suzerainty over a vast 
region stretching eastwards to the coast itself,) and with the 
Mahdi's influence spreading rapidly among the nomadic tribes, 
the eastern seaboard began to be in danger of passing out of" 
effective Egyptian control. As yet, the danger was remote.
The Mahdi's military advance had hardly begun. But to the 
British there was another, more pressing problem: that France
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might use the growing hostility of the tribes towards Egypt 
to improve her own position. If she were, to link Obock with 
Earrar and the interior, French, not British, political 
influence might fill the vacuum left by Egypt on the African 
side of the straits - in spite of the consular commission for 
the Somali Goast recently entrusted to the Aden Residency.
The long tradition of French 'intrigue' in Ethiopia lent colour 
to the idea. As recently as 1877 the French Consul at Massawa 
had assumed the right to forbid Europeans wishing to travel to 
Ethiopia to do so without his personal authorisation - a 
proceeding which had called for a British representation in 
Paris.^ Moreover France had never explicitly recognised 
Egyptian authority over the Somali Goast. In 1873 at the time 
of Bartle Frere's Mission-to Zanzibar there was some evidence 
that she had tried to push the Sultan of Zanzibar's vague claims 
to suzerainty over the Goast in the hope of being rewarded with 
a port, perhaps Berbera. Since the Anglo-Egyptian Convention 
of 1877 she appeared to have been counting on Ethiopian and 
local animosity to Egypt.
This at any rate was the theory advanced by Captain 
Malcolm, a man with considerable experience of Somali Goast 
affairs, and the source of Granville's information about French 
designs on Ghubbet Kharab. Granville and Northbrook had been 
impressed with his views, and later asked him for a full report
 ^ Derby to Lyons, 28 June 1877, Ho. 389; F.O. 146/1957.
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On the looal situation, with particular reference to the slave 
trade. The latter had an obvious bearing on Egypt's position: 
if Britain demanded more rigorous suppression, the slave-dealing 
Sheikhs would become more hostile to Anglo-Egyptian authority.
The course of action Malcolm advocated was therefore adopted.
"We should," he told the First Lord of the Admiralty, "confine 
ourselves principally to our own active repressive measures on 
the sea, and through our Consular and other friendly agencies 
try to strengthen Egypt's commercial and naval position, and do 
our utmost to bring about a reconciliation with Abyssinia.” If 
not, if the Egyptians were unable to hold their own, other 
Powers "first and foremost... the French," would step into the 
breach.^
In considering the causes of the new anti-French trend 
in British policy on the Coast, an underlying element of discord 
between England and France must be mentioned: the growing
divergence between the two countries over Egypt itself. Whereas 
the Anglo-Italian alignment in Egyptian affairs gave Granville 
a diplomatic incentive to be amenable to Italian ambition in the 
Red Sea, the deterioration of Anglo-French relations m de him 
increasingly ready to assess French colonisation, on the Gulf 
of Aden as elsewhere, in terms of local British interests alone.
^ "Report on the supression of the Slave Trade in the North­
east of Africa, the Soudan, and the Coast Provinces of Egypt in 
the Red Sea and Gulf of Aden, considered from a Political and 
Commercial point of view," enclosed in îÆalcolm to Northbrook,
8 November 1881, F.O. Print, Section 41; F.O. 78/3497.
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The tendency became marked after the British occupation of
Egypt in 1882, with the breakdown of the Anglo-French entente
and with the simultaneous Franco-German rapprochement : colonial
differences between Britain and France were magnified out of
proportion to their real importance because neither country
saw any diplomatic advantage in making concessions. As early
as 1881, however, the reason Granville gave, the Indian Secretary
for not opposing Italian activities round Assab Bay was that
'Gladstone's policy' was against France.^
By the end of 1881 these various considerations had
become so firmly established as the basis of British policy over
the Somali Goast that Granville did not for once accept the
views of the British Ambassador in Paris, who regarded French
activities in a rather different light. Lyons was not much
impressed with the arguments advanced by Captain %lcolm. He
habitually tended to minimise the French Government's part in
colonial ventures, and to attribute French activity to the
"petty patriotism" of local officials. He pointed out that
2
Obock had not so far proved a very successful acquisition.
This was indeed true, and a few weeks later the three French 
firms there withdrew. The expedition toGhubbet Kharab turned 
out to be purely exploratory. But Granville did not believe 
France would remain inactive for long.
^ Granville to Hartington, Pte., 31 August 1881; G.D* 29/131.
2
Lyons to Granville, 29 November 1881, Slave Trade No. 37; 
F.O. 84/1589.
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He was soon justified. The French now' started to
examine the possibilities of expansion northwards from Obock
towards the straits. In February 1882 it was known that Paul
Soleillet, the explorer, who was the chief representative of
one of the Obock firms, had gone to the Sebah Islands, nine
miles south-west of Perim. A French paper published in
Alexandria brought out an article (entitled "Que le sort le
favorise.'") implying that the islands were already French
territory on the ground that the 1862 concession extended from
Tajourrah to as far as Ras Dumeirah.^ The British did not
believe that France could claim this long stretch of coast; that
it was not included in the concession seemed to have been
practically admitted by the Journal Officiel's warning about the
uncertainty that existed with regard to the boundaries of Obock
2
in December 1880. But since the terms of the original grant of
»
land were not known, Granville was careful not to recognise 
Obock itself as French territory. On 3 March the government 
reply to a question in the House of Gommons alluded simply to 
the French "claim." France at once declared that Obock had long 
been a French possession. While not explici% denying this, 
Granville referred to Egypt's repudiation of the French claim
^ Malet (Cairo) to Granville, 8 February 1882, No. 58 Political; 
F.O. 78/3496.
2
Memorandum by Hertslet on "Isles of Sebah," 22 February 1882; 
F.O. 78/3496.
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and also tried to elicit from the French Ambassador a definite 
statement on the extent of the concession.^
Although discussions of this kind were hardly an 
adequate way of preventing French action, the practical steps 
to be taken were less obvious. The Permanent Under-Secretary 
at the Foreign Office felt that the Navy should at least 
investigate what was going on.^ The First Lord of the Admiralty, 
however, adopted a 'live and let live' attitude, as he had done
g
over Tunis. It is not surprising that Hartington, in view 
of his earlier concern for British interests over Assab Bay, 
disagreed with Northbrook. He believed that a French 
occupation of the Sebah Islands and the mainland to the west
4
would undermine Britain's position at Perim. Two constructive 
suggestions were put forward. One was that Britain should 
again try to get the Porte to give effect to the Anglo-Egyptian 
Oohvention of 1877.^ The other was that Britain should re- 
occupy the islands of Mussa and Ivat in order to "neutralize to 
a great extent the French possessions both at Obokh and Sebah.^
Granville to Waddington (draft), 10 I,larch 1882; F.O. 78/3496.
 ^Minute by Tenterden, 6 March 1882, on Admiralty to Foreign 
Office, 4 March 1882; F.O. 78/3496.
^ Admiralty to Foreign Office, 4 March 1882, Confidential;
F.O. 78/3496.
India Office to Foreign Office, 13 March 1882, Confidential; 
F.O. 78/3496.
^ Ibid.
 ^Memorandum by Hertslet on "French and Italian designs in the 
Red Sea and its immediate neighbourhood," 6 March 1882; printed 
copy enclosed in Granville to Lyons, 16 March 1882, No. 282 
Confidential, F.O. 146/2415.
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In a sense the two ideas were contradictory. Egypt had never
recognised the natives' cession of the islands to Britain in
1840, and had in 1873 asked the British to withdraw if the
French would also give up Obock. Derby had been quite willing
to do so, with or without the relinquishment of Obock, but as
the Government of India had demurred, the matter had been
dropped. From the Egyptian point of view, ratification of the
Anglo-Egyptian Convention would have invalidated British claims
altogether. A case for re-occupation could have been made out,
however, either on the basis of the cession having been many
years before Egypt had authority over the area, or, alternatively]
on the vagueness of the Convention, which could have been
interpreted as relating solely to the mainland. But Granville I
was warned from Paris against an occupation which might serve '
1
only as an encouragement to France. This time Lyons's advice 
was accepted, for if Britain-had occupied the islands in the 
face of Egyptian opposition, she could not have rejected French
I
claims on the only ground open to her, namely that they were an '
infringement of Egyptian authority. Later, Granville was told
that the islands had no good harbours and were surrounded by
2
dangerous reefs. He had already decided that he would in any 
case try to make Egyptian authority absolute by adopting the
^ Lyons to Granville, 7 April 1882, No. 294, Very confidential; 
g F.O. 78/3497.
War Office to Foreign Office, 14 July 1882, Confidential;
F.O. 78/3497.
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other course proposed to him.
Ratification of the Anglo-Egyptian Convention seemed
all the more desirable in view of developments at Obock itself.
The place was no longer deserted. Soleillet had returned, a
new company with a capital of 2,000,000 francs was setting up
there, and a staff had arrived with a cargo of guns and
ammunition for Shoa. A steamship service with other ports in
the Gulf of Aden had been established.^ The Paris Press was
again putting forward the possibility of a coaling station 
2
being made. About the same time Granville-telegraphed 
instructions to Constantinople that the Porte should be urged
ri
to give "immediate effect" to the Anglo-Egyptian Convention.
The question of Sheikh Seyd which had recently come up
4
again contributed to the sense of urgency. Franco-Turkish 
conversations on a possible French re-occupation probably owed 
more to Turkish than to French instigation, in that the Porte 
was evidently trying to play off France against Britain on the 
Arabian Coast; but it seemed likely that the French would try 
to use Turkish jealousy of Britain's position at Aden and Perim
^ Menabrea to Granville, 15 î.îarch 1882, privee et confidentielle;
2 F.O. 78/3496.
Vide Memo, by Hertslet on "French Movements in the Persian 
Gulf... [and in the Gulf of Aden]," 21 March 1882;F.0.78/3496.
^ Granville to Dufferin (draft), 21 March 1882, tel.80;F.0.78/3496 , 
^ Granville to Dufferin (draft), 11 March 1882, tel. 74; F.O. 78/3496.
^ Dufferin to Granville, 12 î-,larch 1882, tel. 51; ibid., 14 
% r c h  1882, No. 187 Confidential; F.O. 78/3497.
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to secure permission to enlarge the concession obtained in 1869. 
Again opinions in London varied. Northbrook regarded a 
potential French base on the Arabian side of the straits as of 
negligible strategic importance. But Hartington recalled the 
1877 Aden Defence Committee's recommendation that the Govern­
ment should purchase Sheikh Seyd, and believed the present 
danger to British interests was considerable.^ Childers, the 
Secretary of State for War, on the other hand, believed that' 
Sheikh Seyd itself was of little value as a port, but urged
Granville to prevent the French from extending their concession
2southwards to the coast opposite .Perim. Granville did not 
wish, however, to become involved in recriminations with France 
over a purely theoretical contingency. His decision to 'wait 
and see' was wise, for after a few months of investigation the 
French lost interest in the place. But Britain profited from 
the warning. She started to consolidate her position at Aden, 
and before the end of the year bought Sheikh 'Othman, a few 
miles north of the port, from the Sultan of Lahaj.
Granville was still waiting for a definite reply from 
the Porte about the Anglo-Egyptian Convention when in November 
1882 there were renewed Press reports about the indefatigable 
M. Soleillet. Malcolm's warnings of a year before about French 
plans to move westwards from Obock seemed to be vindicated.
India Office to Foreign Office, 18 April 1882, Secret;
2 F.O. 78/3497.
War Office to Foreign Office, 14 July 1882, Confidential;
F.O. 78/3497.
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After a question had been asked in Parliament as to whether
Soleillet had acquired Tajourrah, it was discovered that he had
actually hoisted the French flag at Sagullo, a harbour a few
miles outside Ghubbet Kharab.^ Before being ejected by the
2
Governor of Zeila, the nearest Egyptian authority, he had 
managed to persuade the local sheikh to grant him a small tract 
of land "for trading purposes."^ T^he British Consul for the 
Somali Coast believed that he was acting entirely on his own 
account and that French local officials rather frowned on his 
activities/ Although this rather trivial affair did not seem
4
to call for any British representation to the French Government, 
the fact remained that foreign settlements round the Bed Sea 
were apt to grow from very small beginnings. Assab had 
started in the same ostensibly commercial way, and the British 
had no doubt that when Soleillet had sufficiently developed the 
concession his Government would step in and claim it as part of 
Obock. The answer to such activities was obvious: Egypt
should have greater control over the tribes. Egypt might be 
advised, for instance, to enlarge her garrison at Zeila so that
^ Major Hunter (British Consul for the Somali Coast) to Sir E. 
I'lalet, 27 November 1882, No. 44 (copy), enclosed in Ivlalet to 
Granville, 7 December 1882, No. 876, F.O. 78/3497.
^ Dufferin to Granville, 4 December 1882, tel.36; F.O, 78/3497.
^ Malet to Granville, 7 December 1882, No.877 Political;
F.O. 78/3497.
^ F.O. minute on Malet to Granville, 7 December 1882, No. 877 
Political; F.O. 78/3497.
 ^F.O. Memo, by Bertie on "The French on the Somali Coast,"
22 December 1882; F.O. 78/3497.
114
troops would be more easily available to prevent infringement
of her rights round Ghubbet Kharab. No foreign Power,
Hartington urged, should be allowed to acquire territory "by
purchase or otherwise from the local sheikhs" on that part of 
2
the coast. Soon afterwards Granville again pressed the Porte 
to ratify the Anglo-Egyptian Convention.
By 1883, however, it seemed hopeless to expect the
4
Sultan to exert himself. Granville was now at a loss for a 
new formula against French activities. He got no help from 
Cairo, beyond a suggestion that Egypt should send a cruiser to
5
the Gulf of Tajourrah. Sagullo was subsequently occupied by 
Egyptian troops.^ Meanwhile yet another French firm was about
7
to take over from the Obock company,which was now in liquidation. 
With this in mind, Granville discouraged Egypt from proceeding 
further with the proposed convention recognising Italian rights 
at Assab since such an agreement might have led "other countries 
to apply for a formal recognition of so-called acquisitions of
^ F.O. minute on Malet to Granville, 7 December 1882, No. 877 
Political; F.O. 78/3497.
India Office to Foreign Office, 28 November 1882, Confidential; 
F.O. 78/3497.
^ Granville to %ndham (draft), 30 December 1882, No. 723;
F.O. 78/3497.
^ Dufferin to Granville, 15 January 1883, No. 19; F.O. 78/3725.
^ Granville to Dufferin (draft), 30 December 1882, No.68; F.O. 
78/3497. Dufferin to Granville, 15 January 1883, No. 19;
F.O. 78/3725.
 ^Malet to Granville, 28 February 1883, No. 67; F.O. 78/3725.
India Office to Foreign Office, 8 February 1883; F.O. 78/3725.
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territory within the limits of Egyptian jurisdiction."^ A 
year before, in February 1888, he had made it clear to Italy that 
he approved her establishment on the Bed Sea. Taoit encourage­
ment of Italian ambitions as a counter-weight to those of France, 
and firm support of Egyptian authority on the Somali Goast - 
these seemed to be the only possible policies for Britain at the 
moment.
4. THE ANGLO- EGYPT IAN-ETÈIOP IAN AGREEMENT OF JUNE 1884.
Apart from their naval and strategic implications,French 
activities on the Coast had another aspect which was of concern 
to Britain - their potential effect on the political situation in 
north-east Africa. Two developments now made Granville turn to 
this question. One was the rapid deterioration of Egypt's 
position in the Sudan - soon to lead to the rout of Hicks Pasha's 
forces at El Obeid - which made any disturbances in the coastal 
provinces particularly dangerous from a military point of view.
The other was the Undoubted interest of France in penetrating 
from Obock into the interior, and perhaps in ultimately gaining 
control over Ethiopia. There were persistent reports of arms
p
having been sent from Obock to King Menelek of Shoa, who. for - 
some years had been trying to extend his power at the expense 
Of his suzerain^ the Negus. Early in 1883 Soleillet obtained
g
a concession from the King for a railway into the interior.
^ Granville to Dufferin (draft), 9 % r o h  1880, Ho. 66:
F.O. 78/0725.
India Office to Foreign Office, 4 April 1883; F.O. 78/3725.
® Cartwright (Cairo) to Granville, 14 Anril 1883, Ho. 114; 
F.O. 78/3725.
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The British regarded the traffic in arms as serious, partly
because it would, smooth the way for French penetration towards
Ethiopia, but also because it would weaken Egyptian control
over the coastal tribes. For this reason Granville was as
much against Italian as French attempts to gain influence over
Shoa, and he opposed a scheme to send a consignment of guns to
1
Menelek from Assab. The answer to foreign intrigue with
Shoa was obviously an international agreement prohibiting the 
import of arms, but Granville soon discovered that this would 
have been a hopeless proposition at the moment. He would 
probably have had to contend with domestic opposition from
I
vested interests, too. Instead Granville decided to combat 
French activities by strengthening British influence over the 
Hegus, and by trying, as Ivtalcolm had urged eighteen months 
before, to improve relations between Ethiopia and Egypt. Such 
a policy would not only enable the Hegus to deal more forcefully 
with Shoa, but would remove the danger of an Ethiopian attack on 
the Bed Sea ports, which had seemed likely since the Ethiopian 
raid on î-îassawa in liar ch.
It was not until 1884, that Granville was given his 
chance; Britain had to evacuate Egyptian forces from the Sudan 
through Ethiopian territory. In March Admiral Hewett, Flag 
Officer of the Red Sea Fleet, was sent on a special mission to
^ Higra to Granville, 11 July 1883, Oonfidential; Granville to 
Higra (draft), 28 Jky^ist 1883; F.O. 78/3725.
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the Hegus. His instructions covered not'only the transit of 
troops but also all Ethiopian differences with Egypt - which 
were to be referred to Britain.^ The French tried to forestall
p
Hewett by sending a Mission to Adowa," but the British arrived
first. A day before the French envoy^s audience with the
Hegus, an Anglo-Ethiopian treaty of friendship was signed.
With the aid of a liberal distribution of presents - including
4
rifles, revolvers,and ammunition,- to the Court, Hewett secured, 
on 3 June, a tripartite agreement establishing peace between 
Ethiopia and Egypt. He sent home a triumphant telegram:
"[King] John will do anything British Government want. He says
5
he can never forget it is to Great Britain he owes tlirone.”
For some years to come, British influence in Ethiopia was 
supreme*
5. BRITAIH DECIDES TO ACQUIESCE IH THE FREHGH POSIT10H AT 
030OK, 1883-4.
By the summer of 1883, Granville had still not found a
way of stabilising the situation on the Coast. The French
were trying to consolidate their position at Obock and now
claimed that the 1862 concession had included a seaboard seventy
Granville to Baring (draft), 8 March 1884, tel. 133;
F.O. 78/3725.
^ Baring to Granville, 9 March 1884, tel. 207; F.O. 78/3725.
^ Maurouard (in charge of French Consulate in Cairo) to Barrere 
(then in Paris), 23 June 1884, (transmitting correspondence 
from Adowa), Doc, dipl. fr., I,v, no. 320, pp. 335-6. 
Rear-Admiral Hewett to Granville, 9 June 1884, F.O. 1/31.
 ^Hewett to Admiralty, 16 June 1884; @opy enclosed in Granville 
to Lyons, 18 June 1884, Ho. 544, F.O. 146/2617.
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miles long - from Obock to Tajourrah, As a demonstration the 
French flag was hoisted at Alatela where the Turkish flag had 
hitherto flown. The Egyptian Government, who went in constant 
fear of Turkish displeasure, thought the status quo should be 
restored at once, if necessary by force.^ This was not
considered advisable because it would probably have brought 
the French Government to the defence of the Obock company.^ It 
seemed better to treat the dispute as one between a private 
firm and Egyptian authority. Egypt was therefore advised to 
ask for a copy of the French title deeds, and to make only a 
verbal protest against the violation of Turkish rights.^ 
Arrangements were accordingly made that the disputed territory 
should be left unoccupied pending .discussions in Oairo.^ Egypt 
now wanted to come to terms quickly, and was willing to recognise 
Alatela as belonging to Obock, without reference to the alleged 
seventy-mile concession.^ But to have conceded Alatela would 
have been to recognise the partial validity of the' wider French 
claim. It seemed preferable to decide once and for all exactly . 
what the terras of the 1862 concession had been and then to ensure 
that France kept within the specified limits.^ Granville
1 Baring to Granville, 21 October 1883, Ho. 468 Political, 
Confidential; F.O. 78/3725.
Minute by Bertie, 23 Hovember 1883, on India Office to Foreign 
Office, 22 November 1883; F.O. 78/3725.
 ^Minutes by Bertie and Pauncefote on India Office to Foreign 
Office, 22 November 1883; F.O. 78/3725.
^ Granville to Baring (draft), 3 December 1883, No. 312,
^ Confidential; F.O. 78/3725.
. Baring to Granville, 9 January 1884, tel.25; F.O. 78/3725. 
y Baring to Granville, 3 February 1884, tel. 78; F.O. 78/3725. 
Granville to Baring (draft), 5 February 1884, tel. 59; Foreign 
Cffice to India Office (draft), 8 February 1884; F.O.78/3725.
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discovered^however, that the convention had not only granted the 
coast as far as Tajourrah hut had given the French the option of 
taking Ghuhbet Kharab, or an alternative unnamôd harbour, if 
Obock did not provide suitable facilities for large ships,^ The 
Indian Secretary advised him to get Egyptian authority asserted
p
at once over Ghubbet Kharab.
There was no evidence, however, that France intended to 
take advantage of the terms of the original contract. The semi­
official French Press made a great deal of Obock as a valuable 
harbour, and the local company had been making plans for a 
coaling station that would serve French warships bound for the 
Far East, since A&en had been temporarily closed to them during 
Franco-CJhinese hostilities. Egypt had never recognised French 
claims even to Obock itself, and her garrison at Tajourrah now 
stood between the French and Ghubbet Kharab. Britain had been 
careful not to admit that the French Government as distinct from 
French private individuals had any rights to the Obock concession; 
as recently as 3 February a Government spokesman in the House of 
Commons had said that Her % jesty's Government were "not aware" 
of any "claim" to Obock on the part of the French Governmento 
Thus even if France had openly supported an advance on Ghubbet 
Kharab and had supplied the necessary troops to the Obock firm, 
Granville would have been free to have invoked Egyptian rights.
^ Baring to Granville, 9 February 1884, Ho. 154 Political;
F.O. 78/3725.
India Office to Foreign Office, 5 March 1884; F.O. 78/3725.
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Egypt could legitimately have claimed British armed assistance 
in this case, since the British Fleet had recently been given 
instructions, issued after the debacle in the Sudan, to protect 
all Egyptian ports.in the Sea and Gulf of Aden. It there­
fore seemed unlikely that in present circumstances France would 
try to acquire Ghubbet Kharab, and the Foreign Office felt that 
^no useful purpose' would be served by the presence of Egyptian 
troops.^
Quite apart from this question of French extension, by
îiÆarch 1884 Granville's attitude to the position of France at
Obock had changed. Hardly any progress had been nade towards
a permanent French settlement that would eventually rival Aden
in commercial and naval importance. Instead of a flourishing
port, there were only a few traders who went in constant fear of
native attacks on their stores and lived behind stout walls.
Their principal commercial achievement had been to utilize the
caravan routes into the hinterland for a trade in hides and 
3
ivory. Their recent negotiations with the Aden Goal Company 
about setting up a branch depot at Obock were now known to have 
tailed.^ But even if the French Government provided funds for 
development, the one argument Britain could have used against
^ I.Unute by Bertie, 5 I%rch 1884, on India Office to Foreign 
Office, 5 ÎÆarch 1884; F.O. 78/3725.
 ^Malet to Granville, 28 February 1883, Ho.67, enclosing copy 
Of a report on Obock by Capt. Dowding of H.M.S. Osprey:
F.O. 78/3725.
2 India Office to Foreign Office, 3 August 1883; F.O. 78/3725. 
Admiralty to Foreign Office, 19 lüarch 1884;, F.O. 78/3725.
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the creation of a naval base - Egyptian authority - was about 
to become invalid. In January Britain had decided that the 
Sudan should be evacuated and afterwards the Cabinet had agreed 
that Egyptian authority over the coastal provinces should be 
ended as well. This meant that the Somali Coast would 
subsequently revert to nominal Turkish control. The French 
treaty of 1862 with the Sultan of Tajourrah would in that case 
be as sound legally as the similar treaties Britain had 
negotiated in the 'forties and 'fifties that had given her Perim 
and Mussa and Ivat. The French position at Obock would not be 
dangerous, however, for Britain had decided to assume responsi­
bility for the entire southern shore of the Gulf of Aden beyond
Tajourrah. This was the fundamental reason for Granville's 
»
change of attitude.
Turkish suzerainty over the Somali Coast would by itself 
have been a quite inadequate means of protecting British 
interests and in the early months of 1884 Granville was coming 
round to Northbrook's view^ that British consular jurisdiction 
should be transformed into some kind of political and"territorial 
authority. By the summer the Cabinet had decided that whether 
or not the Porte asserted Turkish rights by occupying the ports  ^
as the Egyptians withdrew, the main burden of protection and 
administration would have to be shouldered by Britain. Granville 
oould thus well afford not '*to raise difficulties with regard to
 ^ Northbrook to Granville, Pte., 10 January 1884; ibid.. 7 March 
1884; G.D. 29/l39.
the possession by France of Obock." As to the recent
assumption of French authority between Obock and Tajourrah, he
simply wished to know the precise extent of territory claimed 
1
officially. The French Government saw at once that Britain
2
was no longer concerned about Obock. Neither was Egypt.
V?hen the French Ambassador provided Granville with a copy of 
the 1862 convention, the status of Obock was finally settled.
6. THE BEGINNING OF THE SOMALI QOAST PHOTSOTORATE. 1884-5.
British policy was now to set a limit to French 
expansion; first, by supporting Egyptian authority until the 
Egyptian garrisons had been withdrawn, and the<i,by direct 
territorial intervention ostensibly in support of Turkish 
rights. As Hartington declared in Parliament in March during 
a debate on credits for the relief expedition to Suakin, Britain;^ 
could not abandon the Egyptian ports after the Sudan lad been 
evacuated; other Powers, he added amidst applause, might be g
tempted to occupy them. ' The nature of British interests was 
clear: economic, in that Aden drew her supplies from Berbera; 
essential for the suppression of the slave trade, since Zeila 
was the chief slave mart of the region; and strategic - most 
vital of all. It was equally clear that France would sooner or] 
later look southwards for -a better port than Obock. Britain's;
^ Granville to Waddington (draft by Granville), 10 March 1884"; A 
F.O. 78/3725.
2 ' ' ‘ 
Waddington a Ferry, 13 mars 1884, no.22; Ferry à Waddington
(draft), 16 mars 1884; Affaires étrangères.803.
^ Wide.Lieut.-Gen. Schneider [British Resident at Aden 1872-77] 
to Granville, 22 January 1884; copy enclosed in Granville to 
Lyons, 2 February 1884, No.107, F.O. 146/2605.
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desire to. forestall France largely explains why the decision 
to end Egyptian administration on the Somali Coast was reached 
so soon. In the spring of 1884 there was no military danger 
from the interior; the Ivlahdi's forces were far away to the 
north-west. Yet as early as April the Cabinet was discussing 
the future of Berbera, and in May Zeila.^ In August Egypt 
reluctantly prepared to evacuate the province of Harrar, and 
in the same month Britain occupied Zeila - the nearest port 
of any size to French territory. Soon afterwards the British 
Consul for the Somali Coast set out on a special mission to the 
tribes inhabiting Harrar and the hinterland further east to 
prepare the way for a British protectorate - months before the 
fall of Khartoum and the subsequent abandonment of the Sudan.
This policy was very much the product of confusion and 
compromise within the Cabinet. Britain was facing an entirely 
new problem - the administration of a large area which for 
centuries had had no effective outside control and of which 
even the geography was still largely unknown. There was no 
informed body of public opinion with commercial or religious or 
other interests in the area (as there was, for instance, in the 
case of West Africa), since there were few if any English 
traders on the Somali Coast and no missionaries. Thus the 
Government was dependent to a much greater extent than in most 
other overseas problems on information supplied by official
1
Bilke Political Diary, entries for 23 and 28 April, and 1, 7
and 14 May; B.M. Add. MS. 43936A.
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British representatives responsible for the area.
Their reports were far from unanimous on the question 
of future administration. In the first place, the British 
Consul ate-General in Egypt and the Government of Bombay, who 
'both had authority over the Somali Coast Consulate, saw the 
problem from entirely different points of view. Egerton, the 
chargé d'affaires in Cairo, did not see any need to replace 
Egyptian administration, and even managed to persuade Granville 
for a short time that the evacuation of Harrar should be post-
k 1
poned. He believed that Egypt was quite capable of dealing
with any future difficulties, and that British influence over
the Egyptian Government, and more particularly his own friendship
with Nubar Pasha, was sufficiently strong to preclude cessions
2
of territory to the French or Italians. He was also very
sceptical about the alleged danger : ."our exaggerated nervousness
respecting the designs of foreign nations constitutes the
gravest danger that threatens our country's interests."' The
; Government of India, on the other hand, saw the problem through
 ^ ^
the eyes of the Aden Residency. They had long wanted Britain
to consolidate her position in the Gulf of Aden, and felt that
there was now an excellent opportunity to throw overboard the
Anglo-Egyptian Convention of 1877. In this case future
^ Egerton to Granville, 2 June 1884, No. 593; Foreign Office to 
2 laüia Office (draft), 13 June 1884; F.O. 78/3726.
Egerton to Granville, 26 July 1884, No. 740 Confidential;
 ^ ttid.. 9 August 1884, Tel. 533; F.O. 78/3726.
 ^ Egerton to Granville, 7 July 1884, No. 686; F.O. 78/3726.
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administration.on the Coast oould be entirely in Britain's
hands, since Turkish claims were considered dubious and could
therefore be ignored. The Viceroy believed Britain could pave
the way with the traditional policy of agreements with the local 
%
sheikhs. '.Then the time came for Egyptian evacuation, she could'
2
take over without the trouble of preliminary military occupation. 
Major Hunter, the Somali Coast Consul, shared these views to 
some extent. He agreed that Turkish claims were practically 
worthless: the Sultan had no more rights than any "casual
conqueror." But he was far more anxious about foreign inter­
vention, and believed immediate British military occupation was 
3
essential. He urged that the two chief parts - Berbera and
Zeila - should be occupied at least during the Egyptian with-
drawal, and that in view of French naval patrols a British war- j
5 '
ship should be stationed at Berbera. He saw the necessity of
l~z
an understanding with the coastal tribes.
The Government depended on these sources and on reports 1 
from the Navy for their information, for the raw material of 
policy. ' In the final shaping of policy they had the assistance 
of Sir Evelyn Baring, who was called to England in April to give:
^ Viceroy of India to Secretary of State for India, 10 May 1884, 
tel. (copy), enclosed in India Office to Foreign Office, 13 îÆay 
1884; F.O. 78/3725.
^ Viceroy of India to Secretary of State for India, 28 June 1884\ 
Tel., Secret (copy), enclosed in India Office to Foreign Office 
28 June 1884; F.O. 78/3726.
Hunter to Kimberley, 5 June 1884, Secret (copy), enclosed in 
India Office to Foreign Office, 24 June 1884, (and laid before 
, the Cabinet); F.O. 78/3726.
Hunter to Baring, 7 April 1884 (copy), enclosed in Granville 
 ^ to Lyons, 10 May 1884, No. 414; F.O. 146/2614.
78/3725^^^ Admiralty to Foreign Office, 9 I%y 1884;
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advice on the general question of Egyptian evacuation. In 
May. he was brought into Cabinet discussions on the Somali Coast 
ports.^ Like Hunter he believed in agreements with the tribes.
p
He also advocated the occupation of Bulhar, Berbera and Zeila.
His views were adopted almost without question,^ and formed the 
basis of policy from July onwards. General Blair, the Aden 
Resident, was also in London in April, though on leave, and was 
consulted by the Secretary of State for India. His attitude 
was similar to that of Hunter and Baring.
Of all these officials. Hunter undoubtedly exercised
the greatest influence on the Government. His reports had of
\
course the advantage, unlike those from Cairo and Bombay, of
being based on first-hand experience of local conditions.
Moreover he had always shown a real concern for British interests,
and had been conscientious and efficient. When his differences
with Egerton came to a head in August 1884, when he revealed the
r
fact that Egypt did not intend to evacuate the Coast unless there 
was strong pressure from Britain, the Government at once came to
4
his rescue. All his recommendations were eventually carried
^ Dilke Political Djgry, 14 % y  1884; B.M. Add. MS. 43936A.
Memorandum by Baring .on Ma.jor Hunter's Mission, 5 July 1884;
F.O. 78/3726.
Kimberley (the Secretary of State for India) was averse to his 
Suggestion that Tajourrah should be left for the French; vide 
his minute on Baring's Memorandum of 5 July (cited in pre­
ceding footnoted
^ Hunter to Kimberley, 10 August 1884, Tel. (copy), enclosed in 
Kimberley to Granville, Pte., 10 August 1884; G.D. 29/136. 
Northbrook to Granville, Pte., 11 August 1884; G.D. 29/139.
■ Granville to Egerton (draft), 11 August' 1884, No. 377 
(extending Tel. 289); F.O. 78/3726.
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out, and he was rewarded with the C.B, in the New Year's Honours 
list of 1886.1
Hunter's fears of French action increased the sense of 
urgency in the Cabinet of 1884, The Prime Minister, however, 
was very reluctant to extend Britain's responsibilities on the 
Somali Coast. But he was also pre-occupied with home affairs - 
with Ireland and the Franchise Bill - and contributed lit tie to 
the actual formulation of policy. This he left to the 
Ministers most concerned - Granville, Hartington, Kimberley and 
Northbrook. They formed a virtual Cabinet committee and made 
important decisions in which Gladstone was merely asked after­
wards to concur.
The policy that emerged from their discussions owed a 
great deal to Northbrook. He was the first Minister to suggest
that the basis of future administration should be some form of
2
British protection. His influence over his colleagues,
particularly over the Foreign Secretary, was largely due to
the fact that his basic attitude to the defence of the short 
route to the East had become acceptable. He had always believed 
that the possession of Aden and Perim coupled with the maintenance 
of British influence on the Somali Coast gave Britain an un- ■
assailable position. Provided Britain kept an unbroken hold on
Vide Salisbury to Hunter (copy), 4 January 1886, (stating the 
award was made on account of his "very efficient service,")
F.O. 78/3971.
® Horthbrook to Granville, Pte., 10 January 1884; G.D. 89/139.
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the Coast from Zeila to Cape Guardafui, it was unnecessary to 
oppose foreign acquisition^beyond the Gulf of Tajourrah.
Granville had long agreed with him as far as Italian activities 
in the Red Sea were concerned, and he now believed that French 
activities, if confined to the Obock area, were not important.
The "traditional policy", which Northbrook felt still lingered, 
"of trying to prevent the establishment of any other power in 
these wretched places [round Bab-el-î.îandebD was in fact almost 
dead. Something very like spheres of influence was about to be 
established in north-east Africa.
In the early months of 1884, however, Granville was 
faced with a fundamental legal problem - the existence of Turkish 
Suzerainty. Despite the views of the Indian Government and the 
Aden Residency, it seemed impossible to ignore it. Britain had 
virtually recognised Turkish claims in pressing the Porte to 
ratify the Anglo-Egyptian Convention. By May Kimberley had 
found a solution: the tribes east of Zeila had always claimed
to be independent and had never recognised Turkish sovereignty, 
whereas west of Zeila and at Zeila itself there were Egyptian 
officials whose authority ultimately derived from the Porte; 
Britain could therefore make her own arrangements for the coast 
east of Zeila, while giving the Sultan the opportunity to assert 
bis rights at Zeila and at Tajourrah to the north-west; if
^ (His complaint was with particular reference to the question 
of' Sheikh Seyd.) Northbrook's minute of 10 April 1884, on 
India Office to Foreign Office, 3 April 1884; F.O. 78/3725.
Ij-4e also his letter to Granville, Pte., 10 April 1884;
G.D. 29/139.
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Turkish policy ran true to form and the Porte did nothing,
Britain could occupy Zeila.^ Granville at once accepted this 
2
plan. On 14 % y  Britain asked the Porte to re-occupy the
ports. Soon afterwards arrangements were made for Hunter's
3Mission to the tribes east of Zeila. Granville also agreed 
that Berbera should be defended "against all comers"by naval 
protection,"^ and Hunter was given permission to make a
5
preliminary agreement with the Somalis round that port. This
was the treaty of 14 July with the Habr Awal tribe.^
By August the Turks had taken no action, and further
delay over Zeila seemed dangerous. In April the French had
7occupied Hichal, a small harbour near Tajourrah. In itself 
the occupation was unimportant, but in the present state of 
uncertainty about the coast beyond the French zone, 'any foreign 
establishment in the Gulf of Tajourrah could only be viewed as 
a base from which to extend foreign i n f l u e n c e s . M o r e o v e r  in 
the summer the character of French activities changed. Obock
^ India Office to Foreign Office, 8 May 1884, Oonfidential;
F.O. 78/3725.
 ^Foreign Office to India Office (draft), 9 May 1884, Oonfi- 
dential; F.O. 78/3725.
^ On 16 May Granville formally accepted the Viceroy's proposal 
that agreements should be made with the Somalis: Foreign Office 
to India Office (draft), 16 May 1884, Oonfidential; F.O. 
78/3725.
^ Foreign Office to India Office (draft), 12 July 1884;F.O. 
78/3726.
 ^Hunter to Kimberley, 12 July 1884, Tel.(copy), enclosed in 
India Office to Foreign Office, 12 July 1884, Immediate;
F.O. 78/3726.
 ^ Vide India Office to Foreign Office, 1 Agust 1884, Secret;
F.O. 78/3726.
^ Egerton to Granville, 18 May 1884, No.540 Political;F.0.78/3725. 
Memorandum by Hunter (copy), enclosed in India Office to 
Foreign Office, 24 June 1884; F.O.78/3726.
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ceased to be an ostensibly commercial enterprise alone. On 
24 June an official decree declared it to be indisputably 
French territory and announced the appointment of a French 
Resident. At the beginning of July a Bill was presented to 
the Ghamber of Deputies for credits to cover administrât ion 
during the second half of the year. Though the sum was small - 
82,000 francs (about £3,000.), the expose des motifs significant­
ly referred to Obock as the beginning of a 'colonial centre.'
It seemed unlikely that this could be achieved, at least in a 
commercial sense, unless extension was intended ; for the past 
two years the only sea-borne trade with Obock had been in native* '
hands and the only European vessels that had entered the harbour
1had been French warships. The true interpretation seemed to 
be that France intended to use her present position as a spring- , 
board from which to seize some other port more suitable for a 
coaling station. In view of the renewed threat of Franco- 
Ghinese hostilities, this appeared more than probable.^ Hunter ; 
was particularly anxious about Zeila; not that it could become ; 
a naval base without enormous expense in harbour improvements i 
(for which however the French might be prepared to pay), but 
that it was the "key to Harrar and Shoa." He believed whatever ] 
Power held Zeila would be able to corner all the resources of
^ Hunter to Gonne (Secretary to the Government of Bombay), 2 June] 
1884 (copy), enclosed in India Office to Foreign Office,
2 July 1884; F.O. 78/3726.
Hunter to Government of Bombay, demi-official, 28 June 1884; 
extracts enclosed in Granville to Lyons, 30 July 1884,No.65S.
F.O. 146/2621.
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the hinterland.^ This was true in so far as the chief routes 
from the interior converged near the port.
On 1 August Hunter was given permission to re-inforce 
the Egyptian garrison at Zeila with British troops if he 
considered occupation could not 'safely' be deferred. The 
possibility of subsequent Turkish action Was left open. But 
Hunter felt that Turkish occupation would encourage the 
Egyptians to stay and would arouse distrust of Britain among
ri
the Somalis, who hated the Turks; on the 18th he sent three 
hundred Indian troops from Aden to Zeila. On the 22nd 
Granville warned the Turkish Ambassador in London for the last 
time that Britain would occupy the port if his Government did 
not do so at once. The next day the troops started to 
disembark.^ It was then too late for the Sultan to assert 
his rights - if he had ever intended to do so. Although Britain 
held Zeila ostensibly on a temporary basis to defend Turkish 
rights during the preparations for Egyptian evacuation, she had 
in reality secured the western extremity of her future 
protectorate.
Britain had acted in'order to prevent French expansion 
on the Gulf of Aden. She also wished to forestall French moves
Hunter to Kimberley, 4 August 1884, (copy), enclosed in India 
Office to For eign Office, 20 August 1884, Secret; F.O.78/3726.
 ^ Foreign Office to India Office (draft), 1 August 1884,
Oonfidential; India Office to Foreign Office, 1 August 1884, 
enclosing copy of telegraphic instructions to Hunter of the 
same day; F.O. 78/3726.
Hunter to Kimberley, 2 August 1884, Tel. (copy),, enclosed in 
India Office to Foreign Office, 2 August 1884; F.O.78/3726.
^ Admiralty to Foreign Office, 24 August 1884; F.O. 78/3726.^
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in the Red Sea, and to ensure that after Egyptian evacuation 
the ports should remain in friendly hands. The fact that she 
gave Italy carte hlanohe over Massawa, Beiloul and Zulla was 
not, however, entirely due to the Foreign Secretary's desire to 
set a limit to French territory.^ Granville's private 
correspondence with Northbrook and Gladstone shows that Granville 
hesitated to encourage Italian ambition to the extent suggested, 
partly because of his fear of antagonising the Porte, partly 
because he feared it would be an incentive to French moves%further 
south. His resistance was broken down first by diplomatic 
considerations - by Italy's pro-British policy, particularly over ; 
Egyptian internal affairs, and by French hostility towards 
Britain, and secondly by the æ ed to provide both for the with­
drawal of British forces from the Sudan via the Red Sea and for 
subsequent administrât ion which Britain herself was unwilling to 
undertake. Italy secured his compliance in December 1884, 
before there was any evidence that Franc e intended to make a bid 
for power at îüassawa. French transports did not arrive in the 
Red Sea in disquieting numbers until January.
The initiatio^n of the Anglo-Italian understanding must 
be ascribed to Northbrook rather than to Granville. It was 
part of his plan for spheres of influence in north-east Africa.
His scheme to ^ropeanize the route to the East - to give the 
Powers a vested interest in its protection - even included
Gp. Raram: S.H.R., 1944, pp. 232-6.
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Provision for German responsibility; he wanted Germany to
have Suakin.^ (This suggestions was ruled out at onee,
however, largely because of the Franco-German diplomatic
alignment.) Northbrook seems to have been the first to suggest
the planting of Italian power in the Red Sea so near to Egypt 
2
as Massawa - a startling innovation in British policy. The
/'
arguments for and against were discussed in great secrecy by 
Northbrook himself who at the time was on a special mission to 
Cairo, and Baring, and by Granville and Gladstone; as late as
g
28 October the Foreign Office had not been consulted.
Northbrook argued that his project would serve Britain's
diplomatic interests as well as her strategic; Massawa would
be a reward for the Italians' support in E g y p t . T h e  reaction
of Granville and Gladstone was at first favourable: it was
"very tempting to give them a reward for their friendly attitu^"
But on second thoughts the Foreign Secretary felt it was
"rdJher early to give them... the Queen's shilling - and to hand
over on our own authority, any portion of the Ottoman Empire
to a European Power;" it would also have been a "regular red
5
rag to France." Moreover the Queen objected strongly, and
^ Northbrook to Gladstone, Pte., 20 October 1884; B.M. Add.
MS. 44267.
 ^Northbrook to Granville, Pte., 27 September 1884; vide also 
Northbrook to Granville, 29 September 1884, cypher Telegram;
G.D. 29/139.
^ Vide Memorandum by Fitzmaurice on "The Red Sea Ports," 28 
October 1884, F.O. Oonfidôntial Print on the Somali Coast, No. 
1; B.M. Add. MS.44629. This document makes no reference to 
the possibility of an Italian occupation of Massawa, and poses 
the alternative of Turkish re-establishment or Egyptian 
^ occupation under British supervision.
Northbrook to Granville, Pte. 27 September 1884;G.D.29/139.
Gladstone, Pte.,' 00 September 1884; B.M. Add.
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there was the danger of parliamentary opposition.^ But with
the start of Wolseley's expedition to relieve Gordon in
Khartoum, the inevitable Egyptian evacuation was brought
uncomfortably nearer. The risk of complications with the
Porte over the future settlement of the Red Sea ports began to
seem as remote as the possibility of a Turkish occupation of
Zeila had been, although Granville intended to preserve the
fiction of Turkish suzerainty, whatever arrangements were made.
Ferry's anti-British policy, especially his "Egyptian crusade
against us," now made Granville less concerned for the
diplomatic consequences of an Anglo-Italian under standing ; he
regarded the cultivation of Italian friendship as more important
than the alleviation of French ill-will. Friendship with
England was, the Italian Foreign Minister assured him, a
3
"constant political tradition" for Italy. He began to grasp 
opportunities for being "civil," as he promised Northbrook and
o
Baring he would. He readily agreed not to oppose extension 
inland from As sab He also abandoned his former objections to
^ Granville to Northbrook, 3 October 1884 (copy); G.D.29/140.
^ Granville to Northbrook, Private and confidential, 17 
October 1884 (copy); G.D. 29/l40.
^ Maneini to Nigra, 29 October 1884, translation communicated
to Granville by Nigra, 3 November 1884; F.O. 78/3727.
^ Baring to Granville, 4 October 1884, Decypher of Tel.619
Secret; F.O.78/3686. Granville to Baring (draft seen by
Gladstone), 8 October 1884, Tel. 317; F.O. 78/3727.
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the import of arms through Assab,^ although Kimberley did not
E
altogether approve of this infringement of previous agreements. 
IVhen Italy formally offered her assistance in covering the 
evacuation from the Sudan,^ Granville had finally made up his 
mind about Massawa. In December Italy knew she cduld have 
all she had asked for.
i
The policy of spheres of influence included toleration
of French consolidation round Obock. It appeared wiser to
allow France to assert what she regarded as her legitimate
rights, than to frustrate her and so stimulate a territorial
appetite which she would probably have attempted to satisfy at .
the expense of Britain. Provided she confined her activities
to the northern shore of the Gulf of Tajourrah and did not
attempt to cross the Gulf, there seemed no danger to Britain's /
position. Thus when the French occupied Tajourrah in the : |
autumn of 1884, Granville agreed to make no objection.^ Lagarde, !
the Resident at Obock, who had only recently left Aden with a 1
5 j
small contingent of troops to take up his appointment, had nade : 
a treaty of protection with the Sultan of Tajourrah on 21 b;
B Nigra to Granville, 13 October 1884; Granville to Nigra,
20 October 1884; copies enclosed in Granville to Lyohs, 25 ■
Octber 1884, No. 906, F.O. 146/2627.
 ^Foreign Office to India Office (draft), 23 October 18,84; India]
Office to Foreign Office, 27 October 1884; F.O.78/3727. t
^ Granville to lumley (draft), 13 November 1884, No. 229 . j
Confidential; F.O. 78/3727. j
^ Baring to Granville, 22 September 1884, Tel.605; Granville to |
Baring (draft), 1 October 1884, No. 418; F.O. 78/3727.
Hunter to Kimberley, 11 August 1884 (copy), enclosed in India 
Office to Foreign Office, 3 September 1884, P.O. 78/3727.
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September, having first surrounded the Egyptian garrison, which 
was subsequently withdrawn. Later the French flag was hoisted 
at Sagullo.^ The Egyptians feared Turkish displeasure if no
p
opposition was made, though the Porte had done nothing to 
assert Turkish rights at Tajourrah, despite the formal requests 
from Britain. Granville assured them that they could be 
relieved of all responsibility in view of their inability to 
retain their garrisons on the coast; if necessary, "the 
proceedings of France at Tajourrqh, and of England at Zeila" 
could be "explained by those two countries to the Porte, direct. 
For the purpose of Anglo-Turkish relations, his compliance with 
the French move rested on the theory that France, like Britain 
at Zeila, was acting on behalf of the Sultan, and was not in 
fact infringing his ultimate sovereignty. Britain would make 
no objection, he told the Turkish'Ambassador, if the Porte did 
not.'^ His susceptibility for Turkish rights explains why 
Hunter was at first instructed to continue to collect the 
customs revenue from Tajourrah at Aden. The difficulty of 
finding reliable local collectors for the Egyptian ports in the 
Gulf of Aden had led. to the temporary collection of duties by
^ Baring to Granville, 28 October 1884, No, 986; F.O. 78/372?..
^ Baring to Granville, 8 November 1884, No. 1011; F.O. 78/3727.
^ Granville to Baring (draft), 12 November 1884, Tel.339 ;
F.O. 78/3727.
^ Granville to Wyndham (draft), 25 November 1884, No. 345;
F.O. 78/3728.
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the Residency. On 1 Decemher the customs houses at all the 
ports except Tajourrah had their authority restored.^ This 
was a few days after Granville had learned that the Porte did 
object to the French occupation, and had protested against it
p -
in Paris. To have immediately handed over the administration 
of customs to the new French authorities would have been 
tantamount to a recognition of annexation. The Franco-Turkish 
dispute soon blew over, however, and when France had formally 
announced the existence of a protectorate, on 11 February,
Britain stopped collecting revenues from Tajourrah. Granville
adopted the same attitude towards the French occupation of Ghubbet
5 "
Kharab in October 1884. He agreed to the Egyptian Government's
putting UD a show of resistance by withdrawing their garrison
6 '  ^under protest, but Britain took no action on her own account. i
It would in any case have been difficult to query these moves, in j
view of Granville's tacit acceptance of the terms of the original J
Obock concession earlier in the year. j
^ Baring to Granville, 13 December 1884, Tel,772; Foreign Office 
to India Office (draft), 15 December 1884, Confidential;. 
Granville to Baring (draft), 23 December 1884, No.501 Confi­
dential; Baring to Granville 24 December 1884, No.1170; F.O. 
78/3728. Bar in^ to Granville, 11 January 1885, Decypher of Tel. 
16; F.O. 78/3857.
^ %ndham to Granville, 26 November 1884, T©1.54; F.O. 78/3728.
^ Minute by Bertie on India Office to Foreign Office, 18 December 
1884; F.O. 78/3728.
^ Granville to Lyons, 21 February 1885, No.161; F.O. 146/2703.
 ^Baring to Granville, 29 October 1884, Tel.665; F.O. 78/3727.
 ^Baring to Granville, 17 November 1884, Tel.715; Granville to 
Baring (draft), 18 November 1884, Tel.343; P.O. 78/0727.
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Although Britain was content in regard the French 
protectorate over the northern shore of the Gulf of Tajourrah 
as a fait accompli, she was determined to prevent its expansion 
southwards. Her own position at the end of 1884 was still
precarious. From the Turkish point of'view, Britain's protec-
tion of the Somali Coast was on a purely temporary basis and 
carried with it no territorial rights. More important still,
■
there was no frontier between the British zone and the French 3 
protectorate, nor was it clear whether Britain had any authority^ 
beyond the coast itself. Thus there was a real danger that 
British influence might be undermined by French infiltration 
among the tribes of the hinterland. France had appointed a -M
consular agent, H. Henri, at Harrar, and it was already rumoured
p
that she not only had designs on that province, but that she
3
might advance on Zeila from the interior. Granville hoped, 
however, that he m^ght be able to use his virtual recognition 
of French authority round Tajourrah as an argument for claiming
4
the right to settle the hinterland to the south on British tems. 
But although Henri's appointment was stated to be merely in
^ Baring to Granville, 24 November 1884, Ho.1067; P.O.78/2728.
 ^ Granville to lumley (draft), 25 November 1884, Ho.243 Most ■ 
Confidential; P.O. 78/3728.
® Baring to Granville, 24 November 1884, Tel. 728 Secret;
P.O. 78/3728.
^ Baring to Granville, 4 Deoember 1884, Tel. 743; Granville 
to Baring (draft), 4 Deoember 1884, Tel.360; P.O. 78/3728.
139
Order to open up trade between Harrar and Obock,^ French
political influence among the tribes round Zeila was spreading
rapidly. Hunter's fears that the Somalis might be induced to
sell territory to France,^ led to the British treaty with the
3Gadàbursi tribe on 11 December. Hunter realised that the 
main attraction the French had for the natives was that they 
were willing to supply them with firearms, and he urged the 
Government to press France, and Italy too, for an agreement * 
prohibiting the import of arms from the coast.^ A few weeks 
later Granville broached the subject to the French Ambassador 
in London. It is not surprising that he asked for no such 
undertaking from Italy. He also started to strengthen 
Britain's position, both militarily and politically: Egyptian 
troops were allowed to remain alongside the British forces at
A
Zeila, and two British vice-consuls were appointed, one for 
Zeila and one for Berbera, and also a subordinate agent for 
Bulhar.*^ In March Berbera was occupied.
^ Baring to Granville, 5 December 1884, No.1099 Oonfidential;
F.O.78/3728.
^ Baring to Granville, 8 December 1884, Tel.757; F.O.78/3728.
^ Granville gave permission for Hunter to conclude the treaty 
(which forbade cessions of territory to any other Power but 
Britain) in his Telegram to Baring, 8 December 1884, 363 
(draft); F.O. 78/3728.
^ Hunter to Baring, 20 November 1884 (copy), enclosed in Baring  ^
to Granville, 29 November 1884, No. 1092; F.O. 78/3728, j
^ Granville to Waddington (draft), 26 February 1885; F.O.78/3858^
 ^Baring to Granville, 24 November 1884, Tel.728 Secret; '
Granville to Baring (draft), 24 November 1884, Tel.352;
F.O. 78/3728.
 ^Hamm: E.H.H. 1944, p.230.
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For a policy of containment, attack seemed better than 
defence. This meant that British authority was to be asserted 
as near as possible to French territory. The first step in 
this direction was the occupation of the islands of Mussa and 
Ivat in December.^ By 1885 a comprehensive declaration of 
authority seemed urgently required, since from the numbers of 
French transports in the Red 8ea^ it now looked as if France 
might attempt a naval coup. For a time, however, Ivîassawa 
appeared to be the French objective, and Italian anxiety led 
Britain to arrange that Egyptian forces should stay there until 
the, Italians took over. But British fears of French action 
were not dispelled by the Italian occupation in February. In 
the same month the French Chamber cf Deputies was asked to grant 
credits for Obock amounting to 448, 112 francs - a quite 
disproportionate sum, unless extension was intended. Rumours
4
of an impending attack on Zeila became more frequent. In 
April Granville decided to forestall France by defining the 
British sphere in the widest possible terms.^ He therefore told 
the French Government that Britain had a protectorate over the
^ India Office to Foreign Office, 17 December 1884; P.O.78/3728. 
The occupation was suggested by Kimberley: vide India Office 
to Foreign Office, 7 November 1884; F.O. 7873727.
^ Eamm: E.H.H. 1944, p. 234.
2 Nigra to Granville, 14 January 1885, and Granville's subse­
quent correspondence with British representatives in Rome and
Cairo; F.O. 78/3857.
^ Vide note by Kimberley on Baring to Granville, 20 April 1885,
TeTT 225; G.D. 29/l36.
 ^An official statement of British claims was suggested by
Kimberley: vide India Office to Foreign Office, 10 April 1885; 
F.O. 78/3857.
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Somali Coast extending from the eastern shore of Chuhbet Kharab 
to as far as Bas Galweni,^
7. THE_AhGLO-FBEl\IOH BOUNDARY DISPUTE. a) SALISBURY * S POLICY, 
1885-6.
Salisbury, who succeeded Granville as Foreign Secretary 
in June, found that his predecessor's declaration had been in­
validated even before it was made: on 26 Ivlarch, Henri, who had
recently been appointed French vice-consul at Zeila, had 
concluded a treaty of protection with a section of the Eesa
Somalis whose territory lay along the southern shore of the
2
Gulf of Tajourrah. Later, a token force of French troops 
landed at Ambadu, and then withdrew. In August Henri announced 
that France had a protectorate over the entire coast between 
Ghubbet Kharab and Zeila. Salisbury at once asked the French
rz
Government to disavow him. When he heard that the French were 
apparently preparing to seize Zeila as well, he sent a warship 
to the port»"^ warning France that any attempt to land would end 
in disaster.5
Salisbury was far less perturbed by French activities,
^ Hamm: E.H.R. 1944, p.232. For instruntions to the British 
Ambassador in Paris, vide Granville to Lyons, 23 April 1885,
Ho. 398; F.O. 146/2712.
 ^ Gapt. J.S. King (British Agent and Vice-Consul Zeila) to G.W. : 
Sealy (Aden, Acting Consul for Somali Goast) 31 August 1885; ' I
Sealy to Egerton,7 September 1885; copies enclosed in Sgerton 
to Salisbury, 16 September 1885, Ho.678, F.O. 78/3860.
Salisbury to Walsham (charge d'affaires in Paris), 30 September 
1885, Ho. 787;.F.O. 146/2726.
Ramm: E.H.R. 1944, p. 232.
 ^ Salisbury to Walsham, 3 October 1885, Ho. 736; F.O. 146/2727.
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however, than Granville had been. He felt that they were 
almost entirely due to excess of zeal on the part of local 
officials - chiefly of Henri himself. He believed that although 
the French Government apparently welcomed the extension of 
French claims up to Zeila, they now wished to call a halt. He 
did not believe France really intended to seize Zeila. As far 
as he could see, the issue between Britain and France was simply 
the boundary between their respective protectorates; provided 
France took a firm line with her local representatives, 
negotiation between the two countries would entirely solve the . 
problem. He therefore offered to discuss the whole question of 
overlapping claims.^ The French Foreign Minister at once agreed 
to this,2 and promised to maintain the status quo until a 
settlement had been reached.^ He naturally expected Britain 
to reciprocate.^
Salisbury at first attached little importance to the 
position of the future frontier. He believed that British 
interests on the Somali Coast had already been adequately secured. 
His confidence was largely due to the conclusion of the Anglo-
^ Waddington a Freycinet, 6 octobre 1885, tél.; Affaires 
étrangères. 812.
 ^Freycinet à Waddington (draft), 7 octobre 1885; Affaires 
étrangères. 812.
^ Walsham to Salisbury, 7 October 1885, Decypher of Tel. 34;
F.O. 78/3861. j
^ Freycinet a Waddington (draft), 26 octobre 1885, no.45; 
Petiteville à Freycinet, 30 octobre 1885, no. 138; Affaires 
étrangères. 812.
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Turkish Agreement in October providing for the complete evacua­
tion of Egyptian forces as soon as practicable, for it was now 
understood that British protection would be permanent. This 
ended the uncertainty in London about Britain's legal position, 
and on 7 October Hunter was given the new title of,Political 
Resident. The protectorate was more than a legal entity, since 
Hunter had carried out the major part of his special mission; 
by the end of 1885 he had concluded treaties with six out of the
!
eight distinct tribes within British territory. The one danger-
spot had been Zeila, where French influence had struck root with
the help of the former Governor, Abu Bekr Pasha, a notorious
slave-dealer and a great power in the district.^ His death in
December made it likely that even Henri would lie low for the
present and would not infringe the status quo agreed to by his
government. Since the British Protectorate now seemed firmly
3established from Zeila eastwards, Salisbury considered the
coastline west of Zeila relatively unimportant.
Nevertheless he was committed by Granville's policy to
4
resist French claims to that part of the coast. Moreover he 
soon realised that the French agreements with the tribes - Henri’s
 ^He had apparently made a secret agreement with the French 
promising to work for ultimate French possession of Zeila: 
Taillandier [chargé d'affaires at the French Gonsulate-General 
in Cairo] h Freycinet"^ 9 décembre 1885, Doc. dipl. fr. I, vi, 
p. 156, no. 137.
 ^ Sgerton to Salisbury, 9 December 1805, Tel.494; F.O.78/3862.
^ ^ide India Office to Foreign Office, 21 December 1885;
F.O. 78/3862.
^ Salisbury to Lyohs, 29 October 1885, Ho. 852, F.O. 146/2730; 
ibid.. 14 December 1885, Ho. 940, F.O. 146/2735.
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treaty with the Eesa Somalis and another with the Gihril Ahokr - 
were potentially dangerous. They could not he regarded merely as 
the basis of a minor encroachment on British territory. The
French-protected natives were linked by kinship and tradition
/
to tribes with whom Britain had made agreements; indeed the 
British maintained, contrary to the French view, that the 
Gibril Abokr were not a distinct tribe but only a sub-section 
of the British-protec ted Habr Awal. Since the Somalis did not 
regard authority over them in terms so much of territory as of 
tribal military obligations, it was obvious that if French 
claims were allowed and if France was thereby enabled to supply 
the natives with arms, French influence could spread far beyond 
the southern shore of the Gulf of Tajoiirrah. The British 
zone would then be liable to attack from the interior. More 
was at stake, therefore, in the territorial dispute than 
Salisbury had at first imagined. •
The affair was also complicated by a long-standing 
personal quarrel between Henri and the British Vice-Consul at
P ,
Zeila. As the French Foreign Minister complained, local
antagonisms - "un ennui perpetuel pour les deux governements" -
made the task of coming to an understanding on basic issues
3
unnecessarily difficult. But although Freycinet practically
«
^ Hunter to Sgerton, 14 December 1885 (copy), enclosed in
Egerton to Salisbury, 23 December 1885, Ho. 852 Confidential; 
F.O. 78/3862.
2
Details were given in the enclosures in Sgerton to Salisbury, 
19 December 1885, Ho. 842; P.O. 78/3862.
® Preyoinet a Yfeddington (draft), IB décembre 1885, privée; 
Affaires étrangères. 813,
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admitted that the fault lay on Henri's side.^ - so clearly
that he would have liked to have relieved'Henri of his appoint- 
2
ment, he felt obliged to-defend him, since French territorial 
claims rested solely on Henri's'actions. Freycinet and 
Salisbury agreed, however, to try to disentangle the question 
of the officials' conduct towards each other.from the territorial 
dispute.
That France genuinely wished to come to terms was shown'
by her proposal, made in January 1886, of a local commission
consisting of one French and one British representative to
4adjudicate on the conflicting claims. Salisbury was delighted 
that his suggestion of negotiations had been so well, received. 
Here, he thought, was a chance to alleviate some of the tension
i I
in Anglo-French relations, by putting an end to a peculiarly 
irritating dispute. Technically, a commission seemed about 
the best mode of settlement, partly because it could be used to 
keep the consular officials under control. He hoped both 
commissioners would be men who had never been mixed up in any , 
way in local affairs, and 'suggested Sir Oharles Warren as a
Walsham to Salisbury, 17 January 1886, Ho.33; F.O. 78/3971, ;
^ Minute by Freycinet, 23 décembre 1885, on Walsham to Freycinet,; 
20 December 1885; Affaires étrangères,813. Freycinet told 
Waddington that Henri seemed to have a "cerveau peu équilibré :"g 
supra/ note 8, p. 144.
 ^ Walsham to Salisbury, 17 January 1886, Ho.33; minute by ,
Salisbury on 7/addington to Salisbury, 21 January 1886; F.O. 78/
3971. Salisbury to Lyohs, 20 January 1886, Ho.49; F.0.146/2801<
^ The draft of Freycinet's instructions to Waddington of 18 • 
January is in Affaires étrangères, 813. Waddington^accordingly 
suggested a commission in conversation with Salisbury on the 
20th: Salisbury to Lyons, 20 January 1886; Ho.49, F.O.146/
2801. The next day he put the proposal in writing: Waddington
■to Salisbury, 21 January 1886; P.O. 78/3971.
14 ô
"j
possible choice for the British representative. , His conception 
of the Commission's function, however, differed, somewhat from 
that of Freycinet: whereas the latter wanted the commissioners
to act as plenipotentiaries who would have negotiated on all 
aspects and at all stages of the proposed settlement, Salisbury 
wanted them to be merely delegates whose chief task would have 
been to work out a practical line of demarcation between the 
two Protectorates that would have best represented what had 
already been decided in theory at a government level. He 
insisted on a strict definition and limitation of the scope of 
the Commission. An essential preliminary, he felt, was to 
determine the respective validity of the various treaties which 
had apparently conferred identical rights on the two countries, 
so that the commissioners would have less to quarrel about. He 
therefore asked the French to produce their treaties so that the i
i
!
signatures of the alleged tribal representatives could be j
2 j
compared with those on the British treaties, - or, in his own ,
!
blunt phrase, so that the two governments could discover which |
of them 'had managed to get its treaties signed by the right 
dagger.
Salisbury was careful to take no action which might have
^ Waddington a Freycinet, 20 janvier 1886, tél.; Affaires' 
étrangères. 813.
Waddington h. Freycinet, 26 janvier 1886, tél., confidentielle; 
Affaires étrangères, 814.
^ Waddington k Freycinet, 18 mars 1886, confidentielle ;
Affaires étrangères. 815.
6é.;,
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been interpreted as an infringement of the status quo. For 
instance, he now decided not to make a formal announcement to 
the Powers of the existence of the British Protectorate, defined 
by Granville as extending from the eastern shore of Ghubbet 
Kharab to Ras Galweni,^ though he had-previously advocated it,^
He also refused to make supplementary agreements with the Eesa 
and Gadabursi tribes as the Aden Resident had suggested in order 
to strengthen British claims. Before the two governments had 
had time to arrange the Gommission, however, indeed before 
Britain had formally accepted it, Salisbury went out of office.
Ü. THE AHGLO-FREHGH BOUHDARY DISPUTE, b) ROSEBERY'S POLICY, 
FEBRUARY-JULY 1886.
Rosebery, who succeeded Salisbury in February 1886, was 
far less concerned to reach an agreement with France. During his 
brief period as.Foreign Secretary he became increasingly unwilling 
to make an effort to improve Anglo-French relations, partly 
because his policy was fundamentally pro-German. A pessimist by 
nature, his experience of French colonial policy tended to hardeni 
his attitude and to make him believe that it was almost impossible 
to achieve a modus vivendi with France in the colonial field.
He was unconciliatory and apt to place the worst construction
^ Foreign Office to India Office (draft), 4 February 1886;
F.O, 78/3971.
 ^Foreign Office to India Office (draft), 18 December 1885; 
F.O. 78/3971.
^ Brig-Gen. Blair to Lord Randolph Churchill, 29 January 1886, 
Tel.(copy), enclosed in India Office to Foreign Office,
30 January 1886; F.O. 78/39 71.
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on French assertiveness overseas. One small incident is '
illustrative. Soon after he took office he heard that a French
Oonsul was to he appointed at Saakin. From Cairo he was told
that the sole object of the appointment was to provide an
opportunity for French intrigue against British influence - as
in the case of Henri's appointment at Zeila.^ Always readier
to believe warnings of this kind than to wait upon events, he
at once expressed strong disapproval to the French Government,
2
although, as he admitted, Britain had no right to interfere.
He gained nothing by his intervention, for the Consul was
appointed before the French Foreign Minister knew officially
Ro
2
of British objections. sebery found the incident "in the
highest degree dista^eful.
His predeliction for Germany influenced his policy over 
the Somali Coast. In effect, he carried on the Granvillian 
tradition of trying to establish a counter-weight to French 
influence jLthough through Germany not Italy), but his motives 
were more diplomatic than strategic. He was not prepared, 
however, to sacrifice British strategic interests in the'Gulf' of
^ Baring to Rosebery, 9 February 1886, Tel.9, confidential;
F.O. 7R/3971. '
 ^Rosebpry to Lyons, 10 February 1886, Ho.92 Confidential;
F.O. 146/2803.
^ Rosebery to Lyohs, 16 February 1886, Ho.96; F.O. 146/2803.
^ Rosebery to Lyons, 3 March 1886; Lyons, II, p. 362.
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Aden on the alter of Anglo-German friendship: he was responsible
for the occupation of Socotra and the declaration of a British 
Protectorate there, after he had beenmrned that Germany might 
try to occupy the island.^ But the strategic value of that 
part of the mainland in which Germany expressed interest - part 
of the coast south of Gape Guardafui^ - appeared negligible to 
Rosebery compared with the diplomatic advantages of satisfying
4
German colonial ambition. He not only looked favourably on 
the German East Africa Company's activities between Has Hafim 
and Warscheik, but encouraged the Germans to go further. He gave 
them carte blanche to occupy the coast between Ras Hafim and the
5
forty-ninth parallel east - the limit of the British Protectorate. 
This was running counter to traditional policy, for Britain load 
signed agreements years before with the Mijerteyn Somalis, 
including one in 1879, and as recently as 27 January 1886 
Salisbury had sanctioned a treaty of friendship with the 
Warsangeli, by which this tribe was precluded from entering into, 
relations with foreign powers. Rosebery's new departure was
^ British Agreement with the Sultan of Socotra, 23 April 1886.
 ^ ^i4e F.O. minute by Barrington, 23 March 1886, and note by 
Rosebery, 25 I'.larch 1886 - "If we wish to hoist the flag there 
is no time to be lost ; " also Foreign Office to India Office 
(draft), 26 March 1886; F.O. 78/3972.
^ Rosebery to Malet [British Ambassador in Berlin]/, 24 I%rch 1886, 
Ho.164, (reporting an interview with the German Ambassador in 
London on 17 Ilarch)^ , F.O. 7S /3D7Z.
^^4e Foreign Office to India Office (draft), 25 l%rch 1886, 
and India Office to Foreign Office, 31 March 1886; F.O.78/3972.
^ Rosebery to Hatzfeldt (draft), 5 April 1886; F.O. 78/3972.
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not weloomed by the local British authorities, #10 continued to 
compete with the Germans for influence round Gape Guardafui 
through the payment of subsidies and other means.^ Hor was it 
successful: three years later, the Ital ians occupied the coast
in question.
As regards the western extremity of the British 
Protectorate, Rosebery's attitude towards the proposed Anglo- 
French co mmission was from the start unenthusiastic, to say the 
least. It was not altogether his fait. In the first place, 
since the whole dispute was new to him, he was dependent on the 
advice of the Permanent Under-Secretary at the Foreign Office, and 
Pauncefote had all along taken a legalistic view of the matter. 
Salisbury with his methods of personal diplomacy had set aside the ; 
Under-Secretary's advice when it suited him, but Rosebery neither i 
desired nor was able to work in this fashion since he lacked his .■
predecessor's advantage of a long-standing friendship with the |
j
French Ambassador. Pauncefote could see no point in setting up j 
a commission to adjudicate over a piece of territory to which 
Britain had prior claim.^ This seemed good sense to Rosebery; ' 
Whereas Salisbury had been concerned with the expediency of a 
settlement acceptable to both sides, he believed in holding |
^ Vide enclosures in India Office to Foreign Office, 16 April 
T886; F.O. 78/3972.
Vide Pauncefote's minute on India Office to Foreign Office, 
11 February 1886, Secret; F.O. 78/3971; and on India Office 
to Foreign Office, 30 & r c h  1886;' F.O. 78/3972.
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fast to British rights. In the second place, he doubted whether 
his predecessor had committed himself to the extent the French 
claimedf he was not aware that Salisbury had accepted the 
Commission en principe. Salisbury had not told his colleagues 
that he had nominated an English commissioner, nor that Freycinet 
had approved the choice of Warren. Rosebery had only Waddington's 
word for it.^ % e n  consulted, Salisbury maintained that his 
conversations with the French Ambassador had been on a personal 
and unofficial basis, thus conveying a slightly misleading 
impression since in practice he was not in the habit of making 
a distinction between his statements as an individual and as 
Foreign Secretary. Thus Rosebery was never sure that. Salisbury 
had done more than discuss the possibility of a commission. ,He 
was also misled into believing that the French intended the 
commission to enquire into the King-Henri affair - an investiga­
tion which could have implied that Britain was dissatisfied with 
her representative's conduct.^ It is true that the formal
invitation from France had been worded^ambiguously, but Salisbury
4had tried to explain French intentions to his subordinates. 
Misinformed, therefore, to a considerable extent, Rosebery told '
— ----------------------------------------- 1--------------------------   j
 ^yide minute by Sanderson, 13 February 1886 (on India Office |
^0 Foreign Office, 11 February 1886, Secret), on his interview 
With Waddington at the Foreign Office on 9 February ; F.O. 78/3971.
 ^ Vide Rosebery to Lyons, 3 March 1886; Lyons, II, p.362; and , |
Rosebery to Waddington (draft), 6 î.îarch 1886; F.O. 78/3972. , |
 ^ India Office to Foreign Office, 11 February 1886, Secret; !
, F.O. 78/3971. !
4 . :
Minutes by Sanderson, Pauncefote, and Salisbury, on Waddington l
to Salisbury, 21 January 1886; F.O. 78/3971. I
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the French Government he could see no reason for a commission 
1
at present. Shortly afterwards Warren was given a civil 
appointment in England (as head of the London police).
Lacking any detailed knowledge of Somali Coast affairs,
o
as he was ready to admit, Rosebery regarded the territorial 
dispute as just another colonial issue in which it was his duty 
to resist French pretensions. This belief, confirmed by 
Pauncefote's prompting, led him to run counter to an important 
tradition; Foreign Office-India Office co-operation. Salisbury, 
like Granville before him, had regarded the ‘Somali Coast as 
primarily an "Indian" interest, and had tried to effect a 
compromise between Imperial and diplomatic objectives. His 
insistence that the proposed commission should be solely for the 
purposes of demarcation, and not for any enquiry into the past  ^
activities of French and British representatives, was partly due
-i
to pressure from the India Office. Rosebery, however, was
3
prepared to ignore the Indian Secretary's views; Kimberley 
like his Conservative predecessor Randolph Churchill, was extreme-• 
ly anxious for a Commission. He believed that if the Government
 ^Rosebery to Waddington (draft), 5 March 1886; F.O.78/3971.
Waddington à Freycinet, 18 mars 1886; Affaires étrangères, 815.
^ The reply suggested by the India Office to the French proposal 
for a joint commission included a final paragraph expressing 
Britain's willingness to set up a commission for delimitation 
Only. This was omitted by Rosebery in his reply (of 5 March) 
to Addington's request (of 27 February) for a definitive answer 
to his proposals; F.O. 78/3971. Yet Rosebery told the 
tobassador that it was the India Office that was responsible 
tor his virtual rejection of a commission: Waddington à
Freycinet, 18 mars 1886; Affaires' étrangères, 815.
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took the trouble to Investigate the French treaties, they would
find they were invalid, and that the frontier could therefore be
1 «
fixed at Ghubbet Kharab. He felt that a local commission was
the only way to ensure that the settlement would be impressed
upon and respected by the tribes. i
'i
Rosebery soon found that his virtual rejection of the -
• 'I
commission did not mean that France would abandon her claims j
■ y|
east of Ghubbet Kharab. The French decided to send Lemaire,
whom they had originally proposed as French commissioner, to make |
P N
a report on the local situation,either alone, or as they hoped,
with an English colleague.^ To Rosebery's relief, affairs in j
4 '!
Zanzibar called for Lemaire's presence therefirst. But the . j 
threatened investigation was only postponed.^ Somewhow, Rosebery| 
reflected rather wearilÿ, the whole dispute seemed to have 
slipped into the "wrong groove". His attempt at extrication was 
to try to "have it out with the French" - to ask them why they 
did not accept the British treaties.^ Three months later when 
he went out of office, he had made no headway whatever. His
^ India Office to Foreign Office, 11 February 1886, Secret,
F.O. 78/3971; ibid., 30 March 1886, F.O. 78/3972.
 ^ Waddington à Freycinet, 18 mars 1886; Affaires étrangères, 815.
^ Rosebery to Lyons, 24 March 1886, Hos.166 and 175; F.0.146/2806.;
4 Lyons to Rosebery, 28 A r c h  1886, Ho. 137; F.O. 78/3972.
 ^Rosebery to Lyons, 2 April 1886, Ho.196; F.O. 146/280 7.
 ^ Rosebery's minute on India Office to Foreign Office, 30 A r c h  
1886; F.O.78/3972. Rosebery to Lyons, 13 April 1886, Ho.218 
Most confidential; F.0.146/2809. 'Waddington à Freycinet, 13 
avril 1886, tél.; Affaires étrangères, 816.
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mistake was that in producing the treaties he was merely begging 
the question: the dispute had arisen because the French would
not accept them. Salisbury, on the other hand, had wanted a 
joint examination of both sets of treaties, so that their 
respective validity could be decided as a preliminary to a 
settlement.
Meanwhile, in the absence of any clear directions from 
London, the local British authorities were taking matters into 
their own hands and pushing British influence west of Zeila.
There had been nothing in Hunter's agreements with the tribes 
directly acknowledging a protectorate; the treaties so far had 
amounted to little more than an engagement on the part of the 
chiefs not to cede their territory to any other Bower.^ Hunter 
felt French influence made it essential to bribe at least two of 
the tribes round Zeila - the Eesa and Gadabursi. There were 
precedents for bribery, including subsidies still being paid to 
the Habr Awal round Bulhar and Berbera, but it was none the 
less an infringement of the status quo agreed to by the 
Conservative Government, in that the Eesa and Gadabursi were the 
very tribes with whom Henri had made agreements. But Kimberley '  ^
and Rosebery decided to overlook this fact. Hunter was there-
^ ^ide Memo, by Bertie,. 13 February 1886, on the Question of the M 
Limits of French and British Protectorates on the Somali Coast /' 
(F.O. Confidential Print 5206), enclosed in Rosebery to îyons, . 
24 March 1886, Ho. 168; F.O. 146/2806. i
Memo, by Hunter, 8 February 1886 (copy), enclosed in Baring to 
Rosebery, 17 February 1886; F.O. 78/3971.
^ India Office to Foreign Office, 11 March 1886; F.O. 78/3971.
\ i-!
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fore able to conclude a series of supplementary treaties on 15 
March granting Britain a definite Protectorate over these tribes. 
One sub-tribe, the French-protected Gibril Abokr, was recalci­
trant, however. The methods Hunter used to make them submit to 
British protection show the consequences of local authorities 
having been allowed a free rein. The Gibril Abokr had apparently; 
been raiding some of the British-protected villages, and though 
inter-tribal warfare was hardly new to this area it provided an 
excuse for a punitive expedition. When Hunter, accompanied not 
only by troops but by about 2,500 tribesmen, reached his goal, 1 
the villagers panicked and tried to defend themselves by throwing 
stones. Hunter's forces opened fire and the villagers fled. Ho : 
one was killed, but three villages were systematically destroyed, 
and hundreds of cattle, camels and sheep were rounded up and 
looted by Hunter's "allies." At nightfall the animals were 
taken away. The herdsmen were subsequently allowed to make 
their peace with the British, and were ordered to sign a treaty 
of protection.^
Hunter's activities had immediate repercussions at Zeila. 
They convinced Henri of the futility of striving for influence 
south of the Gulf of Tajourrah unless he could first stmigthen 
the French position at Zeila. He hoped eventually to subject 
the tribes between Zeila and Ghubbet Kharab to a kind of pincer
^ Hunter to Hogg, 8 A r c h  1886 (copy)', enclosed in India Office 
to Foreign Office, 7 April 1886; F.O'. 78/3972.
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movement. So he oonoentrated on gaining native support at 
Zeila. This led to strife among the inhabitants, and as the 
town became more and more disorderly, Henri's relations with the 
British representative grew increasingly tense. King's reports 
led the Government to believe that Henri was preparing the ground 
for a French assault on the port. To proclaim a state of siege 
and enforce mardal law would have been premature, however, and 
the legal objections proved insuperable.^ But Rosebery demanded 
changes at the French Consulate: first, that Burhan, a son of
Abu Bekr, who had been left in charge during Henri's temporary 
absence at Aden,^ should be dismissed,^ and then, that Henri 
himself should be removed."^ He also wanted to invest King with 
supreme civil authority.^ Hunter objected to this, because in 
seeking Egyptian consent, (which would have been required since 
there was still an Egyptian garrison at Zeila,) Britain would 
have drawn attention to the fact that she had no sovereign right 
to the port. He believed the right course for the Government 
was to make it perfectly clear that Britain intended to stay at 
Zeila; French intrigues would then stop and order would gradually
1 Foreign Office to India Office (draft), 31 !ferch 1886;F.0.78/3972.
^ Baring to Rosebery, 3 April 1886, Tel, 33 Confidential; F.O.
W 3 9  7S.
® Rosebery to Lyons, 13 April 1886, Mo.216; F.O. 146/2809.
^ Rosebery to Lyons, 13 April 1886, No. 218 Most Confidential;
 ^F.O. 146/2809.
Rosebery to Baring (draft), 10 April 1886, Tel.34; Kimberley 
A d  concurred in this: In(iia Office to Foreign Office, 7 April
1886; F.O. 78/3972.
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be restored.^ His own friendly relations with the French
Resident at Obock, Lagarde, and with the French Consul at Aden,
de Gaspari, made him attach far less importance to Henri's
2
activities per se than the British Government did. The real 
danger in his view was that Britain had not made it clear that 
her occupation was to be permanent, and that France, to whom 
alone among the Powers Britain had notified her Protectorate, 
had never formally accepted British claims to Zeila; He was 
convinced that France desired another port besides Obock to 
serve as a supply base for her warships, and he feared that as 
they had now been debarred from obtaining one on the southern 
shore of the Gulf of Tajourrah, they would try for Zeila itself. 
That is why he was so apprehensive on hearing that Lemaire 
intended to visit the port on his way home from his mission to 
Zanaibar and Madagascar. IThy should he meet an obscure Oonsul 
in whom even the local French authorities had little confidence, 
unless he, and therefore his Government, considered it important 
to find out how French influence stood at Zeila?
Rosebery was very alarmed. Lemaire's forthcoming visit 
looked almost like a declaration of official French interest in 
British territory. After having heard that a warship was going •
^ Hunter to Baring, 21 April 1886 (copy), enclosed in Baring to 
Rosebery, 28 April 1886, Ho. 175; F.O. 78/3972.
 ^ Yi&e Hunter to Baring, 22 April 1886 (copy enclosed in Baring 
A  Rosebery, 28 April 1886, Ho. 175, F.O. 78/3972); and Barip 
g to Rosebery, 20 May 1886, Tel.; F.O. 78/3973.
Baring to Rosebery, 15 May 1886, Tel.70; F.O. 78/3973.
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s
to Zeila to hoist the French flag before lemaire arrived, he 
learned that a French gunboat, the Meteore. had in fact left 
Aden for an unknown destination. He decided to take preventive 
measures at once, and H.M, S. Gannet was sent to Zeila to join the 
one British vessel, H.M.S. Penguin, already stationed there.^
Lemaire's visit passed off without any untoward incident,
p
however. - Hunter had a friendly talk with Lemaire, and felt 
able to return to Aden on the Penguin. But he believed a 
continued show of force was necessary, and the Gannet remained 
at Zeila.^
In the meantime Rosebery had taken Hunter's advice, and
/
had decided that it was high time to come to an arrangement with 
the Porte, by which Britain would either be granted sole and 
permanent administrative rights at Zeila, or actual sovereignty.
The present situation was not only dangerous, but anomalous, in 
that under the terms of the Firman of 1875 granting Egypt the 
right to occupy and administer the port, the Egyptians were still 
paying the requisite tribute of £15,000. per annum to the Sultan, 
although the revenues of Zeila were now controlled by the British 
and provided no surplus for this payment. Before the Government*
Foreign Office-to Admiralty (draft), 14 July 1886, Secret; 
Admiralty to Foreign Office, 15 July 1886, Secret; Admiralty to 
Foreign Office, 17 July 1886; F.O. 78/3973. ,
2 Hunter to Baring, 18 July 1886 (copy) enclosed in Portal [Britië^ 
Consul-General in Cairo] to Rosebery,27 July 1886;F.O.78/3973. J
 ^ Wolff [British Consul in Alexandria] to Rosebery, 20 July 1886, |
Tel. 180; F.O. 78/3973. |
^ Vide Admiralty to Foreign Office, 20* July 1886, Confidential; ;
Foreign Office to Admiralty (draft), 21 July 1886; Rosebery to ,
Wolff (draft), 24 July 1886, Tel. 94; F.O. 78/3973. I
5 Foreign Office to India Office (draft), 2 July 1886,
Confidential; P.O. 78/39 73.
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had reached a decision, however, it fell from power.
9. THE AI3GL0-FRBH0H BOUHDABY DISPUTE. c) IDDESLEIGH’S POLICY.
 ^ Y'lhen the Conservatives returned in August 1886, Anglo-
French relations on the Coast were still strained. WHile France 
did not apparently desire to challenge Britain's position at 
Zeila, the anti-British activities of her representative there 
continued unchecked. Clashes between French and British F
protégés were frequent, and Henri saw to it that 'French' natives,.
1 ' were usually released unpunished. In the autumn he decided
that under cover of the disorder he could re-establish French
influence to the west. In November some French troops left Zeila
and landed at Ambadu. They were immediately killed by the
natives. This incident and the subsequent arrangements made for
3a joint investigation by Hunter and Lagarde re-opened the
4
territorial issue. But Iddesleigh, the new Foreign Secretary, 
wished to await the results of the investigation before embarking 
on negotiations for a general settlement. .The French agreed to
^ Portal to Iddesleigh, 3 September 1886, Ho.366 Confidential;.
F.O. 78/3974. Baring to Iddesleigh, 28 November 1886, Ho.494;
F.O. 78/3975.
 ^Baring to Iddesleigh, 23 Hovember 1886, Tel.144; Admiralty to 
Foreign Office, 23 Hovember 1886; F.O. 78/3974.
 ^ Iddesleigh to Baring (draft), 25 Hovember 1886, Tel.112; Baring : 
to Iddesleigh, 26 Hovember 1886, Tel.148; Foreign Office to 
Admiralty (draft), 26 Hovember 1886; F.O. 78/3974. Iddesleigh ; 
to Baring (draft), 1 December 1886, Tel., F.O. 78/39 75. Q
Iddesleigh to Lyons, 26 Hovember 1886, Ho.807; F.O.146/2832. C: 
Waddington a Freycinet, 30 novembre 1886, tél.73; Affaires 
étrangères, 819. Waddington to Iddesleigh, Pte., 1 December 
1886; F.O. 78/3975.
160
maintain the status quo in the disputed area meanwhile.^
It became increasingly clear that v/hile Henri remained 
at Zeila, however, it would be useless to start negotiating, 
since at any moment he might have involved Britain and France in 
fresh recriminations. A further incident occurred, this time at 
Dongarita, a deserted hamlet on the coast south of Zeila. The 
Frencji flag la d recently been flying there, doubtless at Henri's
instigation, and, the French complained,had been pulled down on
( 2
King's orders. The British saw .no possible excuse for any 
French claim since Dongarita was well within the British Protect­
orate.^ Meanwhile Henri was making King's position almost 
unbearable. He had found an ally in Bougrain, the captain of I 
the Meteore, which had been patrolling the coast since the recent I
•5 !
incidents, who actually accused King of having bribed the assas^nSf
4 Tv 'at Ambadu. In December Henri claimed that his life was in i
danger, and asked Bougrain to land troops. Before this could be j
carried out, Iddesleigh sent a strong protest to France,^ and so |
brought the question of local représentât ion to a head. If only, \
the British felt, they could get,Henri and Bougrain removed there ;
 ______________________________________________________________________________ I
 ^ Iddesleigh to Lyons, 1 December 1886, Ho.813; F.O.146/2832.
Iddesleigh to Baring (draft), 4 December 1886, Tel. 212; F.O. 78/0975, |
^ D'Aubigny [Councillor of the French Embassy in London] to Iddes-i 
leigh, 4 December 1886; Iddesleigh to Baring (draft), 7 |
December 1886, Tel.124; P.O. 78/3975. ;
^ Iddesleigh to Waddington (draft), 17 December 1886; F.O.78/3975 
^ Baring to Iddesleigh, 2 December 1886, Tel.158; F.O.78/3975. j
 ^ Iddesleigh to Lyons, 22 December 1886, Telegraphic despatch
Ho. 115; ibid.. Ho. 862; F.O. 146/2834.
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would be "a chance of peace and quiet. The French Government 
had for months been anxious to get rid of Henri., but their amour
n
propre required King's removal too. Iddesleigh was quite 
prepared to sacrifice the Vice-Gonsul. Both sides considered 
the bargain to be the necessary preliminary to a territorial 
settlement. In January 1887 the arrangements for the transfer 
of the two officials were completed, and it was agreed that
Bougrain also should be ordered elsewhere. France had previous-
5ly forbidden troops to be landed at Zeila. On 27 January King ,
and Henri left.^ 2
10. THE AHGLO-FRSHQH BOUNDARY DISPUTE. d) THE FINAL
NEGOTIATIONS. 188778%
Salisbury, who became Foreign Secretary after Iddesleigh's
death on 11 January, now felt able to resume the territorial
discussions. The French Government was equally anxious to settle
the dispute, and on the 7th had already invited the British to
reconsider a joint commission. The Ambadu incident was not now
^ Anute by Pauncefote, 24 December 1886, on Admiralty to Foreign ' 
Office, 24 December 1886; F.0.78/3975.
 ^ Lyons to Iddesleigh, 29 November 1886, No.659; F.O.27/2800.
 ^ Iddesleigh to Lyons, 27 December 1886, No. 874; F.O.146/2834.
Iddesleigh to Lyons, 29 December 1886, No.878; F.O. 146/2834.
Ibid.. 31 December 1886, No.888; F.O.146/2835. Ibid.. 1 January 
TF87, No.8; ibid..11 January 1887, No.18; F.0.146/2901. Lyons . 
to Iddesleigh, 29 December 1886, No.660; F.O.78/3975. Ibid.. ■
5 January 1887, No. 2, ;P.O. 78/4077. i m . , 11 January 1887,
No. 15; P.O. 27/2854.
 ^ Iddesleigh to Lyons, 28 December 1886, No.881; P.0.145/2834.
g Lyons to Iddesleigh, 30 December 1886, Tel.36; P.O. 78/3975.
Vide enclosures in India Office to Foreign Office, 7 February 
1887; P.O. 78/4078.
Iddesleigh to Lyons, 11 January 1887, No.18; P.0.146/2901.
Por the French Ambassador's instructions,vide Plourens a 
Waddington, 6 janvier 1887, tél.; Affaires étrangères. 821.
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allowed to stand in the way of negotiations ; with Henri's
removal muoh of the excitement it had engendered had died down,
and it did not affect the territorial issue since the motive
behind the French landing had been merely a re-statement of old
claims. The punishment of the guilty had been left to the local
authorities. Although his chief adviser was still very much
against a commission,^ Salisbury refused to become immersed in
technicalities. He did not see why a commission should be
regarded as the only means of reaching a settlement, and now that
the local situation was calmer, a commission had for him lost its
raison d 'être. Nor had he ever regarded a conmission as more
than the practical conclusion to an agreement on fundamentals
already reached through the normal diplomatic channels. Events
on the Goast since his previous tenure of the Foreign Office
seemed to point to the wisdom of settling the dispute as far as
possible in London. Still believing that an examination of
respective claims was important, he asked the French Ambassador
on 26 January to provide him with copies of the French treaties
of protection. A few days later Waddington sent him the text
of the agreements Henri had concluded with the Eesa, Gadabursi
and Gibril Abokr in March 1885.^
Salisbury was determined to come to terms quickly. He_
 ^Pauncefote's minute on India Office to Foreign Office, 18 
January 1887; F.O. 78/40 77.
3
Salisbury to Lyons, 3 February 1887, No. 83A; F.O. 146/2903. 
Waddington to Salisbury, 2 February 1887; F.O. 78/4078.
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Considered the attainment of a settled boundary was far more 
important than any of the issues involved. Personally, he 
thought the area was almost valueless: "a coast without harbours,
trade, produce, or strategic a d v a n t a g e . H i s  chief desire was 
to bring political stability to the Ooast, and so dispose of a 
tiresome irritant in Anglo-French relations. He wanted to 
prevent the repetition# of such incidents as the Dongarita flag
episode, which, he complained in a moment of depression after he
' ' 2 heard that the French flag had again been hoisted, was one of ^
those aspects of Anglo-French colonial relations that almost
made him wish for "another Franco-German War to put a stop to
this incessant vexation.
He was unable to proceed as quickly as he would have
liked, however, because of this very incident.^ The French
insisted on connecting it with the main issue, maintaining that
their claim to Dongarita derived from their treaty with the
5
Gibril Abokr. They also held that the status quo agreed on in 
January implied the right to uphold that claim;^ There had
1 Salisbury to Baring, 20 January 1888; Salisbury.IV. p.92.
 ^Baring to Salisbury, 4 February 1887, Telt%; ibid.. 5 February 
1887, Tel.48; India Office to Foreign Office, 4 February 1887; 
F.O. 78/4078.
^ Salisbury to Lyons, 5 February 1887; Lyons. II, p. 386.
^ Salisbury to Lyons, 4 February 1887, Ho.SH; F.O.146/2903.
Salisbury to Waddington (draft), 4 February 1887; F.O. 78/4078.
 ^ Waddington to Salisbury, 2 February 1887; F.O. 78/4078.
 ^ Waddington to Salisbury, 6 February 1887; F.O. 78/4078.
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1 *been a genuine misunderstanding on this point. Moreover the
»
Indian Secretary pointed out that the incident had raised an 
important matter of principle - that of French claims to territory 
within the British Protectorate. The Government of India and j
2  ithe local British representatives were equally emphatic; Hunter j
later went so far as to say he would rather have seen the French ; 
at Zeila than at Dongarita. Salisbury was, therefore forced to | 
clear up the question before starting to negotiate on the ;
original issue. He characteristically turned the obstacle to I
I
diplomatic advantage by using it as a bargaining counter in the |
current Anglo-French negotiations about the Suez Canal. He |
refused to make any progress in discussing this vital European I
5 I
issue until he had obfeined satisfaction about Dongarita. The 
place itself, he remarked in the course of a long and formidable 
statement of the British case, was singularly uninviting: '
uninhabited, and consisting of "a single clump of trees," a 
couple of huts, and a pole. He insisted that the French flag !
^ Of, the report of Pauncefote's conversation with Waddington on 
7 January 1887 in Iddesleigh to Lyons, 11 January 1887, Ho.18, 
F.O. 146/2901, and Waddington'a account in Affaires étrangères.821 
 ^ Viceroy of India ta Kimberley, 5 February 1887,Tel.(copy), en­
closed in India Office to Foreign Office, 7 February 1887; F.0. 
78/4078. Memo.by Hunter, 23 February 1887 (copy), enclosed in 
India Office to Foreign Office, 8 March 1887; F.O. 78/4079.Vide 
also extracts of a letter from Rear-Admiral Richards, 25 Feb- 
A a r y  1887, enclosed in Admiralty to Foreign Office, 17 March 
1887; F.O. 78/4079.
 ^Hunter to Baring, 20 February 1887 (copy), enclosed in Baring to 
Salisbury, 28 February 1887; F.O. 78/4078.
Salisbury to Lyons, 12 February 1887, Ho. 117; F.O.146/2904.
Memo, by T.H. Sanderson, 9 February 1887, on "The Ülaim to 
'hoist the French flag at Dongarita,"F.O. Confidential Print, Ho. 
5393, enclosed in Salisbury to Lyons, 23 February 1887, Ho.141;
^ F.O. 146/2905.
H i e  to I^o.a, 19 96 'leet;
should be removed, and eventually France gave in.
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1
The price the French exacted, however, was the total
2
abandonment of British claims west of Zeila. Although Salisbury 
niade a show of resistance, he was in reality delighted with the 
prospect of sweeping aside the complications of the original issue 
British acquie^ence in French claims as part of a straightforward 
bargain appeared to him a far more satisfactory mode of settlement 
than the compromise on respective rights that had been previously 
envisaged. The one point he had regarded as important had been 
Britain's hold on Zeila, and this was no longer in doubt. Hot 
only had French demands stopped short of Zeila, but Salisbury was 
now making arrangements, for the final transfer of the port to 
British administration,^ He felt, however, that it would be as 
well to establish the future boundary between the two Protectorates 
as far as possible from the port, and therefore proposed that it | 
should be drawn from a point on the coast a few miles to the |
Dyons, II, pp. 388 and 391.
— Salisbury to Waddington, 22 February 1887; printed copy en­
closed in Salisbury to Lyons, 22 February 1887, Ho.140. F.O. 
146/2905.
 ^ Lyons to Salisbury, 2 March 1887, Ho.108; F.O.78/4078. Salisbury 
to Lyons, 19 March 1887, Ho. 201; F.O. 146/2908.
2 Addington à Flourens, 22 mars 1887, no.14 confidentielle; |
Affaires étrangères, 822.
 ^ Waddington h Flourens, 31 mars 1887, no.XI; Affaires étrangères. 
822.
^ Since the autumn of 1886 the Foreign Secretary had urged the 
India Office to come to a decision about the future of Zeila 
(e.g. Foreign Office to India Office (draft), 24 September 1886, 
F.O. 78/2^ 74). In the following February Salisbury learned that 
the Government of India recommended the purchase of Zeila from 
the Porte: India Office to Foreign Office, 25 February 1887, 
Secret, enclosing copy of a report from the Government of India 
dated 18 January 1887; F.O.78/4078. Discussions with the Porte 
ensued shortly afterwards: vide Salisbury to Wolff (draft), 3 i
^oh 1887, Ho.14; Wolff to Salisbury, 16 March 1887, cypher ,
*  iI
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north-west, Bas Jihouti, and thence in a straight line to Earrar.
le
a.
He also stipulated an understanding about th  import of arras.^
These, proposals were immediately accepted.
Once Britain and France had come to terras, the details
3 :
of the settlement fell into place remarkably quickly. The |
French request that the islet of Bab should be included in the S
) V '
French Protectorate was easily granted, since although Bab had 
been formally British for many, years and although its cession 
would on this ground have necessitated Parliamentary consent, it > 
was considered part of the mainlahd and therefore within territory 
already French. France also wanted the i^asa Islands, however, i 
which could not possibly have been similarly defined. Salisbury h 
soon foundxan ingenious argument for getting round the problem of 
cession: Britain had never assumed the sovereignty of these
islands - the Sultan was still technically their suzerain, and
Tel,33; Salisbury to Wolff (draft), 9 April 1887, Tel.23;Wolff I 
to Salisbury, 10 April 1887, cypher Tel.52; ibid.. 11 April 1887! 
cypher Tel.53; F.0.78/4079. But purchase was not mentioned, i 
Since Britain realised that outright cession would necessitate 
European consent under the terras of the Treaty of Paris of 1856.. 
Although the Porte at first seemed to favour permanent British 
occupation, the Sultan apparently changed his mind later in the i 
year: vide Baring to Salisbury, 29 November 1887, Tel.256; F.O. | 
78/4083. But Salisbury felt that Turkish rights of sovereignty ' 
could be considered as having lapsed through the Porte's failure 
to occupy Bella in 1884, and he had "no intention of giving up" 
the port: Salisbury to %i t e  (draft), 14 December 1887, Tel.139 
Confidential; F.O. 78/4083. By 1888 the Egyptian garrison had 
Deen withdrawn, and Britain had supreme control of Zeila.
^ Salisbury to Lyons, 2 April 1887, ÏÏ0.223B; F.O.146/2910. 
Waddington à Flourens,‘ 2 avril 1887, no.XII confidentielle; 
Affaires étrangères. 822.
Flourens à Waddington (draft), 4 avril 1887, tél.40,[personal!; 
ibid.,5 avril 1887; Affaires étrangères,822. Waddington to 
Salisbury, 13 April 1887; F.O. 78/4079.
® Vide Salisbury to d'Aùbigny (draft), 19 April 1887; Foreign
Office to India Office (draft), 29 April 1887, Immediate and
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although the British flag had been hoisted in 1884, there had 
been no permanent oocupation, whereas the Berlin West African 
Conference of 1884-5 had stipulated that, in order to be valid, 
claims to overseas territory had to be based on "effective" 
occupation.^ The original idea of ba sing the territorial 
settlement on the treaties with the natives was thrown overboard, 
and in the final Agreement the names of the tribes within the two 
Protectorates were suppressed. In deference to the India Office, 
Salisbury tried to get the French to undertake not to send oonvictjj 
to their territory, but although the French agreed not to estab­
lish penal settlements, they reserved the right to send convicts
p
as a labour force for public works. This arrangement was 
informal, and not included in the main understanding. After an 
exchange of Motes in London had laid down the terms of the 
settlement,^ the Government of India pressed for a formal agree- 
meiit on the convict question.^ But Salisbury refused to act,^ 
feeling that ^such horror of penal settlements verged on caricature*;
Secret; India Office to foreign Office, 30 April 1887; F.O. 
?8/4079; and Waddington.à Flourens, 29 avril 1887, tél.35; 
Affaires étrangères" 822.
^ Waddington a Flourens, 3 mai 1887, tél.37; Affaires étrang'éres,823« 
^ Waddington to Salisbury, 13 April 1887; F.O.78/4079.
^ Waddington to Salisbury, 11 I.5ay 1887; F.O. 78/4080. Salisbury 
to Waddington, 20 Ivlay 1887; copy enclosed in Salisbury to Lyons, 
27 m y  1887, Mo. 311, F.O. 146/2914.
^ India Office to Foreign Office, 15 June 1887; F.O. 78/4081. i
^ Foreign Office to India Office (draft), 2 July 1887; F.O.
78/4081.
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was it really believed that the slave-trading Arabs of north­
east Africa were in danger of being cantaminated by a few 
European offenders?^
The British hoped there, would be no delay in the 
signature of a formal agreement between the two countries
embodying the terms of the Motes exchanged in May. But on 23 ' ■
June the French suddenly asked for a change in the proposed //
boundary. Salisbury was furious and believed France was trying"-
2to back out of the agreement. The ostensible reason for the
modification was that the boundary as it stood would have left f
certain grazing lands, at present used by herdsmen under French -
protection, within the British Protectorate.^ But the chief
motive was undoubtedly that the boundary would have crossed the
Bay of Jibouti and would thus have given another harbour to
Britain. Salisbury seems to have guessed this, since he asked /
Pauncefote to give the French ambassador the ironical advice that
"if the line includes a certain amount of salt water in our share-:
that is our loss.* Meither he himself nor anyone on the British:
side seems to have realised the potential strategic value of
Jibouti. The failure of Obock as a port (in the early 'nineties q
*1
Minute by Salisbury on India Office to Foreign Office, 15 June /
1887; F.O. 78/4081. q
^ Salisbury to Lyons, 20 July 1887; Lyons. II, p. 409.
^ Deleted passage in Salisbury to Lyons (rough draft), 20 July E
1887, Mo. 430, F.O. 78/4081, referring to part of Pauncefote's ’"
Conversation with Waddington on 23 June. Vide map^dl.
^ Minute by Salisbury following Pauncefote's conversation with 
Waddington on 23 June 1887; F.O. 78/4081.
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the French withdrew the Resident and left the place to subside
into the sand), the unexpected technical difficulties that.had
prevented the naval development of Ghubbet Kharab, the general
inferiority of the existing harbours in the French Protectorate
to the larger ones in the British, and the present unassailable
control Britain had over the southern approaches to Bab-e1-Mandeb
through Aden on the one shore and Berbera on the other - these
considerations had within the last two years given the British
a sense of naval security, a feeling they had not enjoyed since
the 'fifties. The fact that the French had not so far made any _
permanent naval use of their Protectorate, and apparently had
been unable to do so, blinded Britain to the possibility that
France might again attempt to lay the foundations of a great port.
Salisbury's real objection to the modification was that
if the local British authorities had been against it, he might
have had to have re-opened negotiations with France. At first '
he refused to consider the suggestion;, and urged the French to
1sign the original agreement without further delay. Simultaneously^ 
he notified all the Powers who had taken part in the Berlin 
Conference that Britain had a Protectorate extending along the 
Coast westwards from the forty-ninth parallel east to the tip of .
• p ^
Has Jibouti, not to the base - a boundary which would have left ^
 ^ Salisbury to Lyons, 20 July 1887, Ho. 430; F.O. 146/2920. Lyons- 
 ^ to Salisbury, 29 July 1887, Mo. 304; F.O. 78/4081. ^
Circular to-H.M. Representatives at the European Courts, 2Q 
July 1887; copy enclosed in Salisbury to Lyons, 20 July 1887,
Mo. 436, F.O. 146/2920.
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the Bay of Jihouti to France. Salisbury probably hoped that 
the announcement might persuade France that Britain had no 
intention of altering the frontier, but at the same time by not 
specifying how far inland the British Protectorate extended he 
left the door open for a compromise: the terms of the announce­
ment did not preclude France from holding the western shore of 
Ras Jibouti - though not the grazing grounds she claimed. He
postponed a definite answer till he had ascertained the local
1 '
authorities' views.
Hunter believed there was little point in rejecting the 
modification, since France would in any case secure most of the 
southern share of the Gulf of Tajourrah. His only objection, 
was that if Britain gave in she might suffer an economic loss, in
I
that France might establish a free port which would inevitably 
attract trade away from Zeila where duties were imposed. He 
therefore advised the Government to agree to the modification 
only on condition that France promised not to establish any free
p
port in the area. But despite Pauncefote's desire to strike a 
hard bargain, - Salisbury was not prepared to take up the free port 
question;'^ he regarded the economic value of the Coast as almost 
nil.
^ Waddington a Flourens, 15 août 1887, no. 94; Affaires étran.?ères 
824.
 ^Portal to Salisbury, 2 September 1887, Tel.202; P.O. 78/4082.
Pauncefote's minute on Portal to Salisbury, 11 September 1887; 
P.O. 78/4082.
^ Sanderson held the same opinion: vide his minute on India 
Office to Foreign Office, 5 September 1887; P.O. 78/4082.
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For a time Salisbury treated the exchange of Motes in
Ilay as binding on the two countries.^ But the French, knowing
the value of Jibouti, had decided to act on their own account.
In December Salisbury learned that they were already starting to
2
construct a port there. He believed it was better to accept
what they were doing than to start another colonial dispute. He
had made the agreement for diplomatic and local political reasons,
and he was unconcerned at the possibility of Jibouti's economic
superiority over the British ports on the Somali Coast.^ -So long
as the French did not encroach on the British Protectorate, he
felt all was well.^ He accepted the fait accompli. In February
1888 he conceded to France the entire southern shore of the Gulf
5
Of Tajourrah in a formal Anglo-French Agreement.
After 1869 the protection of the short route to the East 
became one of Britain's vital interests. However much the 
policies of successive British governments towards foreign 
settlements on the Somali Coast had differed in practice, they had i 
been framed in accordance with this basic principle. Complaisance,
^ Minute of 6 October 1887 on India Office to Foreign Office, 3 
October 1887; F.O. 78/4082. Salisbury'to Egerton, 13 December 
1887, Mo. 711; F.O. 146/2929.
 ^Baring to Salisbury, 8 December 1887, Tel.266; F.O. 78/4083.
^ Salisbury's minute on Baring to Salisbury, 24 December 1887,
Tel. 292; F.O. 78/4083.
Salisbury to Baring (draft), 9 December 1887, Tel. 163 ; F .0.78/4083,
 ^Agreement between the Governments of Great Britain and France 
with regard to the Somali Coast. February 1888/ A. and Cl8943,1 
X C V I  , Cc. 7389], p. 103. Vide map»II. ' ^
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Over the foundation of Jihouti is not so much evidence of lack 
of foresight as of confidence that Britain's position on the 
Gulf of Aden had been secured.
:î
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C H A P T E R  III
FORBIGH POIIOY VERSUS MATIOHAL INTERESTS:
The British attitude towards French action 
in Ifedagasoar»
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Besides the Somali Coast and Tunis, there was a third 
region over which British policy with regard to Fr/onch colonial 
ambition had to take into account strategic considerations : 
illadagascar• The British reaction to French policy in Madagascar 
is of unique interest, however, in that the course the Government 
took at first ran parallel to public opinion, and then in-1882, 
when the Franco-Malagasy quarrel came to a head, sharply 
diverged from it. As a nation, Britain condemned French action; 
as a Power, she condoned it. 'Attitude' and 'policy', in other
words, were not identical. How different the British attitude
/
towards French activities on the Gulf of Aden, where no vested 
religious or economic interests, no beliefs in national honour, 
were at stake ; the English public was largely indifferent to the 
affairs of the Somali Coast, and Britain's attitude originated in 
a calm assessment of strategic issues. "like the fable of the 
Wolf and the Lamb : " this was the comment' of a member of the 
Foreign Office on French claims to !%lagasy territory in 1882.^
The simile epitomises the attitude of the British Government and 
of English public opinion. French policy, prior to the 
establishment of a virtual protectorate over Madagascar in 1885 
aroused widespread condemnation in England at the time, and has
^ Minute by T.V. Lister on . Proctor [Malagasy Consul in London] 
to Lord Granville [transmitting copies of correspondence 
between the Hova Government and the French Consul in 
MadagasoaaQ, 19 July 1882; F.O. 48/36.
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continued to do so with lesser intensity ever since.^ The 
French attack on Ivîadagascar was often compared with the campaign 
against the Khamirs, but the moral indignation aroused was far 
greater than in the case of Tunis. Whereas the regime of the 
Tunisian Bey was Mohammedan and 'corrupt,' the Hova dynasty had 
been converted to Christianity in the eighteen-sixties, and was 
therefore felt to be entitled to special considérât ion from 
European Powers. Moreover, British subjects became personally 
involved in the war at its very outset, and several incidents 
occurred during the bombardment of Tamatave in .July 1883 which 
fanned national hostility towards France into a blaze of public 
excitement. The death of Pakenham, the British Consul, after 
the French naval authorities had sent him a peremptory order to 
leave the port, the imprisonment of an English missionary, Kev. 
Shaw, on charges of conspiracy with the Malagasies and of 
homicidal intentions against French soldiers, the dispute between 
the French Admiral and Commander Johnstone, who had been sent to 
give British lives and property naval protection - these events, 
once they became known in England, gave rise to the belief that
^ B.E.P. Wastell: "British Imperial Policy in Relation to
Madagascar 1810-1896" (unpublished.Ph.D. Thesis, London 1944), 
p. 641: 'Despite the loudly-voiced claims that France was 
iïierely exacting the recognition of her "uncontested and une on- ’ 
testable rights," the fact emerges that her sole rights were the 
rights conferred by the sword. Heither by discovery, unbroken 
settlement, nor cultural influence could she justify her claim, 
but only by reason of her triumjiiin war, and Madagascar may be 
regarded as the nineteenth century Abyssinia.'
f - : -
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the rights of British suhjeots had been violated and that the 
British flag had been deliberately insulted. Public demands for 
reparation were not entireiy, however, a spontaneous expression of 
independent opinion; large sectional interests, both economic 
and religious, stood'to lose if the French campaign were success­
ful. Missionary societies who had for years financed Protestant 
evangelism in Pladagascar and firms who had invested in î^îalagasy 
exports were among the leading opponents of French policy.
Interest, patriotic feeling, and a sense of moral outrage combined 
to produce an apparent tension in Anglo-French relations that had 
not existed since 1860.
The British Government secured public reparation and 
apology for some of the Tamatave incidents. But no official 
protest was ever made against French policy for its neglect of 
British interests in general. After the failure of her first 
attempt at mediation in 1882, Britain decided not to oppose 
French territorial claims. Yet from the early nineteenth century 
onwards she had always regarded !%dagascar as of national 
importance, not merely as a country in which British subjects 
happened to be interested.
1. BRITISH IBTERSSTS IB MADAGASCAR. 1815-1882.
The Napoleonic Wars had made Britain realise the 
strategic value of Madagascar with regard to the Gape route to 
the East. In the colonial settlement with France of 1814, she 
chose to retain the H e  de France (renamed Mauritius) as a 
strategic bastion, however, and not the French posts in
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I\Iadàgascar, for practical reasons: Mauritius had long been
explored and colonised and economically exploited, whereas after
a hundred and fifty years of precarious trading and spasmodic
/
settlement on the coasts of Ivladagascar, Europeans had not 
succeeded in penetrating more than the fringe of this vast and 
still unexplored island. But Britain looked to the future and 
after about 1820 her policy was to preserve Malagasy independence 
from the possibility of French encroachment. Her objectives were
summed up by the Colonial Office in 1837 as, first, the abolition ;
i
of the slave trade in and around Madagascar, second, the enoourage-|
ment of "commerce and civilization," and third, the prevention of
a French acquisition either of Malagasy territory or of paramount j
influence over the. Ho va Government. This last objective was
explained as follows : "France has frequently sought, and still,
perhaps, desires a settlement on the island. Since she lost
Mauritius, she is in want of a ^ e  and commodious harbour, which
she might find in Madagascar, but such an acquisition would
produce incalculable mischief to British Trade in the Eastern
1
Seas in case of war." Palmerston therefore consistently opposed 
French plans to secure territory on the north-west coast. To this 
snd, Britain started to foster a tradition of common Anglo-French 
interests. The temporary hostility of the Hova Government towards
Cited in Hertslet's Memorandum of 14 August 1878 on "French 
claims to Sovereignty oyer the North-West Malagasy^ Coast," F.O 
Confidential Print, enclosed in Granville to Lyons, 26 July 
1882, Slave Trade No. 49; F.O. 146/2500.
17a ,
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Europeans enabled her to participate in punitive measures - |
notably the joint Anglo-French bombardment of Tamatave in 1845. |
She was assisted by her diplomatic alignment with France at several | 
periods during the 'forties and 'fifties. In the 'sixties, i
although the entente had crumbled, Britain still referred, when­
ever the French were about to renew their territorial claims on 
Madagascar, to a 'special understanding' that there should be no nev/iI
departure in policy over Madagascar without previous agreement nor ij 
any attempt at exclusive privileges.
Meanwhile Britain had profited from the re-opening of 
Madagascar to foreigners after 1855. The public imagination had | 
been caught by travellers' accounts of this prosperous and fertile,! 
yet heathen, land, and Christian evangelists had'seized their |
opportunity. The work of the London Missionary Society and
i
other bodies paved the way for increased British economic and 
political influence. The export trade was stimulated, though*in 
fact the 'closing' of Malagasy ports between 1847 and 1853 had 
not been complete; merchants in Mauritius had protected their 
own interests by privately compensating the Hova Government for 
the bombardment of Tamatave. But with the restoration of more 
normal conditions, English firms regained confidence and after 
1855 large sums were invested in sugar plantations and other 
commercial ventures. These developments gave substance to 
Britain's claim to equal rights with France. At the same time, 
there was growing Franco-Malagasy tension. France was reluctant 
to recognise Hova sovereignty over the whole island, in particular 
Over the Sakalava chiefs on the west coast, with whom she had
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concluded treaties of protection in 1840 and 1841. Then 
Rasoherina, who became Queen in 1863, opposed her predecessor's 
economic concessions to the French. In 1868, after her death, 
France managed to secure a treaty putting her economic relations 
with Madagascar on a firmer footing, but Britain had already 
signed a similar treaty three years before. Under Queen 
Ranavalonâ (1868-1883) Protestant Christianity became the State 
religion. One indication of the extent to which she relied on 
English counsel and support was the îlalagasies' description of 
the system by which fines were imposed for non-attendance at 
Church as "the English corvée." By the 'seventies Britain lad 
a stake in Madagascar at least as great as that of France.
Though there were other European nationals in the country - 
principally German jbraders, the British and the French were the 
sole rivals for political influence.
' 2. THE CONVENTIONAL EIvPLANATIGN OF BRITISH POLICY IN 
1882-3.
1Previous writers have tried to explain why Britain 
abandoned Madagascar to France in the 'eighties. They have 
given one or both of two reasons, a strategic and a diplomatic.
The strategic explanation is that after the opening of the Suez
^ There are two comprehensive accounbs of British policy based on| 
^npublished material: Sonia E. Howe: The Drama of Mada.p:ascar -j
(London,1038), and Wastell, op.cit. Brief accounts are given 
In Fitzmaurice: Granville, vl. II, pp. 314-6, Gwynn and Tuckwell:'
Pi Ike, vol.I, pp. 538-41, and Knaplund: Gladstone's Foreign
Policy, p. 123.
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Canal the Palmerstonian doctrine that Britain should maintain 
naval preponderance in the south-western Indian Ocean no longer 
applied. Quite apart from the trend of French policy in the 
later 'seventies, Britain was pre-disposed not to defend Malagasy 
territorial integrity.^ This does not explain, however, why 
Britain made no portest whatever against a war to extract 
territorial concessions from a hitherto .independent country with 
whom she had treaties granting her economic and other rights 
equal to those of France. This objection has been asnwered by 
the diplomatic explanation. In view of the Egyptian situation, 
Britain voluntarily abdicated her political influence in 
Ivladagascar in order to preserve the remnants of Anglo-French
o
understanding. But the argument continues, Britain's hand was
^ E.g. Wastell, op.cit., p.400, "The opening of the Suez Canal... 
Seriously decreased the value of Madagascar as a strategic 
stronghold in the eyes of British statesmen."
 ^E.g. Granville, II, p.316: "Lord Granville regretted the 
impossibility of taking a stronger line against the French 
proceedings in Madagascar [in 1883] owing to the situation in - 
Egypt." Wastell goes so far as to state that there was an 
Egypt-Iüadagascar bargain, that in return for a free hand in 
Egypt Britain was prepared to allow France to extend her influ-, / 
enoe in idadagascar (p.445). "The Cabinet 's hands were tied'by Q 
a previous agreement with France arising out of the E^rptian 
Settlement" (p.635). The only evidence he produces is that inq 
the autumn of 1882, "the English Consul for Madagascar visited 
the Foreign Office to ascertain the truth [of a rumour àbout 
such a bargain]... and the very absence of positive assurance 
to the contrary revealed the fact that some such working  ^
agreement was in operation" (p.445). * . '-m
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forced by the Tamatave incidents. Violation of British 
neutrality called for reparation, even at the cost of serious 
diplomatic estrangement. Although the crisis of 1883 was a 
conflict not of interest but of national honour, the risk of war 
was involved.^
Taken as a Wiole, this analysis of British policy i s , 
slightly misleading. It underestimates the sacrifice of interest g 
Britain made over Madagascar, and it over-estimates the importance- 
of the Tamatave incidents in Anglo-French relations. The 
component arguments need modification in the light of new sources 
and of a. fresh examination of the documentary evidence hitherto 
available.
3. STRATEGIC CONSIDERATIONS.
Although the opening of the Suez Canal diminished the 
strategic value of Madagascar, it did not change the British 
attitude towards the protection of the Cape route to the extent 
that has often been supposed. After 1869 and until 1883 Britain
^ Wastell seems to imply that if Fran) e had not yielded, Britain , 
would have gone-to war. E.g. "More serious insults to the 
I British flag very nearly precipitated hostilities betv;een France'
and Britain, insults which even the pacific Gladstone could not 
ignore" (pp. 636-7). "With the repudiation of the reprehensible! 
conduct of the French officials in Madagascar, the storm clouds/- 
Of war over Europe slowly dispersed" (p.497). Miss Howe cites g 
a personal letter from Granville to Waddington, dated 23 
September 1883, urging that France should give compensation 
before Shaw's arrival in England since "a stiteh in time saves 
nine" and sim e otherwise the Government might not be able to 
"stem the current" of public opinion, as an illustration of 
"how very close to the brink of war with France England had 
been*!:' The Drama of Mada^cascar. p. 262.
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still opposed French claims to territory in north-west Madagascar,
and refused to admit that France had any territorial rights apart
from the island of Nossi Be. One writer has claimed that Britain
was "concerned purely with the advancement of her trading
2
facilities and the protection of her nationals," as if her 
insistance on Hova sovereignty over the whole of Ivladagascar was 
solely in order to prevent France creating ports subject to 
differential duties. In fact, Britain objected to French claims 
for one of the reasons that France maintained them, - that the 
Sakalava coastline was conveniently near to Diego Suarez, 
potentially valuable as a naval base. The opening of the Suez 
G anal affected the strategic outlook of English Ministers and 
officials less than has been assumed. After about 1875 they 
became afraid, since Britain's apparent ability to defend the 
Oanal was not so great as it became later, that if Britain became . 
involved in war with a European Power, the Oanal would be the 
first target for enemy attack. Not until the Suez Oanal 
Convention of 1888 was the freedom of the Oanal at all times to 
the ships of all nations made part of international law. Even 
after 1882, the fear remained, for Britain was under constant 
diplomatic pressure about her position in Egypt. Britain had 
to reckon with the possibility that in time of war she would not
^ Vide Foreign Office to Admiralty, 24 September 1878; Admiralty 
1/0457.2
Wastell, pjq. pit., p. 634.
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i
be able to maintain her communications with the East via the ■
I
Canal route. In that case she would have been thrown back on
I >■ i'
the old route via the Gape of Good Hope. Now the strategic j
importance of Madagascar to Britain had always been in the last
1(
resort a naval one, and I'lalagasy independence a safeguard against 
interference with British trade and communications with the East 
in time of war. That this still applied in 1882 is shown by a 
Foreign Office Memorandum of that year on British interests in 
Madagascar: in outlining the "General Considerations by which we
have been influenced in maintaining the Independence of Madagasca:]/^ 
economic and the rest, the document gives "the political reasons" 
as
"Those which in 1810 induced us to seize, and which have 
since made us retain Mauritius.
They are the danger of allowing France or any other 
nation to occupy the commanding position which I.4adagascar 
affords for attacking our possessions at the Gape and in 
India, and interfering with vessels going to India by the 
long sea route, as they m y  again be compelled to do by 
complications in the Suez Oanal. Amongst other large and ' 
convenient harbours which this rich island affords, that of 
Diego Suarez... may be specially mentioned as having been 
coveted by the French. The Island of Réunion, their only 
present base in these waters except the unimportant islands 
of Mayotte, Nossi Bé and Ste. î^ îarie, has no strength as a 
military or naval station.
Some naval experts considered that the long sea route to the East j
would have definite advantages over the Canal route in wartime,
quite apart from the question of whether the Canal could be kept
 ^Memorandum on I%dagascar by Clement Hill, 20 October 1882, F.O. % 
Confidential Print, enclosed in Granville to Lyons, 26 October _ 
1882, Slave Trade No. 77, Confidential; F.O. 146/2501.
saw
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Open or not. As Sir Thomas Brassey pointed out to the Prime 
Minister, the time normally saved by the short route was counter 
balanced by technical drawbacks where the transit of troops was 
concerned; it was impossible for large ships, and therefore many 
existing troopships, to enter the Canal, and the heat of the Red 
Sea precluded rapid steaming. Brassey also believed that since 
a quick concentration of troops already stationed in India had 
been made possible by the construction of railways, the time 
factor in communications with the East was of only subsidiary 
importance in the defence of India.^
Primarily because of these strategic considerations, 
Britain consistently opposed French claims to territory in north­
west Madagascar, until it became clear that she could only do so 
at the cost of a complete break with France. During the early 
stages of the final Franco-I.4alagasy dispute, between 1880 and 
1882, Britain took a firm stand on behalf of the Hova Grovernraent. 
For some years after the Franco-Prussian War, there had been no 
sign of any serious conflict between British and French interests. 
The French Consul, Jean Laborde, had lived many years in the
country, and was on the most friendly terms with the native
' 2 
authorities and also with Pakenham, his English colleague. He
^ Memorandum by Sir Thomas Brassey, 5 July 1882, "On the relative 
advantages of the routes to India by the Suez Canal and the 
Cape of Good Hope," (submitted to Gladstone); B.M. Add. M.S. 
44628.
Both Consuls had personal ties with the Hovas. Laborde had been 
^ pioneer entrepreneur, and had acquired extensive concessions 
real estate from the Government. Pakenham had a Malagasy 
wife.
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died in 1879, however, and his successor, Eugene Cassas, had no 
intention of co-operating with the British. Pakenham's reports 
home were soon full of complaints about the new Consul's hostility 
both towards himself and the Hova Government.^ Cassas was 
evidently trying to provoke the authorities into taking some 
action whic h would enable him to manoevre his government into 
renewing their former territorial demands. After deliberately 
magnifying a dispute oter the disposal of Laborde's estate, he 
hauled down his consular flag at the capital and left Antananarivo 
for Tanatave, to await the results of what he considered to be 
the rupture of Franco-I%lagasy relations. The- French Government 
did not support him. When' further difficulties arose, Britain
acted promptly. She complained to France about the Consul's
2
attitude, and then re-inforced her arguments by sending part of
the East African Fleet to Tamatave. Shortly afterwards Cassas
3
was disavowed and was recalled early in L881. But although 
Freycinet referred to the "entente amical que nos deux Governe- 
ments désirent maintenir dans les affaires du Madagascar,"^ 
Granville was not re-assured. The visit of the French Far 
Eastern Squadron to Ivfedagascar in the summer of 1880 was accom-
^ ^ide Salisbury to Lyons, 6 March 1880, No.222; F.O. 146/2210.
 ^Lyons to Salisbury, 10 March 1880, Do. 204; F.O. 27/2428;
Wastell: cit.. pp. 409-10. Vide Lyons to Granville, 31
December 1880, No. 1203; F.O. 27/2408.
Freycinet to Adams, 19 July 1880 (copy), enclosed in Adams to 
Granville, 22 July 1880, No. 647; P.O. 27/2432.
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Panied by disquieting rumours that France intended to seize the
1
north-west coast. Admiral Gore-Jones, who had been in command
of the naval visit to Tamatave, confirmed these reports. "There
can be no doubt," he wrote home, "that we can have no option about
rivalry with the French - for if Madagascar is not free and
independent under a Hova Governrrent, ^he must certainly become
French, and they are fully prepared, if the political cards will
2
give them a chance, to possess themselves of the whole island.” 
Granville decided to comply with Queen Hanavalona's desire for 
some tangible proof of Britain's concern for the independente of 
her country, and in 1881 a formal mission under Gore-Jones was 
sent to Antananarivo. As far as Anglo-Malagasy relations were 
concerned, it was an unqualified success.
Besides giving moral support to the Hova Government, 
Granville tried to stave off French territorial claims by more 
direct means. Sakalava attacks on French and British trading 
posts in the south-west gave him an excuse to propose a joint 
punitive expedition on behalf of the central government. With 
the aid of European arms, Hova authority over the coastal tribes 
could easily have been enforced, and thus any future French claims/ 
based on,treaties of protection with the Sakalavas would have be en :
rr
made untenable. But France refused to be drawn, and Granville'sj
 ^Granville to Lyons, 25 June 1880, No. 775; F.O. 146/2226.
® Gore-Jones to Northbrook, 1 January 1881; quoted in Wastell:
0P• c i t pp. 411—2.
® Hear-Admiral Gore-Jones [Commander-in-Chief, Mauritius Station], 
to Granville, Pte,, 4 August 1881; G.D. 29/137.
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attempt to revive Anglo-French co-operation was no more success­
ful over the north-west coast, where the tribes were also 
reported to have been pillaging European trade depots. In the 
meantime the Hova flag had been hoisted at several points on the 
west coast at the instigation.of some Englishmen, and the French 
Consul had sent an ultimatum to the Queen demanding the immediate 
withdrawal of these flags. In 1882 France turned dojvn the 
British proposal of a joint expedition to the north-west on the 
ground that "les procédés aujourd'hui avérés du Go^ornement de * 
Tananarive a notre égard nous placent dans 1 'impossibilité 
absolue de prêter notre concours même indirect a la réalisation
des projets qû'il médite sur la cote occidentale de l'île." '
3French naval officers removed the Hova flags, and claimed the.
4
entire coastline from Cape Sebastien to Cape St. Vincent.
Although the Franco-Malagasy dispute had now become an
open quarrel, Britain at once took sides'by challenging French
5 Ô
claims. But France based her case on long-standing treaty rights.
 ^Hoc, dipl. fr., I, iv, nos. 230, 269, and 305.
 ^Freycinet à Tissot, 1 mai 1882,.Doc. dipl. fr., I, iv, p.294, 
no. 305.
 ^ Pakenham to Granville, 22 July 1882, tel.; F.O. 48/36.
^  Pakenham to Granville, 8 May 1882T, No. 7; F.O.^ 48/36.
Granville to Lyons, 26 July 1882, Slave Trade No. 49; ibid., 4 
August 1882, Slave Trade No. 53; F.O. 146/2500. Lyons to 
- Granville, 7 August 1882, Slave Trade No. 42; ibid., 10 August 
1882, Slave Trade No. 46; F.O. 48/36. Granville to Lyons,
21 August 1882, A. ^  P., [1883] , XLVIII, [0.3476], p. 3 , No.7.
 ^ Lyons to Granville, 16 August 1882, Slave Trade No. 49;
F.O. 48/36.
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Her evident determination foroed Granville to re-consider her
- 'S
claims on their merits. Always realistic in his approach to J
I
imperial problems, he decided that so long as French protection |
was confined to the west coast, Britain's naval position would, be •'
hardly affected. The inherent danger in the acquisition was i!
that France might seek further concessions, and at one stage '
1 :
Granville considered securing Diego Suarez for Britain. But he
soon realised that France would never consent to such an arrange- a
I
ment. Was he then to abandon I^dagascar altogether? His
A  ■ îi
answer was that Malagasy independence was still of sufficient 
strategic importance to Britain to warrant diplomatic resistance , 
to French claims, but that it was not great enough to justify a 
resort to force. It was not, in other words, a vital British 
interest. He also felt bound to protect Britain's other interests 
in Madagascar - religious and economic - by all possible diplo- | 
matic means. Granville hoped to defeat French ambition by skil- Ij
I•j
ful diplomacy alone. I
4. BRITISH POLIOY. OQTOBEH 1882 to JANUARY 1885. J
As in Tunis, so in Madagascar Britain's surrender to  ^
French interests was gradual, not immediate. Granville was j
calculating not so much the effect of his'policy on the j
%yptian situation as the extent to which he could resist France
 ^Howe: Drama of Madagascar, op. cit., p. 255. •• 1
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without either creating a major diplomatic crisis or committing
himself to verbal protests which could lead only to an
ignominious retreat in the eys of public opinion. His concern
for British interests was too strong for him to become a party
to an early bargain, however tacit, over Egypt and Madagascar.
Since this has not been generally recognised, his policy in the
autumn of 1882 must be examined.
There was one obvious course for British diplomacy:
mediation. The Hova government sent a special embassy to Europe
to negotiate in Paris, thus giving Britain an opportunity to
1
offer her good offices. Now there were other questions at
issue between France and Madagascar besides the French claim to a
protectorate over the north-west coast. In Inarch 1881 the Hova
Government had passed a land law that included a clause known as
'Law 85' which forbade the sale of freehold land to foreigners
and which France held was a violation of the Franco-Malagasy
Treaty of 1868. This, enactment affected British subjects as
well as French. In offering her good offices, Britain hoped to
be able to confine the Franco-I/Ialagasy negotiations to the land
2
question, and other purely administrative matters.
 ^ Granville to Plunkett, 7 October 1882, A. and P., [1885], 
XLVIII, [0. 5476], p. 7, No. 12.
 ^yide a note by T.V. Lister on "Ivladagascar Enbassy," 4 October 
T882 :,,. "On one point - the Law ag#Lii^st foreigners acquiring 
land in Madagascar our interests are the same as those of the 
French and we hold that the Law is contrary to Treaty. On the 
other points of their [the Hovas'] quarrel with France I 
believe the French to be in the wrong...." F.O. 48/56.
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But in continually referring to the identity of French and British ; 
interests in Madagascar, Granville protested'too much. The French 
already suspected that Britain was secretly encouraging Madagascar,' 
despite assurances from the Foreign Office that their only j
information about the Hova embassy was derived from the Press. 
Moreover, from the point of view of French acceptance, the 
wording of Granville's offer of mediation was singularly unfortu­
nate: "Her Majesty's Government would be glad to be in-a position :
to offer their good offices, if acceptable, with a view to the I
■  I;
restoration of the 'status quo'," î
The French Foreign Minister refused to be diverted from 1
his main objective. Less than a week after he had received the ^
■-1
British offer, he made it clear what his formal answer would be.
He said France was dealing with an independent :§tate, that a 
third Power had no right to interfere, and that he had searched 
the archives of the Quai d'Orsay in vain'for "any trace of an 
understanding on the part of France not to act in Madagascar ? 
without previous consultation with E n g l a n d . O n  the previous 
day, 17 October, formal discussions between the Hova envoys and 
the French government had already begun. Buclerc plainly intend­
ed to carry out his plans without reference to Britain.
Tissot a Buclerc, 6 septembre 1882, tél.; Affaires étrangères, 
796. A copy was sent to the Ministère des colonies on 11 
September; Archives du Ministère des colonies. Madagascar 84, 
m  189-84. --------------- ------------------ - --
2 Plunkett to Granville, 19 October 1882, Mo.1103; P.O. 27/2570.
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Granville realised that the French and î'Æalagasy view 
points were irreconcilable, and feared that the inevitable 
failure of the negotiations would provide a convenient pretext 
for subsequent French action. On the 27th he discussed the 
situation with some of his Cabinet colleagues. They agreed that 
if France forced îvîadagascar to accept her terms, Britain would 
stand aside.^ To Granville, the position was somewhat as
follows: Britain was the only Power apart from France with
national interests in ifeidagascar; she could expect no dipbmatic 
support for any attempt to restrain France, especially as the 
French had at present the unqualified backing of Germany in 
colonial enterprise; since Anglo-French relations had already 
deteriorated beyond the stage when France had been prepared to 
forego colonial advantages for the sake of British good will - as 
Freycinet had to some extent in 1880-1 - a mere protest from 
.Britain would have had no effect on the Franco-Lîalagasy issue; 
but more effective measures, such as a hint of armed intervention, 
were unthinkable ; diplomatically isolated, Britain would be 
reduced to impotence if France attempted to realise her ambitions.
lio doubt Salisbury would not have thought in these terms; 
he would have tried to set one colonial issue against another and 
to have struck a bargain with France. But that type of negotia­
tion was alien to Liberal practice, and Granville was more
 ^Dilke Political Diary, 27 October 1882, B.M. Add. MS 43935.
Gwynn and Tuckwell: Dilke. I, p. 539.
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Gonoerned than Salisbury was (until Salisbury’s conversion to 
colonialism in about 1889) with the individual merits of each 
colonial issue. He was also prepared to sacrifice non-vital 
overseas interests when their maintenance would have been in i
serious conflict with his foreign policy. Where the French 
adopted a policy of gradual penetration - as on the Somali Coast 
(and in West Africa) - he was ready to beat them on their own 
ground; in such cases he believed that the imperial advantages 
of protecting British interests heavily outweighed the diplomatic 
disadvantages. The determination France showed over Madagascar ■
in the autumn of 1882, however, necessitated an assessment of j
really major alternatives, and Granville’s answer was colonial 
Surrender. He certainly considered, as previous writers have |
insisted, the potential effect of Anglo-French hostility over 
Madagascar on Britain’s position in Egypt, but this was a sub- 
ordinate aspect of the diplomatic problem that faced him - the \
maintenance of British interests, or the risk of destroying the 
already crumbling foundation of Liberal foreign policy, the Anglo- ;j 
French entente.
The decision that had been reached at the 27 October «I
meeting was later accepted by the full Cabinet. The prevailing 
opinion was that since there was a possibility of a French 
expedition to fedagascar, any avowed opposition to French
 ^Yi&e Granville to Lyons, 14 November 1882, Slave Trade No. 82, 
'Onfidential, F.O. 14 6/2501, and Lyons to Granville, 17 ^
November 1882, quoted by Wastell, p. 448.
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territorial claims might commit Britain to a policy involving
1
the risk of war.
The break-down of the Franco-T^lagasy negotiations in 
November and the subsequent arrival of the Hova envoys in London 
gave Granville an opportunity to employ a new diplomatic gambit, 
however. The Malagasy cause was beginning to evoke widespread 
sympathy in England. Societies and pressure groups interested
in Madagascar, as well as the Conservative Opposition, started
/
to canalise public opinion into a demand for strong resistance
to French claims. The most influential of these groups was the
'Madagascar Committe’, presided over by the Bishop of London,
whose members included sixty-seven Members of Parliament and a
2large number of clergy of various denominations. The Committee 
managed to arrange a meeting with the Foreign Secretary at the end
g
of November. Another influential body was the Aborigines 
Protection Society, who advocated American arbitration for the 
Franco-Malagasy dispute.^ All shades of public opinion seemed 
blended into a common antagonism to France; this, the French
1 Dllke Political Diary, 28 November 1882, B.M. Add.MS. 43935.
 ^A list of members is given in 'Madagascar Tracts Mo. 1 .
% a t  are "French claims" in Madagascar? ' A statement by the 
iviadagasoar Gommittee. ' enclosed in Granville to Lyons, 29 
November 1882, Slave Trade No. 88; P.O. 146/2501.
® Granville to Lynns, 27 November 1882, Slave Trade No. 90; 
P.O. 146/2501.
^ Dllke. I, p. 539.
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i
Ambassador felt, was due to the fact that the question of
j
Madagascar involved issues ”a la fois religieuses et politiques :
I
qui, de ce coté de la ï%nche, mettent toujours tout le monde 
d'accord."^ Yi/hatever the explanation, Granville saw that public i
I
opinion was sufficiently roused to warrant an attempt at •
diplomatic bluff. "We do not mean to quarrel," he explained to 
the British Ambassador in Paris, "but we do not wish the French ;
2 I
to think they are safe on the subject." Hé therefore took the \ 
line that although the British Government, had no desire to oppose i
j
France in any way,' the pressure of English public opinion might 
make it impossible for Britain to accept any settlement of Franco-| 
Malagasy difficulties that was not compatible with British 
interests. In asking for "a system of frank intercommunication,"| 
he was in reality demanding British participation in a settle­
ment that would satisfy both French and British interests on
administrative questions and that would exclude altogether French \
4 ^territorial claims. At the beginning of December he formally
received the Hova envoys and started to discuss a revision of
Law 85 with them.^
 ^Tissot à Duclerc, 30 novembre 1882, no.99; Affaires étranp:ères,
Y97.
2 Granville to Lyons (copy), Pte.» 1 December 1882; G.D.29/203.
 ^ Granville to Lyons, 29 November 1882, Slave Trade Ho.88; 'F.O.• 
146/2501. . Vide the French translation of Lyons’s Note Verbale 
to Duclerc, 30 November 1882, in Doc, dipl. fr., I, iv, p.545, 
%o. 565.
^ Vide Tissot à Duclerc, 6 janvier 1833, no.3; Affaires 
 ^ étrangères. 798.
Granville to Lyons, 2 December 1882, Slave Trade No. 93; ibid., 
5 December 1882, Slave Trade No. 96; F.O. 146/2501.
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A week later, however, Granville’s scheme was ruined.
Lord Derby made a public speech at ’lanchester indicating that in
the last resort Britain v;ould not be prepared to defend Malagasy
territorial integrity. The Prime Minister assured the Oueen
that the Cabinet need not be bound by what amounted to a mere
1
expression of opinion by an independent peer, but since Derby 
was on the point of entering the Cabinet his words had the ring 
of truth. Granville was furious; Dilke declared he had never 
known him to be "so cross with anybody about anything."
Nevertheless Granville’s only hope of success was to . 
ignore the incident. He had made considerable progress in his D 
talks with the Hovas over the question of private property :n
■'■I
contracts, and he tried to use British achievements in this '
direction as an inducement to France to resume negotiations with
3
Madagascar. Again he offered Britain’s good offices. But  ^N
this last appeal failed. The game of bluff was over. The , 1
French Government, Duclerc claimed, had reached the limit of all A
5
possible concessio'ns, Gladstone was pained by his "churlish tone. /
    _______________
 ^ Gladstone to the Queen, 15 December 1882; Queen Victoria’s 
Letters. II, iii, p. 399. ^
 ^ Dilke Political Diary, 15 December 1882, B.M. Add. MS, 43935. p 
For a>further extract from this.entry, vide Granville, II,p.316QJ 
^ Granville to Lyons, 19 December 1882, Slave Trade No. 101; F.O* i
146/2501. Lyons to Duclerc, 22 December 1882; Livre Jaune.
Affaires de Madagascar. 1881-3. po. 35, pp. 7S-6» -4
^ Duclerc à Tissot, 4 janvier 1883; Livre Jaune. Affaires de "■%
Madagascar. 1881-3, no, 34> pp, 74-5. V
Gladstone to Granville (copy), Pte., 13 January 1883; B.M. /
Add, MS. 44546. - I
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Britain had been relegated to the role of an onlooker.
France now openly alluded to the possibility of a Franco-Ilîalagasy
war, while assuring Britain that British and French nationals in
]_
Madagascar would be given equal protection. In April the French 
campaign started. Henceforward British policy was concerned 
solely with the rights and property of British subjects.
5. THE TAJvIATAVE INQIDENTS.
Having in effect sanctioned French action by default, 
Granville now hoped to make diplomatic capital out of Britain’s 
sacrifice. He wanted to repair the damage done to Anglo-French
relations. Hence his conciliatory attitude (ignored in most
accounts of the question) tov/ards the Tamatave incidents. He was 
particularly anxious not to impede the current Egyptian and Suez 
Canal negotiations. He acted from conviction as well as from 
policy, for to him the incidents involved no fresh conflict of 
interest, nor the ’national honour ’ of either country. His 
realism prevented him from equating ’prestige’ with ’interest,’ 
and 'from blaming governments for the irresponsibility of their 
subjects. Nevertheless the rights of British subjects had been 
infringed through the actions of representatives of France, and 
the pressure of pyblic opinion forced him to exact reparation.
But to Granville this was a legal matter, and one which did not 
need to harm Anglo-French relations. Throughout the negotiations,
 ^Duclerc a Tissot, 8 janvier 1883; Livre Jaune, Affaires de 
Madagascar. 1881-3. no. 36, pp. 79-9,
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he disassociated himself from those (some members of thé Cabinet 
included, though not the Prime Minister) who regarded the 
incidents as having raised a moral issue. From his point of 
view, the moral and material damage had already been done - when 
the war started.
After the death of Pakenham and the arrest of Shaw 
became known in England in July 1883, Granville tried to show 
that though he deplored the actions of Admiral Pierre,^ he 
attached no direct blame to the French Government. Far from 
holding France responsible for the incidents, he was willing to 
admit there might have been fault on both sides. He readily 
agreed to the proposition that both Governments should pool their 
information about what had actually happened at Tamatave - with
regard to the dispute between Pierre and Johnstone as well as to
2
the other incidents - before discussing a remedy. In the
meantime, Government spokesmen, himself included, fobbed off
questioners in Parliament with non-committal replies about Anglo-
3
French discussions. In avoiding publicity, Granville was
 ^D ’Aunay a Ohallemel-Iacour, 12 juillet 1883, tél.; Affaires 
étrangères. 800.
D ’Aunay à Challemel-Lacour, 10 juillet 1883, tél.; 3oc.dipl.fr.. 
I, V, pp.71-2, no.62. Waddington a Challemel-Lacour, 13 août 
1883, tél.; Affaires" étrangères. 800. Waddington à Challemel- 
Lacour, 15 août 1883, tél.; Livre Jaune. Affaires de Madagascar. 
1882-3. p. 57, no. 33.
 ^yile an amusing draft of a letter from Gladstone to Granville, . 
13 August 1883, (B.M. Add.MS.44175), asking for advice about a 
suitable reply to Horthcote’s request in the House of Commons 
lor an official statement on the Tamatave incidents. The 
letter contains seven suggested formulae, all amounting to a 
I’efusal to supply any information.
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trying to make it easier for Frarc e to make an amende honorable.
For this reason, he did not demand the release of Shaw, in whose 
case the public was chiefly interested, but left France free to 
act ’spontaneously.
Shaw was released at the end of August. Sino e his 
arrest had been the only material violation of British rights, the 
French felt the Tamatave affair could be regarded as closed. So 
did the Times and some of the m œ  e responsible organs of the 
English Press. I%ny people now realised that Pakenham’s death
had been neither caused nor hastened by Admiral Pierre’s attitude.
2Why then did Granville insist on futfcher negotiation if he really 
wanted to minimise Anglo-French difficulties? The explanation 
is that he feared that public satisfaction was purely temporary 
and that there would be renewed agitation when further details 
about the events at Tamatave became known. Shaw was on his way 
home and the missionary Societies were already talking of compen­
sation for him. Granville realised that if he did not exact 
further reparation, his political opponents would seize their
^ Granville to Plunkett, 25 August 1883, Africa No. 95; F.O.146/ 
2591.
 ^ Granville to Lyons, 30 August 188?, Africa No.100; F.O. 146/2591. 
"It is unlucky," Granville told the Secretary of State for War, 
"that the French Government have got it into their heads (not 
without some encouragement which I regret) that the release of 
Shaw settles the whole matter;" Granville to Hartington (copy), 
Pte., 28 August 1883; G.D. 29/133. The ’encouragement’ was 
given by Fitzmaurice, Parliamentary Under-Secretary to the 
Foreign Office, who had told the French Ambassador that public 
Q'gitation over the Tamatave incidents would collapse if Shaw 
were released. An hour later Waddington saw Granville, who 
said Fitzmaurice had gone too far: Waddington à Ohallemel-'
Laoour, 21 août 1883, tél.; Affaires étrangères, 800.
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opportunity to foment criticism of the Government and hostility
towards France when Parliament re-assembled in the autumn. He
wanted to forestall public demands for reparation of a kind he
might not be prepared to ask for, nor the French to give. He
therefore urged the French to come to terras, and promised that if
. they did so, Britain would never publish the correspondence between
Admiral Pierre and Commander Johnstone, of which so far the
1 "
public was ignorant.
To reach a settlement, Granville initiated a system of 
private diplomacy between himself and the French Ambassador, whose
opinion of the incidents was much the same. The negotiations took
;
the form of informal meetings and private letters in which the
difficulties of both sides were frankly'stated. Granville first
\
suggested that he should make a personal statement of what 
Britain would be prepared to accept, so that France could then
make a ’spontaneous’ and therefore, from the point of view of
2 , , 
public consumption, valuable, offer. A few days later, however,-
the affair was complicated by Blowitz’s unfortunate publication of
part of the Pierre-Johnstone correspondence in the Times. Indig-
nation at the contents at once flared up on both si'des of the
Channel, and made the French Government less willing to offer
reparation. Here Granville’s personal attitude helped the
^ p ’Aunay à Challemel-Lacour, 30 août 1883, no.13g; Affaires 
étrangères. 800.
 ^ Granville to Waddington (draft), Pte., 6 September 1883; G.D. 
29/205.
 ^For Granville’s comments, vide Granville to Northbrook (copy.), 
Pte., 16 September 1883; G.D. 29/139.
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negotiations. He believed that Johnstone was not without blame.^ 
When the Press announced (erroneously, it was learned later) that 
, the French Admiral had been prompted, suggestions were made to
j -
him that in view of the French charges against Johnstone it would
2
be only fair to promote the English Commander. But he remainsd J 
"as convinced^ as ever that if Ale ester, Hay or ïryon [British : 
Admirals in command of various naval stations] had been on the
..r?
spot, nothing would have happened. He considered it would be' 
deplorable for English naval officers to be "led to believe* that 
one way to get promotion was to get into quarrels with the 
officers of other nations.
Meanwhile Haddington was told privately the kind of 
reparation Britain desired, and at the end of September thé 
Ambassador went to Paris to persuade his Government to agree.
On 17 October Waddington m,et Granville at Walmer Gastle, the 
Foreign Secretary’s. country residence, and the whole affair was ; 
settled.^ Waddington produced a despatch from the French Foreigil
 ^ Pauncefote, Permanent Under-Secretary of the Foreign Office, 
agreed with Granville, on the ground that Johnstone had been - 
over-zealous in his duties. But he also felt that Pierre had ; 
exercised the strict rights of a belligerent with unreasonable j 
harshness. Vide Pauncefote’s Memorandum of 14 August 1Q83; A 
oopy enclosed in Granville to Plunkett, 25 August 1883, Africa 
No. 97, F.O.' 146/2591. '
 ^E.£. Northbrook to Granville, Pte., 14 September 1883; G.D.29/L3S 
^ Granville to Northbrook (copy), Pte., 18 September 1883 ;GD. 29/139,
^ Memoranda;! by Granville, 17 October 1883, "A"' Secret, "B" Con-A 
fidential., "0" Private, printed for the Foreign Office ; sub- ■[ 
mitted to Gladstone, Selborne, Hartington and Northbrook; '
G.D. 29/144. : , Q;;
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Minister offering 25,000 francs (£1000) compensation for Shaw 
(strangely enough the exact sum Gladstone 1r d suggested to 
Granville^') and an expression of regret for Pierre’s attitude at -
p
Tamatave. Granville had no desire to haggle over details and 
gave his personal acceptance at once. The First Lord of the 
Admiralty, the Lord Chancellor, and the Colonial Secretary were
A
also entirely satisfied with the terms offered. On 25 October
5
the Cabinet decided to accept the offer. On the 29th Britain 
formally accepted.^
Through personal diplomacy Granville had managed to 
overcome both the diplomatic dangers inherent in an inflamed state 
of public opinion and opposition from some of his own Cabinet 
colleagues. There was never, contrary to the belief of some 
writers, the slightest danger of Britain and France going to war 
over the Tamatave incidents. This was not realised at the time, 
however. The very secrecy in which the negotiations were conducted
^ Granville to Hartington (copy), Pte., 21 October 1883;G.D.29/144.
^ Cha,llemel-Lacour à Waddington, 15 octobre 1883; ^Livre- Jaune. 
Affaires de %da^ascar, 1882-3, po. 37, pp. 60-1.
 ^MS. Memorandum by Granville, ’’D", 17 October 1883; G.D.29/l44.
Note by Northbrook, 19 October 1883; Note by Selborne, 19 ]
October 1883; G.D. 29/l33. Derby to Gladstone, 24 October 1883;I 
B.M. Add. MS 44142. '
 ^ Waddington a'^Challemel-Lacour, 25 Octobre 1883, tél.; Doc. dipl.j 
fr., I, V, p.135, note (l). Gladstone to the Queen, 25 
October 1883; Queen Victoria’s Letters, II, iii, pp. 448-9.
 ^ Granville to Waddington, 29 October 1883; Livre Jaune, 'j
Affaires de Mada.?ascar, 1882-3, no. 40, pp . 65-^. '
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meant that contemporaries derived their impression of the actual 
state of Anglo-French relations from the violent tone of the 
Press on either side of the Ohannel. Even Salisbury in a public 
speech could refer to the "terrible danger" to Anglo-French 
under standing that Admiral Pierre’s actions had created'.^
The Foreign Secretary’s personal assessment of the 
incidents had contributed largely towards an amicable settlement* 
The fact that the Government disapproved of the French attack on 
Madagascar both for its neglect of British interests and on moral 
grounds had very little to do with British policy over the 
particular instances of French action at Tamatave. As the Lord . 
Chancellor pointed out, "when warlike measures are taken by^ one r 
nation against another, a third nation is compelled (unless 
prepared to intervene by force) to accept the recognized inter- >
national rules as to the laws of war, between a belligerent and a
neutral, as binding upon itself, whatever its moral estimate of ,
the proceedings of the belligerent Power, or of its Commanders, Qj 
may be# " The crisis of 1883 was far more apparent than real# D 
It was a crisis in public opinion on both sides of the Channel, ■ 
not a crisis'between governments. But the whole trend of French ' 
policy over îvîadagascar helped to destroy Britain’s confidence in , 
France, and seriously weakened Anglo-French relations generally. Q
1
Speech at Reading, 30 October 1883; Speeches of the Marquis of > 
Salisbury, ed. by Henry W. Lucy (London 1885). -
 ^Note by lori Selborne, 19 October 1883; G.D. 29/144.
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6. CABINET DISAGRSEmiTS.
Granville’s policy with regard to Madagascar from 1882 
onwards was a victory of pro-French Liberalism over the increasing­
ly anti-French tendencies of the Liberal Imperialists. The 
Tamatave incidents widened the cleavage between these two 
political groups, and contributed to the final break of 1886.
In 1883 the Foreign Secretary had to deal with continual opposi­
tion from those who wanted to be "stiff" with France. The chief 
exponents of this view were Dilke, Harcourt, and Hartington. They 
were concerned not so much with British interests in Madagascar 
as with British ’prestige’ vis-a-vis Prance. In this they were 
constantly encouraged by the Queen. On one occasion she was 
even moved to speak warmly of Dilke (of whose constitutional
views she was deeply suspicious): she would, she told the Prime
Minister after Derby’s disastrous speech at îvîanchester, rather 
have Dilke than Derby in the Cabinet,^ since the former lud "the
ri.g:ht views on foreign politics" and knew what "the honour of
2
this country" required. The complaint she.most frequently made
about British policy over the Tamatave incidents was that the
2
Government had ’swallowed an offence’ from France.
At that time Dilke was still Parliamentary Under-Secretary to 
the Foreign Office. He became Chairman of the Local Government J
Board a few weeks later. j
The Queen to Gladstone, 14 December 1882; Queen Victoria’s 
Letters. II, iii, p. 378.
The Queen to Granville, 22 October 1883; G.D. 29/31. The Queen 
to Gladstone, 30 October 1883; Queen Victoria’s Letters. II, 
iii, p. 451.
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Granville himself did not go so far in the other direction: 
as Gladstone, Childers and Derby. Fully aware of British 
interests in î^dagascar, he was concerned to make a just assess­
ment of alternatives - the maintenance of those interests or the ; 
maintenance of Anglo-French understanding. Gladstone and Derby, 
however, were uninterested in colonial questions, and Childers
on his own admission was "an advocate of the French alliance,
1
almost ’quand m e m e . T o  the Prime Minster, Madagascar was
2merely a ’distant country’, and the British public’s antagonism i 
to France on overseas questions a symptom of "pride, greed,
ignorance and passion." Over the Tamatave incidents, he was
plus français que les Français : encountering the French Ambassador
one evening in August 1883, he started to analyse Admiral Pierre’s 
orders to Consul Pakenham in his usual judicious manner, only to 
find that Waddington personally considered Pierre’s conduct quite 
indefensible.^ %ereas Hartington objected to Granville’s
statement of the British view of the incidents, which was submitted
5 6to the French, because it gave facts but no comments, Gladstone i
 ^Childers to Gladstone, 22 June 1883; B.M. Add.MS 44130. He was • 
referring to the current Suez Canal question, on which he said |
"even defeat appears to me to be tolerable, compared with the I
Chances of rupture." - |
 ^D ’Aunay à Challemel-Lacour, 12 juillet 1883, tél.: Affaires ' 
étrangères, ‘ 800.
 ^ Gladstone to Granville (copy), Pte., 14 July 1883; B.M. Add.MS. : 
44546.
^ Gladstone to Granville (copy), Pte., 16 August 1883; B.M.Add. | 
MS 44546. I
 ^Memorandum of 23 August 1883 (draft in Granville’s hand with a | 
comment by Gladstone); G.D. 29/205. This document was originally: 
4rawn up by Pauncefote, and revised by Granville, Northbrook,and] 
Selborne: Granville to Gladstone, Pte., 30 August 1883;B.M. I 
 ^ Add.MS. 44175. . ' J
Hartington to Granville, Pte., 27 August 1883; G.D.29/133.
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claimed that on one point - the death of Pakenham - the Memoran- J
dum "stated the case ex parte" through factual ommissiohs.^ He !
2 i
felt that Pierre had not been wrong "in his general. aim. " He i
was utterly shocked at Shaw’s first request for £10,000 compensa- j
3 !
tion for his imprisonment. But like Granville, he regarded the !
incidents - or "the kladagascar affair," as he always alluded to j
them - as a potential menace to Anglo-French relations, in that j
they might make Parliament more unsympathetic to French views
4 - 5
over the Suez Canal question and over the Franco-Chinese.War.
Hartington’8 attitude to the Tamatave incidents was
entirely different. He disapproved strongly of Granville’s
6
refusal to hurry the negotiations unduly, nor to make an outright
demand for reparation:
"It must give the French Government as well as to the 
public at home an impression of coolness and patience on 
our part amounting to indifference. I
If you think that you have been: insulted, you don’t wait j 
several weeks before you mention the circumstances. It is | 
all very well to wait till you hear the other side of the |
story before you make any demand for reparation, but I 
cannot see that there would have been any harm in letting 
the French Government know that unless they can be explained; 
these acts require reparation.... If an expression of
 ^ Gladstone to Granville, Pte., 27 August 1883; G'.D. 29/29A.- 
2 Granville. II, p. 316. ' _
 ^ Gladstone to Granville, (copy) Pte., 6 October 1883; B.M. Add.
MS. 44546. With regard to Shaw’s attitude, _cf. Wastell, p.496: 
Shaw’s "rehabilitation weighed more with him than^ pecuniary 
compensation, and he magnanimously forbore to erabarass the 
Government. "
^ Gladstone to Granville (copy), Pte., 14 July 1883; B.M. Add.
MS. 44546.
 ^ Ibid.. 7 September 1883.
® Granville to Hartington (copy), Pte., 28 August 1883; G.D.29/
133.
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regret is to satisfy us, it ought to he a very strong 
one. Admiral Pierre has acted like a brute and he 
ought to be disapproved."I
With regard to Shaw’s case, he criticised Granville’s appeal to
p
Yifaddington for ’spontaneous ' reparation, because it read "as if
/
you were only moved by your apprehensions of what Shaw’s friends
may do and by the opinions of some of your colleagues, and did
not think much of the matter yourself," - which was, of course,
the impression Granville tried to convey. Later, he urged the
Foreign Secretary not to accept the terms offered on 17 October,
for he considered the financial compensation for Shaw ’miserable,’
and the expression of regret for the tone of Pierre’s co mraunica-
5tions with Johnstone totally inadequate. Hartington was 
thoroughly anti-French in overseas matters. In 1884 his attitude 
worried Granville, who felt that he did not at all realise how 
serious it would have been to break with France altogether.^
7. BRITAIN’S .RE-INSURANCE POLICY IN SAS-T AFRICA.
The French campaigns of 1882-5 were closely followed by 
the English public, and hostile comments on French policy 
frequently appeared in the Press. But British policy remained
2 N&rtlngton to Granville, Pte., 36 August 1883; G.D. E9/l33. 
29/205^^^ 0^ Waddington (draft), Pte., 6 ,September 1883;G.D.
f Hartington to Granville, Pte., 4 September 1883; G.D.,29/133. 
g ibid.. 19 October 1883.
g Hote by Hartington, 19 Ootober 1883; G.D. 29/144.
Gladstone, Pte., 1 June 1884; B.M. Add. MS. 
Granville to lyohs, Pte., 1 June 1884; G.D. 29/88A.
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strictly neutral. Anglo-French discussions over Madagascar 
were confined to the question of war damage to British property 
and problems that arose out of the continued presence of British 
subjects in the island,^ .
Britain had not forsaken her interests in East African 
waters, however. The connection between the establishment of
French protection over Madagascar in 1885 and the British
Protectorate over Zanzibar in 1890'may seem tenuous at first 
sight, but the Foreign Office clearly envisaged the one as a - 
counterbalance to the other even before the final success of 
French arms. As early as 1884 the Government was considering _ '
V
the attainment of political control over Zanzibar as strategic
compensatLon for the acquisition of Madagascar by France.
The question arose out of the scheme put forward in the
summer of 1884 by the explorer Harry Johnston for 'a British
' 2protectorate over Kilimanjaro and its environs. Granville was
Lister (for Granville) to Lyons, 5 December 1883, Africa 
Ho, 138, F.O, 146/2592, (H.M.G’s desire for France to give the > 
necessary facilities to any British subjects #io might wish to , 
leave Madagascar); Granville to Lyons, 27 December 1883, Africa 
Ho. 151, F.O. 146/2592, (H.M.G’s thanks for the promised facili­
ties); Lyons to Ferry (copy), 19 May 1884, enclosed in Lyons to 
Granville, 19 May 1884, Africa Ho. 51, F.O* 84/1665, (asking, for 
an enquiry into damage to British property tbrought the bombard- 
raent of Vohemar); Ferry to Lyons (copy), 25 May 1884, enclosed in Q 
Lyons to Granville, 26 May 1884, Africa Ho., 55, F.O. 84/1665, 
(stating the damage will be investigated by the prospective 
commission on demands for compensation). 'J
H.H. Johnston to Lord Edmond Fitzmaurice [written at OhaggaJ G 
(copy), 10 July 1884; F.O. Oonfidential Print 5037, G.D.29/145. A
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impressed by his glowing description of this African _
Switzerland as a potential white colony, and- gave him permis- j
sion to annex the area if French or German explorers, who had
appeared recently in the vicinity, seemed on the point of
1
forestalling him. From an economic point of view Kilimanjaro 
would have been of little use to Britain without access to 
the coast, however. Since the nominal suzerain over both the 
intervening land, which was believed to be inhabited by savage 
tribes, and the coast itself, which oo ntained several good 
harbours, was the Sultan of Zanzibar, the desirability of 
strengthening Zanzibar’s hold over the mainland seemed 
obvious. Q
At this point the influence of the African Depart- 
ment of the Foreign. Office became decisive in Government : / 
discussions. Since, the transformation of the old Slave Trade 
Department, in 1883, officials of the Department had acted as : 
de facto liason officers between the Foreign Secretary and 
that section of the public which was later called imperialist. 
Their enthusiasm on behalf of new colonial projects gradually / 
filtered into British foreign policy. They were particularly 
interested in Johnston’s scheme, not only from the colonial 
angle but in its relevance to Britain’s future strategic ' j 
position in East Africa. Johnston had been introduced to
Granville to Sir John Kirk [Zanzibar]/, 29 September 1884, 
Tel.61FF;o. 84/lfe7fe.
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I
the Department in November 1883 by Lord Aberdare,^ the 
President of the Royal Geographical Society and also chairman  ^
of the National African Company and a former member of a !
Liberal Government. Though the Government- had added no thing 1
I
to the £1000 subscribed for the Kilimanjaro Expedition by the -
British Association"for the Advancement of Science and the i
2 'Royal Society, the backing of the African Department and of 1
3
the Parliamentary Under-Secretary to the Foreign Office A
ensured that when Johnston sailed for East Africa in March 
1884,"^ he went out on a semi-official basis. Sir John Kirk,
British Consul-General in Zanzibar, was instructed to give 
him every assistance.
Clement Hill, the Chief Clerk of the African ]
Department (and a relative of Sir Percy Anderson, the depart- /j 
mental heatf), was among those who saw a great future for / I 
British enterprise in East Africa. = The region, he pointed M
■ ■ .'i
out, "is of real importance to Indian & imperial Interests,...:] 
the climate is superior,... commerce is capable of vast
^ Sir Harry Johnston: The Story of %  Life. (Indianapolis 
1923), pp. Ill and 115.
^ Ibid*. P* 116.
® Dilke. II, p. 84.
^ Alex Johnston: The Life & letters of Sir Harry Johnston. 
(London 1929), p. 66. #
 ^Harry Johnston, op.cit.. p.114. A
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iI!
extension, and... our influence could be exercised unchecked 
by the rivalry of Europe, in the extension of civilization, 
and the consequent extinction of the Slave Trade, for which we : 
have so long laboured." A memorandum he wrote in the 
autumn of 1884 oo nveniently sums up Foreign Office opinion at i 
that time. He believed the success of any scheme of East
j
African colonisation depended on control of the coast. That J
Î'
in turn depended on forestalling French designs on Zanzibar, j 
which, in view of the French attack on Madagascar, now seemed  ^
more threatening. Although Britain had declined the Sultan’s ; 
offer of the Regency in 1881, because of the 1862 Anglo-French :
■ I
Agreement on the ind/pendence of Zanzibar, he doubted whether 
the acceptance of a voluntary offer could be construed as a 
breach of that Agreement. In any case, "France has more than 
once pressed claims upon the Sultan of a similar nature to 
those she made the pretext of a war in Madagascar, and the ;
I
Law Officers laid down, when we threatened the Sultan with I 
hostilities in 1873, that an act of war against him would nôt . 
be a breach of the Agreement. Thus, France might at any time ■ 
force on a war and make her own terms after it." Quite apart 
from the Kilimanjaro scheme, "our alternative route by the 
Gape to India may at any time make it important that we should 
have possession of, or at least free access to, good harbours:
^ Memorandum by Olement Hill, 20 October 1884; F.O. 84'/l691*
^ Ibid.
F
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the importance is not less since the French movement in 
lÆadagascar. The Mahoramedan element on the East Coast and 
the large Indian trade which is there carried on, with it s 
connection, which if not hlose is none the less real, with 
all that concerns the Mohammedan world in the Soudan, on the 
shores of the Red ^ea, and on the Hadramaut littoral and 
Persian Gulf, make it essential that we should exercise a
. '.'I
1 '
preponderating influence over its political future.," j
In November Granville instructed Kirk to secure ! 
from the Sultan "a spontaneous declaration" that he would J 
accept no protectorate from and would cede no sovereign j
rights to any association (by which was meant any ostensibly j
"scientific" German or more particularly French expedition) j
2  ■ .i
or Power without Britain’s consent. Subject to the Sultan’s]
\ .1
acceptance of this proposal, he also suggested that the j
Sultan himself should define the extbnt of his hitherto vague j  
rights over the mainland by a formal announcenent to cover the 
'Kilimanjaro district, and that he should promise to grant a 
concession to Britain for a port, if needed.^ On 6 December ' 
the Government heard that the Sultan had acceded to British 
desires. In view of the measure of success so far achieved
 ^ Ibid.  ^ ^
 ^ Granville to Kirkt^^èV November 1884, No.80 (recorder of 
cypher telegram)-F^.Q. 84/l676.
 ^ Granville to Kirk^T^S December 1884, No.86 (recorder of 
Cypher telegram); F.O.
^ Kirk to Granville, 6 December 1884,«^^ypher'ftelegram; 
F.O. %4/j679.
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and also because of constitutional difficulties in Zanzibar, 
the Regency project was held in abeyance. But the Govern- 
ment hoped to secure Kilimanjaro, to link it to the coast by 
an armed expedition under the Saltan’s flag, and to lay the 
foundations of an East African naval base as soon as 
possible.^
The scheme had been approved by what amounted to a I 
Cabinet Committee of the Foreign, Colonial, and Indian j
Secretaries, and of the two leading members of the new anti- I
i
French imperialist group within the Government - Chamberlain I
2 ‘ - ] 
and Dilke. But. it was no longer secret. According to i
Kirk, Johnston had made "indiscreet confidences," and British |
3 •
plans had leaked out. The very day that the Consul-General , 
had telegraphed newscf the Sultan’s acceptance, the French 
Consul in Zanzibar had warned the Sultan that France "would 
not tolerate" the interference of foreign nations between
4
the Congo and Zanzibar. The Prime Minister, who was not
6 - - z
fully informed of the scheme till the 11th, suddenly became
alarmed as to its implications with regard not only to A
' 6"
future expenditure but to the danger of friction with France. :
:----------------------------------   4
I Vide Memorandum by Hill, 9 December 1884, explaining No.86,q 
Confidential, to Sir J .Kirk; F.O. 84/169.5 i?t. i a? ^rint \ -q 
Ao. .% .1. f9 "j45.
 ^ Ibid « , -J
^ Kirk to Anderson fPia.:), 24 November 1884; F.O. )84/167^V .p Q
^ Memorandum by Hill, 9 December 1884, explaining No.86, • -
Confidential to Sir J.. Kirk, [F.O. Confidential Print 5037, 
Mo. 6; ,G.D. 29/145]^ P.O. S4-/U97.
Granville to Gladstone (enclosing Kilimanjaro papers), 11 D; 
g December 1884, B.M. Add. MS. 44177.
Memorandum by Hin, 9 December 1884, loo. cit.. //
"Terribly have I been puzzled and perplexed on finding a 
group of the hob ereet men amongst us to have concocted a
A : :  ^ . .-i
scheme such as that touching the mountain country behind
W'V'.  ^ 1
L// Zanzibar with an unrememberable name," he told Dilke.
: '
|AQ The African Department met all his objections.
it ■■ ■ . :
V squarely, analysing them and disposing of them one by one.
: '  
r. "Our future responsibilities," Hill concludal,
j: "would not... be greater than they now are towards the
lY East Ooast of Africa. There is a very large commercial j
connection already between it and India; the local trade ; 
is almost entirely in the hands of Indian subjects; we 
: cannot refuse to protect them, and we are pledged j
>: irrevocably to the extinction of the Slave Trade. How,
iQ. then, will our responsibility be materially increased by
the addition of the healthiest, and perhaps, the most vi 
valuable portions of East Africa to the dominion of 
Zanzibar? If that Power should fall to pieces, who must Q 
be its successor? Could we admit another occupation like Q 
that of Madagascar on our alternative route to India? Is A 
it not better to forestall others by encouraging this very] 
moderate, but most precious, extension of territory on the! 
part of the Power whose natural, though it may be relue- Q 
Kÿ-  ^ tant, heirs we may hereafter become?" 1
m :  r.
The African Department’s arguments were re-inforced
by Consul Holmwood, who was on leave from Zanzibar. Experienced 
had impressed him with the danger of further French expansion, j
' ' ''-àin East African waters. He advocated the attainment both of Q
, . A
an option over the Kilimanjaro district and of political "A
2 . ' A]
control over the Zanzibar government. a:
Opposition from within the Cabinet proved insuperable^
^ Gladstone to Dilke, 14 December 1884; Dilke,II, pp.83-4. A -  
 ^ Memorandum by Hill, 9 December 1884, loc. cit. 'A
^ Memorandum by Frederick Holmwood, 9. December 1884, on 
The Zanzibar Succession; F.O.. 84/1680.
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however. The Chancellor of the Exchequer was as much against
annexations as Gladstone and felt the expense of the scheme
1
would not be justified. 7i/hen Kirk himself began to point 
out the political difficulties of establishing British 
jurisdiction over Kilimanjaro,^ the scheme was temporarily
3
abandoned. In January the Cabinet suspended it indefinitely 
Johnston had already bought part of Kilimanjaro 
from a local chief, however, and had also secured land at 
Taveita, which became the foundation of the British East 
Africa Protectorate. Almost at once difficulties arose with 
Germany and France - with Germany because of her own colonial 
ambitions in the region, and with France partly because of 
the 1862 Agreement which had guaranteed the independence of 
the Sultan’s dominions. It fell to Hosebery, who entered 
the Cabinet in 1885, rather than to Granville, to deal with 
the problem. He saw it not in imperial but in diplomatic 
terms. During his mission to Berlin in May, it formed one 
of the chief subjects of his discussions with Bismarck, who
said he would regard British policy over Zanzibar as "the
4 -
touchstone of our friendship," Accordingly, during the
Tripartite Zanzibar Commission on delimitation in the following
 ^ Childers to Granville, Pte., 26 December 1884; G.D. 29/119. j
 ^Kirk to Granville, 23 November■1884 (received 24 December), Q 
No. 151;.F.O. 84/1679. Kirk to Granville (copy of cypher 
telegram), 16 January 1885, enclosed in Kirk to Granville,
19 January 1885, Ho. 24; F.O. 84/1724. '
^ Hote' in Granville's hanâ; G.D. 29/145.
Rosebery to Gladstone, 30 May 1885, Oonfide'ntial ; B.M.
Add. KS. 44238.
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!
year, Hosebery clearly showed his predilection for German '
interests as against French. "His point of view was that the i
Germans could only be welcomed as neighbours of English '
Colonies, whereas this was not the case with other nations.
He instructed Kirk to be amenable to German views. The
solution he put forward for the problem of delimitation was v ;
that the Sultah should cede part of his territory to Germany
in exchange for a guarantee of the rest from France, Germany '1 
2
and Britain. Gladstone, sharing Rosebery’s approach, was
enthusiastic over the project, and maintained that concessions;
to Germany over Zanzibar should be the reward for Bismarck’s ]
3 A
"good behaviour" over Greece in the spring ..of 1886. |
■
Salisbury too saw the Zanzibar question in ;
V . I
diplomatic terms and his solution proved somewhat similar to | 
that proposed by Hosebery. He deflected the frontier of .4 
the British Bast Africa Protectorate' so as to leave Kiliman- Q 
jaro in. German hands. But he,regarded it from an imperial, Î 
point of view.as well. The British Protectorate over j
Zanzibar was not only the price for the cession of Heligoland 1
j
to Germany, but was Salisbury’s answer to the threat of |
French supremacy in Bast African waters. So far as Madagasca^^j
h \
^ Hatzfeldt to Bismarck (translation), 22 April 1886; B.T.S., j 
Bugdale (ed.): German Diplomatic Documents 1871-1914 ,i
(London 1928-1950), vol. I, p. 221. '
^ Rosebery to Gladstone, 27 April 1886, Secret ; B.M. Add. ;j 
MS. 44289. Extracts from this letter are printed in Crewe :j 
Lord Rosebery (2 vols., 1931), vol. I, p.277, but the date 
Ts erroneously given as 17 April.
^ Gladstone to Rosebery (copy), 28 April 1886, Secret; B.M. | 
Add. MS. 44289. '!
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Was conoerned, he accepted the fait accompli. His ostenta­
tious concern for.British rights over the exequatur affair in 
1887 (when Prance objected to foreign consuls’ in Madagascar
applying for exequaturs from the îvîalagasy authorities and not
1 '
from the French Resident ) was largely a tactical move to 
force France to co^e to terms over other overseas questions - 
notably that of the Hew Hebrides,^ which France had occupied 
in the face of British opposition. By the autumn, France 
had consented to surrender her exclusive position in the Few 
Hebrides, and Salisbury was therefore ready to recall the
g
offending British Consul from I/üadagascar. Just before he
abandoned the last vestiges of British political influence : 
over the Hovas, however, he became interested in a commercial 
treaty with Zanzibar. Again he tried to useBritish policy 
in Madagascar as the basis of a diplomatic bargain. ’Oomplai- I
sance in Madagascar could only be purchased by complaisance
4 #
at Zanzibar.’ The eventual transformation of the projected
treaty Into a full political protectorate is well known. The i 
successful combination of diplomatic and imperial interests '
Vide Howe: Drama of MadaA^ascar, pp. 272 seq.
 ^ Waddington à Flourens, 2 mai 1887, tél. 26; Affaires 
étrangères. 822.
^ Waddington à Flourens, 25 novembre 1887, Direction des 
Protectorats XXXI; Affaires étrangères. 826.
Salisbury to Lytton, 25 January 1888; Salisbury, IV, p. 94.
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Was part of Salisbury’s contribution to British foreign 
policy.
So far, the effect of French colonisation on 
Britain’s strategic outlook has been considered. The next 
three chapters will deal more especially with the British 
attitude towards French colonisation in those areas where 
her own colonial interests were deeply involved.
\
PART II. BRITAIN'S COLONIAL INTERESTS AND 
FRENCH COLONISATION.
C H A P T E R  IV.
HIE CONFLICT OP TRADE INTERESTS;
The British Attitude to French Expansion in West Africa.
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zIt has often been observed that until the last three decades
of the nineteenth century, iifrica was to Europe a series of coasts
1
rather than a continent. Hie limitations of geographical knowledge 
were clearly reflected in the nomenclature - used for centuries by 
traders and universally accepted - of the west coast: "Gold Coast",
"Ivory Coast", "Oil Rivers", etc. What may be called the 'coastal 
outlook' implied more than ignorance of the interior, however. Of 
no country was it more characteristic than of Britain in early Victorian 
times. To her the coasts of Africa presented problems that appeared 
peculiar to the several seas they bordered rather than to the nature 
of the country that lay beyond. The East Coast had lain within the 
sphere of the East India Conroany and was regarded mainly as a periphery 
of naval action against the slave trade. North African affairs
concerned Britain primarily in their effect on the balance of pov/er 
in the î-fediterranean, not so much in their local political or economic 
aspects. The Somali Coast was of purely strategic interest, in 
connection with the defence of communications with India. West Africa, 
formerly regarded as the great human reservoir v^iich fed the Atlantic 
Slave Trade, was thougtit of chiefly for its chain of coastal trading 
posts that supplied the sea-borne trade with England.
British policy towards Africa almost until the Berlin 
Conference of 1884-5 was dominated by this coastal attitude. It is 
significant that the traditional terminology remained long after it
e.g. Sir Charles Lucas: The Partition and Colonization of Africa 
(Oxford 1922).
Z 2 .0
was out-dated by geographical exploration. Although the term 'Barbary 
Coasts* liad passed out of common usage before the raid-century with the * 
French acquisition of Algeria and the opening-up of North Africa to 
European enterprise,for other parts of Africa the old Coastal terms 
were still used to designate Miole areas that had been explored by 
the 'seventies. In the early 'ei^ities English Ihnisters and officials 
in London habitually referred to 'the West Coast of Africa', not simply 
'West Africa*, and to 'the Somali Coast*, when they meant also the 
hinterland of the Gulf of Aden,
As regards West Africa, the point needs emphasis. In the 
'seventies and early *eighties Britain still conceived her main task 
there to be to defend her forts and factories on the coast, rather than 
to penetrate inland. France, on the other hand, her only serious rival 
at the time, took a quite different view. To her, the coast was only the 
starting-point for acquisitions inland. From -Senegal she carried out 
a determined policy of expansion, and her posts on the Ivory and Slave 
Coasts were not only for trade but were points d 'appui for advance to 
the north. It is true that Britain was traditionally interested in 
penetration via the Niger, and was indeed confident that in course of 
time the rich interior markets of 'Hausaland* would be directly 
accessible to Europeans, After several decades of discouragement 
resulting from the heavy mortality on the early Niger expeditions, 
the Government's interest in penetration had been re-awakened largely 
owing to the advent of the steam-ship and its potential use on African 
waterways. In the 'fifties Beecroft had received official backing
from Palmerson in his explorations to discover commercial
potentialities. Not until French competition threatened to
undermine ]3ritish commerce in the lower Niger, however, and then
only after English merchants had indicated that a political advance
could he successful, was Britain prepared to turn deliberately towards
the interior for the sake of future benefits. Her policy before
1884 was basically to protect her traders on the coast. Public
opinion often tended to regard thé extension of trade and the
1
advance of civilisation as synonymous. But colonial policy derived 
from the conviction that territorial responsibilities should not be 
increased beyond the coastal area. Kimberley once said he was not 
prepared to initiate a "crusade" on behalf of "trade, civilization and 
Christianity" in West Africa. He assumed that a deliberate advance 
inland would provoke native hostility, that colonial resources would 
thus be dissipated and Britain's hold on the coast weakened.
Hie British colonies in West Africa had grown logically from 
the need to protect traders against attack - apart from Sierra Leone 
which had been established as an experiment, in philanthropic 
colonisation. By tlie eighteen-sixties, however, as the reception
1
A topical exponent of this view was Colin Graham-Rosenbush, 
who wrote in his Sierra Leone; its Commercial Position and Prospects 
(London 1881), (p. 18) : "It would be well to bear in mind how 
essential commerce is to civilization. It is chiefly by the means 
of trade that barbarous nations have become civilized; while the 
most commercial nations have been the most civilized, who, in the 
pursuit of commercial objects, have sought out new nations with whom 
to trade, and by commercial intercourse liave extended civilization 
to people wdiom they found in a state of perfect barbarism "
xxz
accorded to the report of the Select Committee in 1865 showed, 
the Government was anxious once more (as in the 'forties) to free 
itself from the financial burden of administration so soon as was 
practicable. But as trade developed withdrawal seemed out of the 
question. In the 'seventies. Ministers were generally agreed that
the present position should be maintained, but that fresh
%
responsibilities should on the whole be avoided. Hie Colonies would 
be kept up, but only as long as the volume of trade appeared to 
justify their existance. The Government was thus prepared to cede 
the Gambia to France, provided an adequate quid pro quo could be 
secured, since the colony was run at a loss to the Treasury, although 
English merchants in Bathurst were bitterly opposed to the idea. There 
was no desire to create opportuhities for trade. Administration 
might follow in the wake of commerce, but never advance before it.
To maintain, as many writers have done, that British policy was based 
on 'economic hrperialism* is to falsify by over-simplification.
This is not to deny that, in the interests of trade, military 
campaigns were undertaken to put down tribal wars and that protection 
was given to local chiefs adjoining the British spheres, but whenever 
such steps were permitted it was in the spirit of defence rather 
than of attack. Britain's conception of her task in West Africa 
was totally different from that of France,
At the same time, the assunç>tion grew that the future interests 
of Britain lay in an 'unbroken coastline*. Hiis meant that the
coast from Sierra Leone to beyond the Bight of Biafra would eventually
-  -I J
come under exclusively British domination, except the independent 
settlement of Liberia. Hie conviction that trade should precede the -
flag was not abandoned. Rather, a recognition of the expanding 
nature of British commerce was implied. Increasing emphasis was 
put on the importance of the unbroken coastline as traders of other 
nations, particularly the French, became more active. It was held 
that to permit other Powers who did not adhere to the principles of 
free trade to infiltrate between the British posts would undermine 
what had become during the nineteenth century the predominantly 
English character of the coastal traffic. So Britain hoped that 
eventually Lagos and the Gold Coast settlements would join hands and 
that British influence elsewhere would gradually spread in the same 
way.
The theory behind the evolving practice of coastal extension 
was based on v/hat had hitherto been a valid estimate of the possibilities 
open to European traders. Hie prevailing economic system was for 
produce to be brought down the rivers to native middlemen and then 
exchanged for European wares at the trade posts. By controlling the 
coasts, Britain would in the first place control the outlets of trade.
In the second place, she would prevent differential duties being imposed 
by other nations against the import of British goods. Hiirdly, she 
would secure customs duties for local revenue. Lastly, there was the 
administrative aspect. With a continuous coastline Britain would be 
able to deal more effectively with recalcitrant native tribes. This 
consideration was always to the fore in the case of the Dahoraian seaboard.
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Such a system worked well enough in the days when penetration 
into the interior was difficult, dangerous, and often disastrous.
. Increased geographical knowledge, however, made Europe 
no longer content to remain a suppliant at the gates of the 
African palace. She wanted access to the treasure-house within.
But Britain kept aloof from the International African Association 
th^t emerged from the Brussells Conference of 1876. She refused 
to contemplate dissipating her energies for many years to come by 
government-sponsored exploration as a prelude to the acquisition 
of new and costly responsibilities. Other nations might open up 
the hinterland and plant their flags in the heart of Africa. So 
much the better for all-provided they did not set up an exclusive 
system of trade which would close the door against eventual British 
competition. Meanwhile Britain clung to her belief in the greater 
efficacy of coastal control. Here there were few dangers, little 
or no financial loss, and much economic advantage.
An appreciation of tliis traditional element in British 
policy is essential to an understanding of Anglo-French relations 
in West Africa in the 'seventies and 'eighties. Without it, it 
would be difficult to see why Britain was so hostile to French 
influence in some areas, and almost indifferent to its spread in 
others. From the Ivory Coast to beyond the Bights the two countries 
were opposed. Until the late 'eighties, when Britain had to accept 
French enclaves as a fait accompli,it was impossible to agree on 
respective rights to territory. Yet Britain regarded French 
penetration into the liinterland of Senegal and the drive towards the
? 2.$'
upper reaches of the Niger v/ith tolerance, and sometimes even 
with encouragement. The French advance to the east was carried 
out by dint of hard fighting and expensive railway-building - why 
should Britain begrudge her neighbour the chance to perform a 
difficult and perhaps unprofitable task? Given command of the 
.mouths of the Niger and the adjacent coasts, she saw no reason to 
fear domination of its sources.
It was a somewhat short-sighted policy. It is sometimes 
said, however, that though Britain allowed the vast territory of 
Afrique occidentale française to come into being, she had 'picked 
out the eyes' of West Africa. To a certain extent this is true.
The British Colonies undoubtedly contain some of the most productive 
areas in the region, and those French territories which compete with 
them in productivity, the Ivory Coast and Daliomey, are precisely those 
which Britain would have liked to have reserved for herself. In 
the ’eighties, however, Britain could not have foreseen the great 
strategic advantage which undivided control of the hinterland would 
give to France, nor the enphasis which French statesmen began to 
put in the 'nineties on the existence of a great 'reservoir d 'hommes ' 
overseas.
In considering the evolution of the British attitude to 
French colonial development in West Africa in the 'seventies and 
'eighties, it will probably be more useful to adhere as far as possible 
to a territorial, rather than a chronological, treatment, since this was 
largely Britain's own approach. There was always a dominant local and
226.
enpirical element in British policy.
1. SENEGAL .\m OHE UPPER NIGER AREA,
In the mid-nineteenth century, Britain had no desire to 
challenge the French position at the mouth of the River Senegal, although 
centuries before St, Louis had been a centre of trade rivalry. In 
1857 Britain agreed to cancel riglnts she had formerly held there in 
return for the French withdrawal from Albreda on the north bank of the 
Gambia. By the 'seventies she took little interest in this part of 
Africa, Her attitude both to French influence along the coast south 
of St. Louis and beyond the Gambia to Portuguese Guinea, as well 
as to the French drive up the Senegal River, which had been started 
by General Faidherbe (who became Governor in 1854), was essentially 
tolerant.
a) The Gambia negotiations.
The main course of the Anglo-French negotiations from 1866-76
1
for the cession of the Gambia is well known and needs no repetition.
New sources of evidence, however, enable a re-assessment of British 
motives to be made. The driving force on the English side was the 
conviction that the Gambia was not v/orth wiiile retaining if other parts 
of the coast could be obtained in exchange. The volume of trade at the 
mouth of the river had hardly ever paid administrative expenses, and 
was mainly in French hands. Ttiis was well known in London, wliere it was 
felt that either Britain should make a success of her position there.
1
Vide J,M. Gray; A History of the Gambia (Cambridge 1940).
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or abandon the field to France. English traders and some of the
officials on the spot tended to regard expansion inland as the
solution to the unsatisfactory state of the colony's finances.
But the Government was unwilling to experiment. The River Gambia,
it w^ as pointed out, did not offer easy access to the Niger, nor had
1
it been proved that extension would necessarily bring fresh trade.
During the negotiations various territories had been proposed 
in exchange for the Gambia, but it was not until 1876 that the English 
put forward their highest price for withdrawal. In so doing, they 
revealed the goal of their West African policy, that is, coastal 
consolidation. In July, they proposed that the French should forego 
all present or future claims to any part of the coast between the 
River Pongas and the River Gaboon. It seems that Lord Derby, the 
Foreign Secretary, was originally responsible for this suggestion, 
which is at first surprising, in view of his strong antipathy to 
annexations a few years later. In May he had pointed out that a 
simple exchange of territory, such as had been contemplated when the
French offered their posts in the Mellicourie area and west of the
2
Gold Coast, left the "valuable Oil Rivers" region unprovided for.
Memorandum on Proposed Exchange of Territory with France on the West 
Coast of Africa, 7 February 1876, (by A. W. L. ^ ^4mming/J) > Colonial Office 
Confidential Print, 17 February 1876, African 94; C. 0.806/60.
W.E, Scotter; International Rivalry in the Bights of Benin and 
Biafra, 1816-1885, (ur^ublished Hi.D. thesis, London, 1933), p. 164.
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More than a fortnight before his letter on the subject to the
Colonial Secretary, Lord Carnarvon, he had a talk with the French
charge d'affaires, Cliarles Gavard, which shows the way liis thoughts
were tending. He argued that hostility from Moslem tribes was making
Britain's position on the Gambia intolerable, and that since France had
an army on the spot, she would be able, were she to take over, to challenge
all comers successfully. The tvra countries, he said, should divide
their spheres of interest in West Africa: France should concentrate on the
north, Britain on the south - or, as he put it, tactfully omitting the
disputable intermediate area, Britain should concern herself v/ith the
1
coast from the Gape of Good Hope to Lagos,
Understandably enough, this premature atterrit to secure the 
unbroken coastline was not welcomed in Paris. Nevertheless the French 
Yrere prepared to negotiate on particular points. England had after 
all formerly been prepared to take much less. In 1869 she had asked 
only for the Ivfellicourie, In 1874 Carnarvon had been favourable to 
the French proposal to cede this area with Grand Bassam and Assinie in 
addition. France was still calling to give up these places, and now, 
in order to meet the English demand as far as possible, she offered her 
claims on the Slave Coast. Slie was in fact offering all the coastal 
establishments she possessed south of the Gambia and north of the Gaboon, 
Carnarvon and the officials in his department were strongly in favour of 
coming to terms with the French on this basis. With these places in hand.
1 \ / , V
Gavard a Decazes, 28 avril 1875; Affaires étrangères, 768.
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the unbroken coastline might yet become a reality. They regarded
1
the exchange project as a matter of expediency and compromise. As
Carnarvon told the French Ambassador quite frankly, the deficit in
the Gambia's finances was considerable, whereas by controlling other
parts of the coast Britain would be able to introduce fiscal uniformity
in her possessions and would have a better chance of stopping tribal wars
in the hinterland. Law and order would be established, and the
"shameful practices" that went on among the natives, particularly in
2
Dahomey, would gradually disappear. The Colonial Office felt that
increased revenue from customs duties would enable the Colonies to be
developed; 'the interests of a few British merchants at the Gambia, and
their desire to be protected against the fair competition of their French
3
rivals, could not be compared to giving civilisation to the blacks. ^
Yet by IVIarch 1876 the negotiations had broken do^ vn. Although 
France had suddenly refused to give up her posts on the Slave Coast, and 
although Carnarvon in his explanatory speech in the House of Lords threw 
the blame for the rupture on the French Government, the break-down 
really occurred on the English side. Carnarvon's statement that Britain 
had been obliged to abandon the negotiations because France would not 
consent to the River Pongas-Gaboon line was inexact and misleading,
1
Vide supra Note 1, p . , C,0, Mamo,, p. S3.
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and was a mere attempt to save face. It has hitherto been supposed
that the sole reason for the failure of the exchange project was public
ODposition in England, Certainly, subsequent remarks of Colonial Office
1
officials give colour to this belief. But if this is so, why were 
the negotiations not abandoned before? Though they would perhaps have 
been concluded successfully if there had been no opposition, the 
responsibility lay partly with the Conservative Government. During the 
previous administration there had been a great deal of opposition from 
interested parties, not only from firms connected with the Ganbia, but 
from bodies such as the Manchester Chamber of Commerce and the V/esleyan 
Missionary Society, In 1870, Gladstone had felt compelled to promise 
that Parliamentary consent for the exchange would be obtained. At the 
same time, however, the Governor General in West Africa had been 
instructed to visit the Gambia to remove local opposition. By withdrawing 
troops from Bathurst and reducing expenditure on public works there to a 
minimum,, the Government shov/ed its determination to proceed with the 
negotiations, despite the opposition. The Conservative Government, on 
the other hand, seems to have been far readier to be influenced by 
sectional interests in colonial affairs.
In April 1875 Carnarvon was already doubtful as to whether the 
Cabinet would agree to the exchange. Very tentatively he suggested to
1
e.g. minute by Meade, 28 June 1880; ".....The two Governments 
have tried to make an arrangement on the basis of an exchange but 
have failed ov/ing to tlie dislike of the uninstructed British Riblic 
ever to give up territory. And I would not recommend any attempt 
to re-open a question Miich I feel sure would fail and involve 
the government in difficulties at home"; C. 0.267/343,
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Gavard that France might instead buy the Gambia, for, say, £8,000.
The idea was not pursued further, Hiree months later, however, the
River Pongas-Gaboon proposal was put forward. Tliough this idea was
readily supported by the Colonial Office, it is also a measure of the
value the Cabinet put upon ceding the Gambia. Moreover, the Foreign
2
Secretary, who was responsible for raising the price, seems to have
deliberately prolonged the negotiations. In the %)ring of 1875 he told
Gavard that the matter would have to be laid before Parliament before
they could come to a final agreement, but that at the moment the Commons*
programme was crowded. Gavard retorted tliat this was hardly a reason for not
3
arranging details. In July Carnarvon complained to the Prime Minister
that he would have been glad to have made a statement in Parliament long
ago, "but that the negotiations between the Foreign Office ard the French
4
Government dragged on. " The I^ris archives make it clear that the 
delay was equally distasteful to the French. In March it was Derby 
vho told the French Ambassador that he personally considered the
5
negotiations at an end, some days before this was actually the case.
1
2
3
4
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Gavard a Decazes, 8 avril 1875; Affaires étrangères, 768,
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Carnarvon to Disraeli, Pte., 28 July 1875; Beaconsfield lepers. Box XLl.
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Disraeli's correspondence with Carnarvon shows that the
Prime îvSLnister was not interested in the merits of the exchange
project, hut rather in its domestic implications. An incident in the
summer of 1875 illustrates the point. On 27 July, in the evening,
Gavard told Carnarvon privately that as the French Assembly would rise
on 4 August, his Government intended to announce their acceptance of the
British terms publicly before that date. The next day Carnarvon told
Disraeli that Parliament would have to be informed of the imminent
conclusion of the negotiations at once. He had already given provisional
notice for the matter to be broached in a few days. His rather defensive
letter significantly referred to the Prime Minister's desire 'to defer
any announcement till he could see his v/ay more clearly as to the general
business of Parliament. ' Since the Summer recess was so near, Carnarvon
feared he might be exposed "to the charge of having delayed the
communication till it was too late for Parliament to express an opinion. "
But he was confident of success; the matter would pass off quietly enough
1 :
"if it Y/as not made too much of" by the Government. By the 29th, however,
his plans liad failed, for Derby told' the French Ambassador that lack of
Parliamentary time meant that a debate would liave to be postponed till
2
the next session. "I knew you vrauld be glad," was Carnarvon's comment to 
3
Disraeli. It looks as if the Colonial Secretary had been defeated by a
1
Carnarvon to Disraeli, Pte., 28 July 1875; Beaconsfield lepers. Box XLl.
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Derby to d'Hareourt, Pte., 29 July 1875; copy enclosed in d'Harcourt 
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private arrangement between the Prime Minister and the Foreign Secretary. 
Curiously enough, the French Ambassador, while recognising the genuine 
difficulties that beset the Government, chiefly over the PLimsoll 
question, felt that the lesson to be drawn from the affair lay in 
"les consequences fâcheuses de 1 'insuffisante direction que le 
Premier Ministre donne \  la marche des affaires." ^
So, public criticism of the exchange project was allowed to
gather strength during the autumn. By the following year many
Conservatives in Parliament were no longer inclined to support their
leaders, ^bch of the opposition derived from the conviction that to
cede the Gambia would be to neglect future advantages for the sake of
insignificant gains elsewhere, since the source of the river lay near
2
that of the Niger. Tliis view v/as expressed by the Royal Colonial 
Institute. A great deal was made of established trade interests.
Another argument, vdiich found favour with the Society for the Protection 
of Aborigines and -(vith missionary circles, was that if France acquired 
the Gambia, defenceless natives v/ould be left to Fi'ench 'barbarism* and 
irréligion'. In February 1876, the Cabinet decided to refer the whole 
matter to a I^rliamentary Committee. When France narrowed the extent 
of her offer, the failure of the negotiations was inevitable.
If Disraeli had allowed the project to be debated earlier, the 
negotiations would probably have succeeded. When the taPcs were re-opened
D'Harcourt à Decazes, 30 juillet 1875, no. 83; Affaires étrangères, 769,
2
e.g. Evening Standard, 27 Au .gust 1875.
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in the Spring of 1875, the agitation had almost died down and was
mainly from a few Bathurst firms. Moreover, the Liberals, who had
supported the project v/hen in office, had no desire to oppose it
now. Their criticism was merely of what they termed the Government's
indecisiveness. The crucial point was when the Government's own
supporters started to desert Carnarvon. Disraeli's accusations about
1
the Colonial Secretary's mismanagement of the negotiations were entirely 
unjust.
The incident illustrates the conflict of the mid-'seventies 
betv/een the forward-1 ooking policy of the Colonial Office, and the 
Cabinet's distaste for bold measures that were not altogether popular.
Tlie strong hand of Disraeli in the Cabinet, coupled with Derby's 
unv/illingness to continue with a project he laimself had devised once 
it met 7/ith the disapproval of his chief, killed the negotiations.
Only when Derby was replaced by Salisbury, who refused to subordinate 
Anglo-French relations to the supposed wishes of the electorate, was 
there again a chance for radical changes to be made in Britai.n's 
handling of West African affairs vis-à-vis France, Tlie opposition to the 
exchange project, however, made the Government for years to come very 
reluctant to consider any proposals for an agreement vd.th France based 
on the cession of the Gambia.^ Not till 1888, when Anglo-French 
difficulties in West Africa had increased tremendously, was it broached 
in negotiation with France, Nevertheless, the Colonial Office was
1
Disraeli to Lady Bradford, 26 April 1876; Buckle: Disraeli,V, p.475. 
Vide also Disraeli, VI, p. 412.
determined to avoid further responsibilities'in the area as far as 
possible, Hie boundaries of the Gambia have never been extended since 
for more than a few miles up the river.
b) The Upper Niger. ' ^
Unlike the French desire to possess the Gambia, French
expansion into the hinterland of Senegal did not affect any established
British interests. Hie formulation of British policy here was left
largely to the departments concerned, i.e. to the Foreign and Colonial
Offices, and hardly ever concerned the Cabinet as a whole.
In some quarters British policy was misunderstood. In 1880,
Bismarck, always ready to discover a diplomatic motive where there was
none, thought that English tolerance was simply due to Gladstone's desire
1
to support the Anglo-French understanding. It does not seem to have
occurred to him that British policy in West Africa was based primarily 
%
on local, rather than on diplomatic considerations, nor that the previous
Ministry had adopted the same attitude over Senegal. -In 1875, the
British attitude had been distinctly encouraging, although the French
were then hardly in a position to launch a full-scale attack on the
hinterland. Both Derby and Carnarvon, for instance, admitted that the
import of arms tlirough the Gambia led to native insurrections which
2
impeded French progress in the upper reaches of the Senegal.
Not until the end of the Conservative administration, hovjever,
1
Bismarck to Weber, German Resident in Tangier, 10 April 1880, 
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was French expansion a reality. In 1879 General Gallierd started
to acquire territory near the sources of the Niger. The Freycinet
plan of 'public works ' included plans for railways in Senegal for
which Briere de 1 'Isle had already made surveys. Dakar was declared
the official port of entry for French West Africa, replacing older
1
St. Louis, as part of the future system of communications. Later in
the year a commission of enquiry to consider a railway from Algeria
to the Senegal was proposed. Tlie res^tion in London was mild: if this
railv/ay scheme were carried out it would mean that 'the Gambia would
become more worthless and more burdensome than it was even then, as the
little trade which it did with the interior would be directed to Senegal
2
and North Africa'. Hiere v/as no intention to oppose the plan.
In February, 1880, the extent of the French programme was known.
The Chamber of Deputies was asked to sanction a three-fold plan of 
railway construction: one line was to run from St. Louis to Dakar, 
another from the last navigable point on the Senegal (Kayes) to the Niger, 
and a third from Kayes to Dalcar. The first line was agreed to almost 
immediately.
Hie British Government remained complacent. They felt that 
the proposed developments showed what a very poor means of access to the
1
Journal Officiel, 14 July 1879.
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LtLnute by Hemming, 1 January 1880, on the Exposé des motifs 
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interior the River Senegal itself must be, lliey also doubted Y/hether
the scheme would have any useful results, at least for many years to
come. A number of attenpts had already been made from about 1873
onwards to connect Algeria v/ith the Upper Niger via the oases, but so
far without success. Hiere was no evidence that the eastward advance
to the Niger, of which the railway scheme was only a part, might not
equally be doomed to failure. Although they knev/ that an official
expedition was already on its way from the Senegal to the Niger, they
felt that the "enormous sums" the French had previously spent on colonial
2
development had had "very inadequate results. " At the moment, French
plans for opening up the hinterland seemed to be "very -wild and,,. fairly
visionary. " Hie curious thing was that the French Government should
5
think it vrarth while "to devote so much money to them. "
It became increasingly clear, however, that French expansion 
was certain, at least on paper. A considerable number of treaties 
were known to have been made with chiefs in the upper Senegal, and 
in January 1881 the first French Governor of the region was appointed. 
British officials in West Africa, including the Governor General 
himself. Sir Samuel Roive, felt that Britain should not lag behind France. 
Rowe suggested that as a first step toY/ards opening up the hinterland 
of her ov/n possessions, Britain should send an expedition up the Gambia/
1
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to explore trade possibilities. But although some Colonial Office 
men felt that liis proposal did not go far anough as a "counter-
2 .
demonstration" to the large-scale activities of Britain's rival,
this was not tlie general view. Indeed, one official saw no need for an
expedition at all. The Gambia, he insisted, could never become a
commercial highway until it belonged to a Power able to subdue the
natives and build forts - which undertaking was out of the question for 
3
Britain. Eventually, a decision was reached and an expedition set out
in 1881 under Dr. Gouldsbury. His instructions included provision for
commercial treaties. The purpose of the expedition was two-fold: to
attract badly-needed trade to the impoverished Gambia, and to establish
a position further inland viiich one day might become a commercial
jumping-off ground. Gouldsbury was not sent out to rival French activities.
The theory was rather that France would gradually open up the hinterland
and Britain vvould follow cautiously in her wake; if ever the French
managed to extend a railway as far as Bamako on the Niger, Britain might
4
then perhaps be able to connect the Gambia with that line; for the time
being Britain's primary duty was towards her existing settlements on the
coast, which would play their part "in a less ambitious manner and according
to their means in opening up new routes and attracting to themselves fresh 
5
trade". British motives were well expressed by an Assistant Under- 
1
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Secretary at the Oolonial Office, Robert îvleaàe, whose views the
Secretary of State himself, Lord Kimberley, generally shared: "We
need not be jealous of a French railway from Senegal to Algiers via
Timbuctoo and other places. If they succeed they will open out
Central Africa which in common with all other countries will benefit,
and if the customs reserve of Gambia and Sierra Leone decline, which
I think doubtful, we may get the general gain to civilization and
1
commerce against our loss. "
There was equal complacency about French expansion in another
connection. In 1880, the whole question of control of the Niger was
becoming more pressing. French activities in the Upper Senegal had an
obvious bearing on it. But since her position in the Lov/er Niger was
hardly challenged, Britain still liad no fear that France would forestall
her. She was confident that in time British influence would spread to
the middle reaches of the Niger, and that British commerce would reign
supreme there. The danger from France far away to the north-west seemed
remote. Thousands of miles of difficult country lay between upper
Senegal and what is now Nigeria, The English would reach "the Bausa
2
country via Lagos long before the French, " Kimberley thought.
By the summer of 1881, France had made rapid and somewhat 
unexpected strides. In February the SenOgal-Niger railway had been
1
Ibid.
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sanctioned by the Assembly. Many commercial treaties had been made 
round the sources of the Niger. In May the blow fell. The Times
reported that France had made a treaty with the King of Segou giving
exclusive privileges to French commerce. At once a question was asked
in the House of Commons. Tliis latest development cut riglit across
British policy. The assumption had been that for France to open up
the hinterland would ultimately be to Britain's advantage, that English
commerce would become the heir to French penetration. But now it looked
as if Britain's 'coastal' policy had been based on a miscalculation.
Meade, who had been so optimistic about the beneficj^ent results of
French expansion, was particularly indignant: he thought a treaty
establishing exclusive trade showed "very antiquated" ideas on the part
of the French Government and he doubted Ydiether it was even consistent
1
with international law. Kimberley was furious, becoming incoherent in
his anger: "We should instruct our Governors in throughout [si<:0 the
West Coast to use every effort to prevent the extension of French influence. "
(Later, however, he thought better of tliis, and decided that for the
moment no such instructions should be given, nor should Britain express
her disanproval of the Segou treaty, in view of the current Sierra Leone
3
negotiations with France. ) The Permanent Under-Secretary alone,
R.G.V/. Herbert, seems to have regarded French action dispassionately.
His position enabled him to be extremely blunt v/ith Kimberley; "We of
1
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course tîiink such exclusive arrangements ungenerous to the commercial 
interests of this country. But France, and all other nations, being 
behind us in commercial enterprise, and power, can in this way only 
secure for their people a market in wiiich we shall not oust trade and 
undersell them. From their point of view they are riglit; anyhow it is 
not of the least use for us to ask them to give us a sliare (which we 
mean to be in due course the lion's share) of those trade advantages
1
which they are spending immense sums of money to procure for themselves. "
Since Britain had no possessions in the area, a decision on
policy did not rest v/ith the Colonial Office alone, however. As a
potentially consular question, the matter concerned the Foreign Office*
Investigation there showed that England load no treaty binding France
to give British subjects the same facilities as French citizens in any
commercial arrangement with a native chief. Yet had France the right
to exclude the commerce of other nations altogether? Although Britain
had never protested against French colonisation in Senegambia, her
2
attitude now needed re-consideration. Commercial circles in England
were alarmed especially when it was rumoured that the French were trying
to exclude other Europeans from the sources of the Niger to as far as 
3
Timbuctoo* On 9 July the British Ambassador asked the French Government
4
for a definite statement about the contents of the Segou treaty.
1
îünute by Herbert, 1 June 1881, on a Fhrliamentary question, supra.
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F. 0, Memo, on French Proceedings in Africa (%per Niger and Congo), 
by Hertslet, 11 June 1881; GoD. 29/362.
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Vide Manchester Chamber of Commerce to Lord Granville (copy), forwarded 
by Foreign Office to Colonial Office, 30 June 1881; C. 0.147/46.
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By the autumn its true nature was knoivn. Though the
reports which liad reached England were exaggerated, and though the
treaty was not ostensibly exclusive, its provisions gave preferential
treatment to Frenchmen. That the treaty was not quite so unfavourable
as had at first been supposed now made little difference to the
British attitude, however. The Government realised tliat though France
had gained much, Britain had lost nothing material- only the hope of
distant benefits which might never have materialised, even if French
commercial policy had been as liberal as she desired. The fact that
for some months after the Segou treaty France made very little progress
in the Upper Niger may have had something to do with the calmer outlook
which prevailed in London, ilfter the occupation of lUnis, the
Governor of Upper Senegal -was instructed not to consider any further
military engagements for the moment. Advance in the south had to wait
upon consolidation in the nortli. In the same year the Flatters mission
was massacred by the Touaregs, and consequently the hope of connecting
Algeria with the Soudan was ten^orarily abandoned. Whatever happened
in the l%)per Niger, Britain was now more than ever determined to leave
France to her own devices there. The Colonial Office refused to be
moved by English traders who wanted Britain to make further commercial
treaties near the Gambia as a counter to ^ French activities. Kimberley
felt tliat such efforts would in any case be fruitless, for no substantial
1
development of trade seemed likely in that area. Instead Britain would
1
Minutes of 19 September 1881 by Hemming and of 25 September by Kimberley 
on coirplaints from T. Broivn and Co, (Bathurst merchants) about 
conditions in the Gambia, forwarded by Governor Havelock to Kimberley,
20 August 1881; C. 0. 87/117.
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concentrate on the area where she had most to gadn, that is, in the Lower 
1
Niger.
Early in 1883, Kimberley, though no longer Colonial Secretary,
put forward a proposal designed to secure French recognition of Britain's
future sphere of influence. Britain would offer the Gambia to France, aid
in return would secure an agreement giving her control of the coast east 
2
of Lagos. But the project had the obvious disadvantage that it would
have called French attention to the area Britain considered most desirable,
3
and opposition from Derby killed the suggestion almost at once. In the
autumn, the Colonial Secretary advanced a new more far reaching and
4
comprehensive plan based on the old Pongas-Gaboon idea. In the same year, 
the idea of the unbroken coastline from the Ivory Coast to the Cameroons 
gained fresh support from an unexpected source - the Foreign Office, who 
started to back local efforts towards a Protectorate over the Oil Rivers 
with great enthusiasm.
Meanwhile France was faced with native hostility in the Upper 
Niger. In 1882 she launched an attack on the powerf\il chief Samory, but 
he managed to fight back with varying success for a decade. Since 
further advance depended on the military situation, France now 
consolidated her gains. In 1882, credits were asked for amounting to 
7,458,785 francs (nearly £300,000) for railway building, and by the next 
year the St. Louis-Dakar line had made substantial progress. The French.
1
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flag was planted on the ITiger for the first time in 1883 at Bamako,
and a protectorate was established over Bafing. Nearer the coast,
treaties were made with Bayol and Cayor, The British Government was
content to remain a spectator. Bamako, for instance, was considered
1
to be far from "the part of the Niger important to British trade. "
Only one commercial treaty touched British interests. This was with
Timbo v/hich lay in the Fouta-Djallon country where there was already
a good deal of rivalry which derived chiefly from the French and British
authorities on the Guinea Coast. Gouldsbury and others before him had
made commercial treaties ivith Timbo, but since the French treaty was
2
not exclusive there seemed nothing to complain of.
Although Britain tended increasingly towards a policy of
spheres of influence in West Africa, there was a considerable divergence
of opinion in the Colonial Office about French expansion. The more
junior officials, unlike Derby and Herbert, did not believe in
abandoning the %>per Niger. A.W. L. Hemming, Head of the African and
Mediterranean department, thought that if Britain did not take care,
the French would divert most of the trade to themselves tlirough Dakar.
3
They put England to shame by their activity - if the Colonial Office 
could .get only a fifth of the money the French had voted for the Senegal
1
Minute by Lister on Lyons to Granville, 22 February 1885, Slave Trade 
No. 20; F. 0.84/ÏG37.
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Vide l) minutes by Hemming, ]\feade, and Kimberley on Foreign Office 
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3
Minute by Hemming on P.O. to C. 0., 24 February.1883; C. 0. 87/L21.
1
railways, they might hope to malce something of the Colonies. He
believed that the French would ultimately reap their reward, and that
2
in the near future they might get as far as Timbuctoo. Meade, on the
other hand, continued to be mildly surprised by the large sums spent
3
on the railways, but by 1884 was convinced that France was at least
4
making progress. But the older school,in v/hose hands policy lay,
5
felt that France was merely throwing away her money^ on "one of many
6
utterly unremunerative foreign enterprises. " The Senegal-Niger
railway would probably" prove to be "a very voracious white elephant, "
As for the treaties with Bafing and Cayor, Britain might wish France
8
joy of these places, wherever they might be.
Derby's apparent failure to provide any kind of counter-weight 
to French colonisation in Senegambia aroused criticism amongst imperialist 
circles at home. It was often alleged that Britain was merely retreating
Mnute by Hemming on P.O. to C. 0., 6 lîarch 1882; C. 0.87/119.
Minute by Hemming on F. 0. to C. 0., 24 February 1883; C. 0. 87/121.
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on F. 0. to C.O., 7 July 1883, C. 0. 87^21.
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1
before the French advance. Firms connected with the Gambia lent
colour to the idea by ascribing their commercial failures to Colonial
2
Office indifference. Until 1885 it was hardly realised that the
Government had a policy at all for West Africa,
In fact, during the early 'eighties Britain was deciding where
her interests lay, Wlien the Niger Protectorate was made, her policy
became plain. In 1887, the northern frontiers of the Niger Company's
3
territory were left undefined. The race for the Tbhad region liad 
already begun by the time Britain fixed the frontiers of the Gambia 
by the Agreement of August, 1889, and so tacitly recognised French 
domination of the Upper Niger,
2o FRENCH GUINEA.
Britain reacted in a very different manner to French expansion 
north of Sierra Leone. Here control of the coast was at stake, not of
the hinterland. Her attitude until about 1884, when she began to attach 
less importance to the area, was based on local considerations rather 
than on any assessment of alternatives such as she had made over the U^per 
Niger, She regarded the spread of French influence as detrimental to 
her own interests on the coast and consequently her policy was to keep
1
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France as far north as possible. It is significant that most of the
relevant correspondence on Anglo-French relations is contained in a
series of Foreign Office 'case volumes* bearing a title at once
defensive and acquisitive in sound: "French Encroachments on the West
1
Coast of ilfrica". These volumes start in 1879, when France became 
particularly active in this area as well as further to the east between 
Lagos and the Gold Coast,
a) The Anglo-French Sierra Leone Convention of 1882, •
In the 'sixties and 'seventies Britain considered Sierra Leone
the most important of her West African Colonies, which can be partly
explained by the peculiar origins of the settlement. The Report of the
1865 Select Committee envisaging eventual withdrawal from the Colonies
acknowledged special responsibilities by making an exception of Sierra
Leone. When, following the recommendations of the Report, the Colonies
were re-united under one administration in 1866, the Govemor-General 's
headquarters were quite naturally fixed at Freetown, The British attitude
was shov/n clearly in the Gambia exchange negotiations. When the French
offered their posts on the Ivory Coast as part of the bargain, Britain
declined to negotiate on this basis and proposed instead tiiat they should
give up all claims to the coast between Portuguese Guinea and the River 
2
Sheba. It was an attenqqt to safeguard the future frontiers of one colony
1
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by the sacrifice of another. When discussions were resumed after the 
Franco-Prussian War, France was prepared to meet Britain to some extent, 
and in 1874 she offered to hand over her posts in the Cercle de la 
Mellicourie as well as those on the Ivory Coast, This seemed an 
attractive proposition at first. Tlie revenue of Sierra Leone had been 
falling off badly, and the decline was ascribed not only to the fact 
that goods were being smuggled past the customs, but that trade was being 
diverted to the French posts wliere there were no duties to pay. Control 
of the rivers to the north, therefore, was hi^ly desirable from the 
British point of view.
After the negotiations had broken down, hov/ever, there was no 
longer any advantage for France to regard her position on the Guinea •
Coast merely as a bargaining counter. She had interests there dating 
from the ifeicien ^ gime, when she had had a settlement in the 'Rivieres 
du Sud'. Trade was flourishing. All along the coast from Portuguese 
Guinea to the River Mellicourie her influence was predominant. Yet only 
three places were generally recognised as French territory. These were 
Boke^ on the River Nunez, Boffa north of the Pongas -vdiere an official post 
was created only in February 1876 though there had been a commercial treaty 
ten years before, and Binty on the Mellicourie. Consolidation was required. 
The French knew from the Pongas-Gaboon proposal that Britain was not 
interested in the coast north of the Pongas, where Boke and Boffa were, 
so there they had a clear field. South of the Pongas, however, they had 
to reckon with opposition from the British authorities.
Rowe, the Governor of Sierra Leone, was just as keen on extension 
as the French. He felt that the financial state of the Colony made it
Z49
imperative. The only alternative would have "been to have raised the
present customs rates, and that would have diminished trade still more.
In view of the disturbing proximity of the French posts and of what he
knew about his rivals* intentions, he decided to push to the north as
fast as possible. In June 1876 he secured formal cessions of territory
round the Searcies Rivers. The next year he made a preliminary move
to establish British authority there, and he also re-affirmed possession
of Matacong Island, first acquired in 1826. He then tried unsuccessfully
to take Toumbo (or Konakry as it was called later) near the British lies
de Los. Shortly afterwards the French Government proclaimed their right
to all territory between the Pongas and the ifellicourie, including, of
course, Toumbo. In 1878 they s^nt a naval officer to Binty with
instructions to maintain control of the place and to conclude fresh
treaties with the natives. On the 25th of the follomng February, Rowe
announced that duties would be imposed on all goods entering or leaving
the territory he had acquired in 1876,
The Colonial Office in London was not happy about this local
rivalry. As far as the French side of it was concerned, they were
inclined to believe that an attempt was being made to put pressure on
1
Britain to re-open negotiations about the Gambia, which they now regarded 
as impossible. They were wrong about tliis, however; until Ivlarch 1879, 
France was carrying out a genuine policy of extension. At the same time, 
although they wanted increased coastal control, they felt unable to give
1
C, 0, to F.0., 2 November 1877; quoted in Scotter: International Rivalry. 
op. cit., p. 197.
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Rowe their full support, llie advantages to he derived from his recent
acquisitions seemed to he outweighed by the counter-measures be provoked.
Yet no other policy for Sierra Leone was feasible. The basic difficulty,
as in so many other administrative problems in the colonies during the
'seventies and 'eighties, was finance. The Treasury virtually imposed
a veto on the only alternative to extension (apart from sheer stagnation),
the attainment of financial solvency, by refusing to grant a subsidy for 
1
the Colony. But there was a growing conviction that extension by
itself was only a palliative, and that the interests of the Colony could
best be served by coming to an agreement with France, Moreover, recent
events seemed to show that soon the northern boundary would have to be
decided on a diplomatic level. The Foreign Office, more concerned with
the effects of local hostility on Anglo-French relations, v/as in full
agreement. Pauncefote hoped as early as 1878 for a conç>rehensive
settlement of all questions at issue beti'/een the two countries in West 
2
Africa.
Thus in March 1879 when the French infringed British rights by 
occupying Matacong Island, Britain was pre-disposed towards negotiation, 
though she deplored the means used to bring it ■ about. Tlie Colonial Office 
interpretation of French policy - that the occupation was part of a 
deliberate plan to undermine Britain's fiscal policy and so force the 
exchange issue - was now generally accepted. The recent French acquisition
1
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2
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of Cootenoo on a d?fferent part of the coast gave it colour.
A protest about JVIatacong was made at once. But although V/addington,
the French Foreign Mnister, at first said that the island was occupied
2
without specific government sanction, France did not intend to withdraw.
In fact, she asserted her ownership by building a new wharf and imposing
3
customs duties - against which Britain duly protested.
By the end of April the British were anxious to discuss the 
whole question of respective rights on the coast, for other causes
of dispute were added to îvîatacong. The ship Rowe had sent from Sierra
Leone to investigate the reported occupation had been given further
4
instructions to hoist the flag at Konakry to anticipate French action, 
Rowe himself went to the Searcies Rivers and on 25 April formally 
annexed the area to Sierra Leone, lüs proclamation of February about 
.customs duties was now put into effect. This was much more of a blow 
to French interests than Ivîatacong was to British. France had several 
treaties v/ith the natives prior to Rowe's (although Britain had, too).
1
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her trade posts liad been there longer than any of the British, and 
her traders* prosperity had largely depended on the previous absence 
of customs. The French Vice-Consul complained bitterly to his 
Government. In May he announced that duties would now be imposed in
Mellicourie,
Despite the urgent need for a settlement it was not until
the following year that negotiations started in earnest. There were
several causes of delay. In the first place, neither Britain nor
France was prepared to jeopardise her chance of coastal extension by a
rigid application of the status quo, although both countries had agreed
in April that the status quo should be maintained pending a settlement.
But no attempt was made to agree on what exactly this meant, except with
regard to Matacong. Although by June, France had withdrav/n her troops 
1
from Matacong, neither country would admit that her own posts on the
mainland came within the same terms of reference. Bach contested the
other's territorial claims, and in effect insisted that the status quo
should be applied, not in her own, but in her opponent's sphere.
Neither would admit the slightest doubt as to her rights. Both could
refer to treaties more than half a century old. Thus it was extremely
difficult to cane to any arrangement about the levying of customs duties
in both the Searcies and the Mellicourie areas. After repeated protests
from France, Britain remitted several months duties in the Searcies,
0
so that the traders could honour their present obligations to their 
customers without financial loss, but in the autumn the customs
1
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regulations came into force again. The French consistently upheld
their ri^it to impose duties in Afellicourie and in îvîatacong. In the
absence of definite instructions about tlie status c|uo, the local
authorities âelt at liberty to extend their authority wherever they
could. Tlieir activities laid both Governments open to further charges
of having infringed the status quo, and at the same time made it politically
impossible to revert to the respective positions they had. held on the
coast before the î^tacong incident. The vicious circle lasted for
eighteen months - until it was agreed that the negotiations should no
longer depend on the restoration of the status quo.
In the second place, France was unwilling to negotiate
except on her own terms. She stuck to her guns for three months, wliich
meant that, quite apart from the effects of the status quo dispute,
there v/as no basis for negotiation till July 1879. vYaddington wanted
something more than a mere delimitation of boundaries noth of Sierra
Leone. Soon after Britain proposed negotiations, he suggested that now
tliere was an excellent opportunity to make an exchange of territory which
1 2 
would give the Gambia to France, Clinging tenaciously to this idea,
he kept on trying to avoid discussing delimitation with the British
Ambassador, and instructed the French Representative in London to do the
3
same with Salisbury. Only at tiie beginning of July, after Lyons had told
1
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liim several times that the cession of the Gambia was an impossibility,
would Waddington agree to consider delimitation en principe. Even
then he required assurances about future customs duties in the British
sphere to enable him to face what he described as the inevitable
1
opposition from commercial circles at home.
In the third place there was inter-departmental disagreement
in London which continued until the Liberal Government came into power
in the following spring. The difficulty was to agree o'n objectives.
The Colonial Office wanted simply a line of demarcation that would
considerably enlarge the present extent of Sierra Leone. They still
wanted, as they had done in 1875-6, to keep the whole coast south of
the Pongas British. They were prepared, however, to draw the boundary
2
a little lower - at the Dubreeka River. But Salisbury disagreed. He
pointed out that the proposal was hardly "fair", since France would have
to give up her title to the Mellicourie and other places south of the
Dubreeka merely to keep territory she already possessed north of that 
3
river. He felt that the attitude of the Colonial Office was unrealistic 
and not conducive to a settlement.
Moreover, Salisbury and his Foreign Office colleagues believed 
that from a diplomatic and imperial point of view demarcation was 
inadequate. They wanted all the causes of dispute on the West Coast to
1
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be discussed at the same'time; Cootenoo, for instance, v/hich commanded
1
an important outlet of trade, could be made part of the settlement,
2
Salisbury was supported oyer this by the .Admiralty who thou^t that
A
Cootenoo could be secured in exchange for the lies de Los. Salisbury
and Pauncefote would have lilced, too, to have revived the Gambia exchange 
3
project, and were impatient at the "vehement opposition" the "bare
4
mention" of it aroused from the Colonial Office. Although Salisbury
assured the Colonial Secretary that pending a settlement of the Matacong
question he would not communicate with the French Government about an 
5
exchange, he felt under no obligation to hide his ov/ji predilection for
6
it from the French charge d'affaires. In one of his last talks with
the French Ambassador before he went out of office, Salisbury still said
he thought tliat an exchange of territory would be the best solution of
all, but that unfortunately there was often great resistance to his
7
ideas from the Colonial Office. lie also wanted to settle other 
non-African colonial questions at the same time as the Sierra Leone dispute, 
One was the long-standing problem of the 'Treaty Shore ' in Nev/foundland 
which had recently come up again: if Britain could treat this pari passu
1
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v/ith the African questions and give up the Gambia, a settlement might 
1
be reached. Another concerned the Pacific Leev/ard Islands over
which France wanted to establish a protectorate but which had been
guaranteed independence by an Anglo-French Declaration of 1847.
Salisbury was sounded as to whether he would abrogate this Declaration,
in July 1879, and though he had no objection to a French Protectorate,
(as Waddington saw from his conversations v/ith him at Dieppe on
19 September,) he soon realised that abrogation could become a useful
bargaining counter in a general settlement. By November 1879, the
1847 Declaration was "standing over" in the Foreign Office for
2
consideration with the ÎÆatacong affair. But Salisbury's plans for 
a general settlement eventually, collapsed through Colonial Office 
opposition. It was not till September 1880 that a final mode of 
negotiation for the Sierra Leone question v/as settled.
The development of British policy.
Four phases can be discerned in Britain's handling of the 
Sierra Leone dispute, i) From April to November 1879, demarcation was 
put fo]T//ard in discussions v/ith France as a basis of negotiation.
ii) From December 1879 to September 1880, the idea of making an agreement
on Sierra Leone part of a wider colonial settlement was considered.
iii) Then Britain decided to treat other Anglo-French colonial disputes 
separately, and until the following April negotiations ensued for a joint
1
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2
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con^ssion on demarcation, iv) The final phage was from May 1881, when 
the Commission first met, to the signature of the Sierra Leone Convention 
in June 1882.
i) Tlie idea of demarcation.
During the first phase the main task on the British side was
to find a formula for demarcation. Tlie Foreign Office, though v/ishing
to combine a local settlement with an agreement on other colonial
questions, was as much in favour of demarcation as the Colonial Office,
Ihey made the first specific proposals. Tliey suggested that the coast
betvveen Sierra Leone and the Pongas should be divided into two zones,
Britain keeping the Searcies and regaining Matacong, and France having
the coast north of the River I4anniah including the Îles de Los.
Pauncefote, whose special qualifications enabled him to sliare the conduct
2
of negotiations with Salisbury, had already sounded ÎÆentebello on this
three days before, ostensibly on liis own initiative. The Frenchman's
3
reply had been distinctly encouraging. Tlie Colonial Secretary
considered the proposal reasonable. He was quite prepared to cede the
lies de Los, which had been a useful base in the days of the slave trade,
4
but wliich now had little value. Throughout his term of office HLcks-Beach 
adopted a much less legalistic attitude to Anglo-French problems in West 
Africa, one more in line with Salisbury's approach, tlian some of liis
1
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colleagues at the Colonial Office. At the same time he was anxious 
to secure a boundary that would not only stop territorial disputes, 
but would be of material benefit to Sierra Leone. As he was not 
sufficiently au fait v/ith local conditions to judge the Foreign Office 
propo^il from this angle, he asked for the negotiations to be postponed 
until the Colonial Governor's views were known.
Rowe did not endorse Hicks-Beach's opinion. He v/as on the
A
vdiole opoosed to abandoning the lies de Los, which he claimed were
2
superior to Matacong as regards facilities for anchorage. His report 
reached London on 4 July, tliree days after Waddington had at last 
been induced to consider demarcation. The brief prospect of negotiations 
beginning in the near future vanished. Now it was Britain who lagged 
behind France, Without Colonial Office approval, Salisbury felt unable 
to make any formal proposals to the French. For six months, Anglo-French 
discussions kept going over the same grounds Nothing was agreed on 
except the principle of demarcation.
In the summer, a new problem arose; what was to be the nature 
of the fiscal regime after demarcation was achieved? The dispute about 
customs duties helped to bring it into prominence, A territorial 
settlement alone would not have solved Britain's difficulties for British 
duties were high compared with those of France, and future trade might, 
therefore, go to the French Zone and not to Sierra Leone. The Miole
C. 0. to F. 0., 24 May 1879; F. 0, 27/2415.
2
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object of demarcation from the colonial stand-point would thus
have been defeated. To prevent this calamity Hicks-Beach conceived the
1
idea of an equalisation of tariffs. But Rov/e disagreed - unless the
2
French raised their tariffs to the British standard. Obviously this 
would never have happened, since the main French grievance against the 
British was that their duties were too high. Hicks-Beach made a great 
effort to convince Rowe that the logical alternative was for Britain 
to meet France half-v/ay; that is, in return for territorial extension 
Britain should lower her duties and France be persuaded to raise hers 
accordingly. He thought that if French complaints were justified, the 
improved relations which might be established on the coast between the 
tv/o Powers by the removal of this grievance would amply repay the 
risk of a temporary loss of revenue; such a loss was not inevitable, 
hov/ever, since British traders would probably be able to attract trade 
to themselves; the better the position of the British posts compared 
with the French, 'the more permanent form of their Government, and the 
greater amount of protection which they gave to traders, * would help 
them. He pointed out that the Sierra Leone Commission of 1877 had 
considered that coastal extension would lead to increased revenue which 
would eventually give the Colony a balance in hand so that customs could 
be lowered and complete freedom of trade eventually established. The 
Commission had believed that free trade was essential for effective 
competition with the French, and Hicks-Beach entirely agreed: since British
1
C. 0. to F. 0., 20 June 1879; F. 0. 27/2415.
2
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Confidential Print, African 175, No. 182; C. 0. 806/129.
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settlements on the West Coast existed mainly for trade, lower duties
1
v^ere highly desirable.
Pauncefote thought so, too, and tried to interest the 
French Ambassador in assimilation. Pothuau was rather pleased with the 
idea, and thou^ nothing definite emerged from their talk, Pauncefote's 
suggestion did dispel any suspicion of bad faith the British might have 
aroused by their failure to lay their cards on the table over demarcation. 
Rowe, however, remained obdurate. He explained tliat even if the 
boundaries of,Sierra Leone were considerably enlarged the reduction in 
duties would mean a drop in revenue from £60,000 to £54,000 per annum.
3
a loss that he claimed would have been most detrimental to the Colony.
This was enough for Hicks-Beach and he decided to drop the project.
By December he no longer wanted assimilation to be one of the bases of
negotiation. Some independent Anglo-French arrangement could be made
in the future, but in any case no steps would be taken till Rowe (who
4
•was coming to England) could be consulted in person.
By the autumn of 1879 the general outlook was much brighter. 
Salisbury had warned the Colonial Office that the tentative negotiations 
might break down altogether if they persisted in demanding the Dubreeka
1
Hicks-Beach to Rowe (copy), 6 September 1879, Confidential, C. 0. 
Confidential print, African 206, pp. 12-13, No.8; C. 0.806/151.
2
Pothuau a Waddington, 20 Septembre 1879, no.22; Affaires étrangères, 781.
3
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C.0. Confidential Print, African 206, No. 45; G.0.806/L51.
4
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1
River line, and at the end of September they agreed to liis alternative
 ^ A
proposals. Again these included the cession of the lies de Los. They
felt they could disregard Rowe's opposition here since the /Admiralty
did not support the naval considerations he had put forward. Herbert,
with his usual detacliment, was pleased to note that there seemed to be
"no Methodist preachers or other patriotic negroes" in the islands who
would "malce an audible outcry against passing under the Roman Catholic 
5
yoke of IVance, " Now that the Colonial Office had given way over 
demarcation, Salisbury felt able to go ahead with his own plans for 
a settlement.
ii) 'A comprehensive colonial settlement'.
At this time Anglo-French relations v/ere firmly based on 
mutual good Avill. Both Salisbury and Waddington were anxious to 
strengthen the entente. Tliey found from their talks in September that 
their attitude towards European affairs was remarkably similar. Salisbury 
hoped that their understanding would now bear fruit in the colonial field. 
He wanted to clear away all the remaining causes of friction overseas. 
Though he himself did not regard any of the colonial issues that had been 
discussed at Dieppe as important in themselves, he knew that Waddington did. 
The French Foreign Minister was far more colonially-minded than he was.
But it was politically impossible for Salisbury to satisfy France without
1
F.O. to 0.0. (draft), 4 September 1879; F. 0,27/2417.
2
C.O. to F. 0., 27 September 1879; F. 0. 27/2417.
3
Minute of 19 September on F. 0. to C. 0., 4 September 1879;
C. 0. 267/339.
obtaining compensation. Now if each issue were negotiated separately
it v/ould have been difficult to find a basis for compensation. Such
negotiations miglit have ended in deadlock, which had always happened
over Newfoundland and which might easily have been the case over West
Africa. Moreover, às regards the Sierra Leone question, there was no
guarantee that tile French would accept the line of demarcation agreed
on in London; it represented merely the limit of Colonial Office
concessions to Foreign Office demands. lienee Salisbury's desire for
a comprehensive settlement. By the association of several issues liis
opponents both at home and abroad might be induced to make concessions
they would othervvise be against.
After his return to England the plan matured. Salisbury ■
1
was "toujours très conciliant" to the French Ambassador, and Bothuau
soon realised what was afoot; "il est evident qu'il cherche, en groupant
certaines des questions que nous débattons en commun, a établir un
2
système de compensations". In November Salisbury insisted tliat the
Leeward Islands question, which up till then he had apparently been
prepared to settle unconditionally, should be considered together with 
3
Newfoundland. Some days later he suggested that West Africa should be
2
included in the settlement. Potinau said he could see no connection
1
Pothuau a Waddington, 11 octobre 1879, no, 50; Affaires étrangères, 782,
2 V * /
Pothuau a Waddington, 12 decembre 1879, no. 49, confidentielle;
Affaires étrangères, 782.
3
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Affaires étrangères» 782.
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betv/een these questions, hut Salisbury would not make further progress
in discussing any of them unless the French accepted the notion of a
general settlement. When Fothuau protested about the recent British
occupation of Katanu on the Slave Coast, Salisbury made no attempt to
give a reasoned defence beyond pointing out that France had previously
occupied Cootenoo nearby. He nerely said that this question too should
1
be brought into the general West jlfrican discussions. His problem was
how to make his proposals sufficiently attractive.
Sometime before 17 Januai^ 1880, the question was raised
at a Cabinet meeting. Salisbury found that Hicks Beach was amenable to
his plan, though he differed on details. The two Ministers decided to
say nothing about it to the Colonial Office till after Salisbury had
made his proposals to France. Between them they worked out their 
2
terms. They were able to agree on objectives in West Africa, for
Salisbury's conception of British interests there accorded remarkably
well in one sense with the general direction of colonial policy: he
realised that the coast from Sierra leone to the Bights'was more important
to Britain than the coast to the north. Thus it was agreed that Frsince 
/
should give up Cootenoo in return for Matacong, while the principle of 
demarcation north of Sierra Leone should still stand. Salisbury felt 
that there was no point in contesting French claims to IÆatacong which
3 '  .
he had long found impressive. He had already hinted at a division of
1
Salisbury to Pothuau (draft), 9 January 1880; F, 0, 27/2480.
2
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5
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to Matacong; F.O, 27/2417.
influence in West Africa on 10 January, when Pothuau came to see him ■
about Katanu. He told the Ambassador that he thought that "all these
West African questions liad better be made the subject of a simultaneous
settlement, of which the principle should be to renounce any grov/th of
British power towards the North, and any growth of French power towards
1
the South of some point to be agreed upon".
Having secured Cabinet approval, Salisbury was able to 
discuss his proposals with Pothuau a week later. He asked France to 
drop her protests about Katanu and to give up Cootenoo. In return 
Britain would give up Matacong and undertalce to impose no duties at 
Katanu^ v/hich were not already levied, and would also consent to abrogate 
the 1847 Declaration regarding the Pacific Leev/ard Islands* At the 
same time, the Sierra Leone question could be settled by fixing a
2
boundary north of the Searcies. There was no mention of Newfoundland,
probably because Hicks-Beach was not prepared for concessions there, since
it afterv/ards transpired that Salisbury had wanted to make, his terms 
3
'more liberal*. But they were generous enough for his purpose, for both
Pothuau and Freycinet (who had succeeded Waddington as Foreign Minister)
4
were favourable to -tdiem as a basis of negotiation.
1
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Nothing came of the plan, however, because it seemed
to the Colonial Office much too generous. Tliey were particularly
1
opposed to the idea of giving up Ivlatacong. Hicks-Beach seems to
have been thoroughly frightened at the storm he had aroused by going
over the heads of his own subordinates, and he failed to give the
Foreign Secretary any further support. Thus Salisbury was never able
to commit his proposals to paper as the French wanted, nor to explain
2
them in greater detail. Nevertheless, on 18 March Potliuau gave him a
3
written statement of French views accepting his main propositions.
But at this very interview Salisbury liad to say 'good-bye ', for he had
4
been ill for some weeks and was off to Biarritz to convalesce. While
he was away no-one at the Foreign Office was prepared to go on witli 
5 6 
liis plan, despite French impatience. Soon after Salisbury's return
the Election results tlirew him out of office. By the end of J^ril the
idea of a general settlement had been temporarily abandoned.
1
Vide C. 0. to F. 0., 22 m y  1880; F. 0. 27/2480.
2
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Tlie Liberal Government decided to proceed with separate
negotiations on each issue. The Colonial Office had agreed that
demarcation should he settled on the Foreign Oilfice basis seven months
before and it was clearly time the negotiations began. The French could
no longer doubt whether the British really meant business when the
Foreign Office started to discuss details such as the map to be used 
1
in negotiation.
Yet still there v/as delay, wliich was due partly to the change
in government in England, for Granville, the new Foreign Secretary, was
for some months not sufficiently acquainted vdth West African problems
to take any independent action. At one point he was reduced to asking
Lyons if he had any suggestions to make on how the question should be 
2
tackled. In May the old dispute about the status quo in Matacong and
Mellicourie became increasingly acrimonious. Repeated statements of,
3
historic territorial rights were made on both sides. By June the
feeling between London and Paris v/as indeed, as Lyons said, "approaching 
4 2
bitterness". Granville put the blame on the French.
The situation on the Coast eventually forced the pace. Relations
between the local authorities had deteriorated until in June it looked
Salisbury to Lyons (draft), 17 April 1880, No. 376; P. 0.27/2480.
Granville to Lyons (copy), Pte., 21 June 1880; G. D, 29/202.
Montebello to Granville, 3 May 1880; Granville to Leon Say (draft)
27 May 1880; F.0.27/2480. Granville to Lyons, 28 May 1880, No. 574;
F. 0.146/2220. Lyons to Granville, 29 May 1880, No, 428; F. 0. 27/2480. 
Freycinet to Lyons (copy), 4 June 1880, enclosed in Lyons to Granville, 
7 June 1880, No. 461; Lyons to Granville, 18 June 1880, No. 496;
]?.(). :27//2'4E&.
Lyons to Granville, Pte., 18 June 1880; G.D.29/Ï71.
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as if further delay in Europe might lead to an armed conflict on the Coast,
Rov/e had ordered Flirt to prevent the French esta'blishing customs
1
duties in the Beri Erie, Fouricariah, and Mellicourie Rivers, from the
2 3
1 July, as had been announced, and had held up ships bound for Matacong.
4
It was also known tliat French gun-boats • had visited the Rivers. In view
of "Freycinet *8 refusal to abstain from levying duties, on the ground tliat
5
it would admit that French sovereignty was in doubt, the situation looked
6
grave. In response to an urgent appeal from Lyons, the Foreign Office
7
intervened, Pauncefote went to the Colonial Office in person and saw to it
that orders were sent at once to the British authorities not to use force
8
and to make a formal protest only if customs houses were established.
But clearly matters could not be allowed to go on like this; at any moment
there might be a "fresh incident tlirough some new clash of authority. The
9
affair was, as Lyons pointed out, "getting to look very ugly". Moreover,
• 10
the interests of Sierra Leone itself were suffering.
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
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Lyons’s advice to Granville .contained much good sense: "It is 
obviously desirable to keep the matter as much as possible out of the 
hands of the local Colonial authorities on both sides, to avoid 
controversy, - and to try .and come in practice to an agreement upon 
a line of demarcation, without discussing at all the abstract right
1
of either party, as things stand now, to any particular territory".
Granville took the hint. In June the Foreign Office
started once ‘again to work out a basis of negotiation. In July it
was arranged that Rowe (who was now in London) and Hemming should be
2
sent on a special mission to Phris. On #îe 2 August the British
charp-e d’affaires was instructed to ask the French Government to open
3
negotiations forthwith.
But an unexpected difficulty arose. The French now wanted 
to introduce other colonial questions into tiie negotiations. They were 
very loath to abandon the hope of an arrangement such as Salisbury liad 
suggested in the Spring, the more so since over one question they thought 
they had the wliip hand: in April a French protectorate over one of the 
Pacific Leeward Islands had been declared without British sanction.
To secure a formal abrogation from Britain of the 1847 Declaration 
regarding the Islands, they were prepared to hold up the West African
1 ,
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5
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1
negotiations. They were saying, in fact, *if you w^ill yield this
point to us now you will find us in a better humour to negotiate
2
other questions*. But though towards the end of August the French 
still had not replied to the invitation to open negotiations, Granville 
would not be browbeaten. He realised that if Britain could convince France 
that she had nothing to gain by delay, the question of the provisional
protectorate in Raiatea could not be used against her. On the contrary,
3
abrogation would be a valuable card to have in hand; it would provide 
a quid pro quo for a settlement of other questions. It could be used in 
obtaining better terms in West iVfrica - or over Newfoundland. Thus 
Granville load come, througli different circumstances, to exactly the 
same conclusion as liis predecessor months before.
Salisbury's final proposals had made the price of abrogation 
a general settlement in V/est Africa. The French must have realised that 
they would not be offered such favourable terms now, or they would not 
have attempted to use their posiii on in Raiatea to put pressure on Britd. n. 
Tliey must also have known that of all Anglo-French colonial issues Britain 
regarded Newfoundland as the most in need of settlement. In Newfoundland 
British interests suffered more tlian ïVench from the long-standing dispute 
over the Treaty Shore. In West Africa, on the other hand, British and 
French interests v/ere suffering alike. TLie French therefore decided that
1
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2
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rthe best way to secure their protectorate in the Leewards was not
after all by delaying the West African negotiations, in which the
British would, probably not be prepared to make concessions on any
account, but by making abrogation the condition on which the Newfoundland
issue would be re-opened. At the end of August, the French Foreign
1
Minister made a formal proposition on these lines. Tlie Foreign Office,
however, seeing that this gambit could be turned against its sponsors,
was determined that abrogation should only be granted after Britain
had secured full satisfaction in negotiation; in other words, that it
should be the result of a settlement favourable to Britain, not the
2
condition for a settlement favourable to France, To Granville it
mattered little from a diplomatic point of view, no more than it had
done to Salisbury, whether abrogation was to be associated with
3
Nev/foundland or West Africa. Tlie Colonial Secretary, however,
thought the chance of using it as a reward for French good behaviour
4
over Newfoundland was too valuable to be lost.
Kimberley's decision meant that the West African negotiations 
once more stood alone. France had already accepted the British invitation 
to negotiate in Paris and had selected her representatives. She had also
Jaureguiberry to Adams (copy), 27 August 1880; enclosed in Adams to 
Granville, 28 August 1880, No. 787; F. 0. 27/2475.
2
Vide Foreign Office minutes on Jaureguiberry to Adams, supra.
3
F.O. to C. 0. (draft), 16 September 1880; F.O. 27/2475,
4
C. 0. to P.O., 29 September 1880; P. 0. 27/2475.
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1
asked Britain to name the day v/hen the negotiations could begin.
iii) Hie approach towards a limited agreement.
By the autumn of 1880 a good deal of bitterness had
crept into Anglo-French relations over V/est ;d’rica for which recent
events on the Guinea Ooast were largely responsible. France had
grown impatient and had made no attempt to restrain her local officials.
Soon after the Mellicourie incident she had declared a protectorate in
KonaJcry, although Rowe had previously ordered the British flag to be
hoistedÜiere, Streeton, the Administrator of Sierra Leone during Rowe's
visit to London, felt that no protest v/as called for since Konalcry had
2
not been actually ceded to Britain, But, as the Colonial Office
pointed out, Britain had several treaties with King Demba, in whose
lands Konalcry lay, and Sierra leone paid tribute to him for trade 
3
privileges. Hemming, v/ith Iris usual entlrusiasm for active measures
against the French, advocated a distribution of presents to all the
native chiefs who might othemvise be induced to make treaties v/ith 
4
Prance, Kimberley agreed; he thought it waé high time Britain
5
'bestirred' herself and tried to 'counterwork the French', After the
1
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discovery of a. new French treaty signed in Demba ' s country, he
ordered Streeton to send a mission to visit the King and proceed on
1
the lines Hemming had suggested. He had no difficulty in securing
. 2
Foreign Office approval; Pauncefote, who since Salisbury's departure
had had a greater measure of control over the handling of Anglo-French
colonial relations, was less friendly towards France than he had been 
3
a year before.
Nevertheless the British desire for a settlement was stronger
than ever. In August, the protests Lyons had been malcing ever since
î.feiy against the French duties in Mellicourie were deliberately dropped.
Later, the Colonial Office agreed not to malce neprotiations depend on
4 .
the maintenance of the status quo, Hie change of Government in France
in September tended to improve anglo-French relations generally and
thus created a better atmosphere for the opening of negotiations. The
thne seemed opportune for a settlement of all colonial difficulties, not
only those in West Africa. St. Hilaire, who had succeeded Freycinet as
Foreign Minister, was reported as "wishing to make himself pleasant to
Kimberley to Streeton (copy), 27 September 1880, (No. 75), 0.0. 
Confidential Print, African 214, p. 175, No, 124; C. 0.806/158.
F.O. to 0.0. (draft), 16 September 1880; F. 0.27/2481.
Minute on Adams to Granville, 20 August 1880, No,760, Confidential;
"Hie French are continuing their levies of IXities in the Mellicourie 
in spite of our Protests and are entitled to no indulgence"; F. 0.27/2i75,
Ivlinute by Pauncefote on 0. 0. to P. 0., 29 September 1880; 0. 0. to P. 0.,
14 October 1880; P.O. 27/2481.
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1
everybody".
There W9.s one minor problem, however - the form the
negotiations were to take. Prance wanted a mixed commission to sht in
2
Paris, but Granville did not at first favour this method. He wanted
the British Ambassador, assisted by experts, and the French Foreign
Minister to negotiate a deux, partly because he had complete faith
in Lyons's qualities as a diplomat. He probably feared that a
gathering of experts alone, each anxious not so much to reach a settlement
as to impose his own point of view on his opposite number, would result
in a stalemate. But the Colonial Office saw distinct advantages in
a commission: if Hemming and Rowe, wiio had already been nominated as
suitable men to send to Paris, became commissioners there would be
positively no danger of undue concessions being made to Prance. By
November Granville had climbed down, although Lyons was horrified at the
prospect of two such anti-French individuals as Hemming and Rowe being
3
allowed to invade his diplomatic domain. Rowe had to return to West
Africa, however, to deal v/ith an impending outbreak of war between the
4
Gold Coast and Ashanti, and A.E. Havelock (who had recently succeeded
5
him as Governor of Sierra Leone) was. chosen in his stead.
1
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By January 1881 Britain as v/ell as France, was ready
2
for the negotiations to start at once. Now that there was to he a
commission there was no longer any need to work out terms in detail
beforehand. Hemming needed no priming on British rights. When Lyons
returned to the charge about the advisability of coming to a practical
3
arrangement v/ith the French without discussing past rights. Hemming
was not prepared to fix a line of demarcation v/ithout making it clear
that the question of actual sovereignty would afterwards have to be
determined, especially in the Mellicourie district^ wiiich had been
ceded to Britain in 1826 though admittedly, "the cession had never
4-
been acted upon". lie thought that for France to continue to uphold 
5 6
her claims there was "very unsatisfactory". Kimberley's approach to
the question was far less uncompromising : "of course" the French would
7
"continue to assert their rights until an agreement" was reached.
1
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But he endorsed Hemming's plan, of campaign, for once delimitation
was achieved questions of sovereignty might be tacitly dropped. Even
Hemming recognised that the French had nine points of the law on their
2
side in being in actual possession of the territories they claimed.
For this reason the British refused to define beforehand the exact
3 4
nature of the forthcoming pourparlers, as the French wanted. If
definite limits had been laid down before the Commission began, Britain
could not have admitted that France had any rights south of the Pongas
except at the isolated post of Binty, and France would have insisted
on Britain recognising her claims over Mellicourie, Hius a fresh
2
discussion over sovereignty would have arisen, which would have
defeated the whole object of the Commission.
At last everything was settled, and at the end of April the
British delegates left for Paris. The French Commissioners were
General Briere de 1 'Isle, the former Governor of Senegal,' and IL Roy,
5*
sous-directeur of Colonial Affairs in the Ministry of Marine,
iv) Tlie Anglo-French Commission.
Hie first formal meeting of the Commission, on 16 Ivlay, was
%
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taken up v/itli the basis of negotiation, îïavelock put forward the 
original Foreign Office proposal of two years before - i.e. that the 
River Manm.ah should be the line of demarcation, and that Britain
A
v/ould cede the lies de Los in return for Binty and the surrender of 
French claims over the Mellicourie area. Roy countered this with the 
proposal that the line should fall between the Searcies and the 
Mellicourie. The British were prepared to accept on three conditions:
(1) Tliat British trade and shipping should have the 
same privileges as French in all French West ilfrican 
ports;
(2) that British subjects and British products should
be treated on the same' terms as French, and
(5) tliat France should not extend her political influence
1
betv/een Sierra Leone and Liberia,
Two days later the territorial basis was drawn up on the
Mellicourie-Searcies line. Progress now became rapid, Havelock offered
a guarantee, which was accepted, that Britain would not extend her
influence between the River Fouricariah and the River Mburiah, nor
betv/een King Demba ' s territory (around Konakry) and the River Pongas.
A
He also agreed to give up the lies de Los in return for ÎÆaliela, the inlet
of the sea on which Binty was situated. The only stumbling block was the
2
second Britisli condition. At the third meeting (on 23^May) it formed the 
chief subject of discussion. Hie basic difficulty was that the French
1 , . ^
16 May 1881, Memorandum by A.ÏÏ. Ikivelock and A.W. L, Hemming (copy). 
Enclosure 1 in F.O. to G. 0., 25 IVIay 1881, C, 0. Confidential Print, 
iLfrican 233, No. 2, pp. 2-3; C. 0. 806/177.
2
18 May 1881, Memorandum by Havelock and Hemming (copy). Enclosure 2 in 
F.O. to C. 0., supra, pp. 3-4,
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refused to give up their policy of differential duties. Hiey therefore
wanted to ch; npre the wording of the equal treatment clause so tliat it
1
applied to British "subjects" only, not to British "products".
Since the primary object of demarcation from the British 
point of view was to benefit trade, there was considerable dismay in
A
London. Kimberley thought that the offer of the lies de Los should now 
2
be withdrawn. But Herbert, while agreeing to tMs, felt tliat it was not
"worthwhile to expend much ar,gument, or to run the risk of losing
a tolerably satisfactory boundary line, in endeavouring to get the French
3
to agree to equality of traded His clearly formulated ideas on
Anplo-French commercial relations were expressed in terms almost identical
4
vdth those he put forward a few days later over the Segou Treaty: "They
Æhe French/ are developing their African influence and possessions, 
under pressure from their merchants, in order to enlarge the field of 
French commercial enterprise, and they have no idea of admitting the more 
energetic and successful British manufacturer and trader to take the
5
lion's share of the business wiiich they are creating for themselves."
1
23 May 1881, Memorandum by Havelock and Hemming, Enclosure 3 in
F. 0, to G. 0., supra, pp. 5-7.
2
Minute by Kimberley, 26 May 1881, on P.O., to G. 0. , 25 May 1881; 
C. 0. 267/347.
3
Minute by Herbert, 26 May 1881, on F.O. to G. 0., 25 May 1881;
G. 0. 267/347.
4
Vide p. 2.41.
5
kdnute by Herbert, 26 May 1881, on F. 0. to G. 0., 25 Ma.y 1881;
G.0.267/347.
R*
His realism carried conviction,and Kimberley, reassured, decided
that the best course to take was to exclude the question of trade
1
from the agreement altogether.
Territorial questions produced few difficulties. Once the 
frontier was determined, questions of ownership along the coast on 
either side were easily settled. Tliat France had accepted the third 
British condition (that she should withdraw all claims to the coast
2
from Sierra Leone to Liberia) was regarded as a valuable concession,
Britain had long wanted to close the gap between Sherbro Island
(annexed in 1862) and Liberia, but several French trading posts had
stood in the way. Wlien, in 1880, the French had started, to set up more
posts, tlie British had decided to negotiate with Liberia for a
3
coterminous frontier, but the talks had been subsequently postponed.
(Rov/e, who was to liave taken part, had had to take up an appointnent in 
4
the Gold Coast. ) The removal of any potential French intervention in
future Anglo-Liberian negotiations prepared the way for another victory
for the 'coastal' policy. On the other hand, Britain was prepared to ^
5
renounce any claims north of the Pongas up to the River Nunez, a
1
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concession wiiich the French had asked for at the third meeting of the 
Commission.
By the meeting of 30 May, nearly every point had been
settled. On the 25th the French Minister of Colonies had finally
refused to grant equality of trade, and so Britain retained the 
A
lies de Los according to plan. Equality of treatment for 'persons and
1
property* was granted, however, Kimberley agreed to French nationals*
holding land in British West African Colonies, as France had already
2
given the corresponding privilege to British subjects. On the whole
he was well satisfied with the outcome of the negotiations.
Ihen, after a convention had been drawn up for Government
signature and the British Commissioners had returned to London, the
French asked for one more concession. They wanted Britain to support
3
any future French claims north of the Nunez. Hemming was, as usual,
very suspicious, and thought that if Britain agreed she might subsequently
become involved in difficulties v/ith other Pov/ers, probably with Portugal
4
who m i ^ t  wish to acquire the same part of the coast herself. This
5
was the only objection, hovvrever, since it was "quite immaterial" to
1
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1
Britain whether France occupied that coast or not. Even Hemming
2
felt that the point v/as ."probably,,, not worth fighting about", if
the: Convention could be suitably worded so that Britain merely
3
acknowledged the existence of French claims.
The Convention was eventually signed in Paris by Lyons
4 5
and Freycinet on 28 June 1882. It comprised seven articles:
I France was to control the River Mellicourie and 
Britain the River Searcies on either side of a 
line of demarcation, of which the exact course was 
to be detemined by a local commission.
II All islands claimed by Britain south of the line were 
to be recognised as British. All islands to the north 
as far as the River Ninez, including I\5atacong, but 
excepting the lies de Los (which were to remain British), 
were to be recognised as French.
1
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Ei.ght^ including the last article,which provided for ratification^ 
Isa* without specifying a time-limit.
III Britain's renunciation of political influence
up to the^ River I\!unez was to be without prejudice 
to any claims France might make north of the River.
IV. France was not to exercise political influence at
any point between the line of demarcation and 
Liberia.
V French and British Subjects were to enjoy the same
treatment as other nationals in the respective 
possessions of Britain and France.
VI British and French subjects were to hold lands
in French and British areas, respectively, in the 
same way as aliens held lands in Britain and France,
VII A Commission, composed of two British and two French 
representatives, was to meet at Sierra Leone within 
six months of the ratification of the Convention.
If they reached no decision on the line of demarcation, 
the matter was to be referred to their respective 
Governments.
1
Within a month Britain had ratified the Convention, and had
2
taken steps to appoint representatives for the local commission. But the
French Government,claiming that the Convention disposed of French 
3
territory, refused to ratify v/ithout the consent of the Cliamber of
1
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Deputies. Hemming was particularly annoyed at this "very vexacious
and unnecessary delay," for he felt that France had surrendered no
rights beyond "certain very shadowy and imperfect claims to authority
1
at Mahela Point and Factory, " i. e, at Binty. Kimberley was more
inclined to take a philosophic view; 'the fact was that the Chamber
2
was now the Government*. So Britain decided to wait and do nothing
further about a local commission until the French ratified. Tie Senate
authorised ratification on 16 February 1883, but despite Lyons's
constant efforts to get the French Government to lay the Convention
before the Deputies, it was not until 19 April that the Ratification
Bill was presented to the Cliamber, By August a Special Committee of
the Deputies had decided against it, probably owing to commercial pressure.
4
Tie Colonial Office was furious at the delay and inclined to agree with 
their representative on the Commission that it showed 'what grasping and 
difficult people the French were to deal with*. It was "monstrous" for 
the French to talk of "undue advantages" having been given to Britain 
when the Convention had recognised "their very shadowy and doubtful 
claims to the Mellicourie District and l&itacong Island", while all that 
the British had obtained was the Searcies, vdiich the PVench had never
1
Minute by Hemming on P. 0, to C. 0 . 5 0  Aumist 1882; C. 0. 267/350.
2
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4
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formally claimed - "though in the interests of French merchants they
1
made some fuss" about Britain's position there. Tie Office agreed
on a timeat to repudiate French sovereignty in Mellicourie and Matacong
2
if the Convention were rejected.
Tie Foreign Secretary, however, did not wish to go on urging 
3
the French to ratify, To flop- an apparently dead horse was- a useless
pastime in his view and one not■calculated to improve Anglo-French
relations. Hence •‘his "reluctance to make any unpleasing representations
to the French Government" - scruples that were frowned on by jthe Colonial 
4
Office. But his own department hoped that Granville 's friendship with
Waddington, wiio became French Ambassador in London in July 1883, might
enable the question to be settled, and in London, In Paris the British
Ambassador seemed to be up against a brick wall of obstruction. Tie
"disagreeable question" could not be officially transferred to England,
since Lyons's professional pride was involved, but Waddington mi,qht at
5
least suggest "some way of cutting the l<not". Granville did not feel 
inclined to intervene personally, however, and merely suggested that
6
d'Aunay, First Secretary of the French Embassy, should be consulted.
1
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Although he had been advised that dhUinay knew nothing about the
1
question cind was not the sort of man to solve it,
n»
Tie basic difficulty was that France considered the
o
Convention a bad bargain, because it had given the Searcies to
Britain, In 1884 the Convention war-' fir.ally rejected by the Chamber
of Deputies. Ferry himself would probably liave liked to get it passed,
but his Government was not in a .sufficiently strong position for him
5
to make it a Cabinet issue. He could not afford to antagonise
the influential Marseilles firms who had interests on the Guinea coast.
Despite Hemming's rear-guard action against the Foreign
Office for not having talien a firm line about ratification and for
4
having ignored Colonial Office demands that the French should be
5
threatened v/ith a reversion to the status quo, the formalities did
not seem to matter very much now. In the meantime Britain had acquired
the territory beirween Sierra Leone and Liberia, and the refusal to
ratifv could only have the effect of setting her free from her undertaking
6
not to interfere to the north of the Colony - not that she wanted to.
1
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Moreover, although Britain had not obtained as much of the coast
1
as she would have liked, demarcation as laid down in the Convention
was incomparably better than the chaotic state of affairs .that had
existed up to the end of 1882* Britain was determined that the
Convention should not become a dead letter. Indeed the settlement
was subsequently observed in practice by both countries.
There v/as some difficulty about Lîatacong, however. The
North West African Company, a British firm which operated there,
asked the Government not to recognise the validity of the Convention,
2
so as to prevent the island becoming French. The Government refused
3
to act in their behalf, pointing out that property rights were
4
fully provided for in the Convention. At the same time, Britain
reminded France tliat until she ratified the Convention her position
5
in ^îatacong was on sufference only. Rosebery made an unsuccessful
6
attempt to re-assert British possession of the-island, but despite 
his flair for action against France in the colonial field, he never
1
C.O. to F.O. (draft), 1 November 1883; C. 0.267/354.
2
Norris and Sons (on behalf of the N. W. African Company) to G. 0,,
16 January 1885 and 24 February 1885; C. 0. 267/361,
3
F. 0. to C, 0., 2 ÎÆay 1885; C. 0. 267/561; and C. 0. replies to Norris 
and Sons, C.O. Confidential Print, African 279; C. 0.806/224,
4
Minute by Fairfield on Norris and Sons to C. 0., 16 Janueiry 1885;
C. 0. 267/361.
5
Lyons to Ferry, 5 February 1885; copy enclosed in Lyons to Granville, 
5 February 1885, ilfrica No. 17; F. 0.64/1705.
6
Rosebery to Lyons (draft), 26 March 1886, iifrica No. 80; F. 0.84/1754.
intended to revert to the status quo. His object was simply to get
the Convention ratified. As far as the mainland was concerned,
ratification became almost unnecessary after 1885. France consolidated
her position in the Dubreeka area in that year, and the Franco-German
Convention of 24 December recognised not only her rights there but
her tenure of the entire coastline between the liinez and the Mellicourie,
The Franco-Portuguese Agreement of 12 May 1886 also recognised French
rights up to the Nunes. The settlement was a fait accompli. Although
in 1887 Britain attempted to acquire Konakry on the ground that it was
vs
an island at high tide and therefore part of the lies de Los, she had
no desire to go back on the Convention, Sir Edward Grey's Statement
in 1895, when a question was asked in Parliament as to the ri^its of
British subjects in Ivîatacong, that the Convention had always been
1
regarded as binding by both France and Britain, was justified. After
1904 the division of influence on the coast v/as complete, for under the
terms of the Anglo-French Convention of 8 April the lies de Los were
handed over to France,
b) The hinterland.
The British attitude to French activities inland was
dominated by the need to protect Britain's position on the coast. A
2
glahce at the map shows the importance of the hinterland - it was linked
1
Parliamentary Debates, Fourth Series, vol XXXll, 9 April 1895, col. 1275,
2
Map IV.
to the coast by many rivers; control of the hinterland, therefore,
meant control of the sources of trade, vVhere exploration was
encouraged it was always with a backward glance at the coast,
Britain, unlike RVance, had no planned strategy of penetration.
Official expeditions up the rivers v/ere exploratory rather than
acquisitive in motive. Trade possibilities were investigated and
commercial treaties made, but the element of expansion for its own
sake, which was characteristic of French exploration, was almost
entirely lacking in British activities in the 'seventies and early
'eighties. Gouldsbury's expedition up the Gambia into the Djallon
country in 1881 was strictly Ijjnited to commercial objectives. Thus
the ïVench explorer Sanderval met with few obstacles from the British
in making political treaties there and in the same year liis Government
was able to announce (on the French National Day) that the Fout*a Djallon
area was now under protection. Mthough the Colonial Secretary thought
1
France had been "too active" for Britain, his regret sprung from the 
conviction that in this particular case the policy of gradual 
penetration had failed. Britain liad been defeated by a more ambitious 
rival. A potentially valuable area - for the Djallon country was hilly 
and suitable for vhite settlement - was lost. But no existing British 
interests had been infringed, and Kimberley did not believe that French 
success demanded a fundamental change in British policy.
1
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By about 1883, Britain no longer regarded Sierra Leone 
as the most important of her West African Colonies, so she was far 
less disturbed by French activities in the interior than she might 
otherv/ise have been. Tie negotiations for the 1882 Convention 
represented the peak point of her interest in the area. After that her 
attention was concentrated increasingly on the Bights, She strove 
to consolidate the Colony up to the sources of the ‘'Rivieres du Sud’ 
and was content to leave what lay beyond to the French,
3, THE prORY COAST.
Tie relationship between the French posts of Assinie and 
Grand Bassam and the neighbouring British Gold Coast was remarkably 
similar to that between Mellicourie and Sierra Leone. In both cases 
French and British territory stood in close proximity. There was also 
a geographical similarity between the regions themselves. In both 
cases French and British posts stood on a coastal plain intersected by 
rivers and backed by forests. Tie historical background had many 
features*' in common, too. France had held Assinie in the eighteenth 
century at the same time as the Rivieres du Sud, Later she abandoned 
the place, but returned in the reign of Louis Fhillipe and acquired 
Grand Bassam as well, Wnen the Franco-Prussian War broke out, the 
Co'te d 'Ivoire was affected by the general inability of France to protect 
her smaller possessions overseas, and the troops stationed at Assinie 
and Grand Bassam were withdrawn. With the subsequent revival of French 
colonial activity, however, possession of these posts was confirmed, and 
in 1878 Verdier, a French trader who had stayed behind in 1870, was 
appointed Official Resident, Soon after, troops were reinstalled.
Z.9S
As on the Guinea Ooast, so on the Ivory Ooasty France started to 
expand tlirough treaties with local chiefs. By the early 'eighties, 
the process of coastal consolidation and suhseiquent moves into the 
interior was v/ell advanced. On the British side, the Gold Ooast, 
though not as old a colony as Sierra Leone, had a long tradition of 
British occupation behind it. Tie African Company had finally 
established British supremacy there in succession to Dutch influence.
When the Company was dissolved in 1821, the Gold Coast came under the 
Crown. From the middle of the century Anglo-French rivalry grew up 
in this area as it had done round Sierra Leone, After France re-occupied 
Assinie in 1842, the Gold Coast forts, which for some years had 
reverted to merchant rule, were put under official administration 
again. Rivalry between the French and British became a permanent 
factor in local politics and commerce.
Until the 'eighties, the British attitude towards French
expansion west of the Gold Coast was dominated to an even greater extent
by the coastal outlook than it was towards developments north of
Sierra Leone, Tiough inextricably connected v/ith the changed climate
of opinion in England regarding the usefulness of colonies in general,
the 'coastal' policy was largely the result of experience. A^s far as the
Gold Coast was concerned, the rapid evolution of policy, - from the 1865
desire for withdrawal to the continuous coastline advocated by the
1
Colonial Office as early as 1873, - can be ascribed to two causes :
First, native hostility to Surppean occupation, culminating in the
1
Scotter, p,156.
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Ashanti war of 1874-, And secondly, French commercial competition.
Both factors made it increasingly difficult for Britc^in to contemplate 
yd-thdrawal unless she were totally to neglect the interests of her 
traders. She became convinced that she should instead "define her 
authority", i.e. consolidate and extend her position. To this end. 
she bought the Dutch forts including Elmina in 1871. Expansion further 
west was the next step. Treaties v/ith the natives brought the 
Gold Coast as far as Nev/tov/n, but here British expansion came to a 
full stop. In 1868, Newtown had been fixed as the Anglo-French 
boundary follovydng an exchange of territory between France and Holland.
Tie British attitude to the French posts was rather like 
that of the ov/ner of a once-isolated house who sees, a similar dwelling 
being built near to his ovm property. Paced with the unpleasant 
prospect of his own house becoming one of a row, he first tries to 
buy out his potential neighbours, Britain tried to do this during the 
Gajnbia exchange negotiations. But instead of being content v/ith the 
French offer of Assinie and Grand Bassam, she liad demanded the option 
of the whole coast from the Pongas to the Gaboon. Her policy missed 
the mark and, as regards the Ivory Coast, was a failure. By 1876, v/ith 
the break-down of the Gambia negotiations, it v/as no longer possible 
for Britain to buy out her French neighbours. The new house v/as there 
to stay. The analogy with the housc-ov/ner can be carried further.
He now tends to take one or both of two courses of action. One is to 
try to gain additional frontage by acquiring some of the intervening land, 
Tiis would keep his neighbours at a distance and also increase the 
relative value of his ovm property. Or he can concentrate on developing
2 4  f
xiis property and male inn; it as attractive as possible. In any case
he tends to he come suspicious of the nev/ arrivals and to he constantly
on the watch for encroachments on his land. So it was with Britain.
After 1876 she tried to induce Prance to consent to her boundary being
moved a little further west so as to gain increased control of the
important lagoon on which Newtown and Assinie were situated. She
also began to assert her authority more than in the past in the
hinterland of the Gold Coast. Both developments necessitated a fresh
definition of the frontier.
As far as the juxtaposition of authority on the coast was
concerned, Britain was dissatisfied with the boundary for two reasons.
Through Assinie Prance commanded important outlets of trade from which
British merchants were virtually debarred tlirough differential dues.
Secondly, the existing arrangement increased Britain's difficulties
v/ith the natives of the hinterland: whereas from the time of the Ashanti
war the import of arm^ throue:h the Gold Coast was prohibited, no such ban
1
existed for Assinie nor for Grand Bassam.
These were not the reasons, however, which made Britain want 
to extend her authority in the interior* Nor was her new interest in 
the liinterland merely an alternative to the expansion furtWr Ti^ est y/hich 
was now precluded. During the 'seventies fresh deposits of gold were 
discovered less than fifty miles from prench territory. A Prench trader, 
Pierre Bonnat, had first heard of the rich gold workings in the Was saw
1
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district, while he was a prisoner of the itshantis, ard when he was
released in 1874, he returned to Prance and founded a company to
investigate. It was a British, firm, however, the iifrican Gold Coast
Company, which first arrived on the scene in 1877, securing a
concession at Tarlorva a few months later. It was quickly follov/ed hy 
1
other conqjanieso It was essential that British rights to these
deposits should he beyond dispute* Moreover, if further sources had
been found, rival claims to ovmership m i ^ t  liave created an awkward
diplomatic problem.
In 1877 Britain proposed that a new boundary should be
negotiated. Prance refused to discuss the question on the ground that
there were more important matters to be dealt with round Sierra Leone,
Tlrree years later the subject was broached ap;ain at the instigation
2
of the Gold Coast Authorities. Britain proposed that there should be
5 4
a joint local commission to settle the boundary, and Prance accepted.
5
Quite fortuitously, the commission had to be postponed. By 1882 a 
settlement was urgently required, since further gold concessions had been
Ï
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0\'ânq- to an accident to the proposed British Commissioner.
obtained by two new companies - the .Alcanko Gold bhning Company and
1
the Guinea Coast Mining Company. Discussions were resumed in the 
2
autumn, but the Prench v/ould not accede to the British demand that
5
the frontier should be fixed at Assinie, It was eventually agreed,
4-~'
however, that this point should be left to the Commissioners. By
5
the autumn of 1883 Britain was ready for the Commission to meet.
But the Commissioners found it impossible to agree. Tüie
most that the Prench would concede was that Nev/town lay in the British
sphere. By January 1884 the discussions had broken dovm. Prance had
shown her determination to stick to her guns by announcing on
16 December (while the Commission was still sitting) that Assinie v/ould
henceforth be the headquarters of the Prench Resident in the Cote d'Ivoire.
Simultaneously, the Protectorate was placed under the general
administration of the Governor in Gaboon. It 'looked as if the Prench
6
meant to be more active in the coast than they had been in the past*.
In comparison, the British were far less active. After 
the failure of the boundary negotiations British interests^ in the Coast
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declined, as compared with the attention she gave other areas.
Her interest Y-ras turning further east. As the Oil Rivers became
economically more important to her the Gold Coast became less so, -
even eJLlov/ing for, the revived export trade in gold. By 1884-, the
cumulative effects of Prench competition were felt and for two years
there was a severe commercial depression. 'Eie imports of British cotton,
on vdiich exports depended to a considerable extent, fell off badly.
Manchester merchants tended to blame the local authorities.
At the same time, the hinterland was being opened up to
trade. Vdiereas in the 'sixties retrenchment or a possible withdrawal had
seemed the logical answer to an unsatisfactory state of affairs on the
coast, in the 'eighties administration followed advancing commerce.
Part of tl.e policy was to set up customs along the routes leading to
entrepots such as Assinie, in order to divert trade to the Gold Coast.
By 1887 the Prench v/ere feeling the pincli. The explorer. Treich-Laplene
believed that if British tactics were not countered the Cote d*Ivoire
would become a more enclave in British-owned territory and -would be
1
commercially ruined. With official backing he started to explore the 
virgin country up the River Comoe'^ , and in the summer of 1887 made 
several treaties which virtually stopped British expansion westv/ard*
Wliile Treich-Laplene consolidated his gains, another explorer, Binger, 
was pressing on towards Kong, On 24 December 1888 ]]k'ance concluded a
1
Iteich-Lapiene to Verdier, 5 A^/ril 1887; quoted in Fred Bullock: 
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treaty there. I'reich-Lapl'^ne was confident that the Cote d 'Ivoire 
would soon join hands with the Upper Niger Protectorate.
Rivalry in the interior rather than the situation on
the coast, forced a renewal of the boundary negotiations. Rosebery
had made an attempt in 1886 to settle the question by arbitration at the
1
prompting of the Colonial Office, But not till 1886 v/as the diplomatic 
issue finally joined. By that time difficulties had arisen between the 
two countries over part of the Samri area which Britain claimed on 
the ground that it belonged to a chief who held lands in British 
territory. The boundary dispute was settled by the vlnglo-Prench 
convention of 10 August 1889 which fixed the frontier at Newto'wn. One 
chapter of Anglo-Prench relations in t M s  part of West Africa was now 
over.
One striking fact which emerges from a study of British 
policy is that expansion inland came only after further coastal 
expansion became impossible. Consolidation was the answer to difficulties 
arising from-a restricted seaboard. That it became a deliberate policy, 
however, was largely due to the efforts of pioneer prospectors and 
traders. Here, the old generalisation - that whereas the tricolour 
opened up virgin lands, the Union Jack tended to follow trade - is borne 
out,
4. THE SLiiVB COAST.
The British attitude to Prench activities east of the' Gold 
Coast provides an excellent illustration of Britain's essential
1 f
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pre-occupation with the coast, Lagos gave Britain no incentive to 
look for an alternative policy. In the 'seventies little was known of 
the interior ^ art from the fact that it was under the domination 
of Dahomey, a kingdom which white residents on the coast wanted to 
keep at a safe distance. Hie intrinsic value of the seaboard far 
surpassed anything tliat the Gold Goast or Sierra Leone and least of 
all the Gambia had to offer. Palm oil was there in abundance - and 
it was brou^t down through the forests and creeks and swampy lagoons 
to the sea itself. Britain did not need to go in search of it.
For centuries the Slave Goast liad been the chief entrepot 
in West Africa for European traders. The abolition of the slave trade 
did not diminish its iirportance. iifter 1607 the former slave dealers 
literally became the "palm oil ruffians" of legend, Hiey found a ready 
market in Europe, where increasing, industrialisation meant that new 
sources of oil to lubricate madiinery and to give light were urgently 
required. Most of the traders were English, Since Britain had held the 
monopoly of the slave supply to the New World, long-establisbied contact 
with the coast gave her a preponderating share in legitimate trade.
By the mid-nineteenth century her interests on the coast were sufficiently 
great to break down official reluctance to take on administrative 
responsibilities. In 1849 a British Consul for the Bights was appointed 
with jurisdiction over other Europeans. Four years later a separate 
Consul for Lagos was set up. Lagos was the nerve centre of the oil trade, 
no less than it had been in the days of the Aslento,
It is often said that Britain annexed Lagos in 1861 in order 
to stamp out the illicit slave trade, but this is only a lialf-truth. It
would be more correct to say that the export of slaves as 'recruited 
labour' interfered with 'legitimate* trade. Hie labour traffic 
•provided other nations with an opportunity to gain influence on the 
coast, was potentially capable of cutting down the supply of oil, and 
made it more difficult to establish peaceful relations -with the natives. 
The raison d-'etre of annexation v/as the protection of British merchants.
It would be easy to explain Britain's later insistence on a 
continuous coastline between the Gold Coast and Lagos from this point 
of view alone, but tliat would be to by-pass the 1865 recommendations 
for withdrawal. Hie desire for colonial retrencliraent, however, sprang 
not from commercial but from administration considerations: Britain had 
got more than she liad bargained for. There i^ vere constant troubles with 
the natives, who were not inclined to submit to European occupation 
except on their own terms. There was, too, an appalling mortality among 
British officials at Lagos wliich confirmed the Coast's reputation for 
unhealtliiness and made anything approaching a systematic programme of 
expansion very unpopular at home. Yet without expansion Lagos seemed . 
likely to become a financial liability. Mien Britain had set up customs 
there to provide the necessary revenue in lieu of an adequate Treasury 
grant, merchants had evaded them by importing tlirough Badagry, which was 
then independent. Badagry was in turn annexed and duties imposed there. 
It became clear that no middle road between such advance and complete 
withdrawal could be maintained for long. By the 'seventies, withdrawal 
had become impractical; Britain was too far committed to the policy of 
protecting her merchants. Moreover, the river mouths and lagoons between 
Lagos and the Gold Coast were no longer terra incognita. Other nations, 
particularly the French, had followed in Britain's wake and established
contact vdth the natives along the coast. France had several trade 
posts wH-ch, on a smaller scale, performed the same commercial function 
as Lagos. To withdraw from the coast v/ould merely have left the 
field to Britain's rivals. Hie other alternative - expansion - seemed 
the obvious course. Many people nov/ realised that its advantages 
outweighed the drawbacks: vdth an extended coastline Britain v/ould be 
in a better position both to enforce law and order among the natives and 
to keep the oil trade in her ov/n lietnds. The cession of the Dutch forts 
hastened the change in opinion, for in closing the seaboard of the 
Gold Coast itself it underlined the fact that the coast to the east 
separated tv/o British colonies. By 1873 the idea that sooner or later 
the intervening coast would have to be absorbed was generally accepted.
Mien the Gold Coast and Lagos were talcen away from the control of 
Sierra leone in the following year, they were made into a single 
administrative unit. Hie only point on which there was still disagreement 
was whether or not the process of absorption should be started at once, 
a) Colonial Office attempts at coastal consolidation in the 'seventies.
Britain's final conversion to a policy of expansion was 
brought about by the revival of French interest in the oête d 'Esclaves 
after the Franco-Prussian War. By 1870 French traders were well 
established, but they enjoyed official protection only as French nationals. 
France had no colonies on the coast nor any territorial rights that 
were recognised by other Powers. Porto Novo liad been made a virtual 
French protectorate by a commercial treaty of 1863 ivitli the native king, 
but the protectorate had been renounced in 1869, Cootenoo had never been 
officially occupied although it had been ceded to the French in 1867.
Fi'ance had some claim to protection only over Grand Popo and Little
Popo, Aghwey, and Porto Seguro, further v/est. About 1875, havever,
the re-awalcened colonialism of the French government found an outlet.
The claim to Cootenoo was confirmed, and in 1876 France announced
that Whydah (which had been claimed as far back as 1852) was now
under her protection. On 8 Ivjarch 1876, in the course of discussions
over the Daliomey blockade, she presented a memorandum to England which
contained the startling information that she was not prepared to
recognise any future annexation between the Gold Coast and Lagos by 
1
another Power,
The effect on British policy was decisive. The last
vestiges of the idea of withdrawal were swept away and 'consolidation'
2
became the accepted panacea for threatened British interests. The 
argument was briefly this: Britain had never formally recognised
the Prench protectorates so that she could not only refrain from doing 
so henceforth but could contest any fresh gains; given time, British 
influence could become supreme all along the coast; either the French 
would eventually be squeezed out, or at least their posts would become 
of little value - if, in the meantime, there was constant vigilance as 
regards French activities and providing Britain seized any chance for 
expansion that might arise.
The blockade of Dahomey which was imposed in July 1876 after
1
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the imprisonment of an English trader seemed to offer just such an
opportunity, 'ihe native king's reluctance to pay his fine was, in
one sense, v/nlcome to Britain. A defeat in native policy could be
turned to victory over the French, for if Britain consented, to forego
the fine the king might possibly be persuaded to transfer his claims to
suzerainty over Cootenoo and its environs to her, Theire were no legal
quaJms, for the French claim to Cootenoo was conveniently shown to be
1
invalid by the Lagos authorities. At the same time, it would, of course,
/
have been "very undesirable to acquaint the French Government... v/ith the
2
nature of the proposal" Britain intended to make to Dahomey. By the
spring of 1877, the scheme looked even more attractice because it would
have allowed Britain to raise the blockade, which was now seen to have
been a mistake. It was inconveniencing "none but the European merchants"
5
and British prestige was waning. On the coast it was well known tliat 
the French were gaining influence with the Daliomians by posing as their 
champions over the fine and were trying to persuade them that the 
British were contemplating an invasion.
Yet the plan fell through because the Foreign Secretary, Derby, 
was not prepared to risk complications with France. He regarded the 
blockade as a joint Anglo-French affair, as in a way it was, since French
1
Enclosure in Lees to Carnarvon, 5 October 1876, Confidential; C. 0,147/52,
2
0.0. to P.O. (draft), 5 January 1877; G. 0.147/34.
3
Minute by Herbert on Admiralty to Colonial Office, 18 April 1877;
C. 0.147/34.
4
Captain of H.M. S. Sirius to Admiralty (copy), 17 î.larch 1877; enclosed 
in Admiralty to C. 0., 18 ipril 1877; C. 0.147/34.
39 '
traders, as well as the Snglisliman Turnbull, had been imprisoned by the
King of Daliomey. 'To the annoyance of the Colonial Office, who had
wanted complete secrecy, he gratuitously informed the French Government
1
that a mission was contemplated. Ilaving agreed to the mission he allowed
its territorial function - which to the Colonial Office was 'the only
2
part of the business in which they were much interested' - to go by the 
3
board.
Although the blockade was raised in May 1877 there was still
a chance for Britain to achieve her original objective, but again Foreign
Office opposition thwarted Colonial Office plans. Under the May agreement
the King paid only part of his fine; in view of his subsequent interference
with European trade, hov/ever, Britain could now have made the surrender
of his claims to Cootenoo, and possibly to Porto Novo as well j the price
4
for remitting the balance of the original fine. This suggestion was made
5
by the Colonial Office in klarch 1878. The Foreign Office did not reply.
On 19 J^ril the captain of the French frigate Serval concluded a treaty 
at Miydah with a representative of Dahomey confirming the cession of
6
Cootenoo to France. The first nev/s of this "piece of sharp practice" was
1
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1
in the Press, and the Colonial Office wanted confirmation. But only-
after some weeks did the Foreign Office try to get information from the
French Government, On 19 June the Colonial Office again tried to
2
elicit a response to their proposal of blarch, but were merely told
5
that no mission to Dahomey could be undertaken -without Cabinet sanction.
Hie only constructive suggestion Derby liad to offer was that the King
4
of Dahomey should be asked not to cede territory to anv Power but Britain.
5
Hiis, however, hardly bore on the immediate issue. By September it was
clear that France intended to stay at Cootenoo, and on 18 October the
French Foreign Mnister formally announced that Cootenoo was under French 
6 '
nrotection. "The neglect and delay of the Foreign Office in dealing -with
7
the Daliomian question" had resulted in Britain's failure to keep the
French away from one of the most important points on the Sla-ve Coast. The
"hope of acquiring the paramount influence along the whole coast.., and
procuring the establisliment of a uniform scale of duties" was temporarily 
8
at an end.
1
0.0. to P.O. (draft), 13 fey 1878; 0.0.147/36.
2 •
Hall: Colonial Office, op. cit., p. 211.
3
F. 0. to C. 0., 3 July 1878; 0, 0.147/36.
4
F.O. to C.O., 30 Aupust 1878; C. 0.147/36.
5
Vide C. 0. minutes on F.O. to C, 0., 30 August 1878; C. 0.147/36.
6
Scotter, p.186,
7
Minute by Hemming on extract from The Times of 16 September 1878; 
0. 0.147/36.
8
Minute by Herbert on F.O. to G. 0. , 29 October 1878; C.O. 147/36.
303
Recent events apart from Cootenoo - the appearance of the
French flag at Grand Popo and the negotiations said to be going on between
France and Dahomey about l-diydah - made it appear that France was 'Ireally
1
carrying out a plan" to occupy the Coast systematically. The danger to
Britain's future position did not bring unanimity v/ithin the Government,
, however. Salisbury, the new Foreign Secretary, was entirely out of
sympathy with those who wanted to beat the French at their own game.
V/ithin the Colonial Offico there were deep divisions. TLie old school,
the Permanent Under—Secretary in particular, still held that Britain did
not "get much out" of West ilfrica, and tlius was "not sorry" to see French
2
influence spreading. Hemming stood at the opposite extreme. He pointed
out that if French progress went unchecked France would have full control
over communications with the interior through Porto Novo and that as a
result the trade and consequently the revenue of Lagos would suffer
severely. Tlie Government would be strongly criticised in Parliament
if Lagos were ruined through official inactivity, especially as successive
Governors of the Gold Coast and the mercantile community there had for
3
years been advocating preventive annexations. Meade, on the other hand,
felt that before any action was taken Britain sliould first clear up her
4
differences with France. In the end Hemming *s view triumphed owing to the
1
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■backing of Hicks-Beach, Tne new Colonial Secretary wanted to carry on
the policy of consolidation, despite the fact that it v/as now impossible
to secure a completely 'closed' coastline.
Part of the plan was to acquire Katanu, w'Mch liad already been
'offered' to Britain, Possession of Katanu would offset the value of
Cootenoo to the French by giving Britain control of the route between
1
Porto Novo and the sea. This time preliminary Foreign Office approval
proved unnecessary. In September 1879 the Administrator of the Gold Coast
took matters into his oim hands and declared a provisional protectorate
over Katanu without waiting for ins tractions. No-one was prepared to .
disavow liim; to have done so would, have been to have played into French
2
liands and in any case to have lowered British prestige. Although the
Oolonicl Office was "officially much shocked", they were "really liighly
5
pleased" at the Administrator 's initiative. Borne members of the Foreign
Office felt the same way: Katanu would be useful not only as a base for
4
possible operations against Dahomey but as a definite check to France.
Salisbury, hcvvever, was far from pleased, for diplomatic reasons:
, 5
to allow "insupportable proconsuls" to direct British colonial policy would
be to antagonise 'the Power with whom more than any other it was in the
6
interest of this Country to live on terms of friendship '. As he feared
1
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it W  just this result, France claimed that Katanu was under the
suzerainty of Porto .Novo, which she regarded as under her protectorate
1
hy virtue of her position at Cootenoo. At the same time Salisbury
realised the importance of the Coast, as one incident shows. In July
1879, the natives of the \Vliemi district ,asked for British protection*
Salisbury did not want a formal protectorate, but thought some kind of
2
naval protection exercised by Lagos would meet the case; it v/ou3.d
3
"Involve no serious responsibility - and would keep other nations out".
But in cases where there were strong counter-claims to those of Britain,
he felt that local action, whether irresponsible or directed from VJiitehall,
should be avoided. Such cases should only be settled at a diplomatic
level, othervd.se "the game of Grab.......the French annexing one portion of
4
the coast and ourselves another", would continue with the most deplorable
effect on Anglo-French relations. Salisbury's handling of West African
affairs since 1878 had led him to the conclusion that notliing less than a
comprehensive settlement of all points at issue between the two countries
would be worthwhile, both from a diplomatic and an imperial point of view.
Believing that French political activities on the West Coast T,vere designed 
.  ^ :,5-
to re-open the Gambia issue, he was already discussing with the French
1
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Ambassador, as early as March 1879, the possibility of an exchange of
territory based on the principle of France becoming mistress of the
1
Gambia and Britain of the Slave Coast.
With the second lialf of the proposition the Colonial Office
agreed. But they v/ere very suspicious of the new Foreign Office tendency
to relegate difficulties with France to a problematic occasion when they
could be dealt ivith in a "comprehensive manner". Tliey had not recovered
from their dissatisfaction with the other department for failing to
capitalise the Dahomian situation. Moreover, they feared that if such
negotiations took place, some British interests would inevitably be
sacrificed. There was, however, the overriding necessity of preventing
France gaining a firmer hold on the Slave Coast. Britain's case against
France still rested, in the autuion of 1879, on the assunçition that Britain
alone had rights and duties on the Coast; by annexing territory there
France was forcing herself "between the (at present) separate portions
2
of the Gold Coast colony". Even Salisbury pointed this out to the French 
3
Government. After the French protests about fetanu in November and
December, Hicks-Beach was quite ready for 'comprehensive ' negotiations with 
4
France, provided they included wliat had always been the main issue on the 
Slave Coast - that of the Porto Novo lagoon.
1
Pothuau b. Waddington, 30 mars 1879; Affaires étrangères 779,
2
Minute by Hemming on P.O. to G. 0., 16 October 1878; G.O. 147/36,
3
Lyons to Waddington, 26 February 1879; copy enclosed in Lyons to 
Salisbury, 26 February 1879, Slave Trade No. 2; F. 0.27/2414,
4
Minute by Hemming, 2 December 1879, on P. 0. to C. 0,, 1 December 1879; 
C. 0. 147/39.
307
Salisbury's plan for a comprehensive settlement (of the
Sierra Leone Boundary and the Pacific Leeward Islands question as well
as the Slave Coast disputes) which he put before prance in January 1880^
fell tlirough, however, largely because Hicks-Beach's subordinates were
not prepared to compromise. The proposed cessions to Prance north of
Sierra Leone together with Salisbury's suggestion that Katanu should be
1
duty-free proved too mucli. The motive in annexing Katanu had been anti- 
Prench and there seemed little point in excluding Prance if Britain was 
to be denied the right to do what she pleased with her own territory. 
Moreover, 'Cootenoo was not by itself a serious enough issue to make the 
Colonial Office willing for sacrifices to solve it. For the time being 
Katanu served to guard British interests.
So far the British attitude to French expansion had been 
indecisive. The theory of consolidation had not been put into præ tice.
In African questions affecting Britain's relation with foreign Povfers, the 
Colonial Office was still very much the subordinate partner of the Foreign 
Office. No programme of expansion against IVance could be implemented at 
a time when Britain was basing her foreign policy on the Anglo-French 
entente. The alternative - a diplomatic settlement - was premature. 
Salisbury's plan only offered a partial solution to the difficulties on 
the Slave Coast; it did not solve the question of rights to territory as 
yet unoccupied.
1
Vide p. 165.
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Td) The conversion of tlie Foreign Office to a forward policy,
Tlie same cautious approach to West African problems characterised
the first two years of the Liberal administration. The political outlook
of the leading members of the Government helped to confirm it. Gladstone
and Granville had come into pov/er partly on their criticism of the
overseas 'adventures' of their predecessors. lliey were personally out
of sympathy with those who wished to impede French colonial policy by
similar measures on the part of Britain. Moreover, from 1880-2 there
was a partial lull in European activity on the Slave Coast, partly due
to the French pre-occupation with Tunis and the British with Egypt.
Minimum demands were therefore made on colonial ingenuity, ' Kimberley, the
new Colonial Secretary, did not agree with Hemming, the consistent advocate
1
of consolidation, that Porto Novo should be annexed.
The years 1882-5, however, proved to be a dividing line in 
British policy. By 1882 French activities in many parts of the world 
showed that France was making a deliberate bid for colonial power on an 
unprecedented scale. Tlie absorption of unoccupied territories round the 
Niger Delta was the part of the programme that affected British interests 
most directly. The Liberal Government was forced, if it was not to be 
discredited in the eyes of public opinion, to protect these interests. The 
surest way was to implement the policy the Colonial Office had been 
advocating ever since they abandoned withdrawal - consolidation.
The new spirit of resistance to France inevitably affected the 
Colonial Office before any other department. Even Herbert felt that now
1
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that France was "so active in i\frica" her interference on the Slave
1
Coast should he prevented. But Derby, who liad succeeded Kimberley,
felt that he should make a stand against what he regarded as dangerous
annexationist tendencies in public opinion. lie believed that Britain's
policy vis-a-vis France should be negative, not positive. He agreed
that Britain should try to stop further annexations by France if they
affected British interests, but he did not want Britain to resort to
2
preventive annexations. His policy was epitomised in the instructions
he gave to the Gold Coast Governor about Little Popo. If France were
actually on the point of annexing it, Rowe was to conclude a treaty
binding the natives "not to cede their country to any foreign power
without first consulting with and obtaining the consent of Her Ivkjesty's 
3
Government". This he tiought would entirely meet the case.
His conservatism was offset by an entirely new development 
within the Government. Tlie Foreign Office started to be deeply concerned 
about the defence of British interests. The transformation of the old 
Slave Trade department into the 'African' Department in the spring of 
1883 showed the importance Granville was beginning to attach to African 
affairs. It is not surprising that with men like Percy Anderson, the head 
of tills new department, Pauncefote with his long experience of /mglo-French 
colonial difficulties, and T, V. Lister, who tended to be anti-French, to 
advise him, Granville soon took the lead in the formulation of the
1
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consolidation policy, rather than Derby. Granville himself had. had to
deal with the Tunisian crisis and the Sierra Leone negotiations and
was a disillusioned man as far as French policy was concerned.
French activities round the Porto Novo lagoon helped to bring
about what Hemming regarded as the long overdue conversion of the Foreign
Office. In March 1882 it became known in London that the French were
preparing to re-assert their old claims to Porto Novo. lliere were reports
of a treaty granting France jurisdiction over Europeans. Since Britain
herself had treaties with the native king signed in 1852 and 1861
securing freedom of trade for British merchants, there was ample ground
1 2 
for a remonstrance. It was accordingly made. Little more was heard
until the following year when on 21 April, the French Ambassador formally
3
announced tliat France liad re-established her protectorate, Everyone
deplored this move,though the Foreign Office was at first inclined to
think a protest vvould be useless since Britain had not disputed French
4
claims in the 'sixties. llie Golonial Office, on the other hand, pointed
out that Britain had in fact told France that the re-establishment of the
protectorate would be regarded as an 'unfriendly act' during the Cootenoo
5
discussions in February 1879. But the vital point was not the protest
1
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itself but what should follow, if, as seemed certain, France refused
to withdraw. Derby's view was that then and then only the British
would have a strong justification for action on their own account,
"as it would be obviously only natural for them to guard against
further agressions by a Power which had shown itself so completely
unmindful of their position wi.th regard to Porto Novo, and of the
remonstrances which they liad repeatedly made against further French
1
encroachments in the vicinity of the Gold Goast colony". This meant
that if the French stayed on at Porto Novo, Britain would declare a
protectorate over other places around the lagoon, Ihe chief of thesé
was Appa which Britain had been offered earlier in the year. As far b æ k
as 1863 Britain had disputed French claims there, and in 1876 the natives
had wanted British protection against the King of Porto Novo, who claimed
2
their allegiance.
The Foreign Office carried these views much further. The 
occupation of Porto Novo was partly instrumental in bringing about the new 
policy which culminated in the Oil Rivers Protectorate of 1884, It 
produced a very important memorandum by Anderson vhich reviewed at length 
not only the history of Anglo-French relations with regard to the lagoon 
but the whole field of French policy in Africa, and vdiich outlined the 
policy which was afterwards adopted^ Tliis document shows the change that 
had come over the British attitude since Salisbury's time: "Tlie French
have a settled policy in .zlfrica, both on the East and V/est coast, and that
1
C. 0. to F.O., 4 June 1883; 0.84/Ï650.
2
Scotter, p.217.
policy is antagonistic to us. The progress of this policy is sometimes
\
sluggish, sometimes feverish, hut it never ceases". It was particularly
noticeable on the west coast. On the Porto Novo lagoon there was some
danger of an actual "collision" between Britain and Prance, for while
one Power held Katanu and its environs and the other Porto Novo itself,
it was impossible for either to have full control over the waterways. In
view of French activities there, and in the upper Niger, on the Ivory
Coast, on the Congo, and especially around the Niger delta (where, if the
Prench induced the natives to accept French treaties, "British trade would
have no chance of existence at the mercy of French officials"), -
in view of all this; "Action seems to be forced on us, and if this is so,
we are fairly forced into a corner as to the direction of it. Only one
course seems possible; that is, to take on ourselves the Protectorate
of the native states at the mouth of the Oil Rivers and on the adjoining
1
« Coasts". As the Foreign Office had already pointed out, "any step sliort
of a protectorate would be worse than useless... Protectorates are unv/elcome
burdens, but in this case it is... a question between British Protectorates,
2
which would be unwelcome, and French Protectorates wliich would be fatal". 
The protest miich was to precede British action was made on
1
F.O. to C.O. (draft), 22 ÎÆay 1883, Confidential; F. 0.84-/1650.
2
Memorandum by II. Percy Anderson, 11 June 1883, on the French Occupation 
of Porto Novo, Oil Rivers Correspondence ('Question of British 
Protectorate), Part II, pp.38-42; G.D.29/269.
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1
9 August 1883. The British cliar.ge d 'affaires' instructions were drafted
2
hy Anderson and submitted to the Cabinet. The Prime Minister made several
emendations, approved by Derby, that softened the tone of the despatch
slightly. But the wording remained stiff: one of the grounds on which
the protest was to be made was that "nothing would be more detrimental to
the development of the legitimate trade of this portion of the African
3
Continent than the anarchy which might result if isolated chiefs should 
be enabled to resist the exercise* of the authority of the Governors of 
the old-established British settlements by appealing to a foreign 
protectorate". There was also a threat of counter-measures based on the 
claim that Katanu had rights over Denliarn Water: "Should the protectorate
be maintained the greatest good vd.ll and forbearance on both sides may 
fail to avert embarrassment, especially as the authorities of Lagos might
find it impossible to agree, in case of emergency, to suspend all action
as regards misconduct on the part of the troublesome chief of Porto Novo
pending the result of a reference to the Idrench Government or to the
authorities at Senegal or the Gaboon; " in other words, Britain would prevent 
any communication between Porto Novo and the sea by means of a naval
1
Plunkett to Challemel-Lacour, 9 August 1883; copy enclosed in Plunkett 
to Granville, 10 August 1883, Africa No. 81, P.0.84/1637.
2
Granville to Plunkett (draft marked "Circulate G/îanville/" ), 7 Mgust 
1883, Africa No. 80; P. 0. 84-/1636.
.3
This stronger word was substituted "for division of authority".
4
Vide map IV.
patrol in the lagoon and hy asserting her authority over most of the
intervening land. Steps had already been taken to tMs end in June,
when Rowe had been instructed to hoist the British flag at places between
/ /
Porto Novo and Cootenoo including Agege and the villages of Aliv/ansori and
Afohtonu, which were supposed to be in some way politically connected 
1
with Katanu.
No reply to the British protest had been received when it
v/as finally decided to take Appa. The decision had been made easier by
an official report on the trade of the lagoon. Britain load barred the
v/ay to the chief outlet of the lagoon, Cootenoo, by asserting British
authority over Denham Water so that future trade would be diverted
eastwards past Appa, and there, the report stated, Britain would be able
2
to collect no less than 15,600 per month in duties. The British Governor
had already told the French that they should not try to assert their
authority over any places that belonged to Katanu or %pa, - which he
3
interpreted as the entire coast between Lagos and the Gold Coast. In 
September he was instructed to tell the King of Porto Novo that he could
4
not send any armed canoes across Denham Water without British permission. 
The final decision to talce Appa was made by the Cabinet committee wMch was 
appointed in October to consider the whole question of Britain's position
1
Scotter: p.223.
2
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vis-a-vis France in West Africa. In Irferch Britain announced that a 
protectorate had been established.
^ There was, however, an alternative to the policy of action.
Although it was never carried out it was in the forefront of discussion 
during the spring and summer of 1883 and it may have contributed an 
element of conciliation to the Anglo-French conversations over the Pbpos 
district in the following year. It was that of an agreement with France 
on a line of demarcation for future action. It originated in the Colonial
1
Office in December 1882 and was suggested to Granville shortly afterwards.
The British Mbassador in Paris was, however, against any attempt at a
general West iifrican agreement on the grounds that present feeling in
France was hostile to England and that it would draw attention to those
2
areas Britain regarded as desirable. lie did not exaggerate French
Anglophobia, and the Government's criticism in Parliament of the occupation 
3 4
of Porto Novo added fuel to the flames. Tlie Foreign Office tended to
agree m t h  Lyons that demarcation would be premature at present - it was
essential for Britain to consolidate her own possessions first so as to
be in a better position to negotiate. But it seemed desirable as an
ultimate goal, Anderson argued the case in his 11 June memorandum: "It
can only be by negotiation that the African question between the two
1
C.O. to P.O. (draft), 6 January 1883; C.O. 147/52.
2
Lyons to Granville, 16 February 1883, Clave Trade No. 18, Confidential; 
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countries can "be utlimately settled. At present the ïtrench Iiave
nothing particular to gain "by negotiation^ for they are playing the
game their own way, and. we are making no serious atten^t to interfere
with them, hut the position would he reversed if we had the Oil Rivers
in our hands* Eien negotiation would he the only escape from the
situation”® xiny hesitation on the French side could he overcome hy
an offer of the Gamhia. British interests in the Oil Rivers vfere
”incomparahly superior to those on the Gamhidl lie proposed that
France should have the Gambia in return for a British protectorate in
the lower Niger, the retirement of the French from the Slavo Coast,
and the renunciation of French Gahoon, ”TIie iifrican commercial policy
on the -b.YO countries would*.... have separate fields, ample for hoth,
in vdiich there need he no collision and no petty rivalries”.
Hie plan was taken up hy Anderson's colleagues. At the
end of the month Fitzmaurice sounded the French chargd d 'affaires on the
Gamhia question and expounded at some length the advantages Britain and
1
France would derive from an exchange of territory* Derhy was '
enthusiastic; he alv/ays preferred diplomacy to action and v/as at heart
dubious ahout the Protectorate policy. He thought Britain would ”do no
good in regard to these West iifrican questions” until she could "come to
some general understanding with France extending over' the v/hole of that 
2
coast”. Granville was inclined to agree. He sounded Waddington
1
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nprivately just after instructions for the Porto Novo protest had
heen sent off, trying to males it appear that he himself did not
attach much importance to the protest, "It wou3.d" he wrote "be
intelligent of you and me. or of you and Derby, to come to a general
1
understanding about our Common V/est African policy, "
In September the plan was carried a stage further wlien
Derby put for^’^-'Erd liis own suggestions for a basis of exchange, They
bore a remarkable resemblance to Salisbury's plan of 1880, and one of
his premises - that French annexations were designed to induce Britain
to cede the Gambia - had been shared by his one-time colleague. But
the basis of his scheme, unlike Salisbury's, was the cession of the
Gambia, in return for the exclusion of jhrance from the West Coast
between the Gambia and the Gaboon, It was a return to the policy of
1875; the Pongas-Gaboon line. He considered that although ceding
territory was always a bad precedent, the cession of the Gambia was
advisable in that it would bring political stability to that part of
Africa through control over the import of arms by one Power instead of
two, and would relieve Britain of a territory vrhich, though no longer
bankrupt, was dependant for its revenue on groundnuts and had an
infertile hinterland, Britain could also recognise the French claim .
to Raiatea, In return France would be asked to a]^lish her penal
settlement in New Caledonia, possibly to surrender her Ne-vvfoundland
■ 2 
fishing rights, and to grant the Pongas-Gaboon line. He realised,
1
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1
however, that such an extensive plan needed Cabinet discussion. He
2
eventually agreed to leave it to the Cabinet Committee on West vlfrica. 
As a result the plan was shelved in favour of the protectorate policy 
and there was no attempt at general agreement with France until 
1888,
c) British acquiescence in French annexations.
By the end of 1883, hovever, increasing difficulties with 
Fryjice made an agreement limited to the Slave Coast very desirable. 
Consolidation had become impracticable. There were two areas of 
dispute; i) the coast west of Whydah as far as Togo, and ii) the 
Porto Novo lagoon itself.
i) In the autumn of 1881 France had signed treaties at the
Popos, Porto Seguro, and Aghwey, confirming rights she had acquired
in the 'sixties. Britain had made no protest at the time, not
3
wishing to prejudice the Sierra Leone negotiations. At the beginning 
of 1882 Little Popo was offered to Britain by one of the Lawsons, a 
native family which sometimes constituted the ruling clique, but 
Kimberley declined the offer. But when it was renewed in November, 
recent French activities made him reconsider his decision.
1
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Colonial Office opinion was now unanimous that somethinpf should he
1
done to "exclude the French", Derby's instructions of 12 June -
that if France were ahout to annex Little Popo the British Governor
2
should take steps to prevent her doing so - arrived too late. The 
French ship Voltigeur called at the Popos, and on 19 July a Presidential 
decree declared that hy virtue of the 1881 treaties France had heen
3
able to accept a protectorate over the Popos, Aghv/ey, and Porto Seguro.
4
Britain protested against the Voltigeur's action, hut France refused
5
to withdraw without proof that Britain's claims were prior to her ov/n.
By December Britain could no longer maintain her old 
argument tliat France was a virtual interloper on the Slave Coast.
France had been too successful in gaining influence with the natives 
for Britain to claim the sole right to protect their interests, and 
the Cootenoo affair four years before liad created a precedent for 
French intervention. Since Britain had long ceased to contest French 
rights there it was useless for her to object to French protectorates 
in the Popos district on the grounds of trespass. The quest for 
territory was now on a purely competitive basis. Granville was thus 
thrown back on a legal quibble. He held that Britain's claims were 
prior to those of France since Britain had been negotiating with the
1
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Herbert, and Derby, on F. 0. to C. 0., 20 January 1883; 0.0.147/53,
2
Vide p.309.
3
Scotter, p.232.
4
Lyons to Granville, 15 October 1883, Africa No, 109; P.O. 84/1637.
5
Lyons to Granville, 12 November 1883, Africa No. 116; P.O. 84/1637.
3ZA
1
natives a year before the French arrived. It was a slender enough
case in view of French occupation in the 'sixties, and to strengthen
it he v/as reduced to arguing that a French protectorate would be
"almost impracticable" because other French settlements were so far 
2
away. Inevitably France retorted by referring to the offers made to
3
her many years before the visit of the Voltigeur.
Soon afterv/ards both sides saw the necessity of replæ ing
claim and counter-claim by negotiation, Granville postponed further
discussions until the arrival of the Gold Coast Governor who was to
4
take part in the forthcoming talks.
ii) By 1684 the Porto Novo affair had made negotiations essential
if a dangerous clash of local authority were to be avoided. Despite
5
British reminders, France load not replied to the protest of 9 August 
1883. In January the French were said to be on the point of sending 
troops to Porto Novo from Cootenoo, To Britain this would have been 
a violition of her suzerainty over Denham Water, (it had the immediate
Granville to Lyons, 10 December 1883, Africa No.144; F. 0.146/2592, 
Ibid,
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1 2 
effect of hastening the protectorate over Appa). Britain protested,
3
and warned the French that the troops would not he allowed to proceed.
France, however, claimed that Britain had no ripcht to close
4
communications with Porto Novo in this way. A few days later Waddington
approached Granville, and while denying that troops had been sent to
Porto Novo beyond a possible handful of soldiers for the French Agent's
guard, said that his Government did not admit that they could not
legally have crossed the lagoon since they had never recognised^the
British claim to Katanu. Hie situation was dangerous, and it was
essential to keep it out of the control of the local officials. He
suggested that the safest way to do so would be for Britain and France
5
to come to an agreement in London as to their respective claims.
Granville readily agreed, stipulatin?* only that meanwhile the status quo
should be kept, i.e. if Britain imposed no duties at Katanu (as the
French apparently wanted), France should refrain from sending troops
across the lagoon and should also prevent the King of Porto Novo from
6
trying to assert liis authority over Katanu'.
1
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Hie last stipulation referred to an aggravating incident
that had recently occurred at I^g^ ge. Hiis place had been formally taken
under British protection in 1883. Siiortly afterwards the French
started to hoist their flags in the district and at other villages
along the Oootenoo-Porto Novo route. In February 1884, a French flag
was known to have been flying at In March the French complained
that the Lagos authorities had taken down their flag and then occupied
Agege and also Toche nearby. It was a trivial incident on the face
2
of it but the Ihrench considered it important. Hie y were right inasmuch
as the question of communications v/ith Porto Novo hinged on it. To admit
the British claim that Xgégé formed part of the protectorate of Katanu 
3
made in 1879 v/ould have been to admit that Katanu had territorial
rights over the surrounding country and vrould have gone a long way
towards conceding to Britain control over Denliam Water. Hiis the French
4
realised, and Waddington persistently denied tiiat Katanu was a 'state 
According to the French, Toche and Ag^egë were under the sovereignty 
of the King of Porto Novo. On this ground* : they asked for immediate
  , , 5
reparation for the "insult" to their flag at iÂgege. Granville retorted
Waddington'a Perry, 10 mars 1884, tel.; Affaires etrangères, 805. 
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1
that the flag should never have heen hoisted. Quite suddenly the 
incident resolved itself, and the curious discrepancy between the 
French claim that the flag had been flying for a year and the
2
British that it had been put up only ten days before its removal,
was explained. Britain discovered that there were two Ageges, on
neighbouring islands - one, under the suzerainty of Porto Novo where
the French flag had indeed been hoisted a year before and had not
subsequently been interfered v/ith, and the other in Katanuan territory
(according to Britain) where a flag had been recently flown by some
agents of the King of Porto Novo and taken doivn by the local inhabitants.
Before the affair closed finally, however, another "most
4
unfortunate incident" occurred, when Britisji and native troops,
misunderstanding their instructions, tried to stop French troops passing
5
through the lagoon to Porto Novo. Britain now admitted that the left
bank of the lagoon belonged to Whemi, which had recently come under
6
French protection. She offered an apology to France, who now regarded.'
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the Aigegë incident as closed. Hie whole affair illustrates the
extent to which Anglo-French relations were at the mercy of local
conditions. The moral Granville drew from it was that it sliowed the
2
folly of putting flags at the disposal of natives. It was probably 
true that the natives often regarded them as "purely decorative signs".
Shortly afterv/ards France resumed the question of the Popos
4-
district, Granville was now ready for the negotiations that were to
settle tliis as well as the Porto Novo affair. Pauncefote was to take
charge of the British side, and d'Aubigny, Councillor of the French
5
Embassy, was to represent France.
The Popos question was settled surprisingly easily.
Influence on this part of the coast liad become far less important to
Britain than control over Porto Novo^ Since French occupation was
a fait accompli, it seemed more profitable to use it as the basis of
a bargain: if France would withdraw from Porto Novo, Britain would allow
6
her to remain on the coast between Cootenoo and the Gold Coast. But the
Granville to Lyons (draft), 2 May 1884, Africa No. 73Aj F. 0.84/1664.
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French refused to he drav/n. In July, however, a new development 
changed the situation entirely: Germany's 'first hid for colonies'.
The German protectorate over Togo made a bargain v/ith France
1
unnecessary. There was no point now in disputing French claims.
Little Popo would have been worthless to Britain v/ith France on one
2
side and Germany on the other, Porto Seguro had been taken by
Germany, and France would not abandon Aghivey and Grand Popo in any
case. Britain accepted Germany as a useful ally in minimising French 
3
gains. Despite a provisional treaty at Little Popo concluded in
September by a British naval officer,Granville agreed to give up all
four places, stipulating only that the Lawson family should not be 
4
penalised.
The v/ay was now clear for the settlement of tlie Porto Novo 
difficulty. Both Britain and France recognised that the real cause of 
dispute was "the attempt of the British to secure the passes between
the Porto Novo Lagoon and the Denham Water, so as to stop^^traffic, or
^ / / 
to subject it to tolls". In spite of her complaints during the Agege
affair, Britain had for some time felt doubtful about her ridit to
1
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control these waterv/ays. By the end of the year, with the Oil Rivers
in hand and the emergence of more serious colonial problems at the
Berlin Conference, Britain's interest in Porto Novo waned. She started
to draw in her horns locally and to concentrate on those other areas
where her influence was undisputed and supreme. Hie final cause of the
dwindling importance of Porto Novo to Britain v/as the French protectorate '
over Dahomey. For Britain to îiave attenç>ted to retain Katanu and
to subject the trade of Dahomey to tolls v/ould have put the French in
an intolerable position. Hie maintenance of cordial relations v/ith
France would have been incessible. Hie colonial game was not worth the
diplomatic candle.
Nevertheless, the question dragged on throughout 1885, at
first because of the Berlin Conference, since West Aifrican exoerts were
1
not available in London, and then largely because Britain could not
find a way to v/ithdraw without losing face. At one point France was
2
considering arbitration as a mode of settlement, Bit after the Franco- 
German Convention of 24 December, by which French rights to Porto Novo 
and Cootenoo and the coast westwards as far as Togo v/ere recognised, the 
complexion of the question changed. Hie Porto Novo affair became a 
mere dispute over the boundary between French territory and Lagos. In 
1888 the frontier v/as ' provisionally fixed, and then finally decided by
Vide Waddington a Ferry, 11 janvier 1885, no.2; Affaires etrangeres^806. 
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the Anglo-French Convention of 10 Angust 1889.
Long before the French penetration of Dahomey in the 'nineties,
Britain had renounced her interests on the Slave Coast. In January 1886
she tacitly acknowledged her defeat by malcing the Gold Coast and Lagos
two entirely separate colord.es.
5. gilB OIL RIVERS AND THE LOTO NIGER.
The Lower Niger was never acquired by France, unlike the other
areas of West Africa so far mentioned. Nevertheless in the early 'eighties
Britain feared an attempt if not at annexation then at complete economic
control of the Delta through treaties of commerce and protection. Her
anxiety led to the Oil Rivers Protectorate of 1884, The considerations
on which British policy were based help to cl^irify much that would
otherwise remain obscure in Mglo-French colonial relations.
It is only recently - watliin the last twenty years or so -
that the full extent of Anglo-French cormnercial rivalry in the lower
Niger has been realised. Previously historians tended to give undue
prominence to the Anglo-German colonial quarrel of 1884-5 and to ignore
the far more serious colonial questions at issue betv/een Britain and
France at that time. This was partly due to the paucity of available
sources. The relevant British records for the years immediately preceding
the Niger Protectorate were made public only in 1950. As Miss Crowe has
pointed out, the only published source on the history of British, French
and German activities in the Bights from 1880-5, the Blue Book on the 
1
Cameroons, "under-emphasises the friction vdiich existed between Britain
1
A. and P. , ^884-p^, LV,
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and France on the West Coast of Africa prior to the appearance of
Germany on the scene in 1884. Iforeover the extent to which the
negotiation of treaties of protection with the chiefs of the Cameroons
formed part of a general scheme embracing the whole of the Niger delta,
1
and the coast from Lagos to Ambas Bay is not fully brought out".
Bismarck's White Books on the i-ingra Pequena dispute and the Cameroons
affair tlurew the Anglo-German quarrel into the limelight. But the causes
of the misconception lie deeper. Historians were long obsessed with the
origins of the First World V/ar, and, in seeking an explanation for the
deterioration of Anglo-German relations, tended to magnify temporary
disputes into settled causes of tension, while treating single-French
colonial friction simply as a passing phenomenon of late nineteenth
century imperialism. This backward look from the standpoint of 1914
helped to falsify the international scene of twenty and thirty years
before. Hie search for what was ' significant ' in the light of the War
led to a disregard for the real causes of tension in Europe in the
'eighties and 'nineties. Even today the misconception lingers. In the
standard diplomatic account of the Bismarckian era, the i\ngra Bequena
2
affair, for instance, is treated at some length, while the equally 
or more important disputes between Britain and France over Madagascar, 
Indo-China and the Pacific, and the tension between the two countries
1
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in West ._frica, are scarcely mentioned. In another work on the
economic development of West Africa,the role of _mglo-French rivalry
in the makinc of the Niger Protectorate is not mentioned; instead it
is stated that "only the seizure of the Cameroons by Gezmany in 1884
1
stimulated the British to attempt any measure of control".
Since about 1950, however, there have been several detailed
studies based on unpublished material, mainly in the Ibreign Office
and Colonial Office records, on various aspects of international
2
relations in West Africa covering the 'eighties. Hioy have described
British policy in a truer perspective, and have shown opposition to
potential French acquisitions to be the mainspring of British action
in the Oil Rivers. Mr. Rudin's dictum on British policy in the
Cameroons can be applied to the whole lower Niger region: "Keeping the
3
French out was certainly the predominant purpose of English policy".
The origins and the main lines of development of the Protectorate policy 
are now well known.
Sir ;Q.an Pirn: The Financial and Economic History of the African 
Tropical Terri¥(^ bs~ (Oxford 1940;, p/sX ^
A, N. Cook: British Enterprise in Nigeria, (phiadelphia. University of 
Pennsylvarda" PTessV 1943)' /Specially Chapter 4 on "International 
Rivalry*]//; Crowe : Berlin West African Conference, op. cit. ;
Lady Dorothy Wellesley: Sir George Goldie, Founder of^Nigeria - A 
Memoir, v/ith an Historical Introduction by Stephen G^ynn (London 1934); 
Hall: The Colonial Office, op. cit. ; H.R. Rudin: Germans in the
C^eroons 1884- to 1914. A Case Study in Modern Imperialism^‘(lk)ndon 1938), 
/Specially Chapter I on the "Occupation of the Cameroons’/./;
Scotter: International Rivalry in the Bights of Benin and Biafra, 
1815-1885, op. cit.
Rudin: Germans in the Cameroons, op. cit., p.25,
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Some aspects of the policy can still he amplified.
One is the influence of commercial pressure, especially prior to
the decision to take action in the autumn of 1883.
a) The economic impetus towards a British protectorate.
The possibility of a British protectorate in the lov/er
Niger does not seem to liave been seriously considered before 1882.
The question arose out of the request made by two Cameroons chiefs
1
for British protection. Their letter to the Prime I\tinister provided the
occasion, but was not, however, the real cause, of subsequent discussion,
2 3
There had been similar petitions before - in 1877 and again in 1879 -
and nothing had come of them. But by 1882 the situation in the Niger
Delta liad radically changed.
Tlie recent development of French commercial conpetition
forced the Government to consider the petition in a new light. In 1881
the United Africa Company no longer ha,d almost complete control of the
oil trade as they had had in 1879. The Société française de 1 /brique
équatoriale, started two years before^mth* semi-official backing,
having recently doubled its capital, was malcing commercial treaties
and securing cessions of territory in the Delta. Unlike the United
Africa Company, which was a purely commercial concern, the S. P. ^  E. was
1
King Bell and King Ac qua to Ivir. Gladstone, 6 November 1881, 
(received 26 December), ^  and P. , /Î884-^ LV, ^4-27^, No. 2.
2
Rudin, p. 20.
3
Cameroons Chiefs to Queen Victoria, 7 August 1879, (received 26 
September), ^  and P.. /TSSé-g/, LV, 4279/Ifo. 1.
in the fortunate position of liaving as its Agent-General someone in
an official position - a former commandant from tlie French War
IVIinistry, lîattei, who was also l^ench Consular Agent. To secure new
markets in the Delta to counter his activities the U. :A.C, had increased
its own capital from fd.25,000 to one million pounds. Early in 1881
Goldie-Tauhman, prime mover and i\gent-General of the U. A. G., applied
for a charter. But the Government, still unaware of the extent of the
trade war that was going on, had refused to grant one. Any expansion
of British consular powers in the Bights, which had so long been regarded
as an unquestionably British preserve, seemed unnecessary and undesirable.
By the autumn, hov/ever, British traders liad managed to gain the ear of
the Government - or rather of the Foreign Office - and to enlip-hten
1
them as to the true state of affairs in the Delta. Their go-between 
was Lister, who was synpathetic to the commercial point of view, inclined 
to be anti-French, and keenly interested in colonial development. One 
firm in particular, John Holt and Company of Liverpool, though outside the 
U. A.C. combine, at first led the agitation for Government intervention 
against the French. Soon after Bell and Ac qua's request was received 
in London, Lister asked Holt for a report on British commerce in the
lower Niger, The response included an outright plea for British protection
2
of the >^viiole coast from Lagos to. the Cameroons. Lister and his 
colleagues v/ere so impressed that idiey went into the commercial side of
1 "
e.£. Holt to Granville, 28 October 1881; F. 0.84/1612.
2
Holt to Granville, 16 February 1882; P. 0. 84/1630.
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1
the question more fully themselves. The Foreign Office also asked
the British Consul for the Bights, whom they had heen able to consult
during his leave in London, to investigate on his return to West
Africa the possibility of a protectorate over the Cameroons in particular,
and to ask the chiefs there not to cede their territory to another 
2
pov/er - although at the instigation of the Colonial Office, Bell and
3
Acqua's request liad already been turned down.
Meanwhile in the spring and sunrner of 1882 Britain was 
steadily losing ground in the Delta, iinother French Company was 
launched, the Compagnie de Senegal, in which the controlling interest 
was Verminok of Marseilles, an influential firm v/ith interests 
tfiroughout the West Coast, Wlien tlie U. A. C, was transformed into the 
National .African Company under the chairmanship of Lord Aberdare, a 
former Mnister in one of Gladstone's Governments, with increased 
financial backing and plans for expansion up the Niger beyond Lokoja, 
hov/ever, the outlook appeared tenporarily brighter. But Goldie's 
subsequent negotiations for the amalgamation of the French and British 
firms under the British flag failed, chiefly owing to Gambetta's support
f /of the Compagnie de Senegal. By the end of the year France had thirty- 
three trading posts in the area and Britain only thirty-tv/o. There was 
no longer any opposition within the Government to the idea of a check on 
French comoetition.
1
F. 0. Memoranda by W. T. Nagent, 29 April 1882, on British Trade upon
the West Coast of Africa; F. 0.84/1630,
2
Rudin, p.22.
5
Lister to Bell (and smilar letter to i\cqua), 1 March 1882, ^  and P,,
ZÎ884-J7, LV, ms3u /b. 4 2 ^ ,  No. 4.
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French activities round the mouth of the Congo also helped 
to create alarm in London. ]^ Iany officials felt that it was high time 
Britain took definite action against France. If not the French would 
"before long plant themselves on all the unoccupied...portions of the 
coast line" and v/ould "go far to destroy the British trade by the
1
imposition of their differential duties in favour of French goods’.’
Tne difficulty was to know what form action should take. Here again
commercial views helped to determine policy. Many traders, like Holt,
favoured political action, i.e_. that Britain should accept native offers
2
of territory and control the coast either by protection or annexation.
But the diplomatic dangers of such an obvious anti-French move were now
much more apparent. Since the spring there had been the Egyptian
crisis, and the precarious balance of Anglo-French relations was further
endangered by Britain's negotiations with Portugal for a treaty to
exclude France from the mouth of the Congo. There was, however, a
solution which had become a traditional alternative - a -diplomatic
agreement on the basis of the old Pongas-Gaboon line; in return for the
Gambia, free and therefore British trade, might still reign supreme in
the Oil Rivers. This was indeed the goal of British policy, but could it
be done? When it was suggested in Colonial Office discussions earlier 
5
in the year, it had been turned down on the familiar ground that there
1
Minute by Hemming on F.O, to C.O,, 22 December 1882; C.O. 147/52.
2
G. r. Holt to Granville, 11 December 1882; F. 0, 84/1631.
3
Minute by Hemming on F.O. to C.O.,, 8 Alarch 1882; G. 0.147/52.
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1
would be inevitable public opposition to the cession of the Gambia.
By December, however, this stumbling block seemed to have diminished.
A leading West ufrican merchant who was on familiar terms with Dilke
(and was incidentally the Belgian Consul in i.ianchester), iir. J. liitton,
came specially to the Colonial Office to appeal for an Anglo-French
agreement on a line of demarcation which would give the Gambia to
France and the Oil Rivers to Britain, he claimed that the French
themselves desired such an arrangement. He himself carried on business
ivith the Gambia, and he said that other business men in a similar
position had also given up their previous objections to its cession.
He pointed, out the extreme urgency of the situation; when in France he
had "learned from IJL de Brazza that the orders given him by the French
Government originally were to visit the Niger and do there what he
subsequently did on the Congo"; de Brazza had only been diverted to the
Congo through Stanley's actions. Commandant Mattel's activities left
2
no room for complacency. Hatton seems to have been supported by the 
largest-section of commercial opinion. About three weeks later a 
deputation to the Foreign Office from the National AfricanCompany put 
forward similar views. The result was that for the first time a
3 '
comprehensive plan of demarcation was talcen up by the Government.
1
Ivlinute by Meade on F. 0. to C. 0., supra.
C.O. Memorandum on ,eade 's interview Jpn 20 December 1 8 ^ 7  v/ith 
Mr, J. Hitton (copy). Oil Rivers Correspondençe (Question of British. 
Protectorate), Part II, p. 3; G.D.29/269.
3
C.O. to F.O. (draft), 6 January 1883; C.O, 14-7/82. Granville to Lyons, 
10 February 1883, Slave Trade No, 17; F. 0.146/2586.
335
The National African Company's views carried a great deal
of weight. Tlie OhairiTian v/as a friend of Gladstone and Granville.
Chamberlain was a shareholder. What was not apparent to the Government
was that there was a decided arriéré pensée about the Company's
continuous pleas for Government intervention. It was obvious that
as the largest company in the Bights they had most to gain from the
elimination of French competition. But they also v/anted to use Government
sympathy to strengthen their own position in relation to other British
firms. In 1883 Aberdare tried to make î^ îattei's position an excuse to
have the Company's representative in the Oil Rivers, îÆacintosh, appointed
2
British Consular Agent. Later, in February 1884, v/hen the question of
a Vice-Consul under Hewett was actually being discussed, the Company
told the Government that no appointment not of their clioice could be 
3
tolerated. Only then did the Company's monopolistic tendencies become 
4
clear. It was not so much French competition that they objected to 
as successful competition - whether French or Britisli. In 1884 they not 
only succeeded in buying out their French donpetitors but their most 
important British rival as v/ell - the Liverpool and Manchester 'Trading 
Company.
But in 1883 the Government was impressed by the fact that
1
Chanberlain to Granville, 31 January 1884; G.D. 29/117.
2
National African Company (Lord Aberdare) to Granville, 28 February 1883; 
Aberdare to Granville, 13 June 1883; F. 0. 84/1654,
3
 ^ Rudin, p.27.
4
Vide Scotter, p.290,
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British merchants were presenting a united front against French
competition, and that their arguments were fundamentally the same -
the iniquity of the French commercial system and the desirability
of excluding it from, a hitherto predominantly British and economically
highly valuable area, From a Government genuinely wedded to free
trade there could be nothing but unqualified approval of such views.
To the Foreign Secretary as to all his colleagues "the real jealousy"
of Britain towards the colonial enterprises of the French rested "not
upon their taking possession of barbarous districts, but of their
establishing contrary to our example differential privileges in favour
1
of their ovn subjects". From the British angle, French colonial policy .
2
thus appeared wrong-headed and even "silly". Since France refused to 
conform to the practice of equal opportunity for all, she had to be
3
rigorously excluded from an area where Britain's "chief present Trade" 
lay.
The failure to exclude the French by agreement owing to Lyons's
4-
objections to negotiations for demarcation left rather a vacuum in British 
policy. The Foreign Office favoured an imiTiediate protectorate, but 
diplomatic considerations and the fear of French retaliation on the Congo 
stood in the way. Amidst all the uncertainty, people like Aberdare and
1
Granville to Lyons (copy), Pte., 2 May 1883; G^D. 29/203.
2
Lord Lyons's word: Lyons to Granville, Pte., 4-î,îay 1883; G.D. 29/Ï73,
3
F. 0. minute on C, 0. to F. 0,, 6 January 1883; P. 0.84/1636,
4
Lyons to Granville, 16 February 1883, Slave Trade No. 18, Confidential; 
F. 0, 84/1637. Vide p. 5IS .
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Holt kept the question continually before the Government by correspondence
and personal interviews. One of their most important functions was to
act as purveyors of nev/s. Holt quite consciously saw himself in tliis 
1
role. He often managed to supply information about the latest developments
in the Delta before official news readied London tlirough the normal
channels. He supplied the first report of the presence of a French
2
gunboat in the Bonny River in March. Later he was able to provide the
Foreign Secretary with a copy of the treaty of commerce the French had
3
put before the Bonny chiefs. Aberdare also played on Granville's
4
"preference for first-hand information". In June he urged him to have
5
a talk v/ith Macintosh during his visit to England. Granville, however,
was t o m  between liis unvd.llingness to take any step that would antagonise
the French and his genuine concern for British commercial interests.
His reluctance to refer the matter to the Cabinet lonp: after Derby had
6
pointed out that this was the obvious preliminary to action points to 
only one explanation: he hoped that France v/as not actually contemplating 
a political move in the Niger. If this were so, if indeed France was only
1
Holt to Granville, 5 June 1883; F.O.84/1654.
2
Holt to Granville, 19 May 1883; F. 0.84/1654.
3
Holt to Granville, 13 June 1883; F. 0.84-/1654,
4
Aberdare to Granville, 3 June 1883; F. 0.64/1654.
5
Aberdare to Granville, 13 June 1885; F. 0.84/1654,
6
C.O, to F.O., 20 July 1883; F. 0. 84/1650.
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making a few unimportant treaties of commerce, he would he able to
postpone a British protectorate to a more convenient season.
By the autumn he could no longer afford to take tliis risk.
At the end of September Goldie sent information about a French gunboat
having appeared in the Niger itself with instructions to seize what
1
territory it could. On checking up on this report at the Admiralty,
Granville was told that a French ship had also been in the Cameroons
2
River and had apparently annexed Malimba Point at the mouth. On
3
23 October he agreed to refer the matter to the Cabinet, and at his
4-
instigation a Cabinet Committee was appointed tv/o days later to deal
5
with all West African questions.
Commercial pressure had thus largely determined the course
of British policy. It had been instrumental in two ways : first, in
making the Government more conscious of British interests, and secondly,
in hastening the Government's decision to take action. But until
February 1884, when Granville let Aberdare know what the Cabinet had 
6
decided, the traders were entirely unaware 'that their efforts had been 
successful, Hie nature of the Government's deliberations during the
Goldie-Taubman (for the National iifrican Company Limited) to Lister,
26 September 1885; F. 0. 84/L655.
Vide F. 0. to C. 0., 23 October 1883, enclosing Admiralty to F.O, (copy), 
4 October 1883; C. 0. 96/Ï34.
F.O. to C.O., 23 October 1883; C. 0.96/Ï54.
Derby to Gladstone, Pte., 26 October 1883; B.M. Add. MS. 44142.
Dilke Political Diary, 28 October 1883; B.M. Add. MS.43935.
Granville to Aberdare (copy), 6 February 1884; G.D. 29/L17.
Vide also Rudin, p.26.
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previous summer had "been necessarily kept secret. The traders had no 
inkling that the Government was in fact being driven tov/ards a 
protectorate.
During the long delay merchants and Government parted company
to some extent. In the first place, the N. A.O. , despairing of Government
action, decided to take matters into their ov/n hands. If political aid
were denied them, they could still drive the French out themselves by
carrying the trade war a stage further. In August they started to lower
their prices by t^'venty-five per cent, in all areas where French posts
had been established. The result was the final surrender of the tv/o
French companies in the following year. In the second place, commercial
circles started to adopt a new line in their dealings m t h  the
Government. They believed that the Government v/ould be more likely to
listen to prop os a], s of a diplomatic nature than to demands for a
protectorate. Several times Granville was approached about some kind of
international agreement for the 'neutralisation* of the lower Niger.
1
Goldie suggested it in September - addressing himself to Lister, not to
Granville, with whom he seems to have entirely lost patience. He put it
forward as an alternative to the agreement v/ith France his Company had
advocated in February, According to Aberdare, neutralisation was now the
2
considered policy of the N. A, C. The JVIanchester Chamber of Commerce also 
3
advocated it, having previously taken the same line over the Congo against
1
Goldie-Taubman (for the National African Company Limited) to Lister, 
26 September 1883; F. 0. 84/1655.
2
Aberdare to Granville, 3 October 1883; F. 0.84/1655,
3
Mr. G. Lord, President of the Manchester Chamber of Commerce, to 
Lord Granville, 2 November 1883; F.O. 84/1655.
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French or Portuguese domination.
Once the Cabinet decision of November was known, however, 
there was no further mention of an international agreement. The N. A.C. 
did nothing at all to advance the cause of free trade which iiad been so 
loudly proclaimed in denunciation of the exclusive tendencies of French 
commerce. The treaties fecintosh made in the winter of 1884— 5, wiiich,
-with Hev/ett's, enabled Britain to announce at' the Berlin Conference that 
the lower Niger was under her protection, usually contained a clause 
granting preferential treatment to the N. A.C. The Government's delay 
in negotiating the protectorate, - first for diplomatic reasons, and 
then in 1884 on the score of expense, which led to Macintosh's appointment 
as an unpaid Vice-Consul, - had unintentionally enabled the N. A.C. to 
shape the commercial future of the Delta according to their own pattern,
b) Foreign Office zeal for British commerce.
Another factor in the development of British policy was the 
important role of the Foreign Office, Inhere as in Salisbury's time the 
Foreign Office had usually acted as a brake on the Colonial Office in 
West African affairs (notably over Sierra Leone and the Slave Coast), in 
1882 the roles were reversed. Hie fact that a British protectorate over ' 
the entire Niger Delta became a. possibility after Bell and Acqua's 
petition for protection of their particular territory had been refused 
was largely due to the efforts of leading officials in the Foreign Office - 
Lister, Anderson, and Dilke. Hie Colonial Secretary had felt that the 
only intrinsically valuable part of the coast was the Cameroons because 
of its comparative healtliiness, but tliat it could still provide a 
sanatorium for British officials in West Africa even if Britain left
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1
anotl'ier Po^ver to occupy it. Pie was utterly opposed to a grant of
oCt
protection, on the old score of unnecessary additions to Britain*s
3
"Burdens and responsihilities". If Britain were to annex territory
4 •
merely in order to keep out the French, where ivas she to stop? The
Oil Rivers themselves did not interest Irun at all from a colonial point
of view. At the time, of course, there was no immediate prospect of
Britain losing her traditional hold on the Delta. Ilev/ett himself
said that of the forty-five firms operating in the Oil Rivers only
5
three v^ ere foreign - tivo German and one French (the S.F.
Kimberley’s attitude to colonial questions was in sliort negative rather
than positive. He Believed in protecting existing British colonies
against forei.gn encroachment - as he had shovwi By his policy over
Sierra Leone and the Slave Coast - By all that "consolidation" implied.
But he was not interested in launching experiments - and to take on
political responsibilities in the Delta was very much of an experiment.'
He Believed that the danger from France was not sufficiently great to
outweigh all the trouble and expense and possible native wars that
British intervention would entail. His colleagues, Herbert and Meade,
also considered the question almost entirely from the administrative 
6
point of view. Kimberley’s decision to have nothing to do ivith Hewett’s
1
Kimberley to Granville, 14 January 1882; G.D. 29/135,
2
Kimberley to Gladstone (copy), 2 January 1882; G. D. 29/Ï35.
3
Minute by Kimberley on F. 0. to 0.0., 8 ÎÆarch 1882; C, 0,147/52.
4
Kimberley to Granville, 14 January 1882; G>D, 29/155.
5
Hewett to Granville, 14 January 1882, Slave Trade No. 1; F, 0.27/2614,
6
Vide G. 0, minutes on F, 0. to C, 0,, 8 Liarch 1882; G. 0.147/52,
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1
proposals for a protectorate meant tliat the Foreign Office embarked 
on the protectorate policy alone. ,
Kimberley’s transfer to the India Office, just at the 
time Mien the great extension of French commerce was being realised, 
temporarily cleared the way for Foreign Office views. In the first 
few months of 1885, commercial, rather than administrative, considerations 
dominated inter-departmental discussions. Hiis was chiefly due to 
Lister and .Anderson, Their approach went far beyond the accepted 
principles of colonial policy in West Africa, beyond the idea of gradual 
consolidation as it had so far been understood. The coastal outlook 
had hitherto been based on the idea that it was to Britain’s interest 
from all points of view - administrative and political as well as 
commercial - to obtain- eventual control of the coast line between her 
existing colonies, and that to this end foreign annexations sliould be 
restricted as far as possible. Consolidation was all important. Tlie 
economic use of each area was a secondary consideration. But Lister 
and Anderson v/ere not thinking in a-dministrative and colonial, but in 
purely commercial, terms. They saw beyond the present difficulties 
v/ith wiiich Kimberley had been concerned to the future of the Oil Rivers 
as a great trading area. They were interested not merely in keeping out 
the French but in giving direct and immediate encouragement to British 
trade. The trade, they argued, "would enormously increase were it under 
our protection, and were the obstructionist middlemen and the wars their
1 .
0.0. to P.O. (draft), 15 April 1882; 0.0.147/52.
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1
jealousies create done away v/ith". British administration was to he
used not only to protect trade, hut to develop it - which was a new
conception of Britain’s duties. In the autumn the question the Cabinet
had to decide was, for them,how the Government could "best protect
British trade in the present, and encourage and secure it in the future".
If properl^T developed, that trade would make "the wealthy regions round
the Oameroons, and the rich districts of the Niger and Oil Rivers... a
more valuable possession than the existing British Colonies on that 
2
coast".
3
Lord Lyons’s objections to Derby’s suggestions for Anglo- 
French negotiations about the Delta enabled Lister and Anderson to come 
forward with a ready-made policy. On tactical grounds, they entirely 
agreed with the i^bassador’s criticism of the demarcation plan, if 
intended as an immediate project: Britain would be more likely to get 
the same sort of treatment she had had from the French over Madagascar 
than to initiate a friendly discussion. In this case why not be 
beforehand vdLth the French instead of shov/ing them Britain’s alarms 
were aroused? Britain should protect herself by action, not by an 
attempt at some "paper line of demarcation". Consul Hewett, Anderson 
pointed out, "has already got a foothold on the Oil Rivers as arbiter 
in native disputes - this might with a little judicious management, be
1
F, 0. minute on C, 0, to F. 0., 6 January 1883; F. 0. 84/1636,
2
F. 0. to 0.0. /p-gned by Liste£7, 5 October 1883, Confidential;
C. 0. 96/154.
3
Lyons to Granville, 16 February 1883, Slave Trade No.18, Confidential; 
F, 0. 84/L637.
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extended to a Protectorate which, as regards the mouths of the Niger,
at any rate, would make us safe". By extending southv/ards from Lagos
Britain would benefit herself "incalculably" from the trade point of
1 2 
view. They v/ere careful to exclude the possibility of outright annexation.
This was a concession to the Colonial Office, Derby, though he agreed
France should be kept out, made it clear that he v/ould be opposed to the
3
creation of a new colony, (it was true that the Oil Rivers v/ere not
4
his province, as he was at pains to point out, but that of the Foreign 
Secretary).
The enthusiasm of the Foreign Office for measures against 
France constituted a major revolution in outlook. To Hemming, v/ho had 
for years struggled against the more conservative tendencies of his own
t-'
colleagues, it was a welcome clianp-e to see the Foreign Office "awaking
5
to the position of affairs in Yifest Africa at last". Tlie Department’s 
"new-found zeal, ..on behalf of British trade and interests" v/as "amusing 
in its fervour and in^petuosity". For years past the Colonial Office had 
been "vainly striving to rouse the Foreign Office to a sense of the 
dangers likely to result from the action of the French on the West Coast"
1
Mnute by Anderson, 20 February 1883, on Lyons to Granville, su ora.
2
P.O. to C.O., 22 May 1883; C. 0. 96/154.
3
C.O. to P.O. (draft), 16'^ri l  1883; C. 0.267/354.
4
Ibid. Vide also Derby’s minute on P.O. to C. 0., 12 March 1883;
C. 0.267/354; and 0.0. to P.O., 4 June 1883; P. 0.84/1650.
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and load, "over and over again urged the necessity of remonstrance, and
1
if possible of negotiating an arrangement or ’modus vivendi*".
Nevertheless, neither Hemming nor any of his colleagues
were, until midsummer 1883, in favour of hnmediate action. They were
2
as reluctant as Granville v/as to copy "French grabbing methods":
Anglo-French coloniall- relations were bad enough as it was; action on
the Niger would be interpreted in Paris as an attempt to trump French
policy in the Congo, where by helping the Congo Association to resist
de Brazza, Britain was "indirectly almost at war with France... already".
But the Porto Novo affair provided a clear excuse for action. If France
refused to withdraw her protectorate there, Britain would have ample
justification in the eyes of public opinion for protecting her interests
4
by similar action in the Niger. The pressure of events in the summer -
the reports of French movements given by British merchants and by Hewett
simplified the position still further; any additional justification for
action was now unnecessary. By July some decision on policy seemed
5
urgently required. In October Granville at last agreed to Derby’s
6 7
repeated requests that the matter should be referred to Cabinet,
1
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ïlie policy that emerged was essentially a product of the
Foreign Office. It represented a fresh victory over the Colonial Office.
Derby had been all along somev/liat dubious about the advisability of a
protectorate. He believed that an agreement with France v/ould be far
better than action which would inevitably have a bad effect on Anglo-
French relations. lie load been very loath to give up the hope of a
comprehensive settlement, even though it had been turned down bv Lyons.
1
His department was behind him. In September he had again proposed an
agreement wiiich brought into line his own Pongas-Gaboon line of eight
years before vdLth recent developments, not only in West Africa but in
2
other parts of the world where difficulties had arisen v/ith France,
The problem was whether or not the cession of the Gambia, on which the
success of his scheme depended, would be acceptable to France, feny
people believed it would. Among them was Admiral Sir F. Richards who
was in command of the West ilfrican Station and vhose views on French
colonial policy carried weiglit with the Government. Be believed the
Gambia was "the real Naboth’s Vineyard of the French in Africa" and that
French, moves in other parts of West ^Ifrica were made -with the idea of
inconveniencing British trade to such an extent that Britain would be
5
prepared to cede the Gambia to obtain relief, Ihis was the interpretation 
of French policy that had gained currency in Government circles at the time 
of the Mataconjr question. Lord Lyons had originally advanced the theory.
1
Vide Minute by Hemming on F. 0. to G. 0., 28 September 1883; G. 0, 96/L54. 
Memorandum by Meade of September; Scotter, p. 284.
2
]lde su ora p. 317,
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Extract from Memorandum by Rear-Admiral Sir F. Rlch&rds, printed as
enclosure 11 in Admiralty to F. 0., 31 May 1883, Oil Rivers Gorrespondence 
 (Question of British Protectorate %  Part II, pp. 23-4; G. D. 29/269, _____ _
347
But now the Ambassador’s views had clianged. Experience had taught him
that French colonial activity was based on a genuine and fervent desire
'• for more territory. J. A. Orov/e, the recently appointed Commercial
1
Attache in Paris, agreed v/ith him. In viev/ of the enormous enthusiasm 
In France - among the general public and in the Press as well as on 
the part of the Government - for a new overseas empire, and the ovation 
given to de Brazza and other pioneers, it was difficult to believe by 
the autumn of 1883 that there was an ulterior motive behind French 
activities.
Before the Cabinet finally turned down a general settlement,
2
the Foreign Office had aH.ready decided against it. To them it had been
no more than a potential long-term policy, never a substitute for action.
Since all hope of agreement on the other questions Derby had associated
in the settlement (the penal settlement in New Caledonia and the
Newfoundland fisheries dispute) v/as fading, the scheme liad boiled dovm
to a straight exchange - ©le Gambia in return for ihe Oil Rivers- But
it seemed prepostrous to give away the Gambia, especially as the colony
#
was now on its feet again financially, merely to beg the French not to
commit in an area v/here they had "neither rights nor property, an
/ pression which would almost amount to a casus belli". It might 
/
Vide minute by Anderson on Lyons to Granville, 16 February 1883,
Slave Trade No. 18, Confidential; F. 0,84/L637.
Memorandum by Lister on the French on the West Coast' of .Africa,
24 October 1883, Oil Rivers Correspondence (question of British 
Protectorate), Part IV, pp. 5-4; G*D. 29/269.
Minute by Lister, 16 November 1883, on the Cession of the Gambia,
Oil Rivers Correspondence (Question of British Protectorate) Part IV, 
No. 13, pp. 23-4; G. D. 29/269.
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have been possible, however, to make the cession a quid pro quo for
a settlement of difficulties on the Slave Coast (according to
British requirements) plus an engagement from France to abolish all
differential duties on British goods and to grant most-favoured-nation
1
terms to British Subjects in all French possessions. TLiat would have
been a v/orthwiiile arrangement, but since it seemed very unlikely that the
French would even consider it at present, the matter was dropped.
There reraained the neutralisation proposals put forward
by the N. fL C. and other commercial bodies. Tiis seemed to the Foreign
Office a more feasible arrangement, providing Britain secured a
protectorate over the Delta, first. Then, "armed m t h  such powers of
interfering v/ith foreign trade, H.M. Government would find it easy to
get other Governments to accept the equal and liberal arrangement winch
2
they might propose". But as the Cabinet came down to practical details
about the Protectorate, this idea, too, faded away. Derby revived it
in the autumn of 1884, going so far as to suggest that the treaties made
3
by Hewett should be withdrawn. It is not -.surprising that he was over­
ruled. By the time of the Berlin Conference, Britain hai become very 
unvllling to listen to German and French suggestions that the Niger shoild 
be subjected to the same kind of international control as the Congo,
Tlie final plan of action the Cabinet produced in November 1883 
was partly shaped by a compromise betv/een the Foreign Office and the
1
Ibid.
2
Memorandum by Lister on the French on the West Coast of .Africa, 
loc, cit.
3
Scotter, p. 333.
Colonial Office. Hie one point of disagreement was over the Oameroons.
Tlie Foreign Office wanted outright annexation, partly because of the
chiefs’ willingness, indeed anxiety, to accept British rule. In view
Of French activities at Malimba Point it seemed essential to put the
political status of tlie coast beyond all doubt. The chiefs apparently
wanted Britain to talce full sovereignty over their country; if they were
granted protection only, there was a real danger that they would have
made over their territory to France, Moreover, Ambas Bay contained a
fine harbour and the climate was much better than in the Oil Rivers.
By annexing the Oameroons Britain would have secured a vantage point from
•çdiich to control the trade of the Delta and in addition a potential
1
site for a much-needed sanatorium, Derby, however, was still not
prepared for additional colonial responsibilities, and felt that a limited
protectorate over a half mile strip of coast was all that was needed to
forestall other Powers, But he consented to the annexation of Ambas Bay,
2
since English missionaries had already full property rights there.
3
Bis views were eventually accepted. Tlie Oil Rivers were an entirely 
different matter: the natives were an unknown quantity, the climate 
pestilential, and the rivers difficult to navigate. Treaties of
4
Protectorate were all that were needed to secure British trade; on this
everyone was agreed,
1
Memorandum by Lister on the Oameroons River, 19 November 1883, Oil 
Rivers Correspondence ('Question of British Protectorate), Part IV, No. 14, 
pp. 24-5; 0. D. 29/269.
2
Vide minute by Hemming on F. 0, to 0. 0., 29 November 1883; and 0. 0. to 
F. 0. ^ draft), 5 January 1884; 0. 0, 96/154.
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c) Britain’s anti-French and pro-German policy.
Another aspect of British policy which needs to be empliasised 
is the clear preference it revealed for German colonisation against 
French from 1884 onwards. British and German traders had always got 
on remarkably well in the Bights. The Germans had no exclusive commercial 
practices like the French. Yet the way in Miich Nachtigal narrowly 
forestalled Hewett in July 1884 and upset British plans for the Oameroons 
might have caused friction. In fact it did not. The reaction of 
Chamberlain and Dilke - disgust with Britain’s too-long hesitation in 
giving Hewett his final instructions - was not at all typical of general 
feelings in the Government. The main object Britain had had was to
1
prevent French annexation and to secure the maintenance of free trade,
and so there was "nothing to do but to put a good face" on German success.
In any case the Germans were much to be preferred to the French as 
2
neighbours. Britain accepted the fait accompli, without a murmur. She
did more; she encouraged Germany to go further. She advised her to
extend her protectorate over the remaining rivers of the Oameroons in
order to bring it to the northern limit of the French possessions at 
''3
Malimba point;, if not the French would take the German leavings; it was
4
much better for Germany to have the territory than France.
1
0.0. to F.O, (draft), 7 October 1883; 0.0.96/162.
2
Minute by Meade'on F.O. to 0. 0., 15 September 1884; 0.0.96/162.
3
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4
Minute by Meade on F. 0, to 0. 0., 15 September 1884; 0. 0. 96/162.
3S(
Britain also displayed her susceptibility for German
feelings over the question of the Niger Company’s charter. The Government
1
had been considerably embarrassed by Goldie ’s demands for what was 
clearly intended to be a monopoly, although the Foreign Office felt that 
to grant administrative rifrhts to the Company was the on].y v/ay for 
Britain to administer the Protectorate successfully, Tie N. A, C, argued 
that a depression was tlireatening British commerce through insufficient
n
government control. Foreign interlopers v/ere creeping in. But
not only v/ould a monopoly have been against* free trade principles, but
would have been contrary to the Anglo-German Agreement of 27 fey/l6 June
5
1885, which renounced any intention of such a regime, Goldie was
furious at the rebuffs he received. All was fair in v/ar but, he
complained to the head of the African Department (who sympathised with
him), he had "always imagined that the traders of country and its
4
government v/ere fighting on the same side",
Salisbury’s doubts about the Charter were not entirely due 
to his desire not to antagonise Germany, as. his later dealings with the 
relations between the Niger Company and its rival the African ^'association 
show. He was genuinely against favouring one Conpany at the expense of 
other British firms, Anderson and Pauncefote, however, deplored the
1
National African Company to Queen Victoria, 12 February 1885; Goldie to 
Salisbury, 18 June 1885; Goldie to Salisbury, 28 December
1885; Goldie to Pauncefote, 15 January 1886; Goldie to Salisbury,
27 January 1886; F.O.84/1880.
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H^jort of the National jlfrican Company, 8 December 1885; James F. Hutton 
on the board of directors/ to Salisbury, 5 January 1886; F. 0, 84/1880,
5
Salisbury to Goldie (draft), 25 January 1886; F.O.84/1880,
4
Goldie to Anderson, Pte,, 1 February 1886; F. 0.84/1880,
35Z
Liverpool merchants ’ atternpts to break through the monopoly. Tiey
maintained that the Niger Company had performed an enormous economic
service in helping to destroy the.power of native middlemen and to
1
give Britain direct access to the trade of the interior. ïliey regarded
the African Association as fighting the battle of the middlemen, as in
a sense they v/ere since it was only by making use of the traditional
economic authority of native chiefs like Jaja of Opobo that they could
tap the oil trade at all.
Tie Charter was granted vdien Rosebery was Foreign Secretary.
He was very careful to do nothing to antagonise Germany. He gave
special instructions that the draft Charter should be shown to Bismarck 
2
personally. Tie actual wording of the Charter was altered so that
the right v/as given specifically to foreigners (by whom was meant Germans)
to have equal access with British Subjects to the Niger Company’s 
5
territory. It was not his fault that in practice the company assumed 
dictatorial powers over foreigners, sometimes expelling them from the 
Protectorate at v/ill. \
Commercial pressure, fear of France, preference for Germany, - 
these were the factors which led to Goldie ’s supreme control on the Niger. 
The later treaties of protection in the Northern Territories were all
1
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negotiated by the Niger Company. It was not long before the boundary 
set up by the Anglo-French I^gr cement of 5 in gust 1890, fixing the extent 
of French influence on the Niger by a line from Say to Lake Tcliad, 
became an inperial reality for Britain.
6. TES CONGO BilSIN.
iinglo-French relations over the Congo Basin in the early 
’eighties were somewhat different from those in other parts of West Africa. 
Britain had no territorial interests round the Congo and there were no 
negotiations between the two countries over purely territorial issues. 
Neither did Britain contemplate making acquisitions herself, so tliat 
France, in absorbing large areas between the OgoYjé and the Congo, was 
not forestallincy her in a colonial sense, Britain v/as no more interested 
in opening up the Congo by official penetration and subsequent 
administration than the Senegal hinterland. In this respect her policy 
had not changed since 1875, when she had refused to sanction Cameron’s 
provisional protectorate. In the second place, the future ownership of 
the Congo Basin was essentially an international question. It concerned 
not only Britain and. France, but Portugal and King Leopold’s International 
Association, and on the diplomatic side, Germany. Thus- Britain did not 
have a free hand in formulating her policy tov/ards France; she had to take 
into account the interests and ambitions of other Pov/ers. Nevertheless, 
she regarded the French drive from the Gaboon to the Congo accomplished 
by de Brazza as a menace to her ov/n interests.
Her attitude to the French advance was primarily commercial.
She opposed France for the same reason that slie opposed her elseMiere: 
because an exclusive commercial regime would close one of the most vital
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economic regions of Africa to British trade. Already in 1876 she had
secured most-favoured-nation treaties v/ith some of the Congo chiefs.
In the ’eighties she hoped that the entrepots her traders had established
on the coast - at the Gaboon, at the mouth of the Congo, and at several
points between the two rivers - would form a base for extended commercial
operations inland. Like the rest of Europe (outside France), she did
not suspect until 1883 that King Leopold had plans to monopolise the
Congo Basin for the benefit of Belgian commerce alone. To her the race
for territory in the Congo was not between two Powers - France and
the International dissociation - but between t m  principles: exclusive
nationalism versus international free trade.
Her main objective was to keep France away from the mouth of .—
the Congo, Hence the abortive Anglo-Portuguese Treaty of February 1884,^
"Pear of France, and of the exclusive commercial policy of her traders,
1
was the motive power at work in the minds of British statesmen", Britain
"made the treaty v/ith Portugal, considering the Portuguese tariff a lesser
evil than a possible French one, and Portuguese rule a less expensive
2
proposition than consular supervision over the Congo Estuary".
The British attitude tov/ards French expansion in the Congo Basin
has become v/ell-knov/n through recent studies of the Berlin Vfest African
3
Conference and its origins. One point, however, has not been realised
Crowe; Berlin V/est African Conference, op. cit., p.17.
Crowe, p.21,
The best analysis of the development of British policy from c. 1881-5 is 
given by Crowe ; The Berlin West African Conference, op. cit. Cf.
G. Kdnigk: Die Berliner Kongo-Konferenz 1884-85 (Essen 1938), and
H. E. Yarnall: The Great Powers and'the Congo Conference (Gottingen 1934).
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sufficiently hitherto, British policy was based on the ’coastal ’
outlook, on the desire to keep the outlets of commerce in free trade
hands; Britain v/ould participate in control of the coast, while the
International.Association would administer the hinterland.
The idea of some measure of British control of the coast had
been foreshadowed as far back as 1875 in the Pongas-Gaboon line, Tiis
v/as femulated as a counter not only to French activities round existing
British possessions north of the Gaboon, but to a possible extension of
the Gaboon itself, Derby gave a hint of this in referring, when he v/as
trying to persuade the French to accept the line, to ’the rich territories
1
from Cape Coast to Lagos ’ which were open to British enterprise. The 
reason the line was not pushed further south was that at the time there 
seemed no immediate danger of French expansion in that direction.
Moreover, the long-established claims of Portugal seemed to preclude it.
/
The mouth of the Congo had not yet become a European issue. The Brussel^s 
Conference was not held till the follov/ing year, nor had the International 
Association been fomed. Tie main expeditions into the Congo Basin prior 
to Stanley’s and de Brazza’s had been English, If any nation managed to 
break through the vague Portuguese monopoly of the estuary it might very 
well have been Britain, But the Gaboon was a different matter altogether. 
The Colonial Office wanted the Pongas-Gaboon line to include the Gaboon 
itself, British traders were v/ell-established there, and it seemed possible 
tliat the river might prove to be an excellent means of communication with
1
Gavard k Decazes, 28 avril 1875; Affaires étrangères, 768,
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the interior. It was at least held to he "as good â river as the Gambia",
1
Trade seemed to he moving from French to British hands. The African Pilot
had described the bay at the mouth of the river as the finest in West
Africa, Despite the French charge d ’affairbî^^suggestion that the
5
Gaboon should be handed over to Britain, it was very unlikely, however,
that the French Government would have listened to any formal proposal of
this nature from Britain. De Brazza’s plans for the expansion of the
colony were secretly approved by the ÎÆLnister of Marine in 1875, and in
any case the Gambia exchange project collapsed a few months later.
Tie idea was not altogether abandoned. Although Britain got
no satisfactory answer to her numerous protests from 1881 onwards against
the nature of the treaties de Brazza was making south of the Ogowe, as
late as 1883 the Foreign Office revived the excliange project as part of
4
a long-term settlement of Anglo-French difficulties. The cession of the 
Gaboon to Britain v/as to be the direct equivalent for the cession of the 
Gambia to France, Significantly enough, in the light of Britain’s 
pre-occupation with the coast, the "dangerous" question of de Brazza’s
5
activities in the hinterleoid was specifically excluded from the proposal.
1
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Tie Anglo-Portuguese Treaty of 1884 was in a sense an
extension of the coastal idea to meet nev/ developments. In this case,
hov/ever, Britain was not interested in sole control of the coast. She
1
refused outright an offer of a protectorate over Sette Comma in 1883.
Although other countries suspected that the proposed Anglo-Portuguese
2
Commission would he more British than Portuguese, Britain had in fact
wanted the Commission to he not Anglo-Portuguese hut international.
Nevertheless, the initiative for securing some form of control over the
Congo estuary came from Britain. In this connection Stanley's views
accorded very well with the development of British policy. Although he
went much further than Britain in this matter, because of his antipathy
to Portuguese participation in joint control, and referred to what he
called Britain's own "indubitable rights" to the coast, his basic
proposition - that Britain should continue to watch over the coast
and the International Association over the hinterland - was remarkably
similar to Britisli ideas. Partly because of his rivalry v/ith de Brazza
and also because of the growing diplomatic -importance of the dissociation
#
he represented, his viev/s received considerable attention in London.
"The English", he wrote in 1883, "are the only people 
who have policed tlie seas and the Congo for the last 
60 years in the interests of morality. Tiiey are the 
only people v/ho have made Treaties with the native chiefs, 
promising them support if necessary to abstain from slave- 
dealing etc. Traders of all nations have adventured their 
money because there was a just police of some sort to whom 
they could appeal in case of necessity",
P.O. to C. 0., 3 October 1883; C.O. to P.O. (draft), 15 October 1883;
G. 0. 96/154.
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Although Britain "became suspicious of the Association after 
Leopold's opposition to the Anglo-Portuguese lieaty, she eventually 
recognised the .Association in Decemher 1884. After the pre-emption 
treaty with France, Britain came to realise that whatever the faults 
of the .Association, it was the only alternative to French control over 
the Congo.
The British attitude to the Congo question was essentially the
fruit of experience of French commercial policy in other parts of West
Africa. There was no commercial pressure comparable to that which was
exerted over the Niger question. The Anglo-Portuguese Treaty was
as
negotiated in the greatest secrecy so far^^Britain was concerned. It
did not originate from British traders, but from, the anti-French group
v/ithin the Government - Dilke, Anderson, and to go further back.
Sir Robert Morier. In fact the measure of control it gave to Portugal
aroused great opposition from some sections of the commercial v/orld.
Bitton, for example, a friend of Stanley (who was as much opposed to
Portugal as to France), said that "whatever guarantee were given by
Portugal would not be observed and tliat it would be inpossible for any
respectable English House of business to trade v/ith any satisfaction in
1
a river subject to Portugal", owing to the extortions of her officials. 
Moreover, there were many old-established firms in Manchester, Liverpool, 
and London who had enjoyed almost a monopoly in supplying goods for 
central Africcu tlirough French trade posts, and tlie y were naturally not
1
C. 0. Memorandum on Meade ' s interview with Hutton /on. 20 December 1882? 
(copy). Oil Rivers Correspondence (Question of British Protectorate), 
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anxious to see the upper Congo thrown open to gene irai competition.
1
Tliey were particularly opposed to the Anglo-Portuguese Treaty. But 
there were other firms, especially those in the Gaboon, who were ready 
to supply details of French commercial practice vbich added to British
o
C t
indignation against France. Wherever the French colonised, Granville
declared, they introduced "high protective tariffs, as hich as 50 per
3
cent", and did Britain "infinite harm".
Tie Anglo-Portuguese Treaty, Britain's recognition of the
Internation/Association, British insistence on the inclusion of the
enlarged Gaboon territories in the Conventional Basin of the Congo at the
Berlin Conference - these were stages in a policy dominated by the desire
to keep France away from "the débouché of the future trade of Central
4
'Africa..... the Mississipi, in fact, of that region".
7« BRITAIN'S COASTAL POLICY.
Mary Kingsley, the explorer, analysing Britain's achievement 
in West Africa little more than a decade after the events described in 
this chapter, came to the conclusion that British policy had been based 
on two main miscalculations. One was the Crov/n Colony system. Tie
1
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other v/as:
'that other fallacious half-reason which our statesmen 
have for years been using to soothe the minds of those 
who urged on her in good time the necessity of acquiring 
the Mnterlands of West Africa, namely ’Lifter all, England 
holds the key of them in holding the outlets of the rivers".
.And while our statesmen have been saying this, France has 
been industriously changing the lock on the door by diverting 
trade routes from the hinterland she has so gallantly acquired, 
dovm into those seaboard districts which she possesses. *1
At the time she was writing, when the economy of West Africa 
was still largely in the hands of native producers, there was some truth 
in her contention. But v/ith the transfer of economic power to European 
hands and with the development of colonies for European benefit, her 
argument has become outdated. Britain has utilised the old trade 
routes and built new ones, and, in the mid-tv/entieth century, the West 
African export trade still depends on possession of the coast. The sea 
is still the gateway to European markets.
1
Mary II. Kingsley: West .African Studies. (London 1899), p. 312.
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C H A P T E R
CONDITIONAL ASSENT;
The British Attitude towards French expansion in South-East 
Asia, 1874-87.
«I ^
Britain saw French colonisation in West Africa largely as 
a challenge to her own colonial and economic position. In the Far East, 
she also regarded French expansion as a threat, hut not so much to her 
colonial interests as first to heb pre-eminence in the China trade and 
then to her 'Indian* interests in the Indo-Chinese peninsula. Just as 
in West Africa the effect of Anglo-French rivalry was to stimulate 
Britain to a new conception of her imperial duties, so the gradual 
absorption of Annam and Tongking by France produced a new consciousness 
of -vdiere Britain's true interests in South-East Asia lay. The 
development of British policy was however far more gradual than in 
West Africa. There was no sudden conversion to a belief in the advantages 
of a forward movement against France such as had been the case with the 
Foreign Office in 1883 and which had made possible the Oil Rivers 
Protectorate* This was partly because the Par Eastern policy of France 
herself after 1870 had its roots more firmly in the past than her West 
African* Britain had long been accustomed to dealing with French political 
ambition in South-East Asia.
1. THE TRADITION OF FRENCH INTEREST IN THE INDO-CHINESE PENINSULA.
Jules Ferry has often been regarded as the founder of the
1
modern French colonial empire. This belief needs considerable modification 
in the case of Indo-China. The spectacular Tending and Annam canpaigns 
that were fought during Ferry's Ministry of 1883-5 were not the beginning 
but the culmination of a venture in territorial expansion. It was not
r?
Ferry, "le tonkinois", but Gambetta who in January 1882 had announced
1
E.£, Langer: Diplomacy of Imperialism. I., p.76*
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that France would finally pacify Tongking. Ferry's objectives were 
the same as those of French policy a decade before. The difference 
between his work and that of his predecessors lay in the scale of his 
endeavour and its success.
In effect. Ferry was the instrument of a long tradition 
of French interest in the eastern side of the Indo-Chinese peninsula.
In the reign of Louis XIV French explorers and missionaries had been 
active in Annam, and towards the end of the eighteenth century French 
engineers were being enployed by the local authorities in the South.
In 1841 several ports were opened to French traders. Hans for 
annexation discussed in Guizot's time matured under Napoleon III.
A minor but successful Mexican adventure ensued. Having captured 
Saigon in 1859, France annexed the lower provinces of Cochin-China, 
then under the suzerainty of Annam, three years later. Saigon became 
a naval base, besides a more important entrepôt for foreign commerce 
than any of the Annamese ports. In 1863 France secured a protectorate 
over Cambodia, though this state was politiceüLly part of Siam, not of 
Annam. In 1867 Cochin-China embraced three further provinces ceded by 
Annam, and the colony's budget for that year already showed a surplus 
of 1,000,000 francs - chiefly due to the export trade in rice. But the 
Marseilles merchants tAio had backed this experiment in colonisation 
looked beyond immediate profits. They shared the belief that was common 
to the two chief industrial nations of western Europe until the late 
’eighties that territorieil acquisitions in the Indo-Chinese peninsula 
were little more than a convenient base from idiich to assault the real 
economic citadel - China itself. They believed, like their counterparts
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^  England, that in China there was a vast potential market for
European goods, a market which had so far been almost inaccessible
from the Treaty Ports owing to official obstruction* The frontal
attack had made limited progress, but through the outlying provinces
of the south-west, far removed from the adninistration of Baking,
Europe might at last establish direct contact with some of the supposed
1
four hundred million potential consumers. Hence Doudart de Lagree's
official expedition up the Mekong in the late 'sixties to investigate
the possibility of tapping the markets of Yunnan from French territory.
But he showed that Cochin-China was too remote an outlet for commercial
use. Instead he directed French attention to Tongking, the great
northern dependency of Annam. The subsequent explorations of Dupuis
confirmed his deductions about the potentialities of the Red River. As
a trader Dupuis demonstrated his theory practically by bringing a
consignment of metal from Yunnan to Hanoi in only nine days. But the
mandarins in Tongking proved as much opposed to foreign infiltration
as any Manchu official. Again the French Government supported economic
interests. In 1873 Hanoi was captured and the delta of the Red River 
2
occupied.
French weakness after the Franco-Prussian War precluded 
immediate territorial consolidation, however. Instead France concentrated
Vide Nathan A. Pelcovits: Old China Hands and the Foreign Office.
"(published under the auspices of the American Institute of Badfic 
Relations, New York 1948), for the myth of the four hundred million 
potential consumers in China - an article of faith with British merchants 
in the nineteenth century*
For an account of the Garnier Mission and the capture of Hanoi, vide 
Virginia Thompson; French Indo-China, (London 1937), pp. 62-5.
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on defining her political position. At Saigon in 1874, she signed
two treaties with Annam, one political, by vdiich the King's
independence fbom China was recognised at the expense of an obligation
to conform his foreign policy to that of France, and one commercial,
by vdiich French traders were given special privileges, with regard to
trade both between Annam and Saigon and between Tongking and Yunnan,
and which stipulated exclusively French control of the customs at
Annamese ports and the submission of all Europeans involved in trade
1
disputes to French consular jurisdiction.
2. THE GENERAL DIRECTION OF BRITISH POLICY. 0.1860-1885.
In 1874 Britain became directly concerned with the French 
advance. Hitherto she had not generally opposed French activities in this 
part of the Indo-Chinese peninsula. For two centuries the French had 
held the field there in exploration, evangelisation, and trade, and 
Britain had been content to have it so. While France had been active in 
the east, Britain had concentrated on the west, largely in order to 
consolidate and safeguard her Indian possessions. Early in the nineteenth 
century French influence had been ousted from the lower Irrawaddy, and 
in 1862 British Burma came into existence as a political unit. For the 
next fifteen years, until difficulties arose with Upper Burma, British 
interests in the Indo-Chinese peninsula were secure from an 'Indian* 
point of view. Nor had Britain seen any danger in the French colonisation 
of Annamese provinces from a political angle. In Napoleon Ill's time
1
The fb.ll French texts of the Political Treaty of 15 March 1874 and 
of the Commercial Treaty of 4 April 1874 were published in the 
Livre Jaune entitled Documents Diplomatiques. Affaires du Tonkin. 
1885, Premiere partie.
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still very little was known of the geography of South-East Asia, and 
Britain welcomed any opening-up of territory in which she herself had 
no direct national interest, for the opportunity it gave for the spread 
of •commerce and civilization** (This was the same attitude that later 
governed Briti^ policy over French expansion in the Upper Niger region). 
Britain's existing conanerce in the China Seas benefited from the 
French acquisition of Cochin-China, imhile the possession of Singapore 
precluded anxiety as to the strategic potentialities of Saigon*
At the same time Britain's virtual assent to French expansion 
had not been absolute^ but conditional. It had depended on French 
willingness to eullow eventual British commercial conpetition. In 1874 
British merchants had for many years enjoyed a preponderant share of 
European trade with the Treaty Ports of China. Britain was not prepared 
to recognise any settlement in Annam and Tongking -vdiich would prevent 
their operations being extended fhrther west* 3he Treaties of Saigon 
threatened precisely this danger.
The general direction of British policy over the development,
in the 'seventies and 'eighties, of vhat later became French Indo-China
is now known* Recent studies have indicated that Britain did not so
much object to the French advance per se, as to its commercial
implications* In 1874-5 she objected to the exclusive privileges
1
granted by the Saigon Treaties. During the renewed burst of French 
colonialism in the 'eighties, she made no attenpt to prevent the final
1
Pelcovits; Old China ^uids* op* cit., p. 143, deals briefly with the 
British attitude* He implies incorrectly that after November 1874 
Britain made no fhrther representations to France against the 
exclusive nature of the Saigon Treaties.
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absolution of Annam and Tongking, but tried to safeguard her own
trade interests. These were affected in the first place by the actual
conquest of Tongking; Franco-Chinese hostilities (China having claimed
direct suzerainty over Tongking) were bound to interfere with British
commerce in the China Seas. In 1883-4 therefore, Britain attempted
a cautious intervention in the cause of peace, and iidien this failed she
1
preserved a rigid neutrality. In the second place, her potential 
coninerce with south-west China was threatened by the primary purpose of 
the Tongking campaigns, 'which was to monopolise the Red River route
into Yunnan. Thus, after the conclusion of peace in June 1885 Britain
2
concentrated on securing counter-concessions from China. Tliis much is 
clear.
The British reactions to the earlier and to the later phase
of French policy have not been given equal attention, however. The
3
British attitude in 1874-5 has been comparatively neglected. Yet the 
Saigon Treaties were of great importance in that they were the basis of 
the later French claims to a protectorate in Annam and Tongking. And 
although the course of British diplomacy over the Tongking canpaigns 
of 1882-5 has been thoroughly examined, the motivation of policy has 
not been altogether explained. Thiis is not a criticism of Dr. KLernan's
A comprehensive treatment of British policy with regard to the 
Tongking Canpaigns, based on unpublished Foreign Office records, is 
given in E. V. Gr.Kieman: British Diplomacy in China, 1880-1885.
^ew York 1939).
Vide Pelcovits. pp.139-142, 148 seq.
Pelcovits is apparently the only historian who has studied this 
question at all.
1
invaluable work, for his purpose was to describe British policy over 
the actual campaigns, not to analyse in detail the British attitude 
towards the objectives of French action. In the case of Tongking, what 
is already known about British views needs to be co-ordinated and also 
supplemented by new material. British policy over the Saigon Treaties, 
however, needs more radical investigation,
3. BRITAIN AND THB FRANCQ-ANNAIvESE TRI3ATIE8 OF 1874.
Britain considered the Treaties of Saigon not so much from
a localised territorial viewpoint as in the light of her own policy
towards the Chinese Empire. Official correspondence suggests that the
Government was still comparatively free from anxiety about French colonial
intentions in the Indo-Chinese peninsula. The India Office, for instance,
2
had no comments to make on the Political Treaty. It was not till the 
*ei^ties that Britain started to believe that her own influence in 
South-East Asia was threatened by French activities, and then not by those 
in Annam and Tongking but by those in Siam and Upper Burma. In the 
'seventies, French action was regarded mainly in terms of Far Eastern 
commerce. For Britain held that Annam was under Chinese suzerainty, 
however weak the ancient ties between the court of and the Manchu 
dynasty had become in recent decades. A treaty designed to subordinate 
a dependency of China to French economic control was a manifestly different 
proposition from previous French treaties with Annam, by which only small 
portions of that dependency had been acquired. Mareover, northern Annam
1
Kiernan: British Diplomacy in China, op. cit.
2
India Office to Foreign Office, 4 November 1874; F. 0.27/2266,
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was more closely linked to Chinese economy than Cochin-China was.
To a lesser extent Britain was also conscious of a political danger 
in French action. Although she had always recognised French interests 
in Annam, the question of the political future of the Chinese Bnpire 
(that had been particularly pressing at the time of the Treaty of 
Tientsin and the subsequent Anglo-French occupation of Peking in 
I860), now made the sweeping nature of the Saigon Treaties disquieting 
to her.
Britain's attitude towards the attempted protectorate cannot
be understood without reference to the basic assunptions of her Far
Eastern policy. In 1874 France infringed three cardinal principles
that had been evolved in the course of Britain's dealings with China.
Tlie first of these was that the independence of China and the adjoining
countries should be preserved. By the 'seventies, the Government had
become convinced that the extent of British trade with the Far East
would not have justified the expense of assuming political control there.
As The Times nointed out, Britain was "not in the mood to undertake the 
" 1 
responsibilities of another India*'. Clarendon's dictum in 1870 was
(and has remained) the classic expression of policy; "British interests
in China are strictly commercial, or, at all events, only so far political
as they may be for the protection of commerce and of British subjects in
their lawful pursuits. Tlie British Government have neither the desire
2
nor the intention to interfere with the internal administration of China". 
At the same time, it was assumed that commerce could only be promoted
1
15 September 1875; quoted by Bslcovits, p.101.
2
To Wade, 7 April 1870; quoted by Pelcovits, p. 85.
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through the co-operation of the existing authorities. Increased
commercial privileges for foreign traders were necessary, "but
contrary to merchant opinion the Government "believed that a very
cautious approach to the pro"blem was essential. Successive Foreign
Secretaries held that to have tried to force the pace of commercial
concessions m i ^ t  have involved Britain in war with China auid in
political rivalry with other Powers. War would have destroyed the
precarious "balance of "business confidence "between Chinese eind European.
Politicsil rivalry might have ended in exclusive territorial monopolies.
As Granville reminded the British Minister in Peking in 1873, in
instructing him to maintain an attitude of "coupromise and conciliation"
towards the Tsungli-Yaraen, "H.M. Government... believe that any attempt
prematurely to force upon the Chinese government reforms and innovations
for which they are not prepared, would be likely to lead not only to
war, but to such a political and social disorganisation of China as
would more than counterbalance any nominal advantages that might be 
1
obtained". Lasting benefits for British trade could only be secured
by gradual concessions. This then was the first principle of Far Eastern
policy: the maintenance of the political status quo, coupled with gradual
economic penetration. Politically, Britain's chief aim from 1860 onwards
"was that China should become able to hold her own in the world of
2
sovereign states now closing in around her".
1
Pelcovits, p.107.
2
Sir John T. Pratt: The Expansion of Europe into the Far East,
(London 1947), p. 95.
The second principle was European solidarity vis-a-vis 
indigenous governments. Britain believed that commercial advance 
should be on an international basis, that any concessions obtained by 
one nation should be available to the traders of all nations. Although 
she had a traditional and particular interest in one avenue of penetration 
the opening of China's 'back door' from Burma, this was regarded as 
incidental to the main theme of international co-operation, and it did 
not in fact conflict with liberal commercial doctrine since Britain 
intended the Bhamo route, once opened, to be, in theory at least, open 
to all. 'No exclusive privileges' was the order of the day. It was the 
precursor of the Open Door policy of the late 'nineties, and one aspect 
of the Free Trade ideal - a system which was assumed to be the obvious 
and natural one for British commerce, since that commerce, being 
preponderant, could only benefit from wider opportunities, (it has been 
observed to what extent this belief governed British policy in West 
Africa, too). Tlius commercially as well as politically French policy in 
Annam in 1874 conflicted with British principles. "One cannot but look 
with some apprehension", observed a member of the Colonial Office, "at 
this departure on the part of the French Government frcan the "entente" 
or practice i«Mch all the Powers have hitherto observed of advancing 
"pari passu" or at all events of seeking no exclusive privileges or 
advantages for carrying Trade and Foreign Civilization into China and the 
adjoining Countries".
1
Memorandum by Pauncefote /^en  Assistant Under-Secretary at the Colonial 
Office/ (copy), 27 August 1874, enclosed in C.0. to P.O., 5 September 
1874; P.O.27/2266.
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A third principle formed a corollary to the first two 
and explains much about the British attitude to the Saigon Treaties.
It was the conviction that the development of trade relations with the 
Par East was the sole, indeed the only legitimate, object of British 
policy, Tidiile the encouragement of direct economic investment was not.
In the 'seventies the Government believed that schemes for 'opening 
up ' the Far East by concessions for mines, telegraphs, roads, etc., 
were not only politically inadvisable but economically premature.
Tkiey were far readier to admit than 'old China hands' that the small 
volume of British exports to the China Seas^ as compared with exports 
to Europe, was not only due to administrative obstruction, but to the 
relative self-sufficiency of Chinese economy. Until markets for 
European manufactures had been firmly established, it was useless to 
consider internal investment - always providing that other Powers did 
not take the initiative in this direction. This approach was 
characteristic of British economic foreign policy in the 'seventies 
where undeveloped areas were concerned. There, the Government 
acknowledged a duty to trade above all else. The European industrial 
depression of 1873 strengthened this belief, in underlining the 
importance of new markets rather than of fresh fields for capital 
investment. As regards the Par East in particular, the stabilization of 
British exports to Cliina in 1872 and their gradual decline thereafter 
until the 'nineties also had this effect. Thus over Annam in 1874,
Britain was pre-occupied with the purely commercial implications of French 
policy, and hardly concerned, if at all, with the potential French 
acquisition of a colonie d'exploitation. Moreover the same economic
conditions were known to prevail in Annam as in China: France was faced
with the same problem that faced British merchants at the Treaty Ports ■
a largely self-sufficient economy and an ancient civilisation, with its
own complex system of law and administration, which repelled foreign
attenç)ts at infiltration.
British policy over the Saigon Treaties was largely the
product of these three principles. At the root of Britain's objections
lay the attempted monopoly of Annamese trade, the intended veto on
British commercial competition. The Colonial Office voiced a general
sentiment in regarding French action as 'the first instance in m o d e m
times in lihlch it had been proposed that one nation should by Treaty
forbid another to trade except on certain conditions with the rest of 
1
the world'. Britain's own recent treaties of protection with the
Malay chiefs were cited as an example of how the legitimate politcal
influence of a European Power in a specific area should be conducted;
it was an illustration of "the wholesome rule" by ^ i c h  "every nation
represented in Chinese and Japanese waters has hitherto been content,
as regards its interest in those waters, to act in concert with other
nations; seeking no exclusive privileges for itself, but co-operating
2
with the common interests to obtain equal rights for all".
It was not on the score of existing but of potential trade
1
Minute by Herbert, 3 March 1876, on P.O. to 0. 0., 22 February 1876, 
endorsed by Carnarvon "I agree"; C. 0.129/L72.
2
British Mémorandum submitted to the French Government, 15 November 1874; 
copy enclosed in lytton to Derby, 17 November 1874, No. 1105,
P. 0. 27/2061.
that Britain objected to the French Treaties. All departments of the
Government agreed that few established British interests had been
endangered. They were well aware that the extent of British commerce
with Annam had so far been negligible. There had been scrnie contact
between Hong Kong and Hué, Touron.and Quinhon - the ports opened
originally by the French. European piece-goods as well as Chinese
products were exported, and in return Hong Kong received sugar, silk,
cassia^ and ground-nut oil. But only sixteen vessels sailed from Hong
Kong for Annam, and only twenty-six arrived at the colony from Annamese
ports, in the period 1870-4, Tihile much of this trade was in the hands
1
of Chinese merchants. There was a bigger trade between Singapore and
2
Annam; in 1874 its value amounted to 560,000 Chinese dollars. But
British commerce with the eastern sea-board of the Indo-Chinese
peninsula went mainly to Saigon. Nevertheless by 1874 the Government
had acknowledged the need for new markets. According to Pauncefote,
Hong Kong in particular (where he had been Attorney-General) required a
fresh trade outlet. He personally felt that despite the restrictions of
the Saigon Treaties, Hong Kong merchants mi^t still be able to capture
3
the Annam market. But this was not the general view, v/hich was that the 
new regulations would prove an almost insuperable obstacle to British
1
Harbour-Master of Hong Kong's returns (copy), enclosed in 
J. Gardiner Austin /Administrator of Hong Kbng/to Carnarvon,
3 May 1876, Confidential; C. 0.129/170.
2
Sir A. Clarke /&vernor of the Straits Settlements/to Carnarvon, 
11 February 1875, Secret; C. 0.273/V9.
3
Memorandum by Pauncefote (copy), 27 Au gist 1874, enclosed in C. 0. 
to P.O., 5 September 1874; P.O.27/2266.
1
traders* There was also the question of future trade with Yunnan
from Tongking. From the point of view of the Indian Government, the
French provisions for this were the "really important feature in the
^(Çoinmerciel/Treaty". Yunnan was believed to be far more accessible
via the Red River than from any of the routes previously explored by tie 
2
British. British consular representatives in China were particularly
alarmed at this aspect of the Saigon Treaties. They believed that unless
Britain soon established a trans-frontier trade with south-west China,
France might easily secure a virtual monopoly of the mineral wealth of 
3
Yunnan.
British policy was directed towards a revision of the
Treaties* Once their contents were known, Britain lodged a strong
4
protest in Baris against the most objectionable clauses. The central 
theme of the protest was that the Treaties as they stood would make
6
Annam "for all political and ccaranercial purposes a French province".
But France insisted that no British interests had been adversely affected, 
and proceeded to lay a Bill for the ratification of the Political Treaty
The British Ambassador in Paris was among those vho held this opinion: 
vide Lyons to Derby, 18 January 1876, No. 58, Confidential; F. 0.27/2103.
Memorandum by îÆr. Andrew Cassells /nember of the Council of India/,
7 September 1874; copy enclosed in India Office to Foreign Office,
4 November 1874, F. 0.27/2266.
Vide enclosures in Derby to Lyons, 27 March 1876, No. 191,
Confidential; F. 0.146/1792.
Tenterden the absence of Derbg/ to lyons, 28 July 1874, No. 426;
F. 0.146/1730. lyons to Derby, 29 July 1874, No. 778; F. 0.27/2266.
0.0. to F. 0., 27 July 1874; F. 0.27/2266. A copy of this letter was 
enclosed in the instructions of 28 July 1874 to the British Ambassador 
in Paris (No. 425, F. 0.146/1730) as the required basis of his protest to 
the French Government.
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before the National Assembly. Ratification was authorised on 31 August 
1874. The French Government consented, however, to withold a similar 
bill for the Commercial Treaty until Britain had stated her objections 
in detail. This looked like a genuine concession, for although the 
Commercial Treaty was merely an amplification of the commercial sections 
of the Political Treaty, the terms of ihe latter were vague enou^ to 
allow some modification of the subsequent Commercial Treaty. Unless this 
Treaty were altered in Britain's favour, France would have secured a 
preponderant share of trade with Annam and Tongking ^  perpetuo; Article 
III of the Political Treaty had forbidden Annam to conclude any treaties 
with other nations that would have been at variance with the Commercial 
Treaty.
Britain therefore presented France with a detailed commentary 
on those clauses which she alleged to be an infringement of the international 
"principle of abstention from all measures calculated to obtain undue or
1
exclusive privileges" in "negotiations with Chinese or Japanese States".
The wording of this Mémorandum of 15 November 1874 was almost identical
with statements drawn up by the Colonial Office and the Board of Trade,
the former department having advised the Foreign Office on matters of
2
principle, the latter having supplied specific criticism. The articles
Lytton to Decazes, 15 November 1674; copy enclosed in Lytton to Derly, 
17 November 1874, No. 1105, F. 0.27/2061.
Of. Memorandum (copy) enclosed in Lytton to Derby, 17 November 1874, 
No. 1105, F. 0.27/2061, with C. 0. to F. 0., 5 September 1874, and Board 
of Trade to F. 0., 23 September 1874, F. 0.27/2266. Copies of this 
departmental correspondence and also India Office to F.0. (copy),
4 November 1874, were enclosed in Derby to lytton, 11 November 1874, 
No.640, F.0.146/1736, as a supplement to Derby's general instructions 
to lytton (11 November 1674, No. 638, F. 0.146/1736),
#ilch Britain found particularly obnoxious were Numbers IV, XII, XV and 
XVII. Article IV provided that goods coming from Saigon bound either 
for Annamese ports or for Yunnan and vice versa, should be relieved 
of half the duty imposed on goods coming from any other place, and 
vice versa. Article XII submitted all disputes between foreign 
merchants and Annamese customs officials to the adjudication of the 
local French Consul and a native magistrate. This clause was "peculiarly 
objectionable" from a legal point of view, as the Annamese 6bstoms were 
to be directed by French officials, and it was a direct infringement of 
the British principle of extra-territorial jurisdiction at Treaty Ports. 
Annam had "not even the pretension to be French territory". Article XV 
required the captain of a foreign ship entering an Annamese port to 
report to the French Consulate within twenty-four hours of his arrival, 
and to furnish the customs with a description of his cargo. It also 
allowed customs officials to confiscate any arms found on board, even if 
they were not intended for import, into Annam (which was forbidden).
Article XVII prohibited foreign merchants from loading or unloading 
goods at Annamese ports without express permission from the Customs. In 
sum,
"it would appear that the practical effect of the Political 
Treaty when fully completed by that of the Commercial Treaty 
may be not only to place the Customs Houses of Annam under the 
exclusive supervision of France and their conduct under her 
special protection by means of French Ships of War in open 
ports, as well as to give to the same European Power exclusive 
ccxnmand of access to the Chinese Province of Yunnan by means of 
the Tonkin River, but also to conplete the surrender to French 
agents exclusively of whatever real authority may have been 
hitherto possessed by the King of Annam in Political as well as 
Ccanraercial matters".^
1
British Memorandum submitted to Decazes, 15 November 1874; copy enclosed 
in Lytton to Derby, 17 November 1874, No. 1105, P.O.27/2061.
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The French reply amounted to little more than a renewed
denial that any British interests had been infringed* Decazes claimed
that foreign nations would be better off as regards trade with Annam
than before the Treaty was made* His answer to the charge of differential
duties was that foreign merchants could share in the fifty per cent*
reduction by simply calling at Saigon. But, as the British Ambassador
pointed out, this principle, if reduced ad absurdum* meant that France
could have contended she were giving her own merchants no preferential
treatment in forcing all trade with a country under her influence to
1
pass through Marseilles or any other French port. Decazes also claimed 
that the British Treaty of 14 January 1874 with the Sultan of Perak gave
the Straits Settlements precisely the same kind of control over local
administration as the French were to have in Annam. By analogy, France 
was fully entitled to special privileges, in view of her traditional
2
interest in the country and her pioneer work in exploration and trade.
3
Britain considered this reply "most unsatisfactory",
particularly as no attempt had been made to meet British criticisms of tie
principles involved. But Decazes now held out no hope of any substantial
alteration in the Treaty. He was probably acting under pressure from the
4
Colonial Ministry. By the end of May 1875 his only concession had been
lyons to Derby, 18 January 1875, No. 58, Confidential; P. 0.27/2103.
French Memorandum on the Franco-Annamese Commercial Treaty (copy), 
enclosed in Lyons to Derby, 18 January 1875, No. 58, Confidential, 
/seen by the Queen, the Prime Minister and the Foreign Secretai^/i
F.O. 27/2103.
Derby's minute on the foregoing despatch.
Lyons to Derby, 16 February 1875, No. 150, Very Confidential;
P. 0.27/2105.
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a suggestion that Britain should negotiate a treaty with Annam exonç)ting
1
British merchants from French consular jurisdiction at Annamese ports.
But this seemed hardly feasible in view of the clause in the already
ratified Political Treaty prohibiting Annam to make treaties at variance
with her agreements with France, The Colonial Secretary felt that Britain
would be perfectly entitled not to recognise the Commercial Treaty and to
2
threaten negotiations with Annam for vdiatever terms she could get, but
this again appeared useless. There was a general feeling that France had
stolen a march on Britain, and by June it was clear that Decazes, whatever
his personal inclinations were, would not be able to out off ratification
3
of the Treaty much longer.
On 17 June a Ratification Bill was laid before the French Assembly 
Time was running short, for the Assembly was soon due to adjourn. On the 
25th the British Ambassador was therefore instructed to make a "strong 
representation" against the terms of the Treaty, with particular reference 
to the differential duties in favour of Saigon, and to ask for a specific 
amendment by which French jurisdiction over non-French Europeans would
4
cease once European governments had made the necessary treaties with Annam.
5
This appeal, however, had little effect. France refused to alter the
Lyons to Derby, 16 February 1875, No. 149, Confidential; F.O.27/2105. 
Ibid., 25 May 1875, No. 427; F. 0.27/2267.
C.O. to P.O., 11 March 1875, Confidential; F.O.27/2267.
lyons to Derby, 14 June 1875, No. 488, Confidential, (seen by the Queen 
and Cabinet); F.O.27/2267.
Derby to lyons, 25 June 1875, No. 390; F. 0.146/Ï797. The original draft 
was amended by Derby, and the fair draft seen by the Queen and Prime 
Minister; F.0.27/2267.
lyons to Decazes, 26 June 1875; copy enclosed in lyons to Derby,
26 June 1875, No.522, F.O.27/2267.
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1
Treaty, but promised a separate "explanation" about French jurisdiction.
Early in July the Ratification Bill was passed without debate or
2
opposition. On the 8th Buffet, the acting Foreign Minister, gave a
written assurance that French jurisdiction over foreigners in Annam was
a purely temporary measure, and offered French good offices in the
3
negotiation of an Anglo-Annamese commercial treaty. Britain accepted
this as a formal undertaking, but made it clear that she still strongly
4
disapproved of the French Treaty. The British Ambassador even hinted
that France need not be surprised if in future Britain started to copy
5
French commercial policy in the Far East.
After ratifications had been exchanged at Hie on 26 August,
however, ,Britain took no further steps against either of the Treaties
of Saigon. She abandoned the idea of negotiating a commercial arrangement
6
with Annam, and appointed no consuls at the open ports. Her immediate 
reaction to the failure of her diplomacy was to write off Annam and Tongking
Lyons to Derby, 4 July 1875, Tel. ; F. 0. 27/2267.
In the temporary absence of Decazes.
Memorandum of 8 July (copy), enclosed in Lyons to Derby, 9 July 
1875, No.581, (seen by the Queen and Cabinet); F.O. 27/2267.
Lyons to Buffet, 26 August 1875; copy enclosed in Lyons to Derby,
26 August 1875, No. 730, F. 0. 27/2267.
Lyons to Derby, 5 July 1875, No.556; F.O.27/2267.
Vide draft reply from Salisbury to Minster /^rman Ambassador in Londor/, 
11 February 1879, regarding the British attitude to the French 
protectorate over Annam and the question of consular representation, 
/^-th annotations by Lyons to whom it had been sent as enclosure in 
Salisbury to lyons, 5 February 1879, No. 131, P.0.146/211]/; F.O.
64/948.
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as a lost cause. She then concentrated on inqproving her own commercial
prospects in the Far Bast by other means. In September 1876 she signed
the Chefoo Convention, which dealt fairly comprehensively with Anglo-
Chinese commercial relations. Several of its provisions show that
it was in some respects a direct reply to French policy. Section I,
for instance, was designed to promote trade with Yunnan from Burma.
But already by 1876 Britain was beginning to doubt whether France would
be able to monopolise the Touting market. Thus i/diile I-Chang and
Wuhu, on the Yangtse, and Wenchow, on the East China seaboard, were
opened to trade by Section III, so also was Wchol, almost on the frontier
between China and Tongking.
The opening of Pakhoi as a Treaty Port was symbolic of a
change in the British attitude towards the French position in Indo-China.
Britain very soon in fact became reconciled to the Saigon Treaties.
In the first place, China had denied the validity of treaties concluded
independently with France by a vassal state. She kept Yunnan closed to
all commerce from the Red River area. She also refused to recognise
1
French administration in Tongking. In practice this meant that she 
secretly encouraged disorder and banditry in Tongking while claiming that 
she alone had a right to suppress it. In the second place, the King of 
Annam failed to carry out his obligations. Although French Consuls were 
established at the open ports, according to Article XIII of the Political
1
Vide Chinese reply of 15 June 1875 to the French announcement of 
the exchange of ratifications of the Franco-Annamese Political Treaty, 
printed in C.B. Norman; Tongking, France in the Far East (London 1884), 
Appendix.
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Treaty, they were badly treated by the local authorities, and their
powers severely limited. French trade with Annam remained very small.
Contrary to the freedom of religion laid down by Article IX of the
Treaty, native (Christians suffered all kinds of persecution. In
Tongking, tariff barriers were erected along the Red River, and the
King of Annam gave his share of encouragement to the hordes of
freebooters who preyed on shipping both in the River and in the
1
difficult waters of the Gulf of Touting. Hardly any European vessels 
were able to sail up the River - only Chinese junks. Haiphong at its 
mouth had, in the early 'eighties, the desolate appearance of a town 
built quickly in the expectation of prosperity, but without the
bustle of commerce in its streets and harbour, almost subsiding into
2
the surrounding marshes. Thirdly, what trade there was with Tongking
seems to have fallen to British merchants - just as Pauncefote had
predicted in 1874. In 1880 about ninety-seven per cent, of Haiphong's
imports came from Hong Kong, thirty-five per cent, of the ships
entering the harbour being British and only five p ^  cent. French.
3
Nearly four-fifths of the exports went to Hong Kong. As late as 1886,
the French President-General of vdiat was by then the Annam-Tongking
protectorate complained that all the woollen cloth bought by the tonkinois
4
was of English or German origin, none of French manufacture. Taking the
3
4
Thompson; French Indo-China. op. cit., p. 65.
Vide contenç)orary travellers' accounts; e.jg. James G. Scott: France and 
Tongking. A Narrative of the Campaign of 1884 and the Occupation of 
Rirther India (London 1885),pp.212-5. and Alfred C^mingham: The French 
in Tonkin and South Œiina (Hong Kong 1902), p. 48.
Scott: France and Tongking. op. cit.. pp.215, seq.
M. Bert to the President of the Rheims Chamber of Commerce, 12 August 
1886, Board of Trade Journal. 1886, Vol.l.
Protectorate as a whole, the chief imports, cotton and building
materials, were not of French origin; eighty-five per cent, of the
cotton yarn imported came from Bombay, the rest frcMn England, and
cotton tissue came exclusively from Hong Kong. The original
differential duties in favour of goods coming from Saigon had for
the most part lapsed. French merchants at Annamese ports dealt almost
1
exclusively in luxury articles, such as wines and spirits.
4. BRITAIN AND THE TONGKING CAMPAIGNS OF 1882-5.
The con^arative failure of French administrative efforts 
in the Kingdom of liie vis-à-vis British commercial progress largely 
accounts for Britain's attitude towards the Red River caiï^igns of the 
'eighties. In official circles in London, the alarm and despondency that 
the Saigon Treaties had aroused had given way by 1882 to profound 
complacency over the actual political situation in Annam and Tongking.
The various warnings sent to the Government between 1879 and 1882 about 
impending French military action were received with almost complete 
indifference. In view of Annamese and Chinese resistance to French 
penetration, it seemed unlikely that even an avowed can^aign of conquest 
carried out on a large scale would result in anything more than a purely 
nominal subjugation of the region. Thus the Governor of Hong Kong 
assured the Colonial Secretary that in itself outright annexation by
2
France would have no adverse effect on the colony's trade with Tongking. 
In the early months of 1883 a large section of the English Press actually
1
Board of Trade Journal, 1887, Vol.III.
2
Sir J. Pope Henessy to Lord Kimberley (copy), Pte., 21 June 1882, 
enclosed in Granville to Lyons, 12 July 1882; F. 0,146/2430,
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welcomed French action in the belief tliat it would serve to open
up Tongking still further to British enterprise.
There was also a prevalent feeling on the British side
that the political issue had been decided years before, that since
Britain had ceased to contest the Saigon Treaties and had made no
attempt to regulate her own relations with Annam, it was impossible
for her to object to the enforcement of French rights granted by those
treaties. British intervention on behalf of China, the British Minister
v/arned the Chinese Grand Secretary, T/ould be scarcely conceivable in
1
these circumstances. Hence also Granville's remark, a propos
the French Assembly's vote in the autumn of 1881 of credits amounting
to more than two million francs for a Tongking expedition, that there
2
was "nothing to be done" about French plans. By 1882, Britain had 
long decided not to oppose these plans. So far as she was concerned, 
the tradition of French interest in that part of the Indo-Cliinese 
peninsula could be carried to its logical conclusion.
Britain's attitude towards the military campaigns themselves, 
however, was not that of an onlooker. %hen, by the end of 1882, it had 
become clear that the hostilities in the Red River delta, ostensibly a 
purely local issue between French adninistration and Black Flag’rebels, 
were widening into a state of undeclared war between France and China,
1
Sir T. Wade to Granville, 17 May 1882, No.22, Confidential; F.O. 17/895.
2
Minute by Granville on Macartney to Pauncefote, Pte,, 3 January, 1882;
F. 0. 27/2705.
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Britain ‘became vitally concerned in the progress and outcome of
the struggle* Franco-Ohinese hostilities were an ever-present menace
to neutral trade in the China Seas. Moreover, while a Chinese
victory would probably have affected adversely China's relations
with European Powers, it was to Britain's interest to remain on the
best possible terms with the Peking Government. These considerations
and the consequent development of British diplomacy have been analysed 
1
by Dr. Kiernan. One point needs emphasis, however: the fact that
Britain, while preserving a rigid neutrality, in reality desired a
French victory.
One reason was that Britain still wished to preserve
European solidarity in the Far East. She believed that although French
success would increase French colonial fervour and therefore the chances
of Anglo-French colonial friction in other parts of the world, it would
2
certainly be a "lesser evil" than a Chinese victory. For if China 
defeated France, her inevitable conviction of superiority over European 
Powers would materially affect foreign economic interests in China. 
Already in 1883 reports from the Treaty Ports showed that anti-foreign 
feeling had been stimulated by French difficulties in Tongking. An 
extract from the Hong Kong Press serves to illustrate the prevailing 
attitude of British merchants towards the war:
1
Kiernan: British Diplomacy in China, passim.
2
Vide Granville to Lyons (copy), Pte., 22 October 1883; G.D. 
29/203; and Granville to Lyons, 12 M ^ c h  1884; Lyons, II. 
p. 324.
224
"Vlfhatever difference of opinion there may be among 
foreigners in China witli regard to the rights of France 
in Tonquin, it is almost universally admitted that any 
serious defeat inflicted upon the French in Tonquin by 
the Chinese troops would prove unfortunate for foreign 
interests generally in China, as few of the Chinese 
mandarins in reality make any distinction between Westerns, 
and a slight success would inflate their conceit to 
something approaching the cracking point".I
This belief found expression in Britain's efforts towards mediation
in 1883, in which Granville constantly asked China to modify her
demands but never suggested corresponding concessions from France. A
conversation he had with Macartney, the Chinese representative, on
11 September^ provides a typical example of his approach. After advising
Macartney to lower his terms (French evacuation of Tongking and Chinese
suzerainty over Annam), he added: "After what has occurred, a great
power like France can scarcely be expected to retire without something
2
being accorded to her". British good offices took the form rather of 
an attempt to convince China that her views were inadmissable, than 
of a genuine search for a basis of agreement.
There was a subsidiary diplomatic reason for Britain's 
partiality for French interests. Whereas in 1874 Britain's friendship 
bad been far more important to France than that of France to Britain, 
by 1883 the European situation was completely changed. The growing 
Franco-German rapprochement made the Liberal Government anxious not
The Daily Press. Hong Kong, 24 December 1883; extract enclosed in 
Sir G.F. Bowen /Governor of Hong Kong/ to Derby (copy sent by C.O. 
to F. 0. ), 24 December 1883, No. 349; F.O. 27/2707.
Chinese Pro Memoria (copy), 22 September 1883, enclosed in Granville 
to Plunkett, 26 September 1883, No. 933; F. 0.146/2533.
to give Prance any unnecessary cause of complaint against British
policy - even at the expense of the continuance of a war creating
political uncertainty and therefore commercial stagnation in the
par East. The diplomatic situation helps to explain the accomodating
attitude Britain adopted towards Prance during the mediation talks in
1
the summer of 1683. General diplomatic considerations were probably
a more important factor in British policy than pre-occupation with
Egypt and the Sudan - which Perry, however, regarded as a providential
2
opportunity for decisive action in Tongking.
5. THE ESTABLISHMENT OF SPHERES OP INFLUENCE IN THE INDO-OHINBaB 
PENINSULA.
Britain's concern both for the maintenance of good relations 
with Prance and for her commerce with China shaped British policy 
during the Franco-Chinese war. It has also been seen how her 
acquiescence in the absorption of Annam and Tongking rested partly on 
French failure to secure an economic monopoly of these countries. 
Fundamentally, however, Britain's attitude towards French colonisation 
in this region derived from a renewed belief in the expediency of a 
division of influence in the Indo-Chinese peninsula. By the 'eighties, 
Britain no longer thought of Annam principally in relation to China and
Vide Granville to Lyons (copy), Pte., 3 July 1883, G.D.29/203;
Granville to Gladstone (copy), Pte,, 6 September 1883, G.D. 29/Ï27; 
Gladstone to Granville (copy), Pte,, 8 September 1883, B.M. Add. MS. 44646.
Ferry à Wadding ton, 12 decembre 1883; "Lettres incites de Jules Ferry 
à W.H. Waddington, " Revue d 'histoire diplomatique, juillet - 
septembre 1937.
399
the China Seas hat also in relation to the geographical region of
which Annam formed the eastern part. She was beginning to regard the
future of Annam in terms of a wider issue - the future of the vihole
Indo-Chinese peninsula. Exploration, the advance of commerce, and a
gradual realisation of the extent of French colonial ambitions, all
hastened the evolution of a 'regional' policy on Britain's part. The
basis of that policy was British preponderance in the west as the
price of Britain's assent to French colonisation of the east,
Indian interests had long made Britain detemined to prevent
any foreign influence replacing her own in %>per Burma. As early as
1876 the French Ambassador in London was convinced that ultimate
1
British occupation of the country was inevitable. On innumerable 
occasions from the early 'seventies onwards, whenever there were rumours 
of French negotiations with the Court of Ava, Britain always argued 
that the geographical position of Upper Burma in relation to India 
was sufficient justification for her to maintain a preponderant 
influence over the native government and to prevent any unilateral 
political or commercial agreements between %p e r  Burma and other Bowers. 
Several developments in the late 'seventies strengthened this policy.
The first was the growth of British economic interests in %p e r  Burma, 
in particular the investment of British capital in the teak forests 
and ruby mines and the development of commerce tlirough the operations 
of the Irrawaddy Flotilla Company, After 1878 the misrule of King Theebaw
1
D ' Bare our t à  Decazes, 27 juillet 1875; Affaires étrangères. 769.
yand the consequent potential danger to British entrepreneurs made
Britain increasingly aware of the extent of her economic commitments.
Until about 1883 she tended to regard them as the most important
1
special interest she had in Upper Burma. There was also the 
question of commercial access to south-west China to which Britain 
gave more serious attention after the Chefoo Convention of 1876.
The explorations of A.R. Colquhoun and Holt Hallett in the early 
'ei^ÿities and the subsequent publicity they gave to their project of 
a railway connection between British Burma and Yunnan aroused a good 
deal of interest in commercial circles in England and increased the 
Government's anxiety about the political situation in % p e r  Burma.
But the decisive factor in the annexation of 1886 was the apparent 
threat of French domination. In the early 'eighties Britain became 
alarmed at the persistence of French activities in the face of repeated
warnings, especially after the Franco-Burraese Agreement of 5 April 1884
2
which brought into effect an abortive commercial Treaty of 1873.
A further treaty of 15 January 1885 seemed to indicate that France
intended to do what she had so far failed to do via Touting - secure
3
an exclusive r i ^ t  to trans-frontier trade with China. By the summer
E.£. Government of India to Viscount Cranbrook (Secrs.tary of State 
for India), 17 OotoTaer 1878, K  and P.. ^ 8 6 / ,  L, /o.461^. No. 3, 
p. 3; ibid., 7 March 1879, ibid., No, 11, pp. 11 seq; Government of 
India to Secretary of State for India, 15 September 1882, No. 104, 
Secret, India Office Confidential Print, pp.19-20, enclosed in India 
Office to Foreign Office, 4 December 1885, F.O. 17/1059.
Vide Kimberley to Granville, Pte,, 7 August 1884; G. D. 29/L36.
India Office Memorandum, 19 February 1885, ^^specially pp. 99-10^, 
printed as Appendix G to Confidential Print on lft>per Burma, enclosed 
in India Office to Foreign Office, 4 December 1885; F.O. 17/1059.
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of 1885 Britain believed that French activities were not only
1
economic in motive, but were part of a "vast scheme of annexation"
in the Indo-Chinese peninsula. That the decision to annex Theebaw's
kingdom was the direct result of the fear of being forestalled is 
2
now well known.
INhether or not France had in fact been aiming at political 
ascendency in Upper Hirma is still uncertain. By September 1885, at 
any rate, she had abandoned any such intention, for, realising the 
nature of Britain's own plans, she seized her opportunity of obtaining 
territorial compensation in the east for vhat she was bound to lose in 
the west. She urged Britain to come to an agreement as to the two 
countries' future spheres of influence in the Indo-Chinese peninsula.
The British reaction to this proposal shows that a limited partition 
had become an axiom of British policy. Britain had accepted the 
Franco-Chinese Peace Treaty of June 1885 as a final political settlement - 
althou^ it was clear that France would have to continue the 'pacification' 
of Tongking for some years at least. So long as the French proposal 
meant simply French colonisation in the east and British in the north­
west, Britain was prepared to accept it. The French absorption of 
Tongking was the price she had to pay for her own preponderance in %per
Minute by Pauncefote on India Office to Foreign Office, 5 August 1885; 
p. 0.27/2728.
Vide B.R. Pearn; Buma Background (London 1943), and D.Gr.E. Halls 
Europe and Burma. A Study of European Relations with Burma to the 
Armexation of TTHbaw's Kingdom. 1886 (Oxford 1945).
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Burma, where her political interests, Salisbury claimed, were very
1
like those of France in Ttinis. But France was aiming at complete
partition* She wanted Britain to agree to a line of demarcation, so
that she would he free to absorb the eastern provinces of Siam. This
idea was inadmissable because for some years British policy had been
moving towards the conception of Siam as a buffer state. Hence Salisbury’s
counter-proposal of a ’self-denying ordinance’ regarding Siam. On
this point the tentative negotiations foundered, although for several
months the French Ambassador in London tried hard to make them something
2
more than an exchange of views.
In the next few years, however, Britain became more 
concerned with preventing French encroachments on Siamese territory
n
. than with maintaining the real indepedence of Siam. The views of
Randolph Churchill, the former Secretary of State for India, who had
opposed the suggestion of a self-denying ordinance on the ground that
5
British influence in Siam ought to be preponderant, now formed the basis 
of policy. Anglo-French rivalry intensified and culminated in the Mekong 
crisis of 1893. But afterwards a political equilibrium was maintained
Salisbury to lyons, 19 October 1885, No. 840; F. 0.146/2729. Waddington 
à Freycinet, 20 octobre 1885, no. 133, très confidentielle; Affaires 
étrangères, 812.
Waddington a Freycinet, prive^ e, 13 novembre 1885; Affaires e^ trangères, 813 
Salisbury to lyons (draft), 20 November 1885, No. 912; F. 0.17/l059. 
Waddington k Freycinet, 20 février 1886, no.27, confidentielle;
Affaires étrangères* 814. Waddington a Freycinet, 18 mai 1886, 
telegramme, confidentielle; Affaires étrangères, 816.
India Office to Foreign Office, 8 October 1885; P. 0.27/2779.
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with comparatively little difficulty, so far as Britain and France 
were concerned. A division of influence in the Indo-Chinese peninsula 
had in effect been accomplished without formal recognition.
The British attitude towards French colonisation had been 
shaped both by commercial considerations with regard to the China 
trade and in accordance with Indian interests. The views of British 
colonial communities in the Far East have been hardly mentioned. This 
is because the Government’s accumulated experience in Far Eastern 
affairs meant that hong Kong and the Straits Settlements made few 
original contributions to the formulation of policy. They acted largely 
as interpreters of the broad economic and strategic issues in the light 
of local interests.
In the ’eighties British colonies with responsible 
government could, however, exercise a considerable influence on the 
decisions of the home Government with regard to imperial questions. The 
role of the Australasian Colonies in Anglo-French colonial relations 
will be discussed in the next chapter.
393
C H A P T E R  VI.
Tm AUSTRALIAN ELEMENT IN BRITISH POLICY;
Britain and France in the Pacific, 1875 - 1888,
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In one of these speeches on the growth of Empire that were 
so frequently made in the late 'eighties, Rosebery declared:
”A very great change has come over the whole of our 
foreign policy in the last twenty years... Our foreign 
policy has become more of a colonial policy, and is 
becoming every day more entwined with our colonial interests 
than has ever been the case before. Formerly our foreign 
policy was mainly an Indian policy: it was mainly guided 
by considerations of what was best for our Indian Empire” 
but now ”the colonial influence must necessarily overshadow 
our foreign policy. In the first place, our colonial 
communities are rising to a pitch of power and influence 
which makes it natural for us to listen to them whenever 
they make representations on their ovm behalf.,. In the 
next place, we find that the other Powers are beginning a 
career of^colonial aggrandizement. We formerly should not 
have /Ead/ in our foreign affairs to trouble ourselves with 
colonial questions, because we had a monopoly of colonies.
That monopoly has ceased”.^
This was a perceptive analysis, characteristic of the man, 
British imperial policy in relation to that of other Powers was indeed 
influenced in the 'ei^ties, to a degree previously unknown, by the 
existence of Responsible Government in British colonies. It happened 
in 1884-5 over Germany's 'first bid for colonies’ in Angra Pequena, when 
the views of Cape Colony on external affairs made their wei^t felt in 
London. To a far greater extent it happened over Anglo-French relations 
in the Pacific. The inflexible determination of the Australasian 
Colonies that the south-western Pacific should be reserved for Britain 
alone, meant that French attempts at colonisation in that area created 
a diplomatic problem for the home government out of all proportion to
1
"Commerce and Empire”, delivered to the Leeds Chamber of Commerce,
11 October 1888; Lord Rosebery's Speeches (1874 - 1896), (London 1896),
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the value of the islands concerned. Britain became involved in 
negotiations with France -which at every stage were influenced, often 
retarded emd impeded, and rarely assisted, by Australian views. From 
the late ’seventies to 1887, these negotiations remained a source of 
irritation in Anglo-French relations. Disagreement over the Western 
Pacific helped to alienate the two countries diplomatically.
Rosebery mi^t have added to his analysis of the change in 
British foreign policy a third factor - the changing attitude of Britain 
towards imperial development as she moved from partial renunciation to 
acceptance of colonial responsibilities. Though the imperialist 
outlook was to some degree a reply to the overseas enterprise of other 
nations and was fostered by the increasingly importunate demands of the 
British colonial communities, it was also an indigenous growth. In the 
Pacific, Britain was at first driven somevhat unwillingly into a 
policy of opposition to France by the pressure of Australian opinion, 
but later became increasingly inclined to.be guided by the new concept 
of her imperial interests, even at the expense of estranging France.
Despite its importance both in diplomatic and colonial his tory, 
the British attitude to French colonial enterprise in the Pacific during 
the ’eighties has been little studied. This is surprising since a great 
deal of evidence, both on British policy and on public opinion at home 
and in Australia, is to be found in published sources alone. Considerable 
publicity was given to the Anglo-French negotiations, particularly after 
1883 when public interest in the Pacific had been aroused on both sides 
of the Channel, Tbe British and French Governments alike occasionally 
communicated ambassadorial Notes and other relevant diplomatic
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documents to the Press, and in The Times statements made at meetings 
between English Ministers and Australasian representatives were 
often published at length. In Parliament there were several notable 
debates on British policy and frequent questions as to the progress 
of the negotiations and as to the Government’s attitude towards 
French activities. A series of very full Blue Books containing a 
large proportion of the correspondence on the Pacific between London 
and Paris and between London and the Australasian capitals was published 
between 1885 and 1888. A Livre Jaune on the negotiations appeared in 
1887.
In the ’eighties, it was France, not Germany, with whom
Britain was most at odds in the Ib.cific. Yet diplomatic historians
1
have either ignored tlie Anglo-French negotiations altogether, or
tended to regard the comparatively brief Anglo-German difficulties over
New Guinea as of greater importance in international relations. Apart
2
from writers who were contemporaries to the events they described, only 
colonial historians have given any account of Anglo-French relations in
1
E.£. Langer: European Alliances and Alignments.
2
Notably two prominent advocates of French colonial expansion, the 
député Paul Deschanel who wrote La politique française en Océanie a  ^
propos du canal de Panama (1884) and Les intérêts français dans 1 ’ocean 
Pacifique (1888), and the economist and journalist J. L. de Lanessan 
who wrote L ’expansion coloniale de la France (1886).
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1
the pacific after 1875, and then merely in outline. There has been 
no analysis of the effect of the negotiations on Britain’s relations 
with France, nor has it ever been made clear what the British attitude 
really was towards French colonisation in the Pacific.
1. THE ANGLO-FRSNOII PACIFIC NEGOTIATIONS. 1879 - 1887.
That the problem of the Pacific in Anglo-French relations 
continued for so long is in itself a measure of its difficulty. No 
less than six separate issues entered the main stream of negotiation 
at different stages. Two of these were unrelated to the Pacific and were 
brought in for bargaining purposes: first, the îfewfoundland ’French Shore ’ 
dispute, and later, the projected Suez Canal Convention of 1886. The 
juxtaposition of distinct questions and their association with two 
non-colonial issues with wider economic and diplomatic implications 
increased the existing difficulty of reaching any agreement. Only in 
1887, when the settlement of several problems had been abandoned and 
two purely territorial issues remained, was it possible to come to terns.
1
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The negotiations began in September 1879, after France proposed
to extend the protectorate she had established in 1843 over Tahiti to
tne Leeward group of the Society Islands, and suggested that the Anglo-
French Convention of 1847 recognising the independence of this group
should be abrogated. The Foreign Secretary's first reaction to this
proposal was favourable, but Salisbury soon decided that British
compliance should be granted only at the cost of a settlement on other
overseas issues. It was therefore agreed that the 1847 Convention
should stand until the perennial Newfoundland dispute had been settled.
In April 1880, hov/ever, the French declared a provisional protectorate
1
over Raiatea, the principal island in the Leeward group. Thus a new 
urgency was given to the negotiations, now being conducted with (k*anvillc 
in office.
VVhile discussions were going on, a fresh problem arose. In 
February 1882 a Bill was put before the Chamber of Deputies providing 
for the transportation of habitual criminals, or 'récidivistes*, to 
New Caledonia in the Western Pacific, among other French colonies.
Since the early 'seventies, the use of this colony as a penal settlement 
and the frequent appearance of escaped convicts in the Australasian 
Colonies had created difficulties between London and Paris. On numerous 
occasions Britain had acted on behalf of her Colonies in asking France 
to guard the settlement more effectively. The Récidiviste Bill produced 
immediate protests from Australia, and from 1883 onwards Britain
1
Vide map VI.
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constantly appealed to France to omit New Caledonia from the provisions 
of the Bill, hut without success.
The récidivistes question became much more serious when 
it looked as if France also intended to send convicts to the New Hebrides, 
for the independence of this group of islands north-east of New Caledonia 
had hitherto been preserved and in fact had been laid down in an Anglo- 
French understanding of 1878. By i^ril 1883 it was knovm that the New 
Hebrides were not after all to be included in the Récidivistes Bill, and 
in July the 1878 agreement was re-affirmed in London. Since 1882, 
however, a French firm had been buying land in the islands, and the 
New Caledonian authorities were openly in favour of the annexation of 
the New Hebrides to France, At the same time, Britain was being urged 
to annex the group herself. For many years the Anglican missionaries 
who had been the pioneers of European enterprise in the islands had 
agitated for formal British protection, and by 1882 they had gathered 
strong public support in Australia and to a lesser degree in England.
Their cause was strengthened by economic interests, particularly those 
of the Queensland sugar planters,-who were largely dependent on native 
labour recruited in the New Hebrides. In December 1883, the British 
Government became aware for the first time of the strength of annexàtionist 
opinion. In that month the Australasian Inter-Colonial Conference 
(representing all the Australasian Colonies, including Fiji and 
New Zealand) met at Sydney. Besides passing a resolution advocating 
the immediate annexation of New Guinea, it enunciated a new Monroe 
Doctrine to the effect that no European Power apart from Britain should 
be allowed to acquire any area in the Pacific south of the Equator.
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#iile Britain was resisting colonial demands for the 
annexation of the New Hebrides and other Western facific islands and trying 
to reach some agreement Y/ith France over the New Caledonian récidivistes 
question, negotiations were going on in Paris about Newfoundland and 
the Pacific Leeward Islands. A preliminary agreement was signed in 
April 1884, but Britain soon decided that she had been too generous 
in consenting to recognise the French position in Raiatea. In December 
the British commissioners therefore proposed that France should hand 
over to Britain the island of Rapa in the Southern Pacific. The 
ostensible reason for this new demand was that the Newfoundland 
legislature wanted the ^prll agreement modified, and that Britain could 
not override the Colony’s wishes without securing a concession elsewhere.
At once, the French seized the opportunity of asking for the New 
Hebrides in return. But the British refhsed to agree to an arrangement 
on this basis. In June 1886 the French offered satisfaction over the 
New Caledonian récidivistes question as an inducement. The Récidivistes 
Bill had become law in May. The French proposal hung fire, however, 
for Salisbury, who was now Foreign Secretary again, had no desire to 
forego a settlement over Newfoundland for the sake of providing a 
possible counterweight to the French position in Raiatea, nor to confuse 
the straightforward Newfoundland - Leewards bargain with the more 
difficult Western Pacific issue in Yhich Australian interests were so 
deeply involved. By temporarily abandoning Rapa, he secured a new 
agreement over Newfoundland and the Leeward Islands in November.
By this time it had become clear that the Australians would 
never agree to the New Hebrides - New Caledonian récidivistes bargain.
401.
unless an iinportsint quid pro quo were obtained. The cession of 
Rapa was therefore broached again in January 1886, as the price of 
Britain’s acceptance of the French proposal, although there was only 
a slight hope of the Colonies* agreeing to a French acquisition of the 
NSW Hebrides on this basis. But France was no longer prepared to 
cede Rapa. Making a last appeal to the spirit of conpromise, however, 
she offered to postpone transportation to New Caledonia until the 
Australian reaction to her original proposal was known. But the 
Colonial governments refused to be drawn into sanctioning French 
expansion, find in July Britain formally rejected the proposed arrangement, 
The situation which faced Rosebery in the summer of 1886 
was tense, -^ n l\feiy the Newfoundland legislature had rejected the Anglo- 
French agreement signed the previous November. In June France had 
occupied the New Hebrides on the pretext of restoring order after the 
alleged murder of several Frenchmen by the natives. On 13 June it was 
announced in the Chamber of Deputies that récidivistes were about to 
be sent to New Cfiledonifiu Since France was not now prepared to give 
way over the récidivistes problem nor over Rapa, the idea gained ground 
in London that the remaining questions of Newfoundland, of the Pacific 
Leeward Islands, and of the New Hebrides, might be brought together in 
a comprehensive settlement. The New Hebrides constituted far the most 
pressing problem, find Britain agreed to discuss the French suggestion 
of a joint administrative commission - with the proviso that France 
should withdraw her troops. An agreement seemed in sight, for it was 
understood that Britain would recognise the French protectorate over the 
Leeward Islands (to which she hfiid never had any major objection) as soon
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as arrangements for the New Bsbrides Commission had been completed. The 
subject of Newfoundland was deliberately dropped.
For a year, however, the negotiations dragged on. The French 
refused to make progress in the Pacific discussions unless the question 
of the New Hebrides was discussed side by side with that of the Suez Canal 
Convention, over Ydiich they hoped for concessions from Britain, and the 
British were equally determined to carry out their policy with regard to 
the Convention without being manoeuvred into accepting the French 
occupation of the New Hsbrides. By the autumn of 1687 there was a complete 
deadlock. Both Salisbury and the French Ambassador (Waddington) began to 
realise the importance of disassociating two entirely distinct questions.
In October an Agreement was finally signed, after private discussions 
between Salisbury and Flourens, the French Foreign Minister. France 
promised to evacuate the New Hebrides by May 1888, when an Anglo-French 
condominium was to be established, and at the same time the 1847 Convention 
recognising the independence of the Leeward Islands was abrogated.
So much for the general course of the negotiations. As 
regards the Pacific, Britain was faced with three problems: transportation 
to New Caledonia, the future of the New Hebrides, and the French position 
in the Leeward Islands. Her attitude towards these questions needs 
elucidation.
2. THE PROBLEMS AT ISSUS.
i) The penal settlement in New Caledonia.
In a sense, the New Caledonian récidivistes problem was not 
new to the British Government in 1882. Although the decision to expel
403.
from France the particular class of person known as a ’habitual
criminal* was a new departure in French judicial policy, the convict
settlement in New Caledonia had existed since 1864, and the Australians
had always strongly disapproved of it, (They also resented the French 
0
being there at all, the New Zealand government having in vain tried
to interest Britain in annexing the island in the early ’fifties).
Napoleon Ill’s use of the colony he had acquired in 1863 as a dumping
ground for prisoners from his Algerian canpaigns and subsequently for
ordinary convicts, touched colonial opinion at an extremely sensitive
point. For years the Australian governments had been struggling to
get rid of the remnants of Britain’s own transportation system.
During the ’fifties and ’sixties legislation had been passed designed
to force ex-convicts to leave Australian territory. The British
government had at first refused to assent to these acts, but after a
few years decided against further resistance, although in at least
1
one case the prerogative of the Crown had been infringed. Later they 
agreed to stop transportation to Western Australia - the only colony 
where the system still continued. The concession thus made to colonial 
opinion established a precedent for the case of escaped convicts from 
New Caledonia.
During the ’sixties, the French penal settlement hardly
entered Anglo-French relations. By 1871 only about three convicts had
2
managed to escape to British territory. After the Franco-Erussian War,
1
The New Zealand Act of 1864 against the ’’diffusion of convicts”. It 
applied not only to escaped convicts but to holders of conditional or 
free pardons granted by the Crown.
o
Many others were probably drowned before reaching land.
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however, the news that thousands of ex-Ooimnunards were to he sent to
1
New Caledonia aroused some concern in London. As usual the colonial
governments were quick to express their, opinion. Paced with their
2
adverse criticism of the French plan, the Colonial Office advised the
Foreign Secretary to ask the French Government for an assurance that
every precaution against escapes would he taken. Satisfaction was
given readily. This was as far as Granville would go in presenting
the colonial case.
The special stand made over the communards was largely due
to the fear, common in orthodox political circles after 1871 - in the
Antipodes no less than in Englaxid, of the spread of revolutionary 
3
principles. In both the British and Australian Press the Commune was 
usually equated with Red Revolution. When Henri de Rochefort and other 
leaders of the Commune escaped from New Caledonia in March 1874, a cartoon 
appeared in the Melbourne Rinch which throws considerable light on the 
official Australian attitude. The cartoon was primarily an attack on 
a prominent politician in Victoria, George Higinbotham, who advocated
Vide C. 0. minutes on Agent-General for Victoria to Colonial Office,
8 June 1871; C.O. 309/102.
E.£. Agent-General for Victoria to Colonial Office, o June 1871, 
and Agent-General for New South Wales to Colonial Office (^.e, to 
Permanent Under-Secretary), Pte., 8 June 1871, /requesting an interview 
with the Secretary of State to discuss the French plan/; C. 0. 309/102.
Vide C.O. Memo by Mercer, 16 October 1883, on "Attitude of Australian 
Colonies with regard to Convicts", C.O. Confidential Print,
Australian 96; C.O. 808/46.
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greater independence from the mother country, and depicted him
addressing a meeting with the gigantic figure of "communism” as a
petroleuse behind him, -çdiile Rochefort, the "distinguished communist",
1
looked on approvingly. Though crudely expressed, the assunptions
of the cartoonist were fundamentally the same as those which inspired
Australian appeals to Britain to stop the transportation of 
2
communards.
Although Britain had asked France for safeguards over
the new influx of deportees to New Caledonia, she was not ready
to make the Australian case against French transportation her own.
It became clear sifter Rochefort’s escape that ^«hat was wanted,
3
particularly by the Victorian government, who usually took the lead
in Australian external affairs, was not so much an extradition treaty
with France to cover escaped political prisoners - with which some of
the Colonies might have been content - but the cessation of all
transportation to the Pacific. The latter solution was an obvious
4
diplomatic impossibility. A special extradition treaty was equally
1
Enclosure in Sir C. Bowen governor of Victori^ to Carnarvon, 
Pte., 20 April 1874; G>IX 6/25.
2
Yet Rochefort was impressed by the sympathetic reception he was 
given by the ordinary public when he reached Sydney.
3
Bowen to Carnarvon, 20 ^ r i l  1874, No. 33; C. 0. 309/112,
4
Vide P.O. to C. 0., 23 July 1874, and Carnarvon to Bowen (draft), 
28 July 1874; C. 0. 309/112.
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out of the question, for it was "not... in accordance with well-
1
established principles to give up political offenders. " There had
been desultory Anglo-French negotiations to extend the provisions
of the 1843 Extradition Convention to cover French deportees’, but
2
not those convicted of political offences alone.
At first the British government was inclined to question
the validity of some of the arguments against French transportation
put before them. The Iferraanent Under-Secretary to the Colonial
Office, for example, suspected that the colonists were not really
3
so averse to escaped convicts as their governments alleged. But
Rochefort’s escape was not an isolated case, and by about 1877 the
Colonial Office no longer doubted that the proximity of the penal
4
settlement was in fact "a nuisance" to the Australians. Whenever 
convicts were known to have landed in Australia or New Zealand, Britain 
felt bound to make some kind of representation to France. The matter 
was aggravated by the colonial governments’ frequent refusal to extradite 
the escaped men for the New Caledonian authorities, hoping by this means 
to force an issue between Britain and France. Convicts who had served 
their term of imprisonment also made their way to Australasian ports.
1
C.O. minute, endorsed by Carnarvon, on F. 0, to G. 0., 26 June 1874, 
Confidential; C.O. 201/678.
2
P.O. to C.O., 23 July 1874; C.O. 309/112.
3
Minute by Herbert on P.O. to C. 0., 26 June 1874, Confidential;
C.O. 201/578.
4
Minute by Herbert, 13 January 1877, on Sir W. W. Cairns /povernor of 
Queensland to Carnarvon, 30 October 1876, No.84; C.O. 234/36
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and although the ^ French Foreign Minister gave a formal undertaking
to prevent this, a number of libérés subsequently arrived in
Auckland, their passages actually paid for by the French authorities 
2
in Noumea. After this episode the British became much more
3
sympathetic to the colonial point of view. In 1880, Kimberley, the
new Colonial Secretary, felt that everything possible had to be done
4
"to protect our colonies".
The penal settlement had created an awkward problem for
the Colonial Office, On the one hand, the Australians and New Zealanders
clearly had grounds for complaint. On the other hand, the French
Foreign Minister’s retort that the colonists had refused extradition
5
for escaped convicts, when he was approached about the libérés, seemed
6
reasonable enough. And although repeated remonstrances in Paris 
produced only a promise that libérés would not be given free passages
1
Deoazes to Lyons (copy), 13 February 1877, enclosed in P. 0. to C. 0., ' 
19 February 1877; C. 0. 234/37.
2
0. 0. to P. 0., 23 February 1880; P. 0. 27/2720.
3
B.£j. Herbert’s minute on Agent-General for New Zealand to Herbert, 
pte., 23 February 1880; "the colonists exaggerate the gravity of this 
evil, but it is a question on which popular opinion is much inflamed 
and the New Zealand Government cannot afford to treat the matter 
lightly"; C.O. 209/239.
4
Minute by Kimberley on Sir H. Robinson /governor of New Zealan^ to 
Hicks-Beach, 9 March 1880, No. 10; C. 0. 209/239.
5
Freycinet to Lyons (copy), 9 April 1880, enclosed in P.O. to C.O.,
15 April 1880; C.O. 201/593.
6
Minute by Meade on Freycinet to Lyons, supra.
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to British territory Yiiile nothing could be done about those who went
1
at their own expense, Kimberley thougkit that France had gone as far
2
as could be expected. Nevertheless the Colonial Office frowned on 
the unwillingness of the Foreign Office to discover arguments against 
the French making whatever use they pleased of their own territory.
As over most other colonial questions in the early ’eighties,
the two departments of state were far from having a common outlook on
the New Caledonian problem. The diverge#mce between them was clearly
revealed over the Extradition Bill put forward by Queensland in 1881 with
the object of deterring French convicts from landing in that colony.
Although both departments and the Law Officers of the Crown agreed that
3
the Bill went too far, the Colonial Office felt that
"there would be very serious objections to assent being 
refused in the case of a Colony under Responsible 
Government to an enactment, which is within the functions 
and powers of the Colonial Legislature, on the ground 
that its provisions may possibly be unpleasing to 
Foreign Powers". ^
Freycinet to Lyons (copy), 9 July 1880, enclosed in Lyons to Granville, 
15 July 1880, No. 605; P. 0. 27/2720.
Minute by Kimberley on F. 0. to C. 0., 19 July 1880, enclosing Lyons 
to Granville (copy), 15 July 1880, No. 605, with enclosure; C.O. 209/239.
F. 0. to C. 0, , 11 May 1881; Law Officers to C. 0., 12 July 1881, with 
C. 0. minutes; Law Officers to C. 0., 18 July 1881; C. 0. 234/41. The Bill 
covered ex-convicts who had been convicted of political offences as well 
as British subjects convicted of petty crimes, and made the captain of 
a foreign ship liable to conviction for bringing prohibited classes of 
criminals to Queensland, unless he could prove his ignorance of the 
status of such passengers. It also provided for the punishment of 
ex-convicts by three years* imprisonment with hard labour if convicted 
within three years of their arrival in Australia of any offence.
0.0. to P.O., 26 November 1881; P.O. 27/2720.
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At the Foreign Office, however, Paunoefote, as a legal expert, pointed
out that one of the most important objects of the right to withhold
the royal assent from such a bill was to guard against "Colonial Laws
1
which might embroil the Imperial Government with Foreign Powers".
Although the Bill’s most objectionable clauses regarding foreign
convicts had been removed by 1882, the royal assent was still withheld.
It was at this point that the Récidivistes Bill was put
before the Chamber of Deputies. Granville probably did not fully realise
its implications at first, since only after an enquiry from the
Colonial Office did he ask for information about it from the British
2
Ambassador in Paris. But his complacency was short lived. During
the next year, the Australian governments started to protest vehemently
against the threatened increase in the convict population of new
Caledonia and the prospect of even more frequent appearances of escaped
or liberated deportees in British territory. In response to the Colonial
Secretary’s request, Granville asked repeatedly for assurances from
Paris, which were given, that the penal settlement would be closely
guarded. But when it became known in the summer of 1883 that the New
Caledonian authorities were refusing to ask for extradition in a fresh
3
case of escaped convicts, the Colonial Office redoubled their efforts
1
Marginal note by Pauncefote on C.O. to P.O., 26 November 1881;
P.O. 27/2720.
2
P.O. to C.O. (draft), 27 March 1882; P.O. 27/2720.g
Agent-General for Queensland to Derby, 26 July 1883; ^  and P. , ^ 8 8 ^ ,  
X m i ,  ^.3814/, No. 23.
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1
on behalf of the Colonies, and later pressed for the complete exclusion
2
of New Caledonia from the Récidivistes Bill, According to their
information,at least two hundred and forty-seven French deportees had
3
landed in the Australian Colonies since 1873. Derby himself was
concerned with wider issues, seeing beyond the effects of the Bill on
Colonial opinion to the diplomatic danger of trying to prevent it.
Like the Foreign Office a few years back, he doubted whether Britain
4
had any right to object to the French transportation system. Bit a 
decade of continual difficulties over Tfew Caledonia meant that his 
views carried little weight with the permanent officials of his own 
Ministry. He had after all been Colonial Secretary for little more 
than a year.
During the summer of 1883 Granville had become much more 
prepared to follow Colonial Office advice. When Lyons was in London 
in the autumn, the Foreign Secretary asked him to act vigorously on 
the instructions he was shortly to receive about the Récidivistes Bill,
Herbert, in a minute on Agent-General for Queensland to Derby, 26 July 
1883, said the matter was "extremely serious"; C.O. 254/43. As Ashley 
pointed out in another minute (31 July 1883), the Queensland Extradition 
Bill still had not received the royal assent.
C.O. to P.O., 5 December 1883; ^  and P.. ^ 6 6 ^ ,  XLVll, ^  3814/, No. 69.
C.O. to P.O., 15 December 1883; A. and P.. ^ 8 8 ^ ,  XLVll, /C. 3 8 1 ^  No. 82.
Derby’s minute on P.O. Confidential Print 4868 (Memo, on "'Transportation 
of French Convicts to New Caledoro.a and the Fh.cific", 6 October 1883) ;
C. 0. 234/43.
Granville to Childers (copy in Sanderson’s hand), Pte., 6 October 1883;
G.D. 29/118.
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although the French Government were "not,.. a pleasant body to deal 
1
with". This was a very different attitude to that of his immediate 
predecessors, who had consistently acted as a brake on the Colonial 
Office when colonial policy involved Britain’s relationsliip to other 
powers. Miereas Salisbury had tended to judge colonial questions 
according to diplomatic requirements, Granville believed now more than 
ever that all problems should be considered on the merits of the 
individual case, his outlook reflected a new enthusiasm for imperial 
interests - the same enthusiasm that sanctioned the Oil Rivers 
Protectorate in West Africa - and also a tendency to disregard diplomatic 
considerations in all but the most dangerous and difficult overseas 
questions, such as Egypt. As regards Pacific affairs, his approach 
bore witness to the change which came over the whole content of British 
policy in 1883 - of the growing consciousness that imperial issues, 
unlike purely European, had to be solved in accordance with their 
intrinsic importance rather than with regard to diplomatic relations.
The change was due partly to the Liberal government’s 
experience of European expansion since 1880. It had become obvious that 
French colonisation was a force to be reckoned with in international 
affairs, and that British policy would have to be adjusted in some way.
By 1883 the overseas conflicts of interest between Britain and France 
had reached a scale unparalleled in diversity and intensity since the 
beginning of the nineteenth century. In the b'acific, there were signs
1
Granville to Derby (copy), Pte., 6 October 1883; GkD. 29/120.
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that Germany, too, would be a participant in the coming international
struggle for influence.
But Britain’s new willingness to reconsider her policy
towards imperial development was also due, in the case of the Ricific,
to the pressure of colonial opinion. Responsible government made it
impossible for her to ignore the openly-expressed antagonism of the
Australian Colonies to French activities, where such activities genuinely
conflicted with colonial interests and were not merely a target for
xenophobia. There were,moreover, two factors which increased the influence
of the Australian governments on decisions made in London far beyond
anything previously known, and tlms forced Britain not merely to consider
colonial views and to act upon them when she thought fit, but to a certain
extent to frame her policy in accordance with them. In this way, the
resistance of the more conservative members of the Cabinet - Gladstone
in particular - to arguments in favour of preventive action against
foreign colonisation was nullified. The .Prime Minister himself realised
his loss of control: "I for my part", he confided in the Foreign Secretary,
"do not mean to be bullied by /the Colonie^, but I am not sure that
1
all our colleagues are altogether so like-minded". One factor was the 
Imperial Federation movement. This aimed, among other things, at closer 
co-operation in imperial defence both between the Colonies and with 
the mother country. There was nothing new or startling in that; the need 
had been spasmodicsilly recognised in England for several decades. But
1
Gladstone to Granville, 29 January 1886; quoted by W.C. Aydelotte: 
Bismarck and British Colonial Policy (Philadelphia 1937).
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the movement was also sympfe^ ?is^ tic of a desire for control over
British policy vis-a-vis other nations in the Pacific. The Australian
governments* attempts at an integrated external policy, as the former
Governor-General of Canada acknowledged in his hook on the Federation
movement published in 1885, were "brought about by the threatening
1
attitude assumed by France and Germany". The Australians were
"loyal yet angry" with Britain for her "pusillanimous" attitude
2
towards the colonial enterprise of these countries. Even in 1883 
the Government was aware that the movement was largely the colonial 
reply to what was regarded as Britain’s neglect of her imperial 
interests* There had already been a dangerous clash between the policy 
of Whitehall and that of the Colonies in the Spring over the provisional 
annexation of part of New Guinea by Queensland (prompted still by the 
fear of being forestalled by France rather than by Germany), which 
the imperial government had vetoed on the score of expense. In December 
the Australasian Inter-Colonial Conference voted in favour of the 
establishment of a federal council to co-ordinate Colonial policy on 
the Western Pacific. Uie ahnosphere in which the resolution was passed • 
the strong condemnation of Britain's failure to annex New Guinea and 
other island groups in that area - made it obvious that such a council 
would eventually have sought to supersede rather than to supplement the 
authority of the British High Commission for the Western Pacific set up
1
The Marquis of Lome; Imperial Federation (London 1885), p.88.
2
Ibid., p. 103.
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in 1875. In this respect, federation was merely an alternative to
another solution to the problem of Australian participation in British
policy, a solution that had been hinted at in radical political
groups in the Colonies for more than a decade - separation frcm Britain.
"Let us face the inevitable fact", said a British speaker at the
International Colonial Exhibition in Amsterdam, "that at a certain
stage of their growth, self-governing dependences, like those of Great
Britain, must either federate or disintegrate". The New Guinea affair
had made the Liberals conscious of the danger that the Australian
Colonies might be tempted to break away from the mother country if
their dissatisfaction with Britisli policy took permanent root.
The Colonial Secretary, as the particular object of their criticism,
was naturally most concerned with the danger. "I do not think we can
long resist doing something more than we have done as to New Guinea,"
he told the Prime Minister. , "I cannot altogether avoid the suspicion
that there is a wish on the part of the Australian politicians to pick
a quarrel - or at least to assert their independence of the mother 
2
country." In replying to Opposition criticism of the Government's 
policy during the debate in the House of Lords on 2 July, he had denied 
that the Australasian governments were free to initiate a foreign policy
Frederick Young; On the Political Relations of Mother Countries and 
Colonies. A Paper read at the ''Conférences et CongrVs*""ScientjJTlc^s" 
of the "Exposition Internationale Coloniale et d 'Exportation Générale" 
at Amsterdam, September 19, 1883 (London 1883), p. 18. — — —
Derby to Gladstone, 13 September 1883; B.M. Add. MS. 44141.
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of their own, but at the same time he had recognised the position of tine
1
Agents-General of the self-governing colonies as being "quasi-diplomatic".
Later, when he knew of the ’Monroe Doctrine for the South Pacific*
propounded by the Australasian Inter-Colonial Conference and of the
specific resolution passed in favour of the annexation of New Guinea,
he argued the necessity of a British protectorate to put an end to the
2
fear of a French occupation; "we could not as matters stand allow any
other state to seize a part of tlie island; the Australians would
3
threaten secession if we did". In 1884 the danger of separation was
4
underlined by the temporary eclipse of the Federation scheme owing to 
inter-colonial jealousies and the Government's opposition to it on 
financial grounds. Childers, the Chancellor of the Exchequer, put the 
case forcefully to the Prime Minister over two of the most pressing 
problems of the Western Ihcific - the possibility of French territorial 
expansion from New Caledonia to the New Hebrides, and the more recent 
threat of a German occupation of New Guinea. "Unless these two questions 
are satisfactorily settled before long," he warned Gladstone, "we shall 
be involved in serious difficulties (perhaps resulting in separation)
1
Parliamentary Debates,Tkiird Series, vol, CGLXXXL, col, 14.
2
Derby to Gladstone, 7 December 1883; B.M. Add. MS, 44142,
3
Ibid; quoted by Aydelotte; Bismarck and British Colonial Policy, 
op, cit.
4
Vide minute by Ashley on a Parliamentary question by Ashmead-Bartie11 
on 22 ^r i l  1884; C, 0. 225/16.
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1
with the Eastern Australian Colonies”, (Childers could speak with
authority on colonial opinion, having kept in close touch with
Australia since his political career in Victoria, where he had heen
a member of the colony's first Cabinet, and his subsequent return to
England as Agent-General for Victoria in 1857. he was the cliampion
of Australian interests in Gladstone's Cabinet; as he admitted, his
'old friends and brother Colonists rather looked to him to say a word 
2
for them'. ) He went on to explain v/hy the Australians might 
reluctantly choose separation as the lesser of two evils:
"There is no desire on their part to quarrel with, 
still less to separate from, the Mother Country, But 
v/ithout distinction of party, and if possible the 
Conservative and Propertied classes feel more strongly 
on this subject than the more democratic party, all 
Colonists are alarmed at the probability of Foreign States 
occupying territory or islands in the South Seas where 
the trade is now almost exclusively in Australian hands, 
and above all things they are alarmed at any extension of 
French influence, i.e. further French penal settlements.
The French are not Colonists and as mere Traders their 
rivalry is of no account. But they appear determined to 
export to this part of the world their enormous and growing 
Convict population (the percentage of French crime is 3 or 
4 times ours) and the Australians will not stand this course. 
The Convicts can only exist where wages are to be got, i.e. 
among the 3,000,000 Englishmen in our Colonies,
The fear of German occupation of places in the 
neighbourhood of our Colonies is not so great, but after 
Prince Bismarck's recent speeches it is not unreasonable.
What the Australians say, and with, in my opinion, absolute 
truth, is that in a few years the natural development of their 
South Sea trade will lead to their occupation of all the 
available points on the Coasts of New Guinea beyond what is
1
Childers to Gladstone, 10 July /%64]7; B.M, Add, M.S, 44131.
2
Childers to Gladstone, 3 December 1884; B.M. Add, MS. 44131,
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considered Dutch and the neighbouring islands of the 
South Western Pacific; and that if we hesitate and other 
nations step in, serious troubles must ensue.
This is the language of reasonable men. A certain 
number of unreasonable men would have us dominate more 
and go further afield to the East; claiming a species of 
supremacy in waters and among islands at a considerable 
distance from Australasia. These pretensions are I think 
quite unfounded and may be dismissed from notice.
But the case as to the Western islands etc. is 
most strong in my opinion, and delay may be exceedingly 
dangerous". ^
The other factor which considerably increased Australian
influence on British policy was the pressure exerted on the Government
from 1883 onwards by the imperialists in England. As the Colonial
Secretary said, posing his own political dilemma, he did not "want to
be bullied by the colonies any more than Mr. Gladstone", but what if
2
they were "backed up by a good deal of opinion at home"? 1883 may
well stand in the history of English imperialism as a turning-point in
public opinion, for it was during that yeacr that the doctrine of Britain’s
colonising mission became established in current political philosophy.
One sign of the times was that a leading member of the Cobden Club,
that traditional stronghold of Little Englandism, advocated the annexation 
3
of New Guinea - a change of front so remarkable that Derby at least saw
4
in it a general indication of the trend of public opinion. Undoubtedly 
1
Childers to Gladstone, 10 July ^ 8 8 ^ ;  B.M. Add. MS. 44131.
2
Derby to Granville, Pte., 2 February 1885; G. D. 29/22,
3
T,B. Potter, M.P., to Derby, 18 May 1883; quoted by Aydelotte, op, cit.
4
Derby to Gladstone, 26 May 1883; quoted by Aydelotte,
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the conflict of colonial interests between Britain and France
hastened the change in outlook. From the start the imperialist
movement had a strong anti-French tendency, which became apparent
in the Press from 1881 - at the time of the occupation of Tunis -
onwards. "Our alleged friendship with France", the newly-founded
Conservative National Review declared in August 1883, "is a hollow
pretence, whose fruits are a perpetual clashing of policies, and
a series of undignified recriminations". By 1884 not only Conservative
journals but The Times and even the Liberal Daily News ("our only real
1
supporter", according to Gladstone ) were criticising the Government
for its alleged failure to provide a British counterweight to French
expansion, W, T. Stead *s can^aign for a bigger Navy in his Liberal
2
Imperialist Pall Mall Gazette against the supposed threat of Franco- 
Russian naval superiority was largely the result of the prevailing 
fear of French overseas predominance.
At the same time the iirperialist movement was markedly 
pro-German, TUfhile the French were regarded as bad colonizers - 
overloading their colonies with bureaucratic administration, setting up 
protectionist tariffs, acting tyrannically towards native people:^ etc., 
the Germans were believed to be the reverse - hard-working, honest, and
1
Minute initialled by Gladstone, 21 December 1884, on Childers to 
Gladstone, 18 December 1884; B.M. Add, MS. 44131,
2
Vide Frederic "Whyte ; The Life of W. T, Stead (2 vols., London 1925), 
vol.I, pp.145-155,
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1
scrupulously fair in commercial dealings. Even though the birth of
the German colonial empire in 1884 was quickly followed by Anglo-German
disputes in South West Africa and New Guinea, partiality for Germany
continued; the greater part of the English Press tended to attribute
the tension to the mismanagement of the Colonial Office ("willing to
back down as soon as anyone replies to our dog-in-the-manger bow-wowing
2
by a bark that looks like business" ), while the Daily News was driven
to find an explanation in Bismarck’s diplomacy - considered as
unrepresentative of the German people. "Judging from the h i ^  character
which they ^ h e  German^ have most deservedly earned abroad, in Egypt,
in India, in Australia, in the Pacific", the News commented, "we
should think that in their management of foreign possessions they will
display the same kind of genius which has characterized their
3
English kinsmen".
This pro-German and anti-French tendency in English public
opinion in 1883-4 had several causes. It was partly derived from a
superficial observation of French colonial methods. It v/as also a relic
of the tradition of Anglo-French, or Anglo-’Latin’, antagonism, and a
4
legacy of Britain’s support for German nationalism. In this respect, a
1
"A genuinely colonising race"; Pall Mall Gazette. 19 December 1884.
2
Pall ^lall Gazette, first leader (on the publication of the German 
White Book on Angra Pequena), 12 December 1884,
3
Daily Jfews, first leader, 23 December 1884.
4
As expressed, for example, by Dilke in his Greater Britain (2 vols, 
London 1868), #iich condemned the French for their frivolity and the 
Russians for their corruption, but praised "our Teutonic brethren"
(the only non-British people to find favour with the author), "to assist 
whom in their struggle for national unity would be a task worthy of the 
British Empire»»; vol. II, pp. 70-1.
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typical view was that expressed by a Times correspondent:
"Everything points in my judgement to closer and closer 
relations between - I will not say between the Governments, 
but between the English and German peoples. A thousand 
fine threads of feeling which never have existed, and 
I think never can exist, between us and the French, Bind 
us and the Germans together, and these will do their 
invaluable work, whatever little collisions there may be 
between the two nations in their two orbits,..
More particularly, pro-Geman feeling was an expression of the
contemporary mystique of Anglo-Saxon racial superiority. The Germans
2
were regarded as "our... kindred", Germany "our blood-relative and 
3
constant ally".
Racial doctrines were of the utmost importance in the
case of the Pacific, more so than in any other partly unoccupied region
of the world. There, ’Anglo-Saxon communities • - the Australasian
Colonies - were already established. Tnis meant, according to the
imperialists, that "the South Pacific was the heritage of the Anglo-Saxon 
4
family" - in other words, of Britain.
Imperialist pressure on the Government was exerted in the 
first place through Parliament. Although the Opposition inevitably
1
2
3
4
Auberon Herbert to the Editor, The Times, 15 October 1884.
W. Hinter to the Editor, The Times, 27 September 1884.
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exploited Liberal failures in foreign and colonial affairs for
party purposes, it was still in 1885-4 the spiritual home of
imperialism. With regard to the Pacific, the Conservatives consistently
championed the Australian case against France, from the time of the
attempted Queensland annexation of New Guinea onwards. In the Lords,
Carnarvon, the former Colonial Secretary, was in the van of the
attack. In the debate of 2 July on New Giinea, for instance, he
meint»6ned that in such matters "of life and death" to the Colonies,
the Government had a duty to carry out Australian wishes. He argued
that a French penal settlement on the southern shores of the island
would have been "cn intolerable nuisance" and the establishment of
1
a foreign naval base there a menace to Australian security. In the 
spring of 1884 he started an intensive and prolonged campaign against 
the threatened transportation of récidivistes to New Caledonia, while 
Ashraead-Bartlett and other imperialists employed the same tactics in 
the Commons.
Almost as potent an expression of the Colonial viewpoint
came from within the Liberal administration itself, and from some of its
leading political supporters. There was first Childers, whose 
2
arguments were listened to with particular respect by Gladstone and
Parliamentary Debates, third series, vol. CGLXXXI, cols. 10-11.
Vide Childers to Granville, 12 March 1884, 20 March 1884, P.0.27/2723; 
ibid., 11 February 1886, G* D. 29/119; and copies of minutes by
Childers on despatches from Lyons, enclosed in Granville to Lyons,
23 May 1885, Confidential, P.O. 146/2776.
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1
Granville because he was generally opposed to annexationism. Then
there was Joseph Chamberlain, the -tresident of the Board of Trade,
with his zeal for colonisation and his passionate belief in the
eventual world domination of ’the Anglo-Saxon race’. Dilke, Chamberlain’s
friend, added an anti-French element to the deliberations of the
Cabinet, and so also on occasion did liartington, the War Secretary.
j^art from these members of the Cabinet, there was Rosebery, still
out of office in 1883, but influential in the inner circles of the
Liberal party and beginning to command a following in the country.
He was deeply interested in problems affecting the Colonies, and
believed imperial federation would provide a bulwark for British
interests against the encroachment of foreign colonisation. During
his tour of Eastern Australia in the winter of 1883-4 he publicly
endorsed the resolutions of the recent Australasian Conference, especially
2
the stand taken against French transportation to the Pacific. On his 
return to Englemd he joined forces with Carnarvon in the Parliamentary 
campaign against the Récidivistes Bill. Later, he became president 
of the Imperial Federation League, Such pressure on the Foreign Secretary
The letter he wrote to Gladstone on the latter’s resignation frcan 
the Premiership and retirement from the leadership of the Liberal 
party is of particular interest: "...You will be spared some great 
disappointments. The madness of the Great Military Powers will,
I anticipate, drag us into the extravagance which you have uniformly 
combated; and we have also caught the infection of inordinate 
Territorial extension, for vdiich, in Africa and elsewhere, our 
neighbours are running a blind and fatal race, I cannot but rejoice 
that you are spared being drawn on by, or /?/ hopeless to combat, 
these destructive tendencies in the Public mind... ;" 5 March 1894,
B.M. Add. MS. 44132.
Speech at Sydney, 8 December 1883; Crewe: îtosebery, vol. I, pp. 180-1.
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was a new political phenomenon, with “vdaich Granville’s Conservative 
predecessors liad not heen faced. In the ’seventies, purely colonial 
questions, apart from the troubles in South Africa, had filled a very 
minor role in political affairs, compared with the great issues that 
seemed involved in such events as the Russo-Thrkish War of 1877-8 
and the Afghan campaigns.
Opinion at home and pressure frcxn the Colonies thus combined 
in 1883 to make the Government take a serious view of the récidivistes 
problem. Although the Foreign Secretary was almost as much out of 
sympathy as Gladstone and Derby with the demands which the Australians 
had been putting forward since 1875 - that the Western Rhcific should 
come under exclusively British rule -, he saw that îVench activities 
affected Colonial interests and had to be controlled. The Queensland 
annexation in New Guinea had shown -vdiat could happen once the initiative 
in fhcific affairs passed from British to Australian hands.
The complete awakening of the Government to the strength of
colonial opinion came in December 1883 when the resolutions of the
Australasian Conference were made known in London. The "Monroe Doctrine
1 2 
laid down for the whole South Pacific" horrified Gladstone and Derby,
3
who characterised it as "mere raving". The Colonial Secretary was 
particularly indignant at the resolution against French transportation:
1
Derby to Gladstone, 7 December 1883; B.M. Add. MS. 44142.
2
Gladstone to Derby, ? December 1883; quoted in Paul Khaplund: 
Gladstone and Britain’s Imperial Policy (New York 1927), pp.108-9.
3
Derby to Gladstone, 7 December 1883; quoted by Knaplund: Gladstone 
and Britain’s Imperial Policy, p. 107,
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"the notion that other powers, and other nationalities, may have
rights which an Australian is hound to respect, does not seem to
have entered the colonial mind... I am half inclined to suspect an
arriéré pensée on the part of the conference leaders. If they
contemplate picking a quarrel with England, sooner or later, they
cannot lay a better ground for one than by asking our sanction to
1
demands which it is incessible that we should endorse". Hit he was
powerless against the tide of Colonial Francophobia, and on 11 January
1884 the Australian Agents-General made a united appeal to him to
stop the Récidivistes Bill. The conduct of negotiations with France
was not his responsibility, however, but that of the Foreign Secretary -
already a partial convert to the Australian point of view.
In March, Granville decided to share the burden of a "very 
2 3
unpleasant" problem by laying it before the Cabinet. His efforts on
behalf of the Colonies had so far been ineffectual. All his representations
4
to France about the Bill ~ eight to the end of îÆarch, he told the Lords - 
had failed. His mounting diplomatic embai^ssment was increased by 
Rosebery’s constant references in 1^1 lament to the intensity of 
Australian feeling on the subject of New Caledonia. In May, however.
Derby to Gladstone, V December 1883; B.M. Add. MS. 44142.
F. 0. minute (by Sir George Dallas) on C. 0. to F. 0., 5 December 1883; 
F.O. 27/2722.
C. Ü. Memo, on "The Attitude of the Australian Colonies with regard to 
the Introduction of Convicts", reprinted with additions for the 
Cabinet and (copy) enclosed in Granville to Lyons, 18 March 1884,
No. 236; F.O. 146/2609.
5 May 1884; Parliamentary Debates, third series, vol. CGLXXX7II, 
col. 1293.
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Rosebery postponed a motion he had tabled against the Récidivistes 
1
Bill, on the advice of the New Zealand Agent-General, Sir Francis
Dillon Bell, who had gone to Pfeiris on his behalf to investigate the
2
French Government’s reaction to the anti-recidivistes canroaign.
Lyons had v^ arned Bell tliat the campaign had stirred up French amour 
propre by making it appear that the British were trying to dictate 
to France on the management of her ov/n colonies, so much so that the 
Bill would probably be passed, "but that endeavours here to render
3
it innocuous would certainly not be assisted by agitation in England".
Rosebery finally withdrew liis motion only in July, hov/ever, iidien it
seemed for a time either that the Bill might be dropped because of
practical difficulties discovered by an official investigator in
New Caledonia, or that the French Government would ensure against the
4
escape of récidivistes. Certain safeguards had been proposed to the
Senate to remove the strongest Australian objections to the Bill.
Meanwhile Lyons had been constantly appealing to Ferry to
exclude New Caledonia from the Bill, but without success. Nevertheless
Granville still hesitated to make the ’strong protest’ the Colonial
5
Office suggested. The Foreign Office felt that though the French ^ vere
1
19 May 1884; Parliamentary Debates, third series, vol. CCLXXXVIII, 
cols. 643-4.
2
Lyons to Granville, Pte,, 16 May 1884; G. D. 29/174,
3
Ibid.
4
14 July 1884; Parliamentary Debates, third series, vol. CGXO, cols. 
876 seq. Vide Crewe ; Rosebery, vol. I, p. 207.
5
C. 0. to F. 0., 8 May 1884; ^  and P., ^884/, LV, /z. 3839/, No, 25.
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violating what could he called ’"bon voisinage *, no "breach of treaty
or of International Law was involved. Indeed by May 1884, Granville
was on the point of giving up the struggle, had he not been dissuaded
2 3
by the Colonial Office. The flood of appeals from Australia
strengthened his resolve. In June he gave the Victorian Agent-General
4
permission to communicate directly with the French Ambassador.
So the question continued - Britain committed to futile 
remonstrance and France equally committed to pass the Bill without 
alteration. The hopes raised during the summer tliat France would 
yield to British pressure did not materialise, for, as Lyons had said,
5
the French public did not like "any appearance of yielding to England", 
Even Australians sometimes recognised that the French Government was in 
a difficult position:
"Diplomatic remonstrance by a foreign State against a 
measure of internal administration is always calculated 
to arouse the susceptibilities of any nation, and more 
especially of a country situated as France is today in 
regard to Great Britain and Europe... The Government fear, 
too, that their support will be doubtful if they yield
1
2
3
4
5
Pauncefote to Herbert (copy), Pte., ? May 1884; P.O. 27/2723.
The passage in the original draft of Granville to Lyons, 19 May 1884, 
No. 4^7, asking merely for preventive measures against the escape 
of récidivistes from New Caledonia, was altered by the Colonial 
Office to a renewed appeal to exclude New Caledonia from the 
provisions of the Bill; P.O. 27/2723. The final despatch is 
printed as No, 36 in A. and P., /Î88^, LV, /C. 386^71
Vide ^  and P., ^884-ÿ^, LIV, . 4217/, passim.
Vide Murray Smith to Granville, 25 July 1884; P.O. 27/2724.
Lyons to Granville, Pte., 8 April 1884; G.D. 29/174.
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to foreign representation, however just, as to the 
use to which French territory shall be put". ^
In other words, it was impossible for Ferry to give up his freedom
of action, despite the harm being done to Anglo-French relations.
Lyons constantly returned to the subject - in fact, he made greater
2
efforts over the récidivistes problem than almost any other - but the
3
most Ferry would offer was an extradition treaty. This would have
made the expulsion of escaped convicts dependent on the doubtful
4
initiative of the New Caledonian authorities. Moreover, events had
shown that no such partial solution would have been acceptable to the 
5
Colonies. The Government of Victoria had already been considering
6
’preventive measures’ - probably of the kind envisaged by Childers, 
that is, forcibly expelling escapees and sending them back to France. 
The Queensland Legislative Assembly also advocated laws to make the 
landing of released convicts in Australia impossible. Ferry’s offer 
was therefore ignored. In the House of Commons a Government Spokesman
3
4
5
6
Memo, on French Transportation to New Caledonia by Howard Vincent 
(late Director of Criminal Investigations, London), enclosed in 
Sir A. Loftus /governor of New Soubh Wale£7 to Derby, 24 December 1884; 
àf and P.. ^884-£7, LIV, ^ . 4 2 7 ^ ,  p. 138.
So he recalled later: Lyons to Rosebery, Pte., 5 March 1886;
Lyons, vol. II, p. 363
Walsham to Granville, 9 October 1884, No, 592; ^  and P., /1884-^,
LIV, 4217/, enclosure in No. 49,
Minute by Ashley on F. 0. to C. 0., 17 October 1884; C. 0. 225/17.
C.O. to F.O., 27 October 1884; ^  and P., /L884-5/, LIV, /G. 42lÿ^ No. 60.
Speech by Governor of Victoria at opening of Victorian Ib.rliament,
10 June 1884.
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said that Britain could not interfere with "any reasonable measures"
1
the Colonies might take for their protection. HVhile the Récidivistes
Bill was being debated in the Chamber of Deputies in the winter of
2
1884-5^ the British Government looked on helplessly. There was no 
hope of a compromise until after the Bill became law in May 1885, when 
France offered not to apply it to New Caledonia in return for British 
acquiescence in a French acquisition of the New Hebrides. The 
récidivistes question had cleared the way for Australian influence 
over British foreign policy,
ii) The question of the New Hebrides.
Long before France put for.vard a claim to the New Hebrides 
in December 1884, the islands had become an unavowed issue in Anglo- 
French relations. Britain had no desire to acquire them herself, 
but until she was tempted by the French offer to discontinue 
transportation to the pacific she was determined that France should 
not secure them.
The New Hebrides had been under British influence since the 
mid-nineteenth century. They had been re-discovered by a French 
explorer at the end of the ei^iteenth century, but it was Captain Cook 
who first explored and charted the islands - a favourite argument of
28 July 1884; Parliamentary Debates, third series, vol. OCXCI, 
cols. 631-2.
Most of Lyons’s despatches on the subject of the Bill were read by the 
Queen and interested members of the Cabinet - Gladstone, Rosebery, and 
Childers, besides Granville - frcrni about May 1884 onwards.
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those who advocated British annexation. For many years no problem 
of sovereignty arose, for there was little European contact with the 
islan(fe apart from the raids made by the traders in Sandalwood, which 
at that time flourished there. The natives were fierce cannibals.
From about 1839, however, missionaries started to gain a foothold.
The first permanent white missionary was a Canadian Presbyterieui. A 
French Catholic mission established soon after met with little success, 
and in the ’fifties evangelisation was mainly csirried on by the Melanesian 
Mission controlled from Australia, In the ’sixties the London Missionary 
Society took over. From about 1857 the missionaries and their supporters 
had started to appeal for British protection. Since the self-denying 
trend was then uppermost in British colonial policy, the Government 
consistently refused to consider assuming political responsibility 
for the islands.
As early as 1858 there had been rumours that France intended 
to treat the New Hebrides as a dependency of New Caledonia, but the
I
British Government remained sceptical. Up to 1876 they were completely 
indifferent to the political future of the islands. Derby, as Foreign 
Secretary in the Conservative administration wiiich came to power in 
1874, said that France could have them for all he cared. His attitude 
reflected the current tendency to regard islands of no strategic value as 
irrelevant to European relations; the New Hebrides were not in the 
category of Disraeli’s "strong places of the world", where British control 
was thought eminently desiraole. His attitude was also due to ignorance 
of the issues involved. Indeed, the blankness of the official mind as
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regards î^cific affairs in general is often surprising. As late as
1876 the Foreign Office was apparently under the ingression that
1
Australia was administered "by a single Governor.
With the change in British colonial, policy in the early 
•seventies came a fresh approach to the problems of the Western Pacific. 
The new readiness of the Colonial Office to assume a measure of 
administrative responsibility in that area was not, however, political 
in motive, "but largely humanitarian and practical. European enterprise 
throughout the island groups had been accompanied by gross evils of native 
exploitation, and Britain’s long fight against the slave trade in other 
regions afforded a clear precedent for similar intervention in the 
case of the recruitment of island labour. Tie Picific Islanders* 
Protection Act of 1872 was designed to replace ’blackbirding• (the 
virtual kidnapping of islanders) by legal recruitment. The establishment 
in 1875 of a H i ^  Commission for the Western Pacific^with jurisdiction 
over British subjects in territories not occupied by a civilised Power, 
was intended to mitigate the brutality and lawlessness of island society 
with British justice.
The fact that the formulation of this policy coincided with 
Australian demands for the annexation of the whole Melanesian area had
1
C.O. to P.O. (draft), 22 #iy 1876, pointing out the mistake made in a 
Foreign Office draft of a note to the French Government; C. 0. 309/Ï14.
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a considerable influence on the British attitude towards particular 
groups of islands. Though the Imperial Government refused to agree 
to any extension of political responsibility, the agitation served to 
draw attention to British interests. After the early Australian 
Conferences of 1870-3 and more especially after the direct appeal to 
Britain for the annexation of New Guinea, the New Hebrides, and other 
territories in the Western I^cific^by the New South Wales Cabinet in 
1876, it was no longer possible for the Colonial Office to think only 
in terms of missionary interests and the rights of individual British 
traders. As regards the New Hebrides, Britain became aware almost for 
the first time of their value to the Australasian Colonies.
Missionary enterprise in the islands had produced more 
settled conditions. Moreover by about 1870 the sandalwood tree was 
virtually extinct through ruthless cutting, and the old type of trader 
began to be displaced by white settlers. The latter found that coffee 
and other tropical commercial crops grev/ well. Besides agricultural 
development and four good harbours, the practice of labour recruitment 
made the New Hebrides desirable from the Australasian point of view.
Cotton planters in Fiji as well as sugar planters in Queensland depended 
on Kanaka labour. These considerations could not be ignored by Britain. 
Whereas in 1853 she had raised no objection to the annexation of New 
Caledonia by France, in 1875 any attempt by a foreign power to acquire 
the New Hebrides was bound to be opposed.
Although the New South Wales plea for annexation was rejected 
on the ground that there was no reason to suspect Frendi action, the 
Colonial Office tried to find out whether in fact there was any foundation
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for the rumour of it. At the same time the Government started to
consider extending the jurisdiction of the Western Ib,cific High
Commission to cover the New Hebrides. The exchange of views between
Derby and D'Harcourt in 1878, when both denied any intention of
annexation on the part of their respective governments, seemed to
settle the matter for a time. Indeed until 1882 there was no evidence that
the French Government was any more interested in acquiring the islands
1
than the British. Waddington in 1879 formally denied it. Gambetta
privately assured his friend Dilke in 1881 that he had refused to
grant a charter to a French company v/ho wished to assume a commercial
2
monopoly over the islands.
The authorities in New Caledonia took a different view, 
however, and from about 1875 they were openly in favour of French 
annexation. They took Australian agitation seriously - far more 
seriously than the British Government did - and realised that they had 
been alone in believing the New Hebrides to be more or less dependencies 
of New Caledonia. Since Britain was against a free traffic in native 
labour, they feared that British control would mean the end of Kanaka 
recruitment for the sugar and coffee plantations and the mines in their
1
Lyons to Salisbury, 1 July 1879, No.706; F.O. 27/2370.
2
Dilke to Gladstone, Pte,, 28 December 1881; B.M. Add. MS. 44149. 
Dilke to Granville, Pte., 28 December 1881; G.D. 29/121.
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own colony. They were well aware that the missionaries in the New 
Hebrides were bitter opponents of ’blackbirding*, and that the Press 
of the English-speaking world often drew attention to the heavy 
mortality among recruited labourers in New Caledonia, bi^orted labour 
was to them an economic necessity. In the ’sixties and ’seventies 
convicts had been employed in the mines, but as the production of 
copper, cobalt, and chrome increased, and with the opening of the 
first nickel mine in 1879, convict labour had become insufficient.
Local natives were not available, for after the revolt of 1878 they 
had been driven back into the interior. The general amnesty of 
communards in 1880 had made the labour problem acute. The colonists 
in New Caledonia were also anxious to accommodate fresh batches of
convicts from Prance in the New Hebrides instead of in their midst.
1
A rumour of this had prompted a British enquiry in 1879.
The aims of the New Caledonians added a sense of urgency to 
Australian demands for preventive action.. Until about 1882, however, 
there was little anxiety in London, since it seemed unlikely that local 
interests would weigh more heavily with the French Government than the 
1878 understanding with Britain. Although the exchange of notes had been 
merely a reciprocal statement of present intentions, it was held to be 
an agreement sufficiently binding to preclude any future alteration of 
the status <^ uo without mutual consent. Subsequent assurances from France
1
Salisbury to Lyons, 20 May 1879, No. 679, enclosing C.O. to F.O. (copy), 
10 May 1879; F. 0. 146/2122.
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were taken at their face value. The reports from the British Consul in
Noumea (the capital of New Caledonia), S.L. Layard, were often so
extravagantly phrased and indicative of such an obvious bias against
the French authorities that the warnings they contained about the
danger to the New Hebrides often missed the mark. Layard was a familiar
type among consular representatives, prone to writing voluminous
despatches in which local affairs were mixed up with personal grievances,
and knowing nothing of Talleyrand’s caution against excess of zeal.
To his superiors, he was an "honest, energetic fellow", but how they
wished he were at a post "where the wicked cease from troubling and the
■ 2
Consuls orp at rest".
'Ey the autumn of 1882, however, Britain no longer felt 
confident that France would not annex the New Hebrides. The activities 
of the Compagnie Cale^donienne des Nouvelles-Hébrides w^ere too extensive 
to be explained away. This company was no doubt that to which Gambetta 
had referred in 1881. The managing director was an Irishman named 
Hlgginson who had settled in New Caledonia and become naturalised. He 
had strengthened the local officials’ interest in the New Hebrides. He 
made frequent trips to Europe but was not at first encouraged by the
Layard made the most of malnutrition and ill-treatment of New Hebridean 
labourers in New Caledonia, and of legal irregularities practised in 
the local law-court over cases between employers and Kanakas; e.g., 
Layard to Granville, 14 February 1882, Confidential; F.O. 84/ l¥14.
Lister to Herbert, Pte., 24 Fsbruary 1883; C. 0. 225/13.
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French Government. But as the chief mine-ov/ner and commercial magnate 
in the colony he was put in charge of the New Caledonian section of 
the Exposition Universelle in 1878, and he made the most of his 
opportunities to interest the Minister of Colonies in his schemes.
He formed the Compagnie Calédonienne, imhich was to open up the New 
Hebrides commercially and prepare the way for annexation, obtained the 
backing of the Rothschilds, and secured as partner , a renegade Prime 
Minister of South Australia. At last in 1882 the charter he sought 
was granted. A French warship was provided to take him with his agents 
to prospect the New Hebrides. During 1882-3 he had virtually bought 
out the British settlers in the islands by acquiring about 150,000 
hectares of land from them. About 200,000 v/ere also ’bou^t* from the 
natives. Settlers were sent from New Caledonia and a regular steamship 
service between the two groups was started. Hlgginson's activities 
had every appearance of an officially-sponsored programme of colonisation. 
It was unfortunate for Anglo-French relations that these
f
events not only coincided with the beginning of the récidivistes question
in general, but were known to be taking place when the news reached
London that the French Minister of I^ine was considering sending
1
récidivistes to the Nev/ Hebrides, If this intention were carried out, 
it would obviously have opened a diplomatic issue, though the general 
state of Anglo-French relations seemed hardly propitious for bringing up
1
lyons to Granville, 7 December 1882, No. 1255; F.O. 27/2720.
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1
the subject of the 1878 understanding. #ien a French newspaper
reported that the Minister of the Interior had told the Chamber of
Deputies Récidivistes Committee that the New Hebrides would be included
 2--------  3
in the Bill, the Foreign Office prepared an enquiry. The French
Foreign Minister answered that no steps would be taken without
consultation v/ith Britain, but professed to be unaware of the 1878 
4
understanding. Hlgginson, significantly enough, was on his way to
Paris. The French had shown their hand. The fact that by i^ril 1883
/
they had decided not to include the New Hebrides in the Récidivistes 
5
Bill after all, made little difference to the British attitude.
Ohallemel-Lacour * s reason for including only those territories which
belonged to France was that ’other places’ were now being ‘treated
6
diplomatically ’.
It was now clear that a new understanding with France was 
necessary. Public opinion in England as well as in the Australasian
Pauncefote to Lyons, Pte., 31 January 1883; F.O. 146/2513. Lyons 
to Pauncefote, Pte., 6 February 1883; F.O. 27/2721,
Enclosure in Lyons to Granville, 3 March 1883, No. 178; F. 0. 27/2721.
F.O. minutes on supra.
Lyons to Granville, 14 Ivferch 1883, No. 211; F.O. 27/2721.
Lyons to Granville, 3 April 1883, No.245; P.O. 27/2721.
Statement to the Récidivistes Committee, reported in the Ten^s (extract) 
enclosed in Lyons to Granville, 13 March 1883, No. 207; F. 0. 27/2721.
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Colonies demanded satisfaction. Missionary bodies were agitating for
British annexation to forestall France and were gaining considerable
public support. The Presbyterian Conference held in Australia in 1882
had agreed that French annexation would have meant persecution of the
Protestant missions, which had been financed to the extent of at least
1
£170,000 up to date. Ttiis aspect of the question could not be 
ignored by Britain, especially as the French authorities * treatment 
of a prominent member of the London Missionary Society in the Loyalty
Islands (a dependency of New Caledonia) had become notorious, and had
2
been criticised by the Foreign Secretary himself. In February 1883
a deputation of missionary societies to the Colonial Office was told
that the Government was prepared to consider a new Anglo-French agreement
3
over the New Hebrides. The Wilson and Baton case which came up in the
House of Commons stiffened the British attitude. These two missionaries
were the owners of Iriniki, one of the smaller islands in the group, and
alleged that the Compagnie Calédonienne was trying to force the natives
4
to sell it over their heads. Granvil'J.e told the French British rights
5
would have to be respected. Agitation in Parliament also stiffened the
3
4
Petition to Queen Victoria, enclosed in Sir A. Loftus to Kimberley,
11 July 1882, New South Wales No. 10; C.O. 201/597.
Granville to Lyons, 1 February 1882; ^  and P., /588/, CIX, 5583/,
No. 14, pp. 14-15. Lyons to Granville, 10 February 1882; ibid., No.l6,p.l5,
The Times, 8 February 1883.
Rev. F.R.M. Wilson and Rev. J. G. Baton to the Colonial Office, 1 March 
1883 (received 10 April); K  and P.. LV, ^ . 3 8 6 ^ .
layons to Ohallemel-Lacour (copy), 3 May 1883, enclosed in Lyons to 
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British attitude towards French ambitions in the New Hebrides. In the
Lords* debate on 2 July there were several references to the New
Hebrides as well as to New Guinea, in relation to Australian fears
1
of foreign domination of the Western Ricific. On the 6th Ashmead-
Bartlett gave notice of an impending resolution in favour of British
2
protection over New Guinea and ’the neighbouring islands’ - a
3
resolution which was accordingly presented to the House a month later.
At the same time, there were several questions as to whether France
4
had actually occupied the New Hebrides.
By June France had lost her initiative in action and sought
to regain it by diplomacy. She saw that annexation could never take
place without a special Anglo-French agreement. Moreover British
annexation, however in^robable, had now become a possibility through
Australasian pressure. Granville was deliberately vague when the 
/
French charge d ’affaires asked him his intentions, saying that the
Government had not yet decided what reply to make to the Colonies ’
demands, but that he did not imagine Britain would take possession of
the islands. D ’Aunay could get nothing out of Fitanaurice and Pauncefote
5
at the Foreign Office. Granville ’s evasiveness was interpreted in Paris
1
Parliamentary Debates, third series, vol. CCLXXXI, cols. 9-19.
2
Ibid., cols. 611-2.
3
Parliamentary Debates, third series, vol. CCLXXXII, col. 1656.
4
Ibid., cols. 580 and 610 (6 July 1883), col. 792 (9 July 1883).
5
D ’Aunay a Ferry, 23 juin 1883, no. 93; Affaires étrangères, 800.
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as a repudiation of the 1878 understanding, which would restore to
1
France her liberty of action. But the danger from Britain now seemed
sufficiently grave for the tables to be turned on her: whereas in the
spring Britain had been anxious for the understanding to be confirmed,
now it was France. By 10 July Granville was prepared to state that
Britain considered the understanding ’perfectly valid’ but asked at
the same time for a similar assurance from France. This was immediately 
2
given. With the Compagnie Calédonienne making such good progress,
formal French annexation could wait.
Britain, on the other hand, was determined that both countries
should atdhere to the new understanding. Partly in order to keep her case
clean, she refhsed to agree to the extension of the Pacific High
Commissioner’s jurisdiction to the New Hebrides and New Guinea unless
3
it was paid for by the Australian governments - which was unlikely.
The formal Australian appeal for British control of the Western Pacific 
4
in July 1883, the similar resolution passed by the Inter-Colonial 
Conference in December, and the Australian parliamentary proposal to 
guarantee the interest on the capital raised for a company to rival
Minute on D ’Aunay a Ferry, 23 juin 1883, no.93; Affaires étrangères,800.
Granville to Lyons, 10 July 1883, No. 676; P.O. 146/2527. D ’Aunay à 
Challemel-Lacour, 10 juillet 1883, télégramme; ibid., 11 juillet 1883, 
particulière et confidentielle; Affaires e^trang>res, 800. D ’Aunay’s 
mémorandum on his conversation with Granville was communicated to the 
French Press.
Derby to the Governor^ of the Australasian Colonies (except Fiji), 9 May 
1684; ^  and P. .A884/, LV, ^ 3 8 3 9 / ,  No. 26, pp. 34-5.
Agents-General of New South Wales,^New Zealand,^.^eenfiland and Victoria 
to Derby, 21 July 1883; ^  and P./T885/.XLVII.^38W . N q.18.p .5. The 
original memorandum was considered by the Foreign and Colonial Offices,
Admiral tv. We s t e m  Pacific High Commissioner (in London for consultation), 
and the Cabinet; C. 0.201/599:
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Hlgginson*s, convinced the Government that even if it became diplcHnatically
expedient, French annexation could never be tolerated without a radical
change in Australian policy. After Meade’s conversations with Bismarck
1
on the Western Pacific, Gladstone assured Parliament that there had
been no question of letting France acquire the New Hebrides except on
2
terms that would be acceptable to the Australasian Colonies. In May 
1885 Derby gave a further assurance that
"any proposal having for its object the annexation of the 
New Hebrides to France would never be entertained by this 
office without consulting the Australian Colonies and 
without securing conditions satisfactory to those Colonies; 
and further th$it no Government of this country wouj-d ever 
think of giving over the New Hebrides to France without 3
taking care that they would never become a penal settlement".
Thus the dominant voice of the Australasian Colonies in the field of
Britain’s Pacific policy was unequivocally acknowledged.
iii) The question of the Pacific Leeward Islands, 1879 - November 1884.
The proposal to whicn Derby referred had been made in 
December 1884, France had decided that the only way she could secure
i
the New Hebrides was to make the acquisition of the islands part of a 
bargain with Britain in the settlement of other •Pacific issues. The 
proposal was made by the French representatives in the Anglo-French
1
Memoranda of Conversations at Berlin on Colonial Matters between 
îvîr. Meade... and Prince Bismarck and Dr. Dgsch (1885)'/ A. and P.
' LTV, ' 4290/.
2 ^
5 March 1885; Parliamentary Debates, third series, vol.CCXCV, cols. 125-6, 
3 _
Derby to Sir H. H. Loch /Governor of Victoriÿ^, 30 May 1885; A. and P. 
^ 8 4 - ^ ,  LIV, / Ç . 4 5 8 ^  Tfo.lll, p. 150.
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Commission negotiating in Riris on the subjects of Nev/foundland and 
the Leeward Islands.
The British attitude to the French plan to extend the 
Tahiti Protectorate to the Leeward group of the Society Islands was 
based on somewhat different considerations from those which had 
determined policy over the New Hebrides and the récidivistes question.
At first Britain had had no intrinsic objection to a French 
protectorate, and during the subsequent negotiations she had withheld 
her coirç)liance only in order to exact a settlement on other issues. 
Economically, the islands were so small as to be of negligible value, 
while they v/ere far enough away for the Aistralasian Colonies to be less 
concerned over their fate than over the islands of the Western Pacific. 
Later, however, Britain realised their potential importance in the 
future system of Pacific communications, and she sought direct 
compensation for her acquiescence in a French protectorate before she 
eventually came to terms -with France. British policy over the islands 
was first diplomatic and then imperial.
The leeward group of what are today knovm as the Society
Islands have usually been treated by the dinlomatic and the colonial
1
historian as merely incidental to the story of Tahiti. Lying less than 
1
Mention should, however, be made of an interesting illustrated book 
(in the Sir Raymond Bsazley collection in the British M.iseum) by the 
former Directeur des Ecoles in the Leeward Islands, Rail Higuerdn: 
Raiatea la Sacrée  ^ (ifeuchatel 1902). The book gives a full account 
of native life in the Islands, formerly the centre of Polynesian culture, 
A.G. Eugene Caillot: Histoire de la Polynésie Orientale (Phris 1910) 
gives an account of the internal history of the Leeward Islands, with 
the texts of official decrees, etc. Vide also Brookes: International 
Rivalry in the Pacific Islands, 1800-1875, op. cit.
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a hundred miles to the north-v/est of Tahiti and its dependencies (the
windward group of the Societies), the Leeward Islands were, it is true,
closely connected in the nineteenth century with whatever was going
on in Tahiti, The native rulers were inter-related. Queen Pomare IV
of Tahiti, after her deposition and the establishment of the French
Protectorate in 1844, was for long a fugitive in Raiatea - the biggest
island in the Leewards. English missionary influence, both before
and after 1844, was strong in both groups. Yet after 1847, the status
of the Leeward Islands was entirely different from that of Tahiti. On
19 June 1847 France and Britain, having decided to put an end to their
differences in this area, signed the Declaration of London, by which
they formally recognised the independence of the Leeward Islands,
agreeing never to take possession of them, or to ackno7/ledge the
1
sovereignty of the dynasty ruling in Tahiti over any of them. For over 
thirty years their uneasy independence lay in the background of 
Anglo-French rivalry in the Pacific. In the late ’seventies France 
began to work actively for a Protectorate, and the islands assumed a 
neiv diplomatic importance.
1
h  P* /%88/, CIX, /C. 5256/, p. 67. The Declaration is referred 
to by French writers as the ’Convention de Jarnac* since it was 
signed by de Jamac, the French Mbsissador in London, (and by 
Palmer^n). It has also been called the ’Reciprocal Independence 
Agreement’ by Ward: British Policy in the South Pacific, 1786-1895, 
op. cit.
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The Anglo-French negotiations over the islands have
1
hitherto been very little known. A Livre Jaune on the subject
appeared in 1887 and up to now has provided the fullest account of
2
the affair. It contains, however, only two documents viiich deal with 
the opening of the negotiations in 1879, and both of these are extracts, 
Although they show plainly enough that the French wished to annex the 
islands, they do not make Salisbury’s attitude entirely clear. No 
mention is made of the important Dieppe meeting, in September 1879, 
between Salisbury and Waddington, at which the Leeward Islands were 
discussed. An examination of Salisbury’s reaction to the French 
proposals is interesting. It illustrates Salisbury’s habitual desire 
to keep a new negotiation entirely to himself as long as he could.
It also shows the way in which he subordinated extra-European questions 
of this kind to the necessities of the European situation. Moreover, 
the Dieppe interview tiirows fresh light on the general state of 
Anglo-French relations at the end of Disraeli’s last administration.
Ward; British Policy in the South R.cific, op. cit., gives a few 
details of the history of the Islands in the 1840s and 1860s, but 
hardly mentions the 1879-87 negotiations. The islands are not 
mentioned in S.H. Roberts: A History of French Colonial Policy, 
1870-1925 (2 vols., London 1929), although the French Protectorate 
of Tahiti is discussed at some length. Most of the numerous French 
works on colonisation either ignore the Pacific Leeward Islands 
negotiations or repeat the little that was known to the public by 
1887. Russier: Le Partage de I ’Oceanie. op. cit., briefly outlines 
the course of the negotiations from 1885 onwards. One of the few 
attempts to trace the negotiations as a whole is in Scholefield:
The Pacific, op. cit., but the book is based on published material only, 
and the account given is misleading.
y
Affaires des Nouvelles-Hebrides et les Iles-sous-lo-Vent de Tahiti,
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In 1878 there v^ as a brief prologue to the negotiations.
The British Admiral of the Pacific Station, in his official report
to the Admiralty at the beginning of the year, gave details of a
1
pamphlet published in Papeete, apparently on official authority, 
entitled ’’Etablissements français de l ’Océanie et Protectorat des Iles 
de la Société", Thich included the Leeward Islands in its list of 
French "establislments", despite an additional paragraph to the effect
2
that the status of the Islands was determined by the 1847 Declaration.
The Foreign Office, to whom the Admiralty sent a copy of the report
in March, felt an enquiry was needed. According to Hertslet, the
French had often tried to absorb the Leeward Islands into their Tahiti
Protectorate; he advised that their attention should be drawn to the
1847 Declaration and that they should be asked exactly vhich islands 
3
they claimed. The necessary instructions to Lyons were framed 
4
accordingly^ The Acting Mnister for Foreign Affairs, however,
repudiated all responsibility for the Tahiti publication and supplied a
5
list of French "establishments", excluding the Leeward Islands. This
The capital of Tahiti.
Admiral of the Pacific Station to Admiralty, 1 January 1878, No. 3; 
Adm. 1/6454.
Memo on French Establishments in the Ricific, 1 April 1878,
F.O. Confidential. Print 3907 on French Establishments, May 1879;
F. 0. 27/2843.
Salisbury to lyons, 6 May 1878, No. 302; F. 0.146/2030.
Dufaure to Lyons (copy), 13 juin 1878, F.O. Conf. Print 3907;
F.O. 27/2843.
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2
Admiral of the Pacific Station to Admiralty, 1 January 1878, No. 3; 
Adm.1/6454.
3
Memo on French Establishments in the Ricific, 1 i^ril 1878,
F.O. Confidential Print 3907 on French Establishments, May 1879;
F. 0. 27/2843.
4
Salisbury to lyons, 6 May 1878, No. 302; F. 0.146/2030.
5
Dufaure to Lyons (copy), 13 juin 1878, F.O. Conf. Print 3907;
F.O. 27/2843.
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incident occurred at tlie time of the Berlin Congress, when the French 
were hardly in a position to realise their ambitions in Oceania.
From British sources it appeals that the French Foreign
Minister first broached the subject of the Leeward Islands to the
British Government, through their charge d ’affaires in Paris, in
September 1879. In a conversation with Adams, Waddington said that
his Government suspected that Germany and the United States both
wished to annex or establish a protectorate over the Islands, and
that they would therefore be glad to be released from the provisions
of the 1847 Declaration, so that they might be free to extend their
Tahiti Protectorate over the group. He enç>hasized the extremely
1
confidential nature of this communication.
Waddington *s pretext may have been genuine. The Islands 
had in the last few months become of interest to other Powers and this 
had probably roused France to try for a Protectorate. The importance of 
the Islands was in relation to the Panama; Canal project. In 1878, a 
construction contract for the Canal had been granted by Panama to an 
officer of the French Navy, Lieutenant %"se, acting on behalf of a 
Paris company formed two years before. There had been many previous 
concessions during the nineteenth century, but no actual cutting had 
been done. In the summer of 1879, however, an international congress 
meeting in Paris under the auspices of Ferdinand de Lesseps, with
1
Adams to Salisbury, 5 September 1879, No.936, Secret; F.O. 27/2411.
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delegates from the United States and Germany, as v/ell as many from 
France and some from England and other countries, decided on the 
route to he followed hy the projected canal, and the Wyse concession 
was bought by a new French company for 10,000,000 francs. Later, 
work on the Canal went ahead for the first time. The islands of the 
Pacific at once became in^ortant commercially, for ports of call 
were needed on the long route across the Ocean to Australasia, The 
Leeward Islands were one group that were potentially useful as a 
coaling station. One of the Islands, Borabora, was reported to have 
one of the finest natural harbours in the world. The Germans, besides 
the French, were certainly interested in the Islands, and the chief 
German company in the Pacific had just tried, unsuccessfully, to make 
a commercial treaty with the native authorities. Influential Hamburg 
firms had backed the venture. Germany may have been trying to get a 
measure of political control over the Islands, as de Lanessan asserted 
a few years later, since two German frigates had appeared off the 
Islands, the Ariadne in 1878 and the Bismarck in 1879, in an attempt 
to intimidate the natives. That the Americans had immediate designs 
on the Leeward Islands seems rather more unlikely. What is certain is 
that they regarded the Canal project as of the greatest importance, and 
were jealous of French predominance in its direction. As President Hayes 
said, the United States was aiming at "a canal under American control".
De Lanessan; L ’expansion coloniale de la France, op. cit., p. 634.
Paper delivered by R. J. Taussig on "The American Inter-Oceanic Canal" 
at the. Panama-Pacific Historical Congress, 1915, printed in The Pacific 
Ocean in History /Collected papers/ ed. by li, Morse Stephens and Herbert
E. Bolton (New York 1917),
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Meanwhile in London, Adams’s report of the French proposal 
received considerable attention. It was shown to both the Queen and 
the Prime Minister, The Admiralty was asked whether the Lords
Commissioners attached any inç>ortance to the Islands as a coaling station
not ^
or othervrise, though they were^ told the reason for this enquiry.
At the same time the Colonial Office was consulted about the answer
2
to be.given to Waddington*s proposal.
In these steps to take the negotiation forward, Salisbury
gave the overture an appearance of freshness to which in fact it had no
right. Waddington had mentioned to Adams that Admiral Pothuau, the
French Ambassador in London, had spoken privately to the Foreign
Secretary some weeks before, and that he /Waddington/ had gathered
that Salisbury had seen no objection to meeting the views of the French
Government, On reading this statement in Adams’s despatch, Salisbury
3
minuted; "Admiral Pothuau must have been dreaming". Yet Pothuau had 
received instructions, dated 21 July, asking him to suggest "officieusement" 
to Salisbury that the 1847 Declaration be abrogated; Waddington had 
explained that the Minister of Marine was re-considering the status of
4
the Leeward Islands, since circumstances had changed materially since 1847,
1
F.O. to Admiralty (draft), 15 September 1879, Secret; P.O. 27/2411.
2
F.O. to C,0. (draft), 11 September 1879, Secret; F.O. 27/2411.
3
Minute on Adams’s No.936; P.O. 27/2411.
Documents Diplomatiques, Affaires des Nouvelles-Hebrides et les Iles 
sous-le-Vent de Tahiti, (1887), no;4.
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There is also a letter from Pothuau to Waddington dated 27 July 1879 
in the archives of the Quai d ’Orsay, in which the Ambassador gives a 
full account of the conversation he had just had with Salisbury on 
’la question delicate’’ of the Islands, According to his instruction^^ 
he wrote, he brought up the question and spoke of attempts being 
made by the Germans and Americans to gain a footing in the Islands, 
Salisbury, he went on, said he was aware of this, and agreed that the 
future development of Tahiti might be hampered if the Islands fell 
under German or American rule, Pothuau continued:
’ ’’Mais, m ’a-t-il dit, l ’Angleterre est toute disposée 
a se desinteresser dans cette question’’.
"Meme, ai-je repondu, dans le cas ou nous voudrions y 
etendre notre protectorat ?"
A cette proposition il n ’a pas dit non; il a seulement 
traite l'affaire de delicate. * ^
It is clear that Salisbury had not given an unqualified
assent to a French protectorate, as was implied by Waddington*s statement
to Adams. Yet Salisbury’s minute on Adams’s despatch was not a mere
refusal to agree to Waddington’s interpretation of his language to
Pothuau, for it gave the impression that no conversation had taken place
2
at all. This is what the Colonial Office was told, and in the British 
archives there is no record of Salisbury’s ever having admitted to the 
conversation.
Pothuau a Waddington, 27 juillet 1879, Affaires étrangères. 781.
2
P.O. to G. 0. (draft), 11 September 1879, Secret, enclosing copy of 
Adams’s No. 936; P.O. 27/2411.
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What is the explanation ? It lies in Salisbury's habit of
1
secrecy and desire to conduct a personal diplomacy. In conversation, 
Salisbury wished to appear friendly to France, since his foreign policy 
during the critical period after the Berlin settlement was largely based 
on French friendship; later, he disavowed any knowledge of the conversation 
in order to safeguard himself against criticism from his colleagues and 
subordinates that he had prejudged the issue, and also to remain free in
negotiation. His personal feeling was that the French should have their
way in a matter he regarded as unimportant compared with the exigencies 
of the diplomatic situation. But the subject had been brought up
officially in Baris, and the Queen and at least two of his colleagues
in the Cabinet knew of the French request; it might have been awkward 
if it had become known that he had gone so far as to tell the French 
Ambassador that England was disposed not to interfere. Ife still hoped 
that it might be possible to settle the question to French satisfaction, 
and so avoid starting one of those irritating colonial issues which he 
always tried to avoid.
Before either the Admiralty or the Colonial Office had replied 
to the Foreign Office letters of enquiry, Salisbury spent a few days at 
his house at Buy, near Dieppe. On 19 September Waddington came to see 
him, and they spent the day in prolonged discussion. The meeting is in
1
Vide L.M. Penson: "The Principles and Methods of Lord Salisbury's 
Foreign Policy", Cambridge Historical Journal, 1935, Vol. V. No.l, 
esp. pp. 89-90.
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itself an indication of the confidence that existed between them. Little
has previously been knoTO about this meeting, however. It has usually
been ignored in diplomatic histories, despite the publication of Waddington*s
account of it in the Documents diplomatiques français, and despite the
evident importance of the incident. In Lady Gwendolyn Cecil's
biography of her father, the interview is briefly described as being the
result of Waddington‘s calling for the express purpose of contradicting
current rumours about a Franco-Russian alliance. A letter Salisbury
2
wrote the same day to Beaconsfield is partially quoted as evidence.
The Ftanco-Ru3sian topic al.one makes the meeting a notable one, for 
the growing coolness between Russia and Germany, and. the partly unknown 
attitude of France towards Russia^were matters of concern to Salisbury. 
Waddington v;as undoubtedly anxious to dispel any fears the British 
might have of a Franco-Russian understanding, and, this was his chief 
object in coming to see Salisbury at that time. But it was not the sole 
purpose of his visit, .
A comparison of Salisbury's own accounts shows the meeting to 
have been wide in scope. In his letter to Beaconsfield of 19 September, 
Salisbury dealt with the topics of conversation that would have been of 
most interest to the Prime Minister: besides Waddington*s disclaimer
There is, for example, no mention of the Dieppe interview, in Langer: 
European Alliances and Alignments, op. cit.
Salisbury, II, pp. 365-4. W. N. Medlicott: The Congress of Berlin and
After (London 1938) repeats this brief estimate of the interview 
Tp T377).
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about an alliance vrlth Russia, Salisbury mentioned the Egyptian and Greek
questions. But the letter does not attempt to give a complete report 
1
of the meeting. Nor does the despatch sent to the British charge d'affaires
in Paris after Salisbury's return to London, Adams v/as told that "the
principal object of VL Waddington*s visit.,, appeared... to be to
convince the English Government that though Italy had yielded to the
Russian seduction there was no chance of a similar weakness on the part 
2
of France," and that certain specified general diplomatic questions and
nolitical affairs in France had been discussed. Salisbury apparently
5
said no more than this to his colleagues at the Foreign Office.
Salisbury's report to the Queen fills in some of the gaps, however.
It gives expanded treatment to what Waddington had to say on the 
diplomatic situation, for Salisbury knev/ the Queen would be interested 
in this and felt that her curiosity could safely be satisfied. But 
he was careful to omit any detailed reference to current Cabinet questions. 
Some of the subjects discussed were dismissed as "too much questions of 
detail to have attracted Your Majesty's attention; " these were "Newfoundland, 
Egypt, Tahiti, Roumanla, Eastern Roumelia, Tirkish finance, the Servian 
railway &c.&c. " Tie report was significantly one-sided; Salisbury 
described part of v/hat Waddington had to say in detail, but hardly 
mentioned his own contributions to the discussion. Despite its extremely
1
The original is in the Beaconsfield Papers.
2
24 September 1879, No. 1169, Secret; F.O. 146/2314.
3
Vide drafts of Salisbury to Adams, 24 September 1879, No. 1169; 
F.O. 27/2359.
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careful phrasing, hov/ever, the document reveals something of the
nature of the Dieppe interview. It is clear that the conversation
had ranged freely over current problems: Waddington "discussed at
great length all the matters now pending in Europe in which France
had any share". It is equally clear from Salisbury’s reference to
"Newfoundland" and "Tahiti" that specifically Anglo-French problems
1
of a quite minor character were reviewed.
Waddington*s own report, sent as a despatch to Pothuau,
confirms these conclusions and shows the interview to have been
2
informal and friendly. his object, he w o  te, had been to continue
the very satisfactory conversations he had had the year before with
Salisbury at the Berlin Congress. Egypt, Greece, Roumanla, and other
current international questions were discussed, as well as the
diplomatic relations of the Great Powers. "Vous pourrez juger
vous-même, "he concluded, "par ce que je viens de vous rapporter,
3
du ton confiant et cordial de nos explications mutuelles". The 
Documents diplomatiques français omits two passages in this despatch. 
One deals, with Roumanla, the other with "Questions coloniales diverses",
1
Salisbury to Queen Victoria (copy), 19 September 1879, enclosed 
in Salisbury to Beaconsfield of the same date; Beaconsfield Papers» 
Box XIII.
2
Waddington *s ov/n holograph notes on the Dieppe interview are also 
to be found in Affaires étrangères, 781.
3
30 septembre 1879; Doc, dipl. fr., I, ii, no. 470, p.572.
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The full text (obtained from the draft in the archives of the Quai 
d ’Orsay) fills in the gaps left by Salisbury, and explains his 
cryptic references to Newfoundland and Tahiti. The colonial questions 
were those that had recently come up between the British and French 
Governnents: West Africa, Newfoundland, and the Leeward Islands. The 
first two were discussed very briefly: "A vrai dire aucun de ces
sujets n ’a êtê traité assez en détail entre nous pour que j ’aye de 
remarquer particuliers a vous transmettre; je n ’en attends pas moins, 
pour la solution de quelques-uns de difficultés en sui^ens, un utile 
effet de l ’esprit amical dans lequel notre rapide échangé de vues a été 
conduit". Then Waddington turned to the subject of the Leeward Islands:
"II est cependant une question importante sur laquelle 
je me suis un peu plus appesanti avec Lord Salisbury, 
et qui demande ici une mention plus développée. Le 
Principal Secrétaire d ’Stat de la Reine m'a confirme^ 
ce qu'il vous avait indique déjà ^  sujet des Iles sous 
le Vent. Il m'a dit qu’il ne prévoyait pas d ’objections 
de modifier les arrangements de 1847; peut être ferait- 
on feulement une reserve en une de l 'établissement d ’un 
dépôt de charbon pour le service des navires anglais, 
n  avait réclamé, a-t-il ajouté, des informations complets 
au Colonial Office, et il m'a promis une réponse prochaine".^
These documents throw light on the actual state of Anglo-French 
relations in the autumn of 1879. Tie significance of the Dieppe interview 
is underlined by the events v/hich followed Salisbury's return to London, 
namely, Germany's efforts to form an Anglo-German alliance, and Britain's
1
Waddington'a Pothuau (draft), 30 septembre 1879, no.149; 
Affaires étrangères, 781.
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subsequent refusal to undertake'binding engagements with regard to
a Russian attack on Austria, largely for fear of alienating France.
"As you say," Salisbury commented to the Prime Minister, "the question
1
is how it will affect our position towards France". Beaconsfield was
fairly well disposed towards the project on account of its anti-
Russian complexion, but the Queen told him: "we must not alienate
France, who, whether Republican or otherwise - this country likes
to be allied with, & the relations with whom are now very satisfactory.
If we ally ourselves with Germany & Austria - France might join
2
with Russia & Italy, wh. wd. be very serious". Later, when Bismarck
had dropped the project, Beaconsfield told the Queen he thought it was
"by no means unfortunate. It would have been a difficult, and even
dangerous, affair to have altogether rejected tne contemplated alliance;
and, although from the interviews of M, Waddington and Lord Salisbury
at Dieppe, an estrangement from France would not have, necessarily,
occurred, still it would have been an event, which might have chilled
the reciprocal feelings of yr. Majesty's Government and that of Paris.
3
At present yr. Majesty is as free as air...."
1
Salisbury to Beaconsfield, 29 September 1879; Salisbury. II, p. 366.
2
30 September 1879. Beaconsfield Pipers, Royal Correspondence I.
The first five words and the last sentence of tnis extract are printed 
in Disraeli, VI, p.489.
3
Beaconsfield to Queen Victoria, 5 November 1879; Disraeli, VI, p. 494,
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Soon after Salisbury's return to London, Pothuau saw the
Foreign Secretary and received similar assurances to those Waddington
1
had been given with regard to the Leeward Islands. Salisbury kept
silence towards his colleagues; there is no record in the Foreign
Office archives of the Islands being mentioned in this conversation.
Meanwhile, he had learned the Colonial Office and AdmirsGLty view of
the French proposal. Hicks-Beach was entirely of Salisbury's opinion:
he had no objection to a French protectorate, and believed the Islands
were of no special interest to the Australasian Colonies, though he
felt the French should act at once to avoid "the occurrence of
2
complications hereafter" The Admiralty, however, took a very
different view, to the Foreign Secretary's irritation. The Lords
Commissioners pointed out the potentialities of the Islands as a coaling
station in view of the future Panama Canal, and thought it inadvisable
to allow the Leeward group "to be included in the French Protectorate,
3
or to be occupied by any other Power". .Salisbury vented his feelings
in the reflection that "The Admiralty is very similar in its ways to
4
the Marine Dept, in France", - that is, too prone to what he and Lyons
1
Pothuau à faddington, 11 octobre 1879; Affaires étrancres. 782.
2
C.0. to F.O., 30 September 1879; F. 0. 27/2411.
3
Admiralty to F. 0., 29 September 1879, Secret; P.O. 27/2411.
4
Minute of 12 November 1879, on Lyons to Salisbury, 10 November 
1879, No. 1122, Confidential; F.O. 27/2411.
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called "chauvinism".
Salisbury was in a dilemma. By November he had made no
reply to the French proposal of September, and Waddington was pressing 
1
for an answer. He apparently avoided speaking about the problem to
the Foreign Office officials, who were in the dark as to his intentions.
All they knew was that there was a possibility that the abrogation of
the 1847 Declaration might be granted in return for the French coming
2
to terms in West Africa. The idea of a general settlement with France 
on the west coast of Africa had recently been under review, and it 
seemed a sound enough proposition to try to settle the West African 
disputes at the same time as the Leeward Islands question. In this 
direction lay Salisbury's hope of a solution. By associating other 
colonial issues with the Islands affair, he hoped to satisfy both 
British interests and the French Government. A useful diplomatic bargain 
might be struck, at little cost to Britain.
Apart from West Africa, however, there was the greater problem 
of Nev/found land, that of the French fishing rights on the so-called "French 
Shore" granted by the Treaty of Utrecht in 1713. The problem had been 
perennial for nearly a hundred years. At various times there had been 
attempts to reach an agreement on the exact nature of the privileges 
extended to France by the original Treaty, but they had always failed.
1
Lyons to Salisbury, ibid.
2
Minutes by Tenterden and Staveley on Lyons to Salisbury, supra.
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In recent years the need for a settlement had become more pressing,
owing to increasing difficulties between the French fishermen and
settlers on the one hand and the people of Ifewfoundland on the other.
The Colony was self-governing and politically conscious to a high
degree; it was loud in its protests against alleged infiltration
inland beyond the limits of the "French Shore", against the use of the
shore for purposes other than that of the legitimate drying of fish,
and against French ccmrpetition in the indigenous fishing industry.
The French for their part protested against attacks made on their
boats, and against alleged attempts to curtail privileges they claimed
under the ambiguous wording of the 1713 Treaty. In 1879 the idea
of a fresh negotiation with France was being discussed once again in
London. Pauncefote was in favour of trying to settle the Newfoundland
1
question simultaneously with that of West Africa.
In a conversation m t h  Pothuau at the end of November,
Salisbury tried to prepare the way. When Pothuau raised the question of 
the Leeward Islands, Salisbury spoke at some length of the attacks made on 
him by the Parliamentary Opposition for his too great complaisance towards 
France, especially over Egypt, Warming to his theme, he spoke of 
another kind of opposition with which he had to contend, that of the 
missionary societies; since their influence had prevented the Gambia 
exchange project from going through, he explained, he had to be carefUl
1
Pauncefote *s minute of 3 August 1879 on 0.0. to F. 0., 2 August 1879; 
F.O, 27/2416.
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over other colonial questions. He then suggested associating the
Leeward Islands question wi.th that of Newfoundland. To Salisbury, as
to his colleagues, it was more important to settle the "French Shore"
disputes than the more recent questions in West Africa. He deliberately
pitched his aim for negotiations high, holding West Africa in reserve.
Pothuau replied that it was difficult to see the connection between
the two subjects, that at first England had seemed disinterested in the
Leeward Islands, and that Salisbury should give a tangible proof of
his good will tov/ards France. Undeterred, Salisbury went on to speak
of a commission on the Newfoundland question, and elaborated his
proposals. Pothuau *s impression was that Salisbury had decided not
1
to move on the Leeward Islands proposal, without compensation.
Three weeks later they again discussed the question. Although
Pothuau was confirmed in his opinion that the Foreign Secretary would
only give way over the Islands in re tarn for scxne equivalent, he now
realised that to Salisbury the natire of the equivalent v/as comparatively
2
unimportant. It m i ^ t  be Newfoundland or it might be West Africa. A
few days later, having received instructions that Salisbury's proposals
3
with regard to Newfoundland were not to be accepted, Pothuau told the
Pothuau a Waddington, 24 novembre 1879, no. 46 confidentielle. 
Affaires étrangères. 782. A brief and inadequate extract was 
published in the Livre Jaune^ Affaires des Nouvelles-Hebrides 
et les Iles-sous-le-Vent de Tahiti. (1887), noT5.
Potlauau à Waddington, 12 décembre 1879, no. 49 confidentielle; 
Affaires étrangères, 782.
Waddington a Pothuau (draft) 8 decembre. 1879, no, 184; 
Affaires étrangères, 782.
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Foreign Secretary that the tv/o questions of Nevrf*oundland and the
1
Leeward Islands ought to he treated separately. Accordingly, on
17 January 1880, Salisbury abandoned Newfoundland and played his last
card. He had already suggested to Pothuau on the 10th as a purely
personal idea that all the West African issues could be settled 
2
together. He now proposed that in return for a comprehensive
settlement in West Africa the 1847 Declaration respecting the Leeward
3
Islands would be abrogated. This plan met with the Ambassador’s
4
general approval. It had been fully discussed betv/een the Foreign
and Colonial Offices, and there was no further need on Salisbury’s
part for secrecy vis-a-vis his colleagues.
For some weeks the question hung fire, for in the third week
of January, Salisbury was taken seriously ill and had to remain at his
5
country residence until the end of î^bruary. In I\5arch, however, Pothuau 
was able to present Salisbury with a memorandum on what would be 
acceptable to his. government with regard to West Africa. In the case 
of these proposals being accepted, he wrote, "il est entendu que toute
1
Pothuau V  Waddington, 17 décembre 1879, no. 52, confidentielle; 
Affaires étrangères, 782.
2
Salisbury to Lyons (draft), 17 January 1880, No.49; F.O. 27/2480.
3
Vide p. 264,
4
Pothuau a^Freycinet, 20 janvier 1880, no. 6, confidentielle; 
Affaires étrangères, 783.
5
Salisbury, II, pp.377-9.
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latitude nous serait laissée pour étendre aux Iles-sous-le-Vent notre 
1
Protectorat. " It seems that by this time there were rumours at the
Foreign Office of Salisbury’s having promised concessions with regard
to the Leeward Islands in earlier conversations with Pothuau, that is,
before 17 January; Salisbury tried to dispel the idea:- "Reports of ray
2
supposed conversations to be taken cum grano," he vo'ote. Whether he
3
convinced M s  subordinates is not known. As it happened the meeting
at which Pothuau presented M s  memorandum was one of the last occasions
on which the two men met in an official capacity. Salisbury was ordered
4
to Biarritz to convalesce by M s  doctor, and he left on 22 March. The
General Election came soon after, and Salisbury returned from abroad
5
merely to join in the formalities of surrendering office. The
Conservatives had been heavily defeated.
Meanwhile the French were considering their next move.
De Freycinet, the new Foreign Minister, was at first favourable to the
idea of a negotiation, though he felt that Salisbury’s proposals for
6
West Africa did not meet the French case entirely. Yet it seemed doubtful
Notes by Admiral Pothuau communicated personally on 18 March 1880;
P.O. 27/2480.
Minute by Salisbury on Pothuau*s Notes; P.O. 27/2480.
Salisbury’s experience of Pothuau in other negotiations going on at die 
same time had made him lose whatever confidence he had had in him, and 
illness made the Foreign Secretary more than usually intolerant: "Pothuau 
is a perfect ass", he told Beaconsfield (Salisbury to Beaconsfield,
12 February 1880, Pte., Beaconsfield Papers, XIII (l)).
Salisbury, II, p.380.
ibid. III, p. 35.
Freycinet à Pothuau, 6 mars 1880; Doc, dipl. fr., I.,iii.no.52.Salisbury’s 
"offer" of the Leeward Islands to France, discussed in this despatch, 
constitutes the first mention of the Islands in the Documents 
diplomatiques français.
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explanation from France. The reply was that Chessé had been instructed
2
not to accept the request for a protectorate. A fortnight later,
however, Freycinet told Lyons that recent despatches from Tahiti showed
that the affair had gone much further than had been supposed, for the
Commandant had actually hoisted the French flag in Raiatea. It Vfould
therefore be very inconvenient to haul down the flag as that would
encourage the designs of other Powers. Tie French Government did not
deny that they were bound by the 1847 Declaration to haul down their flag
if the British insisted, but they would much prefer that the British
3
flag should be hoisted too. To have done so would of course have
associated Britain with the French action and given it a measure of
approval. The impression created in London by this suggestion was bad;
4
Tenterden felt the French were "shuffling". To Granville, coming new to 
the question, the French move appeared more culpable than it might have 
done to Salisbury. During the political upheaval, colonial questions, 
including that of the Leeward Islands, had been eclipsed by more pressing 
issues. No action had been taken on the proposed West African-Leeward 
Islands negotiations since Pothuau presented his reply to the British
3
4
Granville to Lyons (draft), 26 June 1880, No.788; F.O, 27/2474.
Lyons to Granville, 28 June 1880, Tel.No. 45; F. 0. 27/2474, Freycinet’s 
written reply to Lyons’s enquiries, 28 June 1880, is printed as no.7 
Documents Diplomatiques, ^ f aires des Nouvelles Hebrides et les 
Iles-sous-le-Vent de Tahiti (l887),
Lyons to Granville, 12 July 1880, No.596; F.O. 27/2475.
Minute on the above despatch.
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proposals in March. Freycinet’s obvious approval of Chesséfe ostensibly
uninstructed action changed the whole situation: up to June, France had
been a suppliant for a British favour, but now she could dictate terms.
Granville felt that the best means of dealing with the
matter was first to refuse to countenance the present French position
in Raiatea, othervd.se France would have no further need to make
concessions elsewhere, and the conroensation scheme would be ruined.
1
He therefore asked for the restoration of the status quo. But the
French would not agree to this. Courcel, one of the chief officials
at the 'Quai d ’Orsay, told Adams that if the British insisted and "put
the knife to their throats" they would agree, but that they would be
far more inclined to be conciliatory in the current Newfoundland and
West African negotiations (since June carefully kept distinct from the
Leeward Islands question by the British) if they were allowed to stay in
2
Raiatea. To leave the island nov/ would be a humiliation. A Vv e^k later
Admiral Jaureguiberry, temporarily in charge of the Foreign Ministry,
put forward Salisbury’s original proposal that the Newfoundland and
3
Leeward Islands questions should be negotiated sianultaneously.
Granville’s insistence on the v/ithdrawal of the French
1
Granville to Adams (draft), 2 Aupust 1880, No, 1039; F. 0,27/2475,
2
Adams to Granville, 20 August 1880, No. 760, Confidential; F. 0,27/2475.
3 - /
Jaureguiberry a Adams, 27 aout 1880; Documents Diplomatiques,
Affaires des Nouvelles Hebrides et les IIes-s ou s-1e-Vent de Tahiti, 
(Î887), no. e.
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Protectorate from Raiatea now disappeared; the chance of a settlement
1
in other areas was too valuable to be lost. The Colonial Office.
2
when consulted, advised that an arrangement about Nevrfouniland and
3
not about West Africa should be the basis of compensation. In
October, Britain agreed that the Protectorate in Raiatea should
continue provisionally, pendi.ng the settlement of the Nev/foundland 
4
question. She stipulated, however, that if the negotiations- did not
come to a successful conclusion before a fixed date, the Protectorate
6
should be withdrav/n and the 1847 Declaration maintained. Later,
she had to remind France that the Protectorate was not to continue
indefinitely, but was to be strictly conditional on a settlement in 
6
Newfoundland.
Despite the initial unpleasantness over the French coup, 
and the subsequent friction between British and French representatives 
on the spot, Britain was well satisfied vd.th the turn events had taken.
4
5
6
F.O. minutes on Adams to Granville, 28 August 1880, No,787, (enclosing 
copy Jaureguiberry to Adams, .27 aout I860); F. 0. 27/2475.
F.O. to 0,0, (draft), 16 September 1880, Confidential; F, 0.27/2475.
G. 0. to F. 0., 29 September 1880; F. 0. 27/2475. Vide p. 270,
Granville to Lyons (draft), 22 October 1880, No. 1406; F.O. 27/2476.
Lyons to St, Hilaire, 5 November 1880; Affaires étrangères, 788.
^  extract was printed in Affaires des Nouvelles Hebrides et les 
lles-sous-le-Vent de Tahiti, as no. 9.
Granville to I^ ’^-ons, 5 Februsory 1881, No.Ill; F.O. 146/2310.
Vide St. Hilaire to Lyons (copy), 8 January 1881, enclosed in Lyons 
to Granville, 10 January 1881, No, 27; F.O. 27/2546.
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The Colonial Secretary felt that the Protectorate was ’an excellent
card, the more so as the question was of much importance to France,
1
and not of much to Britain’, The prospect of settling the troublesome
Newfoundland problem at last was attractive, and in order to obviate
delay Britain was at first careful to grant no more than a three-monthly
term to the provisional Protectorate. In ^%rch 1881, however, she had
2
to accept an extension to the end of June, and afterwards, as the
formal Nevfoundland negotiations were not to start till May, tixis date
3
was subsequently altered to September.
Britain’s earlier expectations of being able to retain her
bargaining power in negotiation soon faded. Even in April it looked as
if a further extension of the Raiatea Protectorate beyond the autumn
4
would have to be accepted. Tie Anglo-French Commission on Ife'wfoundland
5
which sat in Paris during the summer was a failure. By August all 
attempts to negotiate on the broad issue of the ’French shore* were
6
at an end, and only a general settlement was considered worth vdiile. 
Britain regarded the French Commissioner’s offer to cede a "completely
1
Minute on F.O. to C.0., 16 September 1880; C.0. 225/6.
2
' Granville to Lyons, 11 March 1881, No, 243; F.O. 146/2315.
3
Lyons to St. Hilaire, 12 ^ril 1881; Documents Diplomatiques,
Affaires des Nouvelles-Hebrides et leg Iles-sous-le-yent de Tahiti,no. 12.
4
C.O. to F.O., 2 April 1881; F.O. 27/2546.
5
The negotiations are described in R. A. MacKay (ed.) : NeY^rfoundland 
(Oxford 1946), but vdthout reference to Raiatea.
6
Note by Dilke, ? August 1881; F.O. 27/2548.
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valueless bit” of the "Treaty shore^in return for a British promise to
collaborate in sending warshins to induce all the Raiatea natives to
1
accept the French Protectorate, as ”quite inadmissable”. There seemed
nothing to be done but to agree once more to an extension of the 
2
Protectorate, and to hope for renewed negotiations in which France
would be more amenable to British views. But the danger was that
having occuoied Raiatea, the French would allow the Newfoundland question
3
to drag on indefinitely. Britain therefore announced that after June
1882, she would not be prepared to sanction any further continuance of
4
the protectorate.
The failure of the Anglo-French Commission forced Britain
to seek.another solution for the question of Raiatea. During the winter
of 1861-2, Gladstone, Granville, and Kimberley gave a good deal of
thought to it. The Prime Minister suggested buying out the French
5
interest in Nsv/foundland, but this was dismissed as a hopeless proposition.
7
Granville proposed a renewed attenç>t to cede the Gambia, but the Colonial
1
2
5
4
5
6
F.0. note, 12 August 1881; P.O. 27/2548.
Vide Granville *s minute on Dilke to Granville, Pte,, 18 November 1881;
G.D. 29/121. The French request for a further extension was made in 
Challerael-Lacour to Granville, 21 November 1881; P.O. 27/2549.
Minute by Tente rden on C. 0, to P.O., 5 November 1881; P.O. 27/2549.
Granville to Challemel-Ia.cour (draft), 23 November 1881; P.O. 27/2549.
Gladstone to Kimberley (copy), 23 November 1881; G.D. 29/135.
Granville to Gladstone (draft) 23 November 1881; G. D. 29/124. Kimberley
to Granville, 24 November 1881; G. D, 29/135.
Granville to Kimberley (draft), 30 November 1881; G.D. 29/135.
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Secretary ruled it out in viev/ of the exclusive tendencies of French 
1
trade, *Colonially speaking*, he now thought it might he best just
2
to ‘dxift* over Newfoundland.
These rather academic discussions came to an end when the 
Government began to realise that the Leeward Islands were of some 
importance in themselves. Public opinion was stirring, and letters and
leading articles drawing attention to the position in Raiatea had begun
3
to appear in the Press. The Royal Colonial Institute forced Granville
4
to receive a deputation by threatening publication of their correspondence
5
with him over the Leewards. They had emphasised the extent of
New Zealand*s trade v/ith the Islands, and by implication had criticised
6
Britain's policy of allowing the French Protectorate to continue. The
Colonial Secretary was beginning to dislike the v/hole idea of abrogating
7
the 1847 Declaration for the sake of Newfoundland. He feared that
8
Australasian opinion would strongly oppose such a concession to France,
1
Kimberley to Granville, 3 December 1881; G.D. 29/135.
2
Ibid.
3
F.g. Pall-Mall Gazette, 25 November 1881, and The Times, 26 November 1881,
4
On 10 March 1882.
5
Secretary of the Royal Colonial Institute to Granville, 27 February 1882; 
F.O. 83/1082.
6
Royal Colonial Institute to Granville, 31 January 1882; F.O. 83/1082.
7
Minute of 4 March 1882, on Royal Colonial Institute to Granville,
27 February 1882; F. 0. 83/1082.
8
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He now felt that British interests dictated some equivalent for 
Raiatea, not in Newfoundland, but in the Fhcific,
1
Kimberley’s suggestion was the Hervey Islands, some hundreds of
miles south-west of Tahiti, France herself had shown signs of interest
in this group, and in view of New Zealand’s commercial connections with
the Islands, Britain had asked earlier in the year for an assurance that
2
France did not intend to establish a protectorate there. The French
were pressing for renev/ed negotiations over Newfoundland, however, and
Granville realised that some decision over Raiatea had to be reached
3
quickly if Britain were not to lose control of the situation there. The
Foreign Office was in favour of leaving the Hervey Islands question alone
4
unless renewed Newfoundland negotiations fell through. But although
5
the Colonial Secretary bowed to their opinion, he still hankered after
a concession in the Ricific. He therefore held back from making any
fresh proposals regarding Ne^^yfoundland. Britain had to accept yet another
6
extension of the Raiatea Protectorate, and the Foreign Office was
Kimberley to Granville, 22 March 1882; G, D. 29/L75. Minutes by Kimberley 
on Granville to Lyons (draft), 30 March 1882, No, 355; F. O, 27/2610.
For the British Ambassador’s instructions, vide Granville to Lyons,
17 January 1882, No, 53 (enclosing copies of a memo, of 27 October 1881 
by the Prime Minister of New Zealand, and other correspondence);
P.O. 146/2410.
Minute by Granville on Granville to Lyons (rough draft), 30 March lo82. 
No. 355; ko. 27/2610.
Minutes by Granville, Pauncefote, and Dilke^ on Granville to Lyons, supra. 
Minute on 5 April 1882, on Granville to Lyons, supra.
Granville to Tissot (draft), 4 May 1882; F.O. 27/2610.
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1
inclined to blame Kimberley personally for the delay. The Foreign
Secretary himself thought that there was something to be said for
2
Kimberley’s proposal, emd consulted Lyons, Frevcinet’s assurance
3 4
about the Hervey Islands had after all not been very satisfactory.
But ’the present moment would have been a very inopportune time for
mooting a question of the kind wd.th the French Government’, and Lyons
considered an attempt at a final settlement over Newfoundland far 
5
preferable. That decided the matter, although in view of the failure of
tbi previous year’s negotiations, it seemed very dubious whether any
6
agreement would be reached. Nevertheless Granville was anxious for
the ’French Shore’ question to be settled, and to this end he held
out the hope of the continuance of the Raiatea Protectorate beyond the
7
three months * extension to î/Iarch 1883. France hoped this meant that
8
the Protectorate could continue mthout any further checks, and althou^
3
4
5
6
7
8
F.O. minute on ’the responsibility for delay in the Neivfoundland 
negotiations’, on Granville to Lyons (draft). No.430A; private minute 
by the Chief Clerk, F. 0., for Pauncefote, on Tissot to Granville,
23 May 1882; ?. 0. 27/2610.
Granville to lyons, 2 June 1882, No.651, (enclosing 0.0. to P.O. C°°py3>
22 May 1882); P.O. 146/2425.
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1
Granville indignantly repudiated this interpretation, he went a long
way towards conceding the point in declaring that so long as the
Newfoundland negotiations were conducted ’in a spirit which offered
reasonable hope of an agreement’, on the basis accepted by the two
2
Governments, Britain would agree to renew the Protectorate.
From November 1882, when France was told Britain was ready 
3 4
to resume negotiations, to the autumn of 1883, the new British
proposals on Newfoundland were being worked out departmentally under
the supervision of the Cabinet. In Jamary 1884 another Anglo-French
Commission met in Paris. By April the delegates had managed to sign an
agreement about the Treaty Shore,
By this time, Britain’s attitude towards the negotiations
had altered substantially, however. In the first place, the alienation
of Britain and France made an agreement over Newfoundland less attractive
than two or three years before. The basic reason for the negotiations
had been to dispose of an unnecessary diplomatic irritant, but now an
agreement on so small a question would have made little difference to tbs
1
Granville to Lyons (draft), 27 April 1883, No.442; F.O. 27/2655.
2
Granville to Lyons, 2 July 1883, No. 659; F.O. 146/2526. The relevant 
extract of . lyons's subsequent note verbale to Ghallemel-Lacour, 3 July 
1883, is printed (in a French transiation)’ in Doc, dipl. fr., I, v,p. 1,No te (]).
3
Lyons to Duclerc, 8 November 1882; this note verbale is printed (in a 
French translation) in Doc.dipl.fr,, I, iv, p. 534, no. 558.
4
Vide Challsmel-Lacour a Waddington, 26 octobre 1883; Doc, dipl. fr, ,I,v, 
p. 137, no. 127.
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general temper of Anglo-French relations. With the diplomatic motive 
gone, the probability of continual local difficulties^in the absence of 
a settlement, seemed comparatively unimportant, for British colonists and 
French fishermen suffered alike. In the second place, Britain no 
longer regarded French occupation of the Lee\mrd Islands as a trivial 
price to pay for a settlement elsewhere. (Bie I^naraa Canal project had 
created a new.strategic interest and had changed the whole aspect of 
Pacific affairs. As the Colonial Office reflected a few months later:
"Since the time at which the question of the abrogation 
of the Declaration of 1847 was first connected with that 
of the Newfoundland fisheries, the great value of the 
islands in the Pacific Ocean lying between Panama and 
Australasia has been brought into prominent notice!’ ^
In view of the progress of the Canal project since 1880, and with the
recent increase in trans-I^cific communications, the prospect of
France’s acquiring an unrivalled position in the South Pacific was
alarming. Kimberley’s desire to acquire the Hervey Islands for Britain
as compensation for the Leeward group was beginning to be appreciated.
The French enquiry of May 1884 as to when Britain intended
2
to abrogate the 1847 Declaration at once raised the question of an 
equivalent - even before it was known that the Newfoundland legislature 
would not accept the Anglo-French Agreement signed in April. Attention
C. 0. Confidential Print, 31 December 1884, "Memorandum regarding the 
Newfoundland negotiations, and the question of the abrogation of the 
1847 Declaration regarding the Society Islands”; F.O. 27/2703,
Ferry to Lyons (copy), 27 May 1884, enclosed in Lyons to Granville, 
28 May 1884, No. 313; F. 0. 27/2701.
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1
centred on Rapa, which had been singled out as a ’desirable resort for
British shipping* by the New Zealand government and by the Admiralty in
2
the previous year. This rocky, isolated island with an ’exceptionally 
3
fine ’ harbour, about six hundred miles from Tahiti, had been bought
by a Frenchman in 1867 and annexed by France in 1881. At that time
4
Britain had seen no reason to object, and had formally recognised French
possession. But now she felt that if France could be induced to give
up the island, she would gain a strategic position on the direct route
5
between Panama and Australasia at least as good as the Leewards.
According to Admiralty information, there were no other points in that 
part of the Pacific equal in inç>ortance to either Rapa or the Leewards.
The fact that France had declared a protectorate over only 
one of the Leeward Islands offered Britain a loophole for refusing to 
carry out the agreement reached in Paris without a fhrther concession. 
Although the Foreign Office had decided more than a year before, when a 
query arose, that Salisbury’s original proposal had been a settlement
1
C. 0. to P. 0. , 24 June 1884; P. 0. 27/2702.
2
Admiralty to C. 0., 25 October 1883, C. 0. Confidential Print, Australia 95, 
No. 84, pp. 107-8; 0.0. 808/45.
3
C»0. "Memorandum regarding the Newfoundland negotiations...
31 December 1884; F. 0. 27/2703.
4
Minutes on Miller to Granville, 14 March 1881, No.4 Political, and on 
Admiralty to F. 0., 4 June 1881; F. 0. 83,A082.
5
C. 0. to F, 0., 22 November 1884; F. 0. 27/2703.
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in Newfoundland acconç>anied by the abrogation of the 1847 Declaration —
1
which covered all the Leeward Islands, there was some slight legal
justification for withholding British consent to French protection of
the whole group. Tlie periodic extensions of the provisional Protectorate
had related solely to Raiatea. Granville received this ingenious
2
Colonial Office plan to acquire Rapa with entliusiasm. Lyons was
3
consulted on the best means of making the overture. In the meantime
the Nev/found land legislature had asked for a modification of the April
Agreement. Lyons suggested that the British Commissioners should first
attempt to secure the required alterations, but that if the French held
out, then the cession of Rapa could be proposed as the only price at
4
which Britain could consent to hand over the Leev/ards. Again, Lyons’s
5 ■
advice was unquestioningly accepted.
3. THB NEGOTIATIONS, NQTOÆBSR 1884 - 1888.
i) The Leeward Islands, Newfoundland. Rapa, and the New Hebrides. 
November 1884 - June 1885.
V/hen the Anglo-French Commission met again in November, the
French argued that since Britain, not France, wished the previous a^greement
1
Minute by pauncefote on C. 0. to F. 0., 5 March 1883; F. 0. 27/2655.
2
Minutes by Granville (and I^uncefote) on C. 0, to F. 0., 24 June 1884; 
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to be modified, she should at once abrogate the 1847 Declaration. The
1
British refused to do so, and then promised eventual abrogation in return 
for Rapa. Tlie French immediately asked for the acquisition of the New 
Hebrides.
France thus introduced an entirely new element into the
negotiations. Britain could not now acquire Rapa except at a high cost.
Nevertheless her need to gain compensation in the South Pacific made
the French proposals seem at first sight not impracticable. The Colonial
Office advocated two separate sets of negotiations, the first ■'Arith the
object of modifying the Newfoundland agreement, thereby allowing the •
1847 Declaration to be abrogated, and subsequent negotiations on the
2
New Bebrides-Rapa bargain. There was, however, a serious weakness in
this plan, and one which was soon realised to be an insuperable obstacle
to acceptance of the French proposals - that it ignored Australian
3
susceptibilities over the New Hebrides. After some months, an alternative 
means of acquiring Rapa was formulated, France was to be told ’informally 
and confidentially’ that unless Rapa were ceded to Britain,the Newfoundland
Vide British Commissioners ’ reports (copies), enclosed in C. 0. to P. 0.,
22 November 1884; F. 0. 27/2703.
0.0. "Memorandum regarding the Nev/foundland negotiations...
31 December 1884; F.O. 27/2703.
When the C. 0. Memo, of 31 December 1884 on the Newfoundland negotiations 
was reprinted with alterations for the Cabinet (and dated 14 January 1885), 
the suggestion of eventual negotiations over Rapa and the New Hebrides 
was omitted; F.O. 27/2765.
475,
negotiations might collapse altogether, since the Newfoundland Government
was dissatisfied with the current Anglo-French arrangement, and that the
1
Leeward Islands would thus remain independent. This prooosal was nut
2 "
before Freycinet on 27 1885.
The same day the Récidivistes Bill became law. Knowing that
Britain would not abandon the New Hebrides without some great concession,
the French Foreign Minister offered to suspend the application of the Law
to New Caledonia if Britain would agree to a French acquisition of the 
3
NSW Hebrides. There was a chance that Britain would accept; when
questioned in Parliament on the Anglo-Qerman conversations about the
Pacific at Berlin in December 1884, Gladstone had already looked to the
possibility of French sovereignty over the New Hebrides provided
4
"favourable tems" were secured to the Australasian Colonies. At that 
time he had had Rapa in mind, but if Australian satisfaction was to be 
Britain’s yardstick in negotiation, the cessation of transportation to 
NSW Caledonia would have been a far more ^favourable ’ quid pro quo.
1
C.O. to F.O., 20 May 1885, Confidential; F.O. 27/2765. Granville 
to Lyons, 23 Vhy 1885, No. 514, Confidential; F.O. 146/2715.
2
Lyons to Granville, 29 May 1885, No, 347; F.O. 27/2765.
3
Walsham to Salisbury, 30 June 1885, No. 28 Consular, Confidential; 
F.O. 27/2737.
4
I^liamentary Debates, third series, vol. CCXCV, cols. 125-6 
(5 March 1885)^
476.
ii)l The New Hebrides and New Caledonia, the Leeward Islands and 
Newfound 1 and, July 1885 - June 1666.
On becoming Foreign Secretary ®sssç again, Salisbury at
once realised the difficulties in the way of a Western Pacific
settlement such as France had proposed, Meade’s conversations with
Bismarck at Berlin the previous A^rinter had received much publicity,
1
and there had been widespread criticism, both at home and in the 
Australian Colonies, of Britain’s alleged Vvâllingness to see the New 
Hebrides fall to France. Rjjmours of the proposed Rapa-New Hebrides
n
:'.u
bargain had leaked out, and Salisbury feared there would be equal
opposition to a New Hebrides-New Caledonia bargain. A3 he once, bitterly
remarked, some misguided peonle seemed to think that ’no negotiation 'ims
f 3
worth having unless the other side was very sore , He entirely-
disapproved of the uncompromising attitude of the Australians over the
Western Pacific, and he felt that this particular 'oroblem in Anglo-French
4
relations had gone on far too long. The longer a settlement was delayed,
he complained to Waddington, the more difficult it would become to reach
any agreement because of the pressure exerted on Britain from Australia - 
 ^  ^ 5
"qui échappé de plus en plus au contrôle de la métropole".
1
3
5
IzjS." Po-11 Ma 11 Gazette, 10 February 1885.
Vide ppll Mail Gazette^  5 January 1885.
Salisbury to Aastin, 27 October 1884; Salisbury XV, p. 54,
Salisbury’s minute on Waddington to Salisbury, 10 July 1885;- 
F. 0, 27/2766,
Waddington a Frevcinet, 8 juillet 1885. télégramme; Affaires etranp^res, 
811,
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Salisbury also considered the value to Br-itain of island
groups in the South Pacific much exaggerated. He attached no more
importance to Rapa than he had to the Leeward Islands in 1879-80. When
the French Ambassador mentioned Rapa to him, he not only had to be shown
1
the island on a map, but had never heard of it, Waddington confused
the immediate issue by misunderstanding his instructions and proposing
exactly what Britain had previously considered a possibility - Rapa for
2
the New Hebrides, but Salisbury refused to take advantage of the
3
Ambassador’s mistake, despite prompting from the Colonial Office, He
saw that France was not prepared to relinquish Rapa, and he also wished
4
to keep tne Western Pacific problem apart from that of the South.
In this way he hoped to minimise the effects of vdiat he regarded as 
the intolerable intrusion of Colonial ajmbitions into Anglo-French 
relations. He was not interested in forcing France to make concessions, 
vdth the importance of which he personally was not impressed. As in 
1879, he was thinking in diplomatic terras., and his primary aim in 
negotiation was to reach a speedy settlement in order to lessen the 
tension between Britain and France. He considered that to simplify the 
negotiations, by keeping the several Pacific issues as far as possible 
distinct, would be to increase the chances of ultimate agreement.
1
Waddington a Freycinet, 3 juillet 1885, no,73; Affaires étrangères, 811,
2
tbid. Salisbury to Walsham, 2 July 1885, No. 624; F. 0.146/2719. 
Waddington a Freycinet, 6 juillet 1885, tele^gramme; Affaires 
étrangères, 811,
Minute by Salisbury on C* 0. to F. 0., 10 August 1885; F. 0. 27/2766,
4
Salisbury to Lyons, 8 July 1885, No. 638; F.O. 146/2719.
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Salisbury was delighted when France agreed tliat the
Newfoundland negotiations should proceed with reference to the Leeward 
1
Islands only. He was in no mood to listen to any Colonial objections
to a French acquisition of the Islands, since the latter v/ere two
thousand miles from Wellington and three thousand six hundred from 
2
Sydney. His only conditions v/ere that they should never be used as
a nenal settlement and that British trade there would be favourably 
3
treated. But he refused to make the convict question a formal
4
stipulation, as the Colonial Office desired; to wish to do so seemed
5
to him to indicate an absurd tenderness for Colonial sentiments, and
he was content with an informal understanding. Happily, the Newfoundland
6
negotiations made good progress in Paris, and in October Salisbury and
Waddington were able to congratulate each other on the immediate prospect
7
of the negotiations being concluded.
1
2
3
4 
6
B
7
Waddington to Salisbury, 10 July 1885; F. 0. 27/2766.
I^nute by Salisbury on Waddington to Salisbury, supra,
Waddington k Freycinet, 16 juillet 1885, 17 juillet 1885, télégrammes; 
Affaires étrangères, 811.
C. 0. to F. 0., 10 August 1885; F, 0. 27/2766.
Freycinet \  Waddington, 23 juillet 1885, telégrsjnrae, Affaires 
étrangères, 811.
Minute by Salisbury on C. 0. to F- 0., su pra.
Waddington a Freycinet, 8 octobre 1885; Affaires étrangères, 812.
479.
The conduct of the Bxcific negotiations as a whole, however, 
was not exclusively in Salisbury’s hands. The Colonial Office still
1
wished to acquire Rapa, and had the support of the New Zealand Government.
2
Tie possibility of acquiring the Cook Islands instead was broached, but
3
the Admiralty declared the Islands had no safe harbours. A Cabinet
decision forced Salisbury to act against his personal convictions and
to propose that Rapa should be ceded to Britain, when he was asked to
4
give his answer to the New Hebrides-I'few Caledonia proposal. Inevitably,
France refused to pay double for the New Hebrides. After this rebuff,
Salisbury felt that while there was a hope of the South Pacific question
being settled on the Newfoundland-Leeward Islands basis, that is, until
the Newfoundland legislature had decided for or against the new Anglo-
5
French Agreement, the subject of Rapa should be dropped. At the same 
time, he tried to conciliate the Colonial Office by proposing that a
Jervois /governor of New Zealan^ to Stanley, 12 September 1885, No. 108; 
C.O. 209/245.
C.0. to F.O., 13 November 1885; C.O. to Admiralty, 13 November 1885;
C.O. Confidential print, Australia 112a, p.82, Nos.73 and 74,
C.O. 808/62.
Admiralty to C. 0., 27 November 1885, C.O. Confidential Print, Australia 
112a, p.90, No.84; C.O. 808/62. In fact, there is a good sheltered 
harbour in Raratonga, one of the Islands. Was the Colonial Office being 
deliberately misled by the Admiralty who favoured Rapa above all other 
potential coaling stations in the South Rhcific, or was Admiralty 
information deficient over the Cook Islands?
Waddington k Freycinet, 20 janvier 1886, télégramme, confidentiel; 
Affaires étrangères, 814. Salisbury to Lyons, 20 January 1886, No. 42; 
F.O. 146/2801.
F.O. to C.O. (draft), 21 January 1886, Secret; F.O. 27/2843.
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1
British consular representative should be appointed in Raratonga,
one of the Cook Islands, where British traders had been established
for many years.
Rosebery, who succeeded Salisbury at the Foreign Office,
was less concerned to improve Anglo-French relations than to seek
opportunities for promoting wuat he considered were imperial interests.
Salisbury’s map of the South Seas had lain in Europe. Rosebery’s policy
was formulated in accordance with his belief in British pre-eminence
in the Pacific. He refused to go forward with the proposed New Hebrides-
New Caledonia negotiation until he was ful^^acquainted with Australian 
2
views on it. His determination to act on behalf of the Colonies was
strengthened when, on 23 February 1886, all the Australian Agents-Qeneral
and the High Commissioner for Canada came in a body to the Colonial
Office and stated their attitude very plainly, criticising almost every
step Britain had previously taken, or failed to take, over French
3
colonisation in the Ricific, Rosebery had a special regard for tne 
Australian Colonies, which transcended the vague hopes he had had on 
assuming office of improving relations with France, The aspirations of 
other British colonies failed to arouse in him anything like the same
1
F.O. to C.O., 25 January 1886; C.O. 225/23,
2
Rosebery to^Lyons (draft), 9 February 1886, No. 79; F-0. 27/2843.
Waddington a Freycinet, 9 février 1886, télégramme; Affaires des Nouvelles 
Hebrides et les Iles-sous-le-Vent de Tahiti, no. 17.
3
"Notes on an interview..., " C. 0. Confidential Print, Australia 112a,
No. 182a; C.O, 808/62.
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response. He v/as, for instance, comparatively unsympathetic towards 
the Newfoundlanders, whose complaints against the French were less a 
matter of racial sentiment and ambition, than of practical economic 
grievances; when he knew that the colony was antagonistic towards the 
new Anglo-French arrangement about the Treaty Shore, he asked, in 
mock despair, "what can we do with a statutory incorruptible legislature?"
He was, moreover, subject to A strong Parliamentary pressure over the
2
Western Pacific, which stiffened his own resistance to the concessions 
France desired.
At the same time, Rosebery acknowledged that there would be 
some advantage in accepting the terms France had offered, in order to end 
the récidivistes problem. Though less prepared to compromise than 
Granville, now Colonial Secretary, he was at times ready to admit that 
a French occupation of the New Hebrides would be a lesser evil than the 
continuance of transportation to New Caledonia. The French must have 
knov/n that Britain considered the récidivistes oroblem more serious than 
that of the New Hebrides, for the French Ambassador had often used the 
threat of récidivistes being sent to New Caledonia to frighten Britain
1
Rosebery to Gladstone, Pte., 15 March 1886; Add. MS. 44289.
2 -
E. ^  parliamentary Debates, third series; vol. CCCII, cols, 888-9 
February 1886;; vol. CCCV, cols. 909-10 (13 May 1886) and 1042-3 
(14 May 1886).
3
Memorandum by Meade for the Cabinet, 1 April 1886; G*D. 29/213.
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1
into accepting the French offer, A French occupation of the New
Hebrides would not have meant a material loss to the Australasian
Colonies, for the Compagnie Calédonienne had almost established a
monopoly of property and commerce in the islands. The Colonies were
therefore advised to regard the French offer as at least worthy of 
2 3
consideration, as Granville declared in the Lords, and at best as
4
decidedly advantageous*
It was agreed, however, that every effort should be made
5
to secure Rapa as 'well. The Colonial Office hoped that if tlie 
Colonies made Rapa a sine qua non for the potential loss of the Nev/
g
Hebrides, France might give up the island. So the colonial governments
were secretly encouraged to insist on Rapa, Meanwhile Rosebery tried to 
impress the French with the great sacrifice Britain would make in 
abandoning the New Hebrides to French enterprise. He complained of
1
Waddington a Freycinet, 31 janvier 1886, no,12, tres confidentielle; 
Affaires étrangères, 814. Waddington’s tactics were approved by 
the Minister for Foreign Affairs; Freycinet a Waddington, 3 février 1886, 
tél.; Affaires étrangères. 814.
Granville to Sir.H. Loch (copy), Pte., 29 July 1886; G.D. 29/213»
Parliamentary Debates, third series, vol.CCCI7, 26 March 1886.
Granville to Governor of South Australia (copy), 2 March 1886, 
cypher tel. /Containing instructions to communicate the contents to 
the Governors of the other Australian ColcniekT, enclosed in G. 0. to F. 0., 
3 March 1886; F. 0. 27/2843. .
C.O. to F.O,, 13 February 1886; F.O. to C.O. (draft), 6 April 1886;
F.O. 27/2843.
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French treatment of English missionaries in the Loyalty Islands, and
insisted that Britain’s missionai^r Interests in the New Hebrides very
considerably increased his "difficulties in dealing with the general 
1
question".
After all, the proposed negotiation came to nothing. By 
June 1886 all the Australian Colonies had refused to agree to it, some
of them even if Rapa had been ceded to Britain. Tius Britain was
2
obliged to ’knock on the head’ the one and only chance of a complete 
settlement in the western Pacific.
iii) The New Hebrides, Newfoundland, and the Leeward Islands.
June 1886 - August 1886.
France occ?ipied the Nevf Hebrides before Britain had formally
3
turned down the French proposal. This action, together with the
announcement that récidivistes were now to be sent to New Caledonia'^9
strained Anglo-French relations generally and created an unpleasant 
atmosphere around what had hitherto been fairly amicable negotiations. 
With French troops in the New Hebrides and British ships near the coast
Rosebery to Lyons, 30 April 1886, No. 285; P.O. 146/2811. Waddington 
a Freycinet, 50 avril 1886, confidentielle; Affaire s étrangères. 816.
3
Granville to Sir H Loch (copy), Pte., 29 July 1886; G.D. 29/213.
Rosebery to Waddington (copy), 7 July 1886, enclosed in Waddington a 
Freycinet, 8 juillet 1886; Affaires des Nouvelles-Hebrides et les 
îles-sous-le-yent de Tahiti. (1887), no. 24.
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holding a watching brief, the situation was tense. In London, no one
believed that the French pretext for occupation was genuine: it looked
1
like a fresh case of Tunisian Kfoumirs. This seemed all the more
probable in view of the French Foreign Minister’s admission that he
had no detailed information about the alleged murders committed by the 
2
natives. From the iBritish stand-point, France had by trying to
force the issue forfeited her right to any further consideration of her
claims to the islands.
Meanwhile the Newfoundland legislature had passed a Bait .Act
7/hich was in effect contrary to the Anglo-French Agreement of the
previous year. When Britain was told that French naval vessels would
3
be ordered to ’guard Treaty rights’ in Ne vrf oundl and waters, she seized 
the chance to associate this problem with a new FU.cific settlement, glie 
intended to make France pay heavily for the only concession she was now 
prepared to grant, that is, Raiatea: France could occupy Raiatea 
permanently on condition that she agreed to abide by the Anglo-French
4
arrangement about Newfoundland and that she evacuated the New Hebrides.
1
Minuke by pauncefote on Rosebery to Lyons (draft), 17 June 1886, 
Tel. No. 75; F.O. 27/2844.
2
Lyons to Rosebery, 1 July 1886, No. 348; F. 0. 27/2845.
3
Waddington to Rosebery, 21 June 1886; P. 0. 27/2838.
4
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Despite French disclaimers of any intention to annex the 
1
New Hebrides, the fact that France had failed to consult Britain or
to give her any warning with regard to the military occupation gave
Britain an opportunity to insist on equal participation in the future
administration of the islands. A joint Anglo-French administrative
2
commission was suggested. Mindful of British experience of the
Condominium in Egypt, Rosebery himself did not at first warm to the 
5
idea. But he was determined that France alone should not be allowed
to administer the islands, and he made repeated demands for her troops
4
to be withdrawn. Britain, he considered, had an "overwhelming case".
To make it more difficult for France to claim that her interests were
predominant, he advised the Colonial Secretary to reverse the policy
of forbidding the official registration of land acquired by British
5
subjects in the Western Pacific. In July he formally proposed a joint
commission, but on condition that French military evacuation took place 
6
first. Nothing would induce him to proceed with any negotiations with
Waddington a Freycinet, 6 juillet 1886, télégramme; Affaires des 
Nouvelles-Hebrides et les Iles-sous-le-Vent de Tahiti, no. 23.
2
C.O. to F.O., 25 June 1886; P.O. 27/2844.
3
Minute by Rosebery on C.O. to F. 0., supra.
4
Crewe; Roseber^^ I, p.268.
5
P.O. to C.O. (draft, suggested by Rosebery), 30 June 1886;
P.O. 27/2844.
6
Rosebery to Lyons, 20 July 1886, No.609; F.O. 146/2821.
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France, not only those relating to the Pacific hut those concerned with
other broader diplomatic issues as ;vell, until tne troops were gone,
"Whenever 7/addington asked for an answer about anything", he recollected
shortly after he went out of office, "I always turned the conversation
1
round to that interesting spot". His efforts were fruitless, for 
France refused to submit to such a demand from another Power, especially 
as she had insisted that the occupation was provisional only and would 
cease when an Anglo-French arrangement was concluded. The French became 
very tired of Rosebery’s perpetual non possumus, viiich Salisbury 
afterwards characteristically, but probably erroneously, attributed to
2
the former Foreign Secretary’s lack of control over the Colonial Office.
Only the fall of the Gladstone Government made any progress
in negotiation possible, Iddesleigh, Rosebery’s successor, was willing
to accent the French proposition that the troops could not be T,vithdrawn
3
till the Joint Commission had been established. 7/hereas to Rosebery 
prior withdrawal had been a matter of principle, to Iddesleigh and 
Salisbury it mattered little whether the troops went before or after the 
establishment of the Commission, once France had agreed to a joint 
admini s tration.
1
Rosebery to Lyons, Pte., 10 August 1886; Lyons, II, p. 374.
^ \ / \
Waddington a Freycinet, 11 aout 1886; Affaires étrangères, 818.
Waddington à Freycinet, 13 aout 1886; Doc, dipl. fr., I, vi,no. 284,
p.289.
3
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iv)• The New Hebrides and the Leeward Islands, September 1886-May 1888.
Tie main difficulty in the Pacific negotiations had been
resolved. The question of the Leeward Islands could now be resumed. In
the excitement over the New Hebrides, Raiatea had been almost forgotten,
although the provisional protectorate had been periodically and almost
automatically renewed. On 9 September a meeting was convened at the
Colonial Office to decide the main objectives in the negotiation of all
the remaining issues. Those taking part were Salisbury (the Prime IHnister),
Iddesleigh, Edward Stanhope (the Colonial Secretary), and, on tlie French
side, d ’Aubigny, the charge d ’affaires. Tiey agreed that the 1847
Declaration recognising the independence of the Leeward Islands would be
abrogated in return for joint Anglo-French administration of the New
1
Hebrides, which would end French military occupation. Tie thorny problem
of Newfoundland was to be dropped; ("l’arrangement n ’est pas mort, il est
2
seulement endormi". )
Only the récidivistes problem^ remained, and here progress
proved incessible. Iddesleigh tried hard to persuade France to stop
transportation to New Caledonia; indeed, he felt that the question should
3
be settled alongside that of the New Hebrides, In parliament. Stanhope
Memorandum of statements made by Salisbury, Iddesleigh, and Stanhope;
F. 0. 27/2847, Iddesleigh to Egerton, 9 September 1886, No. ^ 8 A;
F.O. 146/2824. D ’Aubigny a Freycinet, 9^septembre 1886, télégramme; 
Affaires des Nouvelles Hebrides et les Iles-sous-le-Vent de Tahiti,no. 35.
2 V
Salisbury’s picturesque phrase reported in d ’Aubigny a Freycinet,
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3
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referred to the "o-reat evils" vdiich the penal settlement had inflicted
1
on the Australian Colonies. After Iddesleigh’s death in January 1887, 
however, the question was not pursued. In the reconstructed Cabinet,
Stanhope 7/as transferred to the War Office, and his place as Colonial 
Secretary was taken by Sir Henry Holland, whose self-effacing nature 
fitted in well with Salisbury's desire to minimise the intrusion of 
colonial interests into diplomacy. Salisbury himself had no interest 
in the récidivistes problem as a subject for negotiation. He regarded 
it as a purely local matter, and in 1888, he advised the Australian 
governments to protect themselves by municipal legislation against 
escaped convicts.
After the September meeting, the conclusion of the 
negotiations was purely a matter of time. But the long deferment of a 
final agreement was harmful to Anglo-French relations. Salisbury v/as 
very irritated by French insistence that the Nev/ Hebrides negotiations 
should proceed side by side with the question of the Suez Canal Convention, 
which France hoped to extract from Britain, He retaliated by holding out
2
on the Canal issue till he had obtained satisfaction about the New Hebrides. 
He was also annoyed that his gesture in refusing to sanction the 
Newfoundland Bait Act (which was against French interests) had not been
1
Parliamentary Debates, third series, vol. CCOIX, col. 1122 
(21 September 1886),
2 .
Waddin^on a Flourens, 22 mars 1887; Affaires des Nouvelles Hebrides 
et les Iles-sous-le-yent de Tahiti, no. 42,
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reciprocated in some way. Waddington did not relish the situation
1
either, despite his definite instructions not to hurry on the negotiations.
Salisbury was constantly exposed to persistent Htrliamentary questions
2
about the progress of the Anglo-French discussions. In June, he put his 
case frankly before France:
"The unaccountable delay on the part of the French 
Government in proceeding with this question has become 
a matter of grave anxiety to Her Majesty's Government, 
and has created a feeling of distrust and dissatisfaction 
in the public mind in this country and in the colonies 
which it is most important to allay.
In view of the solemn and re-iterated assurances they 
have received. Her Majesty's Government cannot doubt 
that the French Government are determined loyally to 
observe the agreement regarding the New Hebrides. But 
they entertain a strong objection to any further delay 
in carrying out the proposed settlement of the question, 
as to which both Governments are agreed upon all material 
points".^
A few days later Waddington himself recommended his Government to come 
to terms. He argued that though the six-months’ delay had been useful 
over the Suez Canal and Madagascar, it had now served its purpose; one 
reason was that Britain had recently conceded an important point in the 
Madagascar exequatur dispute. According to him, the original arrangement
Freycinet a Waddington, 19 novembre 1886, télégramme no. 85; Affaires 
étrangères, 819.
E.g.. parliamentary Debates, third series; vol.C0CXI7, cols. 496-505 
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Salisliury to lyons, 7 June 1887, No, 406; w, 0. 146/2918,
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had not been that the Suez Canal and New Hebrides negotiations should
proceed simultaneously, but that the final answer on both questions
1
should be given at the same time. But througiiout the summer of 1887
the delay continued, because France declined to forego the diplomatic
2
bargaining power her position in the New Hebrides gave her.
The first Colonial Conference, held in London, increased
Salisbury’s troubles considerably. It provided an opportunity for
increased criticism of his alleged mismanagement of the negotiations,
both from his opponents at home ("Jingoes who on all questions between
foreign countries and us or our colonies, take the most extravagant
5
view as a matter of course"), and from the Australian Colonies. The
Conference was the work of Rosebery’s cousin, Edward Stanhope, and it
became a convenient mouthpiece for the Imperial Federation League, of
4
which Rosebery v/ag Chairman, The League was still mainly concerned with 
the promotion of Australian interests. From the start the Conference was 
dominated by the Australian delegates, and since the proceedings were 
largely taken up v/ith discussions on the Western Fhcific, and more 
particularly on the New Hebrides, the atmosphere was strongly anti-French.
1
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On the first day.the chief delegate for Victoria, Alfred Deakin, said
that he wished to make it clear that he and the other Australian
Ministers had come over to impress the imperial Government with the
importance of ending ‘Blench military occupation of the New Hebrides,
1
and that they did not mean to return till the question was settled.
Salisbury was outraged by the delegates’ suggestion that an Australian
representative should be sent to Baris to negotiate directly with the
2
French Government. #ien he himself addressed the Conference he said 
that the islands were worthless, compared with the diplomatic necessity 
of settling a negotiation with France amicably and in its proper time.
His somewhat carelessly phrased, yet frank and realistic, speech aroused 
the furious resentment of the colonials. De akin felt that it revealed 
”the autocratic condescension of a î,tinister addressing a deputation of 
visitors from the antipodes whom it became his duty to instruct in 
current foreign politics for their own sakes”. Salisbury’s reaction 
to the Australians’ attitude was equally strong: ”It does seem to me”, 
he told Holland (who presided at the Conference) "that they are the 
most unreasonable people I ever heard or dreamt of, They want us to incur
1
Sydney Holland, Viscount Khutsford: In Black and White (London 1926), 
p. 92.
2
Salisbury, IV, p. 34.
5
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4
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all the bloodshed, the dangers, and the stupendous cost of a war with
France, of which almost the exclusive burden will fall upon us, for a
group of islands which to us are as valueless as the South Pole, and
1
to which they are only attached by a debating club sentiment”.
Nevertheless his warning of the dangers of an actual war with France
had its effect on the Conference, and the proposal of independent
2
negotiations was not pressed. After tne Conference, however, Salisbury
was dkill beset by advice from the Colonies on the New Hebrides question.
One suggestion was from the Governor of Victoria, who proposed to
undertake a special mission to investigate the alleged infraction of
3
the rights of British subjects in the islands. Salisbury felt that
the Australian attitude v/as "quite as likely to be injurious" to Britain
4
that of France.
Eventually, Britain and France were able to come to terms over 
the Sues Canal and the New Hebrides. It was typical of Salisbury’s raetnods 
in diplomacy that both questions were settled without reference to the 
Cabinet, by private discussion. The procedure was pleasantly informal. 
During his autumn visit to his house near Dieppe, Salisbury met 
Mo Chaud or dy, who was acting on behalf of Flourens, the French Foreign
1
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Minister, and together they worked out the final arrangements.
Chaudordy had been a fellow-plenipotentiary at the Constantinople
Conference over ten years before, and Salisbury had maintained social
1
contact with him. He was also a personal friend of PHourens.
The New Hebrides Agreement took the form of a convention
approved by an exchange of Notes dated 21 and 22 October 1887. The
Convention was signed in Haris by Flourens and Egerton, the British
2
charge d ’affaires, on 16 November. The terms included provision for
the abrogation of the 1847 Declaration with regard to the Leeward Islands
and French military evacuation of the New Hebrides, where a joint Naval
3
Commission was to be established. #ien the i\nglo-French Condominium
(as it was now called) came into force in 1888 , the Agreement was
supplemented by a Declaration signed on 30 May formally abrogating the
4
1847 Declaration. The texts of the New Hebrides Convention with 
Salisbury’s Note (which gave a brief resume^ of the negotiations since 1880)
and the French reply, of the 1847 Declaration and of the new Leeward Islands
'
Declaration, were presented to Parliament in 1888,
1
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Lr^rgely through skill in negotiation, Britajji had reason to
he satisfied with the settlement. She secured equal rights in the
New Hebrides, although her interests there were far less than those of
prance. She allov/ed Prance to acquire the Leeward Islands and abandoned
Rapa, but annexed the Cook Islands in 1888, In contrast, France had
difficulty in administering the Leeward Islands, for the natives were
hostile. In 1897 an expedition was sent against them, and it was not u n ü l
the following year that the French position was assured. In March, the
Islands were declared part of the French colonial empire. As for the
r</cidivistes problem, France herself decreed the abolition of transportation
to the Pacific in 1898. By taking the initiative in all the questions
that had led to Anglo-French negotiations - the protectorate in Raiatea,
the Récidivistes Bill, the occupation of the New Hebrides, France should
theoretically have been in an unassailable position. As Carnarvon
acknowledged vdien he was in Australia in 1887, Britain could not always
’invoke the mere engines of force’ in dealing with the activities of
1
great nations; ’diplomacy was the sole treatment*. In fact, considering 
that France had taken positive action to achieve her objectives and that 
Britain had done nothing in this respect, the outcome of the negotiations 
was more in favour of Britain than of France. By the ’nineties prance 
had been outstripped in the contest for Pacific power. During the final
1
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stages of the Anglo-French negotiations, Germany had taken the place of 
France as Britain’s chief rival, and in the subsequent race for territorial 
influence, France was left far behind.
Undoubtedly this result was due largely to Australian pressure 
on Britain. Colonial agitation against foreign expansion in the Pacific, 
aided by the imperialist movement in England, had focussed the attention 
of Gladstone’s second administration on problems to which Britain had 
previously'- been comparatively indifferent. Up to 1883 Britain had been 
largely concerned to use French colonial aspirations in the Pacific as 
a useful counter in other negotiations. During that year her policy 
changed to one of definite and unequivocal resistance to French expansion. 
By 1886 this policy had been carried sufficiently far to ensure that no 
ultijnate settlement v/ith France could be made that would not have promoted 
Britain’s imperial interests. The Conservative Government that came to 
power in 1886 eventually ended the stalqnate that had ensued, and brought 
the negotiations v/ith France to a conclusion, which, though not as 
advantageous to the Australian Colonies nor as much of a blow to French 
hopes as the imperialists had desired, was still profitable to Britain. 
Direct Australian influence on British policy was temporarily lessened 
by Salisbury’s firm handling of the situation in 1887. But the fact that 
Salisbury’s diplomatic realism and his tact and skill as a negotiator 
prevented the Anglo-French negotiations from leaving any serious or 
permanent ill-feeling between the two countries, meant that in her 
fu-ture defence of Australian interests against other Powers Britain was 
not hampered by French antagonism.
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CONCLUSION.
In the autumn of 1883, the French chargé d'affaires in 
London reflected gloomily on the attitude towards France that 
prevailed in English political circles. Recent speeches on Anglo- 
French colonial differences made hy the Leader of the Opposition 
in the House of Commons had, he told the Quai d ’Orsay, emphasised 
the fact that France now had even less to hope for from a future 
Conservative government than from the present liberal regime. This 
was in striking contrant to the situation during the first Gladstone 
administration, when France had always been able to console herself 
for Liberal hostility with the prospect of eventual Conservative 
support, ("II y a quelques années, nous pouvions penser que, si les 
libéraux nous étaient hostiles, les conservateurs du moins se montreraient 
plus favorables \  nos intérêts. Mais aujourd’hui, il n ’est plus permis 
d ’entretenir une pareille illusion..." ^).
The validity of this analysis is largely borne out by an 
examination of party allegiances in foreign affairs. By 1883 the two 
parties had reversed the roles that had become associated with them 
since the ’sixties. In their partiality for German nationalism, the 
Liberals had often appeared antagonistic towards France, and even the 
downfall of Napoleon III and the foundation of the Third Republic had
1
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not served to rid them entirely of their deep-rooted mistrust of French
policy. In the ’seventies religious affiliations still counted in the
realm of foreign affairs, and the Liberal party was still predominantly
Protestant and anti-Catholic. The Conservatives, on the other hand,
were the avowed champions of the ’Anglo-French alliance ’, They put
into effect that spirit of synpathetic friendship - "une charité enragee,
1
une passion pour la France" - that had been immensely stimulated by the 
German onslaught of 1871. The apparent threat, represented by the siege 
of Paris, to a stronghold of civilised values had engaged Conservative 
synpathies at the deepest level. The English aristocracy had also been 
phfoundly distrubed by the Commune and were anxious to promote the internal 
stability of France. As the French Ambassador remarked, summing up the
attitude of the Disraeli administration in the light of his many years*
2
experience as a foreign observer in Britain, all the old feelings of 
bitter diplomatic rivalry and suspicion that had existed for several 
decades had vanished, and the Government was as fziendly to France as 
it could possibly be. The Conservatives regarded the ’alliance ’ as
Charles Gavard: Un diplomate 'a Londres, (Paris 1895) , p. 56,
2
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Britain’s defence against the Dreikaiserhund. They were more concerned
than the Liberals for the balance of power in Europe and with its
preservation against German militarism, and their position was in
essence a return to the Palmerstonian doctrines of the ’thirties -
Western Europe versus the ’northern confederacy’. Disraeli’s famous
remark in 1876 that since the fall of France there had been ’no balance 
1
in Europe ’ was a classic expression of the assumption which led 
Britain to take a prominent part in resolving the War Scare of 1875.
The alienation of Britain and Russia and the rapprochement of France 
and Russia during the Eactem Crisis of 1876-8 heavily underlined 
the importance of the western entente. It was the b æ  is of Salisbury’s 
post-Berlin Congress policy.
When the Liberals returned to power in 1880 , they had 
partially adapted their outlook to the needs of the international 
situation. They were now convinced of the diplomatic necessity of 
keeping up the Anglo-French entente, partly because of the perennial 
danger of a Franco-Russian alignment, and partly because they had 
become more aware of the possibility of British isolation in a Europe 
increasingly dominated by Bismarck, A ’good understanding’ between 
Britain and France was to Granville "necessary to the peace of Europe",^
1
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1
and "an immense national advantage". Moreover for a Liberal 
Government the fact that France as well as Britain was now a 
constitutional state engendered a sense of obligation to æ  t in 
concert, or at least to consult, over many minor problems of 
international conduct. It counterbalanced the unfavourable effect 
of the frequent reports of French corruption in high places aid of the 
influence of financial interests over the Quai d*Orsay which were 
received from the British Embassy in Paris.
The divergeance of British and French policy over Egypt 
coupled with difficulties arising from mutual colonial activity caused 
the two countries to drift apart during 1882-3. The Conservatives, 
and later their Liberal imperialist allies, becomingiy increasingly 
solicitous for Britain’s overseas interests, criticised the Government 
not so much for its failure to maintain the entente as for undue 
subservience to France. Some of the more outspoken members of the 
Opposition advocated, and had done so ever since the French acquisition 
of Tinis, the abandonment of the entente and its replacement by closer 
ties with the Central Powers. Why conciliate France at all costs? 
demanded a speaker in the Lords, attacking the Government for not having 
defended Turkish integrity over Tunis; France had ceased to be 
technically Britain’s ally after the fall of Napoleon III, and would 
never be more than a formal ally so long as the question of Alsace-Lorraine
1
Granville to Lyons (copy), 19th July 1882, Pte. ; GvD. 29/203.
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1
was unsettled; now was the chance for an Anglo-Italian rapprochement, 
Ashmead-Bartlett, that indefatigable opponent of Granville in the 
Commons, constantly urged the necessity of an understanding with
2
Au stria-Hangary and Germany as a means of combating France overseas.
In contrast, orthodox Liberals, with their innate streak of Little
England!sm, minimised the impact of colonial differences and clung to
the entente as the indispensable foundation of British policy. It
became almost a Liberal tenet; a political supporter declared later
that he had always understood Granville believed in friendship with
France as "the true keystone of our policy and the only guarantee of 
3
peace". Even Chamberlain, who in the Cabinet proved himself no friend 
of France and who became one of the most vigorous advocates of preventive 
annexations against French colonisation, was driven to support the 
entente for party purposes: during the Election campaign of 1885 he 
defended the Government against the charge of having "truckled to the 
French", and pointed out that on the other side of the Channel there 
were French Ashmead-Bartletts and Randolph Churchills -vdio attacked their 
own government for its pusillanimity towards England. "I attach the
1
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greatest possibb importance to the French alliance", he declared.
"The friendship between France and this country has been slovly
built up during a generation. It has done a great deal for civilisation ...
I believe that, near neighbours as we are, in our continued and cordial
friendship lies the best guarantee for the future happiness of both 
1
nations. "
In the course of this evolution of party feeling there was,
between the Conservative administration of 1874-80 and the Li*teral of
1880-5, considerable continuity of policy with regard to Anglo-French
relations. The desire to maintain the entente was one important
factor in Britain’s attitude towards French colonisation. So long as
Britain regarded close relations with France as both desirable and
attainable, colonial problems were bound to be to some extent subordinated
to that end. Salisbury’s handling of French aspirations in the Pacific
in 1879-80 was the outcome of his desire for Anglo-French understanding 
2
in all spheres. Despite misgivings, Granville finally dealt with the
3
French occupation of Tinis in 1881 according to diplomatic considerations.
His policy over French moves in Madagascar in 1882-3 was dictated in a 
4
similar fashion. Over the Tongking War in 1883 he was as much on the
1
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side of France as he dared without jeopardising Britain’s relations 
1
with China.
This policy failed to give std) ility to the entente.
British attempts at conciliation in the colonial field did not
produce mutual diplomatic confidence. The fundamental French
diplomatic problem in the ’seventies and ’eighties was that of allies,
and the measure of success France had in solving it considerably
influenced Anglo-French relations overseas. After 1879 France felt a y
diminishing obligation to reach colonial understanding with Britain.
This had a profound effect on Britain’s attitude to French colonisation,
for it removed the diplomatic incentive to acquiesce in what had always
been regarded as encroachments to some degree on Britain’s overseas
interests. It also meant that consequent colonial difficulties were
less amenable to a negotiated settlement. The basic factor in the
situation was that though in 1880 Freycinet accepted the legacy of
Anglo-French friendship that had been conpleted under Waddington’s
direction at the Quai d ’Orsay and genuinely desired an ’intimate alliance'^ 
2
with England, France subsequently grew less dependent on the entente.
In the first place, France was courted by Germany, Whereas 
Britain had not pursued Bismarck’s vague offer of an alliance in 1879 
and was left - until the Anglo-Italian rapprochement pf 1883-4 - without
1
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any other permanent European connection beyond the Anglo-French 
understanding, France was able to go ahead with her plans for overseas 
development confident of Germm support. While Bismarck encouraged 
French colonisation in order to distract French statesmen from a 
revanche, France deliberately set about it largely to strengthen her 
economic and strategic position. Her efforts were the logical 
continuation of the re-organisation of her Army in the ’seventies.
They have too long been regarded as a substitute for continental power, 
as an indication of the despair of France about her general position 
vis-a-vis Germany and her particular desire to win back the lost 
provinces. The situation was the reverse: France embarked afresh on 
colonisation when she had regained her status as a Great Power. The 
occupation of Thnis, for instance, had been contemplated long before 
Bismarck’s ’pear is ripe’ conversations of January 1879, before even 
German promptings at the Congress of Berlin the summer before, but was 
postponed till the moment France felt secure both diplomatically and 
militarily. A false picture of the motives behind French colonisation 
has often been painted, partly because the popular French view of 
Jules Ferry as the man who turned his back on Europe has been accepted. 
The vituperation of 1885 towards him has been regarded as symptomatic 
of a ’return’ in French policy to European issues. The upholders of 
this view have been doubly misled: firstly, by the polemics of people 
like Deroulède who spoke of ’twenty servants’ (the colonies) having 
been offered to the French people instead of ’two lost children’
(Alsace and Lorraine); and secondly, by the attitude of Bismarck, who
505.
for a decade miscailculated the French Enpire as a useful distræ tion.
France was not abandoning the revanche ; she was merely postponing it.
In the meantime, while the work of colonial consolidation went on,
*
it was, as Granville observed, ’difficult for a French Foreign Mnister
1
not to be Bismarckian’. But from the French point of view, Germany
was only a useful temporary ally; the Franco-German understanding had
to be based on mutual material ad\r ant ages - on a ’politique des
2
intérêts’, hot a ’x^olitique des sentiments*. As Ferry said in August- 
1884, it was not to become a ’machine a guerre’ against England. The 
French knew what they wanted and did not want from the association; 
for example, at the London Conference in 1884-, Oouroel accused G e m æ y  
of trying to alienate France and Britain and of not giving enough help 
over the Egyptian question. In effect, however, French reliance on 
German support meant that comparatively small-scale overseas activities 
took on a new diplomatic significance and so hardened Britain’s attitude 
to French colonisation.
French dependence on the entente with Britain was lessened 
in the second place by the Franco-Russian rapprochement. From the mid- 
’ seventies, France hoped for the permanence of an alignment she bel je ved 
would ultimately be more advantageous than that with Britain; as Lyons 
pointed out, a land alliance was more valuable to a country planning
1
Granville to Gladstone, Pte,, 2 April 1885; B.M, Add.^ MS, 44178,
2
Courcel a Ferry, 17 a out 1884; Doc, dipl. fr. , I, v, no. 372, p, 374.
506.
a revanche against Germany than a naval alliance. ^  Tîie Franco-Russian
Convention which preceded the AJLliance of 1894 v/as after all a purely
military agreement in the first instance. In 1886 Waddington admitted
privately that if Russia and Germany were at war, ’the temptation* for
2
France te join Russia weuld he strong. The Franco-Russian rapprochement
inevitably lessened British cordiality towards France. The Eastern
Crisis of 1876-8 had driven too great a wedge between Britd n and Russia
for the two Powers to be associated in a common bloc, and the impossibility
of such a triple entente was realised even by Gambetta who had been
3
the protagonist of the idea. Moreover, the association of France and 
Russia often seemed to operate against Britain; for instance in 1882, 
when a Livre Jaune revealed frequent consultation between France m d
4
Russia over Egypt.
The French tendency to look beyond the old Anglo-French entente 
for general diplomatic support had an enormous influence on Britain * s 
attitude to French colonisation. As France relied at various times on 
German or Russian assistance while she developed her colonial interests^ 
so she lessened the chances of coming to terms with Britain overseas.
1
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Sometimes Germany or Russia became directly interested in colonial
disputes, and the knowledge or suspicion of pro#red aid to France
necessarily stiffened Britain’s attitude. Two examples will suffice.
One is the backing given by Germany to France over the Congo Basin
before and during the early stages of the Berlin Conference of 1884-5.
The other is a little known incident which occurred after the French
occupation of the New Hebrides. From an ex-Russian spy, a Montenegrin
called Georgevie, particulars were obtained of an alleged convention
concluded between France and Russia, based on mutual aid with regard
to the New Hebrides, Bulgaria and Egypt. In the event of conplications
in the New Hebrides coming to a head, Russia, the document was said to
have stated, engaged to supply stores, munitions, etc., from VIadivostock,
and would sell part of her Siberian fleet to France. Other clauses
1
dealt with Bulgaria and Egypt. Georgevi^ was paid for this story by
2
the British Embassy in Paris, and although British Intelligence treated
it with derision, the Permanent Under-Secretary at the Foreign Office
3
thought it was not without value. Whether the tale had any foundation 
or not, it reflects a situation in vhich such an alleged agreement had 
some plausibility.
1
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Similarly the Egyptian situation from the summer of 1882
onwards introduced one of the greatest elements of discord into Anglo-
French relations and had repercussions in the colonial sphere. Both
France and Britain considered the cornerstone of the entente had "been
removed "by their diverge ance of policy. Both regarded the rupture
as the fault of the other side; •• of France hy her failure to co-operate
in naval action against the Nationalists, of Britain because of her
decision to occupy Egypt by herself. Britain still desired the basis
1
of her foreign policy to be "a cordial understanding" with France,
"une amitié intime et cordiale", but the use of the phrase "Anglo-French
2
Alliance" was no longer possible. The deterioration in Anglo-French 
relations had two results. First, it encouraged France to ac t more 
vigorously in the colonial field, partly in order to regain her lost 
prestige in the eyes of the French public, and partly because it was 
no longer so important to hold back for the sake of the beaux yeux of 
England. This development was prophesied soon after the Egyptian Crisis:
"I cannot say", the British Charge d ’affaires explained, "whether it 
has been or not, with a view of reminding mne of this side of the gaestion; 
but the fact is that, within the last week, the Directors of the French 
Foreign Office, have called my attention, in a quiet way, to the many 
smaller questions now pending, between our two Governments: especially 
our threat to stop Coolie emigration to Mauritius; our delay in graitir^
1
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the Exequatur to their Consul at St. John’s; the Newfoundland
Fisheries question, and the Madagascar question; and on none of "these
1
was their language as cordial as it might have been". Secondly,
it stiffened Britain’s own attitude in reducing her willingness to
make colonial concessions, especially in the case of North-East Africa.
Anxiety about her position in Egypt and about the defence of her
communications via the Suez Canal made Britain particularly watchful
over French activities on the Somali Coast and in the region of Abyssinia
2
from 1883 onwards. Diplomatic assistance from Italy during aid after
the Egyptian Crisis was one of the most important factors in the
Anglo-Italian rapprochement of the mid- ’eighties, and enabled Italian
power to be permanently planted in the Red Sea.
Britain’s attitude to French colonisation was also conditioned
by the fact that up to 1884, when Germary entered the scene, France
seemed to be Britain’s only serious colonial rival. She was also
interested in some areas in close proximity to British possessions -
as in West Africa. French colonisation thus appeared far more of a
menace to Britain’s colonial position than it would have done had other
Powers - notably Belgium - been as frank in their colonial aspirations
3
as France. Until 1884 it was true, as was pointed out at the time.
A
V. Plunkett to Granville, 30 August 1882, No, 955, Secret; F. 0.27/2568.
2
V. p. 106, se^
3
Lyons to Granville, 5 January 1882, No. 5, Secret; F. 0.27/2559.
510.
that France was more in conflict over her colonies with Britain than
with any other country. By the time the Germans emerged as colonisers,
the two older colonial Powers were already estranged. Meanwhile,
traditional Liberal partiality for things Teutonic was given an
1
opportunity to re-assert itself, and German colonisation was actually
2
encouraged by Britain.
To the British public, France appeared to be taking the 
initiative in colonisation, and to be intruding in a field which had 
hitherto been Britain’s own preserve. This partly explains the sustained 
public interest in the question from 1881 onwards. Hiblic opinion 
undoubtedly affected the policy of the second Gladstone administration. 
Granville admitted public pressure had had some influence on him.
"I am very sorry", he told the British Ambassador in Paris early in 1883,
"that we should have drifted into this state of 
awkward relations with France. I do not see how it 
could have been avoided, without making too great a 
sacrifice, and without ; irritating public opinion in 
England.
It is hard upon me that being probably of all English 
public men, the one who for various reasons is most attached 
to France, that we should always have such difficult 
moments to pass when I am in office". 3
1
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1 2 
Both Granville and even more so Lyons saw that the Press
on both sides of the Channel strengthened the influences that made for
bad relations between the two countries. Memories of old antagonisms
were deliberately revived, and on the British side points of difference
between British and French colonial methods were frequently pointed out.
One of the most hackneyed criticisms of France was that she levied
differential duties which operated against foreign competitors at her
colonial ports. Although this was true in mary cases - notably in Annam
and in Madagascar after 1883, the total impression given was misleading^ in
that in some places French colonial ports were duty-free, while neighbcu ring
British harbours were subject to high import dues, for instance, on the
Guinea Coast of West Africa. Nevertheless, France was regarded in
England as a backslider in respect of her colonial fiscal policy, as an
offender against one of the more loosely interpreted principles of Free
3
Trade - that of equal opportunity for the traders of all nationalities.
Both political parties criticised French colonisation, the Liberals terding 
to excuse the Government’s faL lure to check it by maintaining that France 
did not understand the principles of true colonisation and so was no 
threat to British interests, the Conservatives maintdning that it was.
1
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1
at least in its purely expansionist aspect, all too successful.
The effect of the Government’s anti-annexationist policy, Salisbury
told a Manchester audience in 1884, had been to allow new markets in
undevelooed areas to be monopolised by France a ni other foreign Powers
2
practising a discriminatory trade policy.
Four journals may be taken as representative of the Liberal
Press point of view: the Daily News. Macmillanfe, The Nineteenth Century.
and the Edinburgh Review. The Daily News’s reaction to the French
occupation of ihnis was typical of its general attitude - a series of
excuses for the Government’s f &  lure to take preventive measures.
It first declared that it was not Britain’s business to be the guardian
of the rights of Tinis ard Tripoli, while French occupation was in any 
3
case inevitable, then that France had made a deplorable mistake in
4
alienating Britain and Italy by the Bardo Treaty, and finally that 
French colonisation was bound to be a failure, since France was not a 
colonising nation - her home population was declining and her colonial
5
experiments in the Pacific and in Cochin-China had been unsuccessful.
1.
E.£. Magnus C. Rend all: Gladstone’s Foreign and Colonial Policy^ (Leith, 
1884), a speech attacking the Government,made in Leith on 1 February 1884,
2
Speech of 16 April 1884: Philip H. Bagenal (ed. ): The Tory Policy of the 
Marquess of Salisbury, K. G., (London, 1885).
3
11 May 1881, second leader,
4
14 May 1881, third leader,
5
16 May 1881, first leader.
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Later, over the Tongking expedition, the News maintà ned that the French
Cabinet had once more "yielded to the fatal temptation of putting the
cart before the horse" - of sending the flag in advance of real trade 
1
interests. Macmillan’s was also contemptuous of French expanâon,
2
especially in Africa. So was The Nineteenth Century, which malntaaned
that French colonies had so far been a failure because they were top-heavy
3
with officialdom. The Edinburgh Review took the same line as the News.
over French enterprise in Annam and Tongking, arguing that France was
wrong in making trade follow the flag, and that Britain need have ’no
apprehension whatever from French success; the more complete it proved
the more would English commerce, and foreign influence as opposed to
4
Chinese exclusiveness, benefit by it.’ Colonial enterprise was in any
case alien to the sentiments of the French people; their Government ?/as
5
sinply trying to make political capital from it.
In contrast. Conservative journals were pessimistic about
British chances against French in the colonial sphere. With regard to
6
the Far East, the National Review held that Britain had been ’weak’, 
and the Quarterly Review that a French protectorate over Tongking would 
be detrimental to British interests: "The extension of French dominion
1
28 May 1883,
2
issues for June and July 1883,
3
May 1884, article on "The Colonies of France".
4
1883, vol. II (May to August), "The French in Annam and Tonquin", p. 260.
5
Ibid., pp. 258 - 260.
6
February 1884.
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in the uj^per part of the Indo-Cliinese Peninsula would he, whatever its
merits in other respects, the death-blow to every reasonable hope of
increased British commerce in Yunnan, Western China, and ’the independent
1
Shan States’, all in one". Similarly, over West Africa, the Pall Mall
Gazette was afraid that if French claims to territory from the Gaboon
to Stanley Pool and to both banks of the Congo above the Pool were
recognised, the Congo would become a "cul de sac terminating in the
2
pocket of France. "
Public criticism of French colonial methods, particularly
of the restrictions on foreign coirpetition in French colonies, was
effective with regard to areas where Britain’s own economic interests
were obvious, as in the Oil Rivers region. In this case there was a
well-organised and outspoken body of commercial opinion which bad a
3
decisive influence on the Governnent’s protectorate policy. Before tie 
Liberal administration^ conversion to a forward policy in colonisation, 
however, Britain’s attitude to French overseas activity was coib iderably 
influenced by the belief that France was being pushed into colonies by 
vested interests. To a certain extent the observation was correct.
In this connection, the European trade recession of 1873-9, when there 
was little opportunity for domestic investment in France, is of some 
significance. The influence of financial and commercial groups on
1
October 1883, vol. 156.
2
6 January 1885.
3
V. p. 330, seg.,
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successive French governments was constantly noticed hy contemporaries:
"%ie French, " Dilke once remarked, "mix up finance with politics in a
1
manner which we think disgraceful". At tlie same time the Republican
regime deliberately fostered territorial expansion in order to strengthen
French material resources outside Europe. The theory of economic
imperialism can probably be applied more closely to the French colonial
empire of the late nineteenth century than to the general colonisation of
any other Power of the same period. The advice of political ecnnomists
like Paul Leroy-Beaulieu was well to the fore in the debates on colonial
policy in the Assembly of the early ’eighties. The particular form
French colonisation took in each case was, however, often shaped by
financial interests. Speculation in shares accounted for much of the
2
enthusiasm behind the French expedition to Tunis, for instance. Tkiis
was one of the elements in French expansion that was most criticised 
3
in England.
Apart from being Britain’s only serious colonial rival, France 
had, in taking the initiative in several fields of colonisation, 
presented Britain with a new problem. Under the Disraeli administration
1
Minute on Lyons to Granville, 3 January 1882, No. 5, Secret; F.O. 27/2559.
2
For the comments of the British charg/ d ’affaires in Paris,ÿ, Adams to 
Granville, 15 September 1881, No, 833, Secret, (seen by the Queen and 
Gladstone, and marked "an able report" by Granville]; F. 0. 27/2496.
3
For a sidelight on the British attitude, Lister’s minute on Lyons to 
Granville, 29 November 1881, Slave Trade No. 38, Secret; "Sir J. Kirk 
said to me yest[erda]y that since the Tunis afffaijr every French Consul 
was on the lookout for some Comm[eroia]l job wh[ich] might be turned 
into a national claim"; F. 0. 84/1589.
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the problem was still conç>aratively tiny, and the Conservatives, then
in the process of abandoning a doctrinaire aversion to territorial
expansion, were able partially to meet it by trying to make bargains
with France, Kie most important of tbsse was Tunis for Cyprus,
Negotiation often staved off a more rapid French advance - as in West
1
Africa over Sierra Leone and the Slave Coast. But for the Liberals
the problem was more difficult, and not merely because French colonisation
burst into full flower only after 1880. The Government that came to
power in that year disapproved of both annexation and of diplomatic
territorial bargains - the two ways in which it had hitherto been
possible to deal successfully with French colonisation, "Jingoism"
was abhorrent to them, and they took every opportunity of saying so in 
2
public. Initially, they also lacked a constructive approach to
strategic questions, and so, paradoxically, over the Mediterranean, the
Liberals were conservative where the Conservatives had been radical.
Fortuitously, they had the foresight to see that their predecessors’ plan
3
to make Cyprus another Malta was merely a "foolish dream". But their 
only scheme for Mediterranean defence was the status quo. So was it 
over Madagascar.
In 1883, however, the outlook of the Government and more
1
V. Ch. IV, sections 2a) and 4a),
2
, Northbrook’s intention to speak at Birmingham "against annexations 
and for peace and economy - in fact to try to give a strong anti-Jingo 
moral to the address": Northbrook to Gladstone, Pte., 24 October 1880; 
B.M. Add. MS. 44266.
3
Kimberley to Gladstone, Pte., 16 April 1881; B.K Add. MS. 44226.
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particularly of the Foreign Office changed profoundly. Instead of
ineffective obstruction to French colonisation,Britain started
cautiously to undertake a kind of defensive advance. In West Africa
she not only put into effect the long-standing theory of the 'continuous
coastline* but concentrated her efforts on one valuable area, the
Oil Rivers, not for the old philantliropic reasons, but for economic 
1
ones. Later, as compensation for the final loss of Madagascar, she
2
became interested in Zanzibar. For strategic reasons, too, she
3
brou^t about the Somali Coast Protectorate. In the Pacific, she also
became mindful of strategic considerations and attempted to safeguard
4
tr ans-Pacific communications. In Indo-China, she began to think
in terms of soheres of influence, and virtually divided the peninsula
5
betv/een herself and France,
One of the main causes of the colonial policy Britain 
adopted vis-a-vis France from 1883 onwards was the development of 
imperialism, Britain awoke to the in^ortance of her overseas cammitnents, 
This awakening of colonial consciousness coincided with the diplomatic 
estrangement resulting from the breakdown of joint Anglo-French action 
in Egypt. Consequently, Britain became unwilling to attempt a diploiatic
1
V. Ch. IV, sections 4 and 5, passim.
2
V, p, 207, seg.
3
V. p. 140, sec^ .
4
V, p. 467, seq.
5 _
V, Ch. V, Section 5,
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rapprochement throu^ the medium of colonial concessions. She began
to regard her colonial differences with France as inevitable and
unavoidable - unless there was some degree of colonial renunciation
on the French side. So in those areas to which Britain attached a
new and special value, notably West Africa and the Pacific, Anglo-
French difficulties took on a far more serious aspect than before. In
this way the diplomatic split between the two countries widened. The
idea of colonial compromise for the sake of a cordial understanding faded
from British policy. At the same time the Liberals* sense of an
inescapable dilemma between diplomatic and colonial interests deepened.
As Granville reflected towards the end of his tenure of the Foreign
Office, it would have been unfortunate to have quarelled with France
over the technicalities of British neutrality in the Franco-Chinese War,
but nevertheless it might have been unavoidable: 'Such things were
1
the accompaniments and the woes of an Imperial Govemment'. On both 
sides of the Channel people realised how much colonial disputes were to
blame for the current hostility between the two countries. As early
y
as the summer of 1882, the British charge d'affaires in îhris complained 
of the way in which small overseas differences in^eded the Anglo-French 
negotiations over Egypt: ‘*They could probably be better treated," he 
argued, "when Egypt is no longer so ticklish a question, and at all 
events we should not liave smaller vexatious questions to embitter the
1
Granville to Lyons (copy), Pte., 21 March 1885; G. D. 29/204.
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1
discussion of the greater one." A year later, vhen difficulties in
the Pacific and in West Africa were coming to a head, the French
charge d'affaires in London sensed a growing general coolness on the
2
part of the Foreign Office. Meanwhile from Fhris, the British
Ambassador was constantly urging Granville to be conciliatory over
Colonial questions, pointing out that Waddington had been deliberately
chosen as the new French Ambassador in England to improve Anglo-French 
3
relations. He was always convinced that these colonial problems were
4
at the root of the mutual tension and ill-will. So was another very
worried observer, the Chairman of the British Chamber of Commerce in 
5
Paris. In London, Waddington acted as Lyons's exact counterpart,
advising his Government to go slow in colonisation, and even to hold
6
back altogether in some cases, in order to avoid British opposition.
Symptomatic of this change in the climate of British opinion 
was the ’Navy Scare ’ of 1884. This was not merely a product of the 
Pall Mall Gazette and certain other imperialist or Conservative journals.
1
Plunlcett to Sanderson [Granville's private secretary]), Pte., 25 August 
1882; G.D. 29/Ï75.
2
D'Au nay a Challemel-Lacour* 10 juillet 1883, no. 107, confidentielle; 
Affaires étrangères, 800.
3
Lyons to Granville, Pte., 17 July 1883; G. D. 29/173.
4
Ibid. , 14 March 1884; G. D. 29/Ï74.
5
Sir Thomas Barclay: Thirty Years: Anglo-French Reminiscences, 1876-1906. 
(London, 1914), pp. 86-7.
6
B. g., Waddington a Ferry, 20 janvier 1884, no. 4, confidentielle; Affaires 
Étrangères. 803; (re the contemplated annexation of the Gambier Islands 
byFrance).
^ The Liberal Nineteenth Century in November 1884 backed up the Pall Mail 
Gazette in its attack on the British naval authorities.
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The public was seriously concerned at the state of the Navy conpared
with the French. So was the Government. Even the Chancellor cf the
Exchequer, normally a brake on naval expenditure, was effected, by the
scare, and urged greatly increased production of naval wep ons because
of the relatively lai’ge French output of guns and torpedoes. There v/as,
however, a traditional practice of relating the Naval Estimates to
French naval expenditure, although for obvious diplomatic reasons the
Government always deprecated any Parliamentary comparison ship by ship
2
or class by class with France. This element of ancient overseas
rivalry had survived many changes in the international situation. Even
in 1880, at a time of marked Anglo-French cordiality, the First Lord of
the Admiralty told the Prime Minister that the British Estimates were
3
'as little as was safe* in view of the French naval programme. But by
1884 both the diplomatic and the colonial situation made such calculations
assume a fresh significance. One of the arguments popularly advanced
for a bigger Navy was that if Britain and France were at war, the French
4
colonies would then be at Britain's mercy.
The Liberal Government's determination to resist what were 
regarded as French encroachments on Britain's colonial interests was
1
Memorandum by Childers, 6 October 1884; B.M. Add. MS. 44131.
2
Campbell-Bannerman to Childers (copy), Pte., 2 October 1884; B.M. Add. 
MS. 44131.
3
"‘"^^orthbrook to Gladstone, 16 December 1880; B.M. Add. IvIS. 44266.
4 ^
National Review. May 1884.
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1
strengthened from within. There was an anti-French group in the Cabinet,
and the Sovereign herself became antagonistic towards France, The
Queen exerted a spasmodic pressure on the Government, and in the critical
period 1882-4 considerably increased Granville's difficulties in trying
to carry on the Anglo-French entente. (she was, the Prime Minister
once complained, enough to kill a man.) In 1879, she had declared
that France was 'the country with which Britain liked to be allied',
but after the annexation of Ihnis, which she deeply deplored, she resisted
every attempt to conciliate France - most of all over Egypt. At the
same time she grew increasingly in favour of a r appr ocheme nt with Germany.
During the London Conference in 1884, her views made themselves strongly
felt. "The Queen," she told the Foreign Secretary,"... has so often 
already expressed her feelings on the subject.
But she thinks P(rin]ce. Bismarck strange and unreliable 
as he is - is seriously desirous that G^ea^t. Britain 
sh[oul]d. have a firm hold over Egypt and not surrender 
our advantages to please France, who, as he says, is not 
to be satisfied.
There must be no more yielding to her. -
There is a very strong feeling of want of confidence in 
us abroad in consequence of our foreign policy...
Her trend of thought was repeated in that of Hartington and his associates,
who after the British occupation of Egypt, advocated dropping the entente
completely. "After all that has happened lately," he told Granville, "there
can scarcely be much use in keeping up any longer the fiction of any
1
V. Ch. Ill, section 6.
2
Queen Victoria to Lord Granville, 8 July 1884; G.D. 29/31.
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1 2 
special alliance with France," or even of any "special understanding".
Anglo-French colonial differences created a vicious circle 
in the relations of the two countries. They helped to loosen the old 
diplomatic ties, and as France veered first towards Germany and then 
tovi/ards Russia, so Britain looked increasingly to Italy for support. 
Inevitably the British and French became even less conciliatory towards 
each other overseas, and colonial difficulties increased. On the British 
side, the cycle is particularly notceable in the case of the Somali Coast. 
Wcien the Conservatives were returned to power in 1885, however, a 
rapprochement became once more possible. During his ^ort period of 
office, Salisbury had the satisfaction of seeing a sli^t detente in 
Anglo-French relations. In the first place, he was able to take 
advantage of the breakdown of Franco-German co-operation after the 
Berlin West African Conference of 1884-5, (The French representative 
at the Conference of Constantinople in 1885, for instance, usually 
supported the British, not the German, representative.) . Secondly, he 
was an expert at keeping several diplomatic irons in the fire simultaneously; 
while promoting cordiality with France, he collaborated with Bisraardc over 
Greece and Bulgaria. His task was made easier by the fact that he was on 
excellent terms with the French Ambassador, ani had been ever since 1879 
when he and Waddington (then Foreign Minister) had put the Anglo-French 
entente on a comfortable foundation of personal friendship. Waddington *s
1
Hartington to Granville, 11 June 1882; G^D. 29/L32.
2
Ibid., additional note by Hartington.
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mind, Salisbury once said, worked "on principles intelligible to an
Englishman". When Salisbury took office in 1885, Waddington was
congratulated by the French Foreign Minister on his relations with the
1
new Foreign Secretary. Finally - and here lay the great difference be tween
his outlook and that of his predecessor, - Salisbury still considered
colonial questions generally if not always subordinate to European
issues. He constantly tried to minimise the effect of colonial
difficulties on the international situation. In several spheres he took
practical steps to promote under standing 5 over the Somali Coast, for
example, he initiated discussions for a definition of the frontier
2
between the British and French protectorates, and in the Pacific he
sou^t to conclude the long negotiations that had been going on about
3
the New Hebrides and the Leeward Islands.
In contrast, the connection between foreign and colonial 
policy was never so direct, in the period 1875-1887, as during Rosebery's 
temre of the Foreign Office in 1886. Unlike Salisbury, with his
realistic approach to Britain's European position, and unlike Granville,
(
with his fundamental desire to tackle both diplomatic and overseas problems 
on the merits of the individual case, Rosebery tended to conduct diplomacy 
according to the logic of personal relationships. There is no doubt that
Freycinet a Waddington, 28 juin 1885, tel. particulière [draft in 
Freycinet's handj: Affaires etran^^res. 811.
2
V. p. 142, seq.
3
V. pp. 476-480.
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he had a peculiar antipathy to the French, and that it continually
influenced his handling of all Britain's dealing with France. His
attitude was known even before he took office. On the eve of Rosebery's
appointment, Waddington telegraphed the news to Paris in the following
fashion: "A mon grand regret, c 'est Lord Rosebery qui l'a enç)orte pour 
les Affaires Etrangères.,. Toutefois, je vous engage a faire 
bonne mine a mauvais jeu et a saisir une occasion de dire a 
OConlte. de Munster [the Gerimn Ambassador in BarisQ qué, vous 
etes tï^s satisfait de cette nomination; tachez de donner 
le mot d'ordre a la presse, en faisant louer 1 'esprit,
1 'intelligence et 1 'indépendance de Lord Rosebery...
It is interesting to note that Waddington at the same time welcomed the
appointment of Granville to the Colonial Office - a tribute to the former
Foreign Secretary's persistent attempts to maintain good relations m  th
France, despite the forward colonial policy he had pursued in some areas.
Incidentally, Granville was on informai and friendly terms with the
French Ambassador, after his initial fears of Waddington's "bumptiousness',
whereas Rosebery never got beyond a purely official relationship with
him. Rosebery did not hide his dislike for the French; the Queen noticed
2
it in one of her first interviews with him in his new capacity.
Rosebery certainly desired continuity as a cardinal principle 
of his foreign policy, but in practice it was only partially achieved.
On the one hand, his regard for Germany meant that he continued Salisbury's 
collaboration with Bismarck over some of the current Balkan questions.
Waddington a Freycinet, 4 février 1886, tel., (l, 20 a.m.), très conf. ; 
Affaires étrangères, 814.
2
Queen's Journal, 6 February 1886; Queen Victoria's Letters. Series III, 
vol. 1, p.48.
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On the other hand a rapprochement with France was nipped in the hud.
Rosebery's tenure of office contributed to the assumption that grew
during the 'nineties that Britain had eventually to choose between a
German or a French alignment. This was partly because Franco-German
relations were bad during the summer of 1886. International tension and
pre-occupation v/ith the possibility of a European v/ar foreshadowed the
real War Scare of January 1887. The fact that Rosebery took a very
1
serious view of the Franco-German situation made him more inclined to
see a necessity to take sides.
Where colonial activities were concerned, Rosebery took
sides in an emphatic way. His friendly talks at Berlin over Zanzibar in 
2
May 1885 and his subsequent sympa.thetic attitude towards German
aspirations in East Africa, compared with his handling of the Hew Hebrides
3
issue with France, are proof of his willingness to see Germany become 
Britain's partner in colonisation and his uncompromising hostility to 
French colonial ambitions. It was doubly unfortunate for Anglo-French 
relations that Anglo-German difficulties in the Pacific had been settled 
in 1885, whereas Anglo-French problems were very much alive. Here 
Rosebery's concern for imperial interests, particularly those most dear 
to the Australians, caused him to turn his back on the possibility of m
1
Minute by Rosebery, 26 June 1886, on Lyons to Rosebery, 25 June 1886, 
No. 337, Confidential; F.O. 27/2797.
2
V. p. 214.
3
V. pp. 480-486.
agreement with France except on the most humiliating terras. On the
1
other hand, in East Africa and on the Somali Coast Rosebery's
partiality for German interests was obvious, whereas in 1884 the Foreign
Office had been anxious to exclude both France and Germany from those 
2
areas, for strategic reasons. In West Africa, however, there was a
certain measure of continuity, owing to the fact that British policy
there had run in an anti-French and pro-German groove for the past two
years. 1886 saw a lull in overt Anglo-French difficulties, largely
because France was busy fighting the Moslem tribes of the hinterland. The
great question that spring was the grant of a Charter to the Niger Company,
and here Rosebery followed Salisbury's line of resistance to Goldie's 
5
demands, in deference to German commercial ambitions, going so far as to
4
submit the Charter in its final form to Bismarck, jn Indo-China there 
was no question of German colonisation, while Rosebery carried on the 
traditions of British policy vis-a-vis France, His particular 
contribution was the series of telegrams he sent to 0 'Conor, the British 
Minister in Peking, after the Franco-Chinese Commercial Treaty of i^ril 
1886, to be on his guard against specific Chinese concessions to foreign 
financial groups. The Board of Trade, however, felt that his anxiety was 
premature, arguing that the Commercial Treaty, despite its special 
provisions for French trade overland between Touting and China, would not
1
V. pp. 149-150.
2
V. p. 208.
3
7. p. 551.
4
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in fact affect British commerce through the Treaty Ports till the age 
1
of railways.
An innate hesitation in Rosebery's character partially
accounts for Britain's failure, during the third Gladstone administration,
to carry the colonial alignment with Germany to a logical conclusion
in Europe, Despite the undoubted friendliness of both the Prime Minister
and the Foreign Secretary towards Germany, Britain's relations with the
Central PCwers did not rest on a basis of confident reliance on mutual
assistance. Conservative criticism of Liberal foreign policy after the
break-down of the Anglo-French entente in 1882 coupled with Salisbury's
obvious determination during his recent tenure of office to align
Britain with Germany and Italy, helped to weaken German oonfidence in
Liberal intentions. Bismarck still hoped for a settled Conservative
regime under Salisbury's leadership in preference to Rosebery's
continuance in office. It is interesting that shortly after Salisbury's
accession to power in 1885 the French Ambassador in London had felt that
a closer connection between Britain and the Central Powers would not be
achieved under a future Liberal government:
"Aujourd'hui il y a un rapprochement visible entre l'Allemagne,
1 'Autriche et l'Italie pour ne créer aucune difficulté a 
Lord Salisbury, et lui laisser quant a present toute sa 
liberté d'action. Je ne crois pas qu'on prenne d'engagemai ts 
formels avec lui, mais on veut le soutenir, l'aider, lui 
faire la meilleure situation possible en vue des élections 
générales, lui donner toutes les chances de rester au 
pouvoir. En derniere analyse, c'est du résultat des 
élections que dépendra la politique extérieure de 1 'Angleterre, 
et jusqu'à present les^chances paraissent incontestablement 
etre en faveur des libéraux".^
1
Board of Trade to F. 0., 24 July 1886; F. 0. 27/2842.
2
Waddington a Freycinet, (Pte), 30 juillet 1885; Affaires étrangères. 811.
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To the German Ambassador in London, the extent of Rosebery's partiality
for his country appeared to be no more than the conviction that if
Britain happened to conflict with France or Russia, Germany would
fight for her. He felt that Rosebery would be most unlikely to assist
Germany were she in a similar predicament, and that there was little to
1
hope for from the present Government.
At the end of his short period of office, Rosebery had not
been able to strengthen Britain's diplomatic position. Anglo-German
relations had been inconclusive, while Anglo-French relations were worse
than they had been for many years. Rosebery was warned by the British
Ambassador in Paris against assuming the imminence of a Franco-German
quarrel. His analysis of the situation was that current French policy
was negative in character in order to give no offence abroad, and ihat
it was rather the desire not to appear weak than any intended revanche
against Germany that was dangerous - and for Britain, not Germany,
"The irritability cf the French", he pointed out, "is not much less
with regard to England than with regard to Germany, while they do not
stand in the same awe of the military strength of England; and questions
between France and England are continually cropping up in all parts of 
2
the world... "
1
Hatzfeldt to Bismarck, 2 June 1886, Very confidential; Dugdale: German 
Diplomatic Documents, I, p. 222 (translation).
2
Lyons to Rosebery, 30 JCily 1886, No. 415, Very confidential, (seen by 
the Queen, the Prince of Wales, and Rosebery); F.O, 27/2798.
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The second Salisbury administration sincerely desired an
improvement in Anglo-French relations. To the Prime Minister, one
obvious method was to clear the air of colonial disputes. On the
Somali Coast, he resumed the negotiations that had broken down under 
1
Rosebery and eventually succeeded in delimiting the respective British
2
and French protectorates by the Agreement of February 1888. In the
Pacific, his efforts and those of Iddesleigh, formally the Foreign Secretary
until his death in January 1887, were crowned by the Anglo-French
Condominium in the New Hebrides (set up by the Convention of November 1887),
and by the Declaration of 1888 through which France was later able to
3
take possession of the long-disputed Leeward Islands. In West Africa,
Salisbury resolved to settle the pressing problem of frontiers and was
prepared to make considerable concessions. In 1888 negotiations for the
cession of the Gambia to France were re-opened. Though this particular
project failed, the Agreement of 10 August in the following year settled
most of the smaller boundary difficulties. Britain surrendered the
watershed of the Gambia to France and finally fixed the limits of the
colony, and she also gave the French all they claimed with regard to the
4
frontier between the Gold Coast and the Cote d'Ivoire. An Anglo-French
1
V. Ch.II, section 8, b).
2
V. Ch.II, section 9, c) and d).
3
7. pp. 486-493.
4
The frontier had been provisionally fixed on 2 January 1888.
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joint commission on the Lagos-Cote des Esclaves boundary produced a
similar agreement. The bigger question of respective rights to the
north of the British Niger territory had been raised by the Niger
Company's Charter, which had not provided for a northern limit to the
Company's operations. The limits of French territory were eventually
1
fixed by the Convention of 5 August 1890. Salisbury still considered
colonial questions subordinate to his foreign policy, and this attitude
also characterised his handling of Anglo-German rivalry in East Africa.
He ceded Kilimanjaro - the mountain area which Johnston had acquired
for Britain only a few years before - to Germany, althou^ at ihe
same time he secured Zanzibar for Britain, since he was fully alive, and
2
always had been, to Britain's strategic interests. It was only after 
about 1889, however, that Salisbury began to be enthusiastic about 
imperial development in a territorial and economic sense.
In spite of Salisbury's conciliatory approach towards France, 
it was no^ impossible for colonial detente to ripen into diplomatic 
rapprochement. Nor did Salisbury intend it to. In the first place, 
there was the by now undoubted French alignment with Russia, which was 
one of the main reasons for Bismarck's Reinsurance policy. In the second 
place, Salisbury had a re-insurance policy of his own. Tliis he believed
1
In March 1892 Salisbury proposed negotiations for a fresh clarification 
of the frontier, and after agreeing on a boundary commission in 1896, 
Britain and France resumed these negotiations in 1897, and signed a 
new Agreement the following year.
2
V. pp. 214-217.
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would supply the need Britain had felt ever since the crumbling of the
Anglo-French entente - the need for a reliable diplomatic connection.
Both as Conservative and as statesman, he was firmly committed to
friendship with the Central Poiærs. Salisbury's initiative in
clearing up Anglo-French colonial differences had a strictly limited
purpose; it was not meant to be the prelude to a re-statement of the
old strains of cordiality that had sounded so harmoniously in the
late 'seventies. Britain was merely seeking to lessen her depmdence
on the Central Powers. For the same reason there was an Anglo-Russian
detente while the discussions leading to the first Ifediterranean
Agreement were going on. As the French Ambassador in London tried to
re-as sure his Government, Salisbury did not wish to go over to the
Triple Alliance unreservedly, despite the non-ratification of theWolff
Convention - his cherished project for a diplomatic solution to the
Egyptian problem - owing to Franco-Russian pressure on the Porte. It
was also true that he tried to minimise his differences with France and
Russia, and that in any fUture European V/ar he would preserve British 
1
neutrality. But Britain's alignment with the Central Pov/ers over 
Mediterranean and Balkan questions made a resumption of the old pre-1882 
cordiality with France unthinkable. Even over small colonial matters, 
suspicion and mistrust on either side hampered discussions, which, in
1
Waddington a Flourens, 12 novembre 1887, le Direction du Nord, 
no. XXVIII, très confidentielle; Affaires étrangères. 826.
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1879-80, would have proceeded rapidly on the basis of a frank exchange 
1
of opinion.
The international situation in 1887 also helped to minimise
the effect of the settlement of Anglo-French colonial disputes. Formerly,
in the comparatively tranquil Europe of the early 'eighties, colonial
issues had had relatively more influence on diplomacy. But at a time
of continental tension and alarm, with the shadow of war in the
background of most diplomatic discussions, they seemed less in^ortant.
The French Government was uncomfortably aware that the desire to get
rid of overseas complications made little difference to the general
direction of Salisbury's policy. Despite Waddington's attempts at calm,
one of the basic French fears was that Britain would side irrevocably
with the Central Powers over the Mediterranean, and that France would
2
therefore become powerless to extend her North African territories.
Waddington's line was that there was nothing new about Britain's
antagonism to French interests in the Western Mediterranean - that this
had in fact united Britain and Italy - and to Russian, interests in the
•Eastern, and that s® long as France maintained the status quo in North
Africa and so long as there was no outbreak of war in the Balkans, France
3
had nothing to fear. This brought little comfort, partly because the
1 , ^
Waddington a Flourens, 12 aout 1887, le Direction des Protectorats, 
no. XXIV, confidentielle; Affaires étrancres, 824,
2  ^  ^
Flourens \  V/’addington, 14 novembre 1887, tel. no. 137; Affaires étrangères, 
826. ' ---
5
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1
self-denying policy in the Mediterranean Waddington suggested vfould 
have run counter to French ambitions both for the development of 
Hinis and for. the future of Morocco, and p&irtly because a future war 
in the Balkans seemed fairly likely.
The French Government correctly diagnosed, in the autumn
of 1887, that Britain was contemplating a Mediterranean agreement with the
Central Powers. In November Salisbury was asked whether there was an
agreement betv/een Italy and Germany over the Mediterranean and whether
Britain had any formal understanding with Germany as to her attitude in
the case of a Franco-German war. Salisbury evaded the first part of
2
the question and denied any formal understanding with Germany. In
December he again categorically denied the existence of any British
3
entente with the Central Powers directed against France. But the French
Foreign Minister remained unconvinced: "II est vrai que lorsque vous
avez demandé k Lord Salisbury s'il avait conserve son entière 
independence vis-a-vis de la triple alliance, il vous a 
repondu: certainement. Mais il n'est pas inpossible que, 
sans s'être engagé avec la coalition politique que porte le nom 
de triple alliance, il ait pris, avec quelques unes des 
puissances qui la conposent, des ai*rangements pour certaines 
circonstances particulières qui péui}aient se produire, par 
example, dans la Meditérannee..." 4
1
Waddington tried to dissuade the French Government from a project to 
create a naval base at Bizerta - an infringement of St. Hilaire 's 
undertaking to Britain of 16 May 1881, Only general inprovements for 
commerce should be undertaken, he urged, otherwise France would be 
faced with united Anglo-Italian hostility; Waddington a Flourens,
12 juillet 1887, Sous-Direction des Protectorats, no. XIX, très 
confidentielle; iAffaires étrangères, 824.
2
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Waddington himself admitted that diplomatic circles in London felt
Britain would fall in with the policy of the Triple Alliance in the
1
Mediterranean, provided British interests were at stake. In the 
continental Press, there were rumours of an actual Mediterranean 
Agreement.
This was the closest alignment Britain ever had with the 
Centrsil Powers. To the development of British policy, Anglo-French 
colonial differences had contributed much. In the 'nineties recurring 
colonial crisis failed to drive Britain into the arms of Germany. By 
that time, Germany was fast becoming a great imperial Power, and as much 
of a threat to Britain's colonial preponderance as France had seemed.
At the turn of the century the increasing might of German arms brou^t 
back European attention from beyond the seas, and led Britain to seek 
to restore the old friendship with France. The Entente Cordiale of 1904, 
with its final settlement of ancient colonial disputes, marked the end o f 
a period in European history when overseas problems had exercised a 
dominating and often decisive influence on British policy.
1  ^ ^
Waddington a Flourens, 27^decembre 1887, le Direction du Nord, no. XXXIII, 
confidentielle; Affaires étrangères. 826.
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' A P P E N D I X  I.
Memorand'ujn by Frederick Holmwood. British Consul in
Zanzibar. 9 December 1884. entitled -
TH3 2AÜI2IBM SUOCESSIOlf
PROM the geographical situation of the Zanzibar dominions 
it is evident that any steps which may be contemplated in 
connection with the mountain district of^Kilimanjaro, such as 
were referred to in a former Memorandum, must involve a most 
serious consideration of the possible future, as well as of the 
present, position of that State.
The present position of Zanzibar is that of an independent 
Monarchy having its relations with the subjects of European 
Powers regulated by Commercial Treaties which make its ports as 
free to commerce as those of Creat Britain, concede the right of 
settlement and of the purchase of immovable property in all parts 
of the country, and secure to the European settler not only an 
indisputable tenure, but also a complete immunity from all 
imposts, whether local or general, beyond the. moderate ad
valorem import duty of 5 per cent.
The future of the country is, however, by no means so 
clearly defined; there are undoubtedly influences at work which 
may at any moment alter its whole position, and, as any such 
alteration would be likely to prove prejudicial to its present 
freedom, and probably also to the development of the whole of, 
Eastern Tropical Africa, it may be useful to consider briefly 
the nature of these influences.
- The European Powers which at present actively interest 
themselves in the affairs of the Zanzibar dominions, and which 
alone can.practically affect its immediate future, are Great 
Britain, Prance, and Germany. The two former, in addition to 
other interests, have long had more or less distinct political 
ends in view; the latter has not until now concerned itself
^ P.O. 84/1680. Printed for the Foreign Office as No.7 of 
Confidential Print 5037, G.D. 29/145.
^ Holmwood'8 Memo, on the hill district of Kilimanjaro (East 
Africa I); P.O. 84/I68O. "The Zanzibar Succession" is 
"East Africa II."
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min this way, hut it has lately done so in response to public 
feeling at home, called forth by the discoveries ofrecent 
African explorers, through whose Reports it has become alive 
to the future importance of the vast undeveloped region to 
v;hich the Ruler of Zanzibar holds the key.
, The interest which Prance takes in this part of Africa 
is essentially political. The real aim of her policy may 
perhaps be best understood by glancing back through the past 
few years, which en brace her action in Tunis, Madagascar, and 
China. At Zanzibar, as in thorn places, her Agents have followed 
traditional methods; petty financial and other intrigues, 
possibly abortive in themselves, but furnishing the necessary 
pretext for after demands, have been encouraged, and several 
such undefined claims are now held more or less in abeyance, 
though sufficiently tangible to afford ground for action whenever 
her plans may require it.
But because her aims are political, the success of her 
policy would not in consequence be less baneful to commerce or 
to the general development and civilization of the oountry, ncr 
would it fail to nullify the good influence which our anti­
slavery measures have wrought on this side of Africa. Without 
going into details, it may be said that the general effects cf 
French influence becoming paramount at Zanzibar would be to 
close its ports to free trade, introduce French colonial bureauc­
racy with its accompaniment of heavy dues and vexatious 
restrictions - in short, to make the place throughly French, and 
practically put an end to legitimate trade.
In regard to the benefits which our humane but costly 
anti-slavery policy has conferred on the country, we may gather 
from recent experience that, in the event of Zanzibar becoming 
virtually a French Colony, our work would be thrown away. In 
carrying out the steps which a strong national feeling has so 
long urged on successive Governments, not only has the Sultan 
been forcqd into measures which have rendered him unpopular 
throughout his dominions, but unremitting coercion has been 
employed to stamp out the complicity in slave-trading of the 
large and wealthy British Indian community who supported the 
system financially. During the transition period it has been 
necessary to confiscate and destroy the property, and to deal 
with as felons all implicated in a traffic which had long been 
regarded as legitimate, and even acquiesced in by Treaty; but 
British Consular officers were firm in their painful duty, 
because they felt that the result would eventually repay tenfold 
those whom it was necessary to coerce. • How rapidly these 
predictions were being fulfilled, the Memorial from the British < 
subjects at Zanzibar to Sir John Kirk, on his recent temporary ’ 
departure, has abidantly proved; but the sajfld effects recently j 
produced by French colonial influence in the Comoro Islands and * 
Ivladagascar warn us that its extension to Zanzibar might soon
convince our loyal Indian subjects that they had suffere in
Vain, and that their best ohanoe of future prosperity would
be to renew their former oomplioity in Slave Traffic, under
French auspices and under another name.
But deplorable as these effects would be on the country 
immediately oo ncerned and on its commerce, the results to 
ourselves would be simply disastrous, not only including the 
extinction of our prestige and influence throughout East Africa, 
but also giving to the French that supremacy in East African 
waters which they have so long coveted, and hopelessly isolating 
I\/Eauritias, our one naval station between the Gape and Aden,
which is already cramped by natural disadvantages and by the
strong French sympathies of its. population. With the Frencii 
at ÎÆadagascar, Mayotte, and Zanzibar, they would occupy a chain 
of naval stations unsurpassed in the world, and mutually 
supporting each other so as to dominate entirely the whole sea­
board of East Africa, as well as the routes to India, Australia, 
and our smaller Colonies, via the Cape, the closing of which, 
in event of certain possible contingencies, w u l d  prove fatal 
to us.
Even if it be probable that no European Power is likely 
to acquire paramount influence at Zanzibar during the present 
Sultan's lifetime, the dangers referrëd to still deserve our 
serious attention, for the French Agents are fully alive to all 
the chances which, in the event of the Sultan's early decease, 
may enable them to interfere in the succession, and nothing 
could more surely bring about the evils which we have to fear 
than the success of a French nominee. Under the circumstances 
in which France is just now situated with regard to 3,Madagascar, 
we have still time, so far as she is concerned, to v/ard off the 
evils here indicated; indeed, but for the fact that during the 
past three years the secret intrigues of her Agents have done 
much to undermine our influence with the Sultan, the present 
moment would be peculiarly favourable for taking measures which 
might effectually frustrate her ulterior designs.
But the position has now become complicated by another 
difficulty, for in consequence of Germany having abandoned her 
passive attitude, we shall be compelled to consider what claims 
she may bring forward. Under ordinary circumstances it would, 
undoubtedly, have suited her purpose to see the future of the 
Zanzibar dominions safely in our hands, as that fact alone would 
be a guarantee for continued freedom of trade. Unf or tunat ely, 
however, the recent awakening of national feeling in Germany 
to the importance of this part of Africa is almost certain to 
bring to the surface an element which, though long dormant-, may 
prove as dangerous to the freedom of the country as the establish­
ment of French influence would be.
Soon after the accession of the present Sultan,his 
sister, who had formed an illicit connection with a young
VHamburgh merchant named Reute, eloped with and was duly married 
to him before the birth of her son. This boy has been carefully 
educated in Germany, and his mother has never ceased to intrigue 
in order to bring about his reoognitioh; but the Sultan has 
altogether refused to acknowledge him in any way, and the 
subject is so distasteful to him, and to the Arabs generally?-, 
that he has persistently declined even to discuss the subject, 
though frequently pressed to do so at the desire of the German 
Government. . '
Madame Reute, however, is not ignorant of the advantages 
which the Aiâ) custom in regard to succession may at any moment 
offer, nor can she fail to be alive to the opportunity which 
has now arisen for interesting Germany in her,son's claims to, 
the Zanzibar Sultanate; and should she succeed in doing so, 
which is not unlikely, firm_and prompt action on our part will 
possibly be the only means of preserving Zanzibar arom a German 
Protectorate, which would inevitably be' the prelude to its 
becoming virtually a German Colony.. Any such pretensiohs, 
however, would be so obnoxious to the present Ruler that we 
should probably experience little difficulty in saving His 
Highness from having a measure forced upon him which would be 
so manifestly against the wishes of the country.
But though we need hot pe rhaps be too anxious in regard 
to this danger, so far as it threatens the present limits of 
the Zanzibar dominions, we must consider that it is more 
especially the future value of the recently discovered mountain 
region lying immediately beyond these limits that is now 
arresting public attention in Germany, and it is to be feared 
that, were she to assume any form of Protectorate over that 
district, the absolute necessity for having command of a port , - 
on the coast in order to develop it would soon be felt by her, 
and would prove an irresistible temptation towards intereference 
in the Zanzibar succession.
In order to weigh correctly the true meaning and certain 
practical result of another Power becoming paramount at Zanzibar, i 
or on its immediate confines, we must consider more fully the 
position and interests of Great Britain in this quarter, a 
subject which lias as yet been scartely touched upon.
Our position at Zanzibar is in every way exceptional/, 
and it is no exaggeration to say that our interests there are 
more varied than in any other quarter of the globe outside our '1 
own territory.  ^ - .j
It is true the country is an' independent State, but it .4 
was through our action that it became so, and owing to our /.I
support that it has continued to exist as such. It is true, tliatll 
the highly cultivated clove islands of Zanzibar and Pemba, /
perhaps the largest spice plantations in the world, are in the
^n
hands of Prab proprietors, who are also nominally the dominant 
raoe, and that ;lrab caravans bring down all those valuable ' 3
products fro$ the interior which make Zanzibar a great commercial:^
emporium and the centre of trade in East Africa.
»
But all this is only nominal; every penny invested in 
the soil is British capital, and two-thirds of the land itself '" 
is virtually, if not actually, British property. The great 
caravans, moreover, which conduct the whole business of the ‘ h
East African mainland, are in reality British ventures, and 
•their Arab leaders simply the agents of British subjects, and, ;.J 
though mercantile houses of other natiohs have settled in the ; "
capital, they partici,pate in its trade only second-hand through / ,
the medium of British firms, who made the trade of the country, --1
and vho hold it entirely under their control. . ,j
- h
They provide the whele of the large State revenue, /
support the British mail and teleg%)bic services, except so f a r// 
as the former is subsidized by our Government; in short, all • // 
the institutions which mark the progress of wealth and civiliza- ,i 
tion in the country are practically British.
The more closely we examine this position of Great i
Britain, the more apparent it will become not only that it is for ! 
our interests, but also that it is our distinct duty, to maintain 
our influence at Zanzibar against all rivals. It is not V/
necessary here to review at length the past history of our *
relations with the Government of the country, or of the successive 
steps we have taken with regard to our subjects. In assuming 
the right to enforce measures for the suppression of the ^lave ! 
Trade on them regardless bbth of the wishes of the people and cf ,
vested interests, and which, in fact, involved a complete 
revolution in the customs and trade of the country, we incurred 
a responsibility which it is impossible now to ignore. Though 
the results of our anti-slavery policy are now rapidly justify­
ing our action, the momeht we cease to retain in our hands the 
future of the country all the good we have wrought will be 
sacrificed, and we may find it beyond our power to fulfil the  ^
pledges we have given to our subjects for the security of the 
immense capital invested by them on the faith of our supremacy.
We should also inevitably lose our control over the future 
development of Eastern Tropical Africa, and if, notwithstanding 
our Indian subjects should take a leading part in the opening 
up of this part of the continent, they would do so under other 
auspices, and others would reap the advantages of their wealth 
and enterprise.
/.
It now remains to discuss the practical measures vÉiich 
are indicated by the foregoing considérât ions.
/ /A:
This Memorandum poitts distinctly to two conclusions: 
the necessity for securing to ourselves a control over the 
Zanzibar succession, and the importance of preventing any other/g
Power from acquiring territorial or protective rights over the '
mountain district of Kilimanjaro, which must either threaten
the integrity of the Zanzibar dominions or retard the future •
development of Eastern Tropical Africa. -
The dangers to our influence, which might supervene in 
the event of the Sultan's early decease, first gave cause for ‘ 
anxiety when French aims in East African waters began to develope 
themselves, and in August 1881 Sir John Kirk induced His Highness = 
to execute a secret deed nominating his young son (9 years old) ; 
as his successor, and placing the Regency of the State in our . i 
hands pending his majority.
The dominions of Zanzibar would thus have been brought ' 
practically under our control, so far as we might think it 
expedient to accept such a responsibility, but Her ilajesty's 
Government did not feel that the moment was favourable for J
availing themselves of the powers which it was sought to confer 
upon "them.
We may now, however, seriously consider v;hether it  ^ . S
would not be advisable to induce the Sultan to renew his offer, / 
and to give our Agent instructions to press him to execute a new % 
deed. oi
Such a step would effectually secure our naval supremacy, J 
protect the property of British subjects,and restore commercial/ J 
confidence, now so rudely shaken by the effects of Frencfe f
proceedings. We could then watch over the future of the country/.^ 
in'a way that would prevent its development and freedom from . / 
being interfered with, while His Highness' successor would be Rl 
removed from influences otherwise certain to render him an unfit.1 
Ruler. ,
Such an arrangement, moreover, would solve all _ \
difficulties in connection with the moujitain region of Kiliman- 
jaro, for it would enable us confidently to make use of the 
Zanzibar Government in preventing other Powers from acquiring 
rights there which would be inconsistent with our anti-slavery 
and commercial policy, while our known adherence to free trade 
principles would afford a guarantee to other Powers that .the : 
equality provided for in their respective Gommercial Treaties. , j 
v;ith Zanzibar would be preserved. The very means thus employed ..: 
to terminate the international rivalries at present so imminent 
would finally remove the danger from other political oo mplicatiens; 
which now threaten to give us so much special cause for anxiety.:/?
Till
In order to secure these advantages we should 
I venture to think, allow the difficulties 
meet with in reopening the question of the 
to deter us from coming to a speedy and definite under standing 
with the Sultan.
not,
we are now sure to 
Zanzibar succession
In regard to the possible claims of other Powers, a 
frank statement as to the magnitude of our interest at Zanzibar 
must carry considerable weight, and it may not be difficult to 
make concessions in other quarters which would be appreciated. 
We may well sacrifice sentiment in reference to Madagascar, 
and acquiesce in an occupation which we are unable to prevent,' 
and, now that questions on the Gongo and Niger are being 
permanently settled, v/e can safely leave the Germans to expend 
their energy on the surf-bound coast of West Africa.
(Signed) FR2D0. HOLMWOOD.
'  -
IX.
APPENDIX II.
Memorandum "by }Jir, Anderson on the French Occupation
of Porto Novo. 1
In order to assist the considération of the proposal of the 
Colonial Office that a remonstrance should he addressed to the French 
Grovernment, I have studied and analyzed the old papers on the a  hject 
of the French claims, and have had the recent papers printed for 
convenience of reference. The following is the history of the French 
proceedings:
In 1863 the French Consular Agent in Dahomey repaired to Porto 
Novo to conclude a Treaty of Commerce. On his arrival, according to 
his account, the King expressed the wish to he placed under the 
Protectorate of France, and he, having convinced himself that this wish 
was supported hy the unanimous aspirations of the people, assented. On 
the 10th September the French Ambassador in London informed us that this 
action of the Consular Agent had been approved by his Government, and 
added that the object of the Protectorate was the suppression of the 
Slave Trade and the development of the resources of the country. He 
also stated that the arms of France had penetrated into the district a 
century before, and had left pleasant traces in the traditions of the 
natives. No protest was made by us, but a despatch was addressed by 
Lord Russell to Mr. Grey, then Chargé d 'Affaires at Paris, directing 
him to express the hope that the objects attributed to the Protectorate 
would be carried out. The following paragraph was added, in Lord 
Palmerston’s handwriting, to the original draft of this despatch;-
"But hitherto I regret to say that the French on the coast of 
Africa seem to have been mainly animated by petty commercial jealousy 
of the English, and to have been wholly insensible to higher and nobler 
motives. Accordingly, wherever there has been a thriving English 
Settlement, carrying on legitimate trade, and endeavouring to civilise 
the natives and to wean them from slave-trading, the French have frequently 
come and have planted a rival establishnent in close contiguity with the 
English one, although the extent of the coast of Africa gives anple room 
for both French and English to carry on their commercial enterprises 
without jostling or interfering with each other. The French Government
P.O. Confidential Print 4819. Printed for the Foreign Office, 15 June 1883. 
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cannot but see that this system is calculated to lead to differences 
and disputes which tend to create embarrassments to the two Govemnents, 
The Marquis de Cadore states in his note that the Government of the 
Emperor ascribes to favourable recollections on the part of the Chief 
and people of Porto Novo of the temporary occupation of their country 
a century ago by French troops the desire which that Chief and his 
people have now expressed to be placed under French protection; but 
though Her Majesty’s Government must be unwilling to dispel so agreeable 
an illusion, it ou^t not to be concealed from the French Government 
that this application for French protection by the Chief of Porto Novo 
is founded not on recollections a century old, but upon his recent 
experience that British influence and power are exerted to put down 
that Slave Trade wiiich had so long and so actively been carried on from 
Porto Novo, and upon the hope and expectation which that Chief entertal ns 
that under the shelter of France he will be able actively to resume the • 
commission of that abominable crime. Her Majesty’s Government hope and 
trust that he may be disappointed. "
The allusion on this passage to the recent experience of 
British influence and power referred to the destruction of the town 
two years previously by the British, which was doubtless the incentive 
to the appeal for French Protectorate.
The necessity for continuing the discussion was, however, 
obviated by the abrupt withdrawal of the French Protectorate in 1864, 
which was duly notified to the Lieutenant-Governor of Lagos on the 
21st December of that year by the French Admiral, who gave as the 
reason the culpable conduct of the Chief of Porto Novo. Till now it 
had not been resumed. The subject was mentioned in a conversation between 
Lord Lyons and the Due Decazes on the 26th December, 1875, when the 
latter denied that there was any question of its re-establishment.
The Chief of Porto Novo seems subsequently to have fully 
justified the low opinion entertained of him by his protectors, and the 
character of the successor now on the throne is said to be still worse. 
Frequent outrages have formed the subject of complaints by our Colonial 
authorities; human sacrifices continue, and his malpractices culminated 
in 1877-78, in his enploying a British steamer under the British flag to 
bombard some towns on the Denham waters. The present Chief is described 
to me by Consul Hewett and by Captain Moloney, late Acting Administrator 
at Lagos, as "one of the greatest blackguards on the coast. "
About the time of the outrage in the Denham Lake district the 
reappearance of the French on the scene was officially notified to us, 
but this time they confined themselves to the occupation of the 
neighbourhood of the coast. On the 18th October, 1878, M. Waddington 
put into Lord Lyons’ hands a paper in which it was stated that a 
Convention had been recently signed with the King of Dahomey by which the 
possession of Eu turn (which was commonly considered to be the maritime 
outlet of Porto Novo) was assured to France. The ceded district was
XI.
described as a strip of 6 kilom., and its limits were afterwards, on 
Lord Lyons * invitation, marked on a map by M. Waddington. This 
Convention was said to be a renewal of an Agreement made in 1868, which 
had not been ratified; the transaction of 1868 has been mentioned from 
time to time by the French, but we have never seen any document recording 
it.
On the 26th February, 1879, Lord Lyons addressed a friendly 
remonstrance to the French Government against the annexation of the 
district. The following paragraph shows the form of the remonstrance: 
"Great Britain," said his Excellency, "has old-established and 
regularly governed Settlements in the immediate neighbourhood. By the 
action and influence of the Government of those Settlements trade is 
carried on with safety along the intervening coast, and the Settlements 
have been maintained by Great Britain at a considerable cost of life 
and money. The French Government are well aware that Her Majesty’s 
Government attach much importance to exercising themselves control 
over the coast in question, or keeping it independent; and in these 
circumstances they cannot but feel that it is impossible that Her 
Majesty’s Government can look without pain upon the acquisition by France 
of isolated portions of territory beirween the separate portions of the 
British Gold Coast Colony. "
M. Waddington replied by a justification of the annexation, and 
an expression of the conviction that the knowledge of the exceptionally 
liberal character of the French regime in Africa must prevent any alarm 
on the part of British commerce, and the discussion dropped. No attempt, 
however, • was made to establish more than a nominal occupation of the 
district; and the Commander of a German man-of-war, dispatched subsequently 
to the coast of Katunu in consequence of the ill-treatment by the 
natives of the shipY/recked crew of a German vessel, finding no French 
authority on the spot, appealed to the British authorities at Lagos, and 
then took the inquiry into his own hands.
The Colonial Office, alarmed, in spite of M. Waddington’s 
assurances, was considering the expediency of taking under British 
Protectorate the districts of Katanu and i^pa, by v/hich step Porto Novo 
would have been cut off from water comnunications with the coast both to 
the east and west, when, before any decision was taken. Governor Ussher 
forced our hands by assuming the Protectorate of Katanu. This place is 
said to be on a creek 50 yards wide; it is navigable, for Consul Hewett 
tells me that he passed through it in the "Gertrude," a vessel drawing 
about 4 feet of water; and it is the only communication by water between 
Kutumi and Porto Novo. Governor Ussher was sharply reprimanded for acting 
without authority; but the Protectorate was confirmed, and the French 
Government were so informed in answer to inquiries made by their Ambassador 
in London. The Protectorate of Appa has not been assumed, and the Chief 
of it is said to be now considering whether, if we hesitate any longer, 
he shall not place himself under the masters of Porto Novo. If he does 
so the position of Katanu Yd.ll be turned.
XXI.
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The annexed Map shows the places referred to, Katanu is on the 
spot marked with a cross. The part coloured red is the tract marked 
by M. Waddington as the territory occupied in 1878.
In the present year the French have resumed their Protectorate 
over Porto Novo. The French Ambassador, in informing us of the fact on 
the 21st J^ril, referred to the Protectorate of 1863-64, and to the old 
story of the occupation in the last century, and the pleasant 
recollections which it had left behind it, and stated that the resumption 
was decided on in consequence of the express request of the King, and 
in view of the considerable development of French trade. A further 
reason was, he said, that the geographical difficulties which had caused 
the retirement in 1864 no longer exist, as the acquisition of i&itunu 
in 1878 has opened a free communication from Porto Novo to the sea by 
the Denham Passage.
This latter statement, it will be at once seen, ignores the 
British Protectorate of Katanu, and if the French local authorities have 
not had their attention distinctly called to this point, there will be 
trouble— indeed, trouble has already begun. The Governor of Lagos 
reported, on the 21st April, that French officers had visited Ahfohtoxa, 
Ahwansori, and Agege, and had allowed or encouraged the inhabitants to 
hoist the French flag. These places are marked on the Map; the two 
first are islands between I'litunu and Porto Novo, the third is on a 
lagoon near Porto Novo, and commands a branch of the Denham Passage.
Their position has been explained to me by Captain Moloney, who has 
visited them. The Governor added that he proposed to inform the French 
Consular Agent that they were, as forming part of Katanu, under Briti^ 
protection, and that the French flags should be removed. Not only has 
the proposed action been approved by the Colonial Office, but the 
Governor has been told by telegraph to inform the French Consular Agent 
that the places named are within the Protectorate of Katanu, and that 
no foreign flag can be hoisted there; and, further, to send an officer 
in a Colonial steamer to visit the inhabitants, and remind them that 
they are under British protection and control, and to hoist the British 
flag.
This order raises a fresh complication. Captain Moloney hæ 
sho-wn me that when this vessel passes the line to the east of Porto Novo 
which I have marked on the Map, where an old slave-route crossed the 
lagoon— she infringes, as the French assert, on Porto Novo rights, for 
which reason Sir S. Rowe has hitherto always stopped short at the point; 
in fact, the position is that the French cannot get at Porto Novo as we 
stop them at Katanu, and we cannot get at Katanu as they stop us at 
Porto Novo; the danger of a collision under such circumstances is ob^ ou s.
1
A map (not reproduced here) showing the coastal lagoons, rivers, and 
villages, from Cootenoo to Lagos, The map is printed with the Memorandum 
in F, 0.84/L654, but is not annexed to the Oil Rivers Correspondence.
Xlll.
The proposal of the Colonial Office now is that a strong 
remonstrance should he at once urgently addressed to the French Government. 
The grounds given, on which it is suggested the remonstrance shall he 
based, are the same as those on which the remonstrance of 1878 was 
founded; but it is wished that we should add that it is absolutely 
necessary that we should be able to deal directly with the troublesome 
King of Porto Novo, and that it would be impossible for us to agree, in 
case of emergency, to suspend all action pending the result of a reference 
to the French Government, or to the French authorities at Senegal or the 
Gaboon.
I think that these are all the materials upon which the decision 
as to addressing a remonstrance to France has to be based. They may 
be summed up as follows: We made a representation in 1863, when the
Slave Trade only was in question; we made a strong remonstrance in 1878, 
when there was only question of a small strip on the coast; we are asked 
now to make an urgent remonstrance, when our Colony is alarmed as to 
the peace of its frontier and the security of its trade, and when 
conflicting territorial claims are productive of danger.
Whatever the decision may be as to the remonstrance, I cannot 
avoid pointing out that there are questions involved the solution of 
which is forced on us. As regards the remonstrance, I believe we may 
discount the answer. We cannot be sanguine enough to believe that the 
French will retire; they will probably reply as before that, knowing 
the liberality of their African commercial policy, we should welccme 
them as neighbours. The position will then be practically the same as 
if we had not remonstrated, though it will be so far improved, in the 
opinion of the Colonial Office, if I rightly understand their view, 
that it will be impossible for the British public to misunderstand the 
object of the French advance. The question then will have to be decided 
what is to be done. I think we should be prepared beforehand with the 
decision. If we remain passive, we shall see our trade stifled, we 
shall find our traders furious, and we shall hardly escape grave 
complications with the French as successive Protectorates produce fresh 
irritation till, when the field is finally closed against us, we shall 
have to deal with chronic grievances and complaints. If it is thought 
that the field will not be closed, my reply us that Consul Hewett 
assures me (and I have questioned him closely on the point) that, thcugh 
we have now the vantage-ground with the Oil River Chiefs, these Chiefs, 
if we do not within a given time accept the Protectorate for which they 
are prepared, will unquestionably put themselves in the hands of the French.
How can we doubt that the French will take them? If there is one 
thing clearer than another, it seems to be that the French have a settled 
policy in Africa, both on the East and West Coast, and that that policy 
is antagonistic to us. The progress of this policy is sometimes sluggish, 
sometimes feverish, but it never ceases. Admiral Wilson, who has had 
some forty years* experience of African waters, called my attention some 
months since to the sagacity -vdiich the French had shown in occupying the 
unobtrusive position of Mayotte, an island in which there was good
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anchorage for their ships, so protected by nature that it could be 
held by a handful of men against a fleet, and giving easy access to 
Zanzibar, the Comoros, and, with Nossi Be as an outpost, to Madagascar.
Its utility is now being proved. On the West Coast the policy is more 
marked. Railways are being pushed in Senegal from St. Louis to the 
Upper Niger. Connection is being established with the Soudan, and a 
push is being made tov/ards Timbuctoo. New stations have recently been 
established at Grand Bassam and Assinie, M. de Brazza is on the Congo; 
a vessel sent direct from France has brou^t Rinta Negra and Loango 
under her sovereignty,, and the gap between this district and Gaboon 
will probably be closed, while the question of the Congo mouth is 
kept an open one with Portugal; from Porto Novo the trade of Lagos 
is attacked; a French official Agent is at work above the delta of the 
Niger, while the Captain of the "Voltigeur" is trying to induce the 
natives of the mouths of that river to accept his Treaties. If he 
succeeds in this, the final step will have been taken, and British 
trade will have no chance of existence except at the mercy of French 
officials.
Action seems to be forced on us, and if tlois is so, we are fairly 
forced into a corner as to the direction of it. Only one course seems 
possible; that is, to take on ourselves the Protectorate of the native 
States at the mouth of the Oil Rivers, and on the adjoining coast.
Reasons were given in the letter to the Colonial Office of the 22nd May, 
the force of which was admitted in their reply, why any step short of 
Protectorate would be worse than useless; the step beyond it— Annexation—  
is inadmissable. Partial Protectorates would result in an unseemly and 
dangerous race with the French; Porto Novo, for instance, is now said to 
be a reply to Whydah; Mr. Hitton, of Manchester, tells me that it is 
openly spoken of thus by the French Merchants. Protectorates are 
unwelcome burdens, but in this case it is, if my view is correct, a 
question between British Protectorates, which would be unwelcome, and 
French Protectorates, which would be fatal. Protectorates, of one sort 
or another, are the inevitable outcome of the situation. In our case, 
if Consul Hewett and Captain Moloney are to be trusted (and they do not 
speak impulsively), they could be imposed almost without an effort on 
the majority of the Chiefs; they would not be difficult of management, 
for one gun-boat in the Bights would suffice, under ordinary circumstances, 
to keep the protégés in order, and they would not be burdensome to the 
Treasury, for expenses could be managed by manipulating the traders.
There remains to be considered the effect on our relations with 
France. That there would be irritation in France cannot be doubted; but 
would this be a more important factor than the irritation in this country 
if the Protectorates go to France? Ground for minor grievances, of the 
character already referred to, would disappear, for the battle-ground 
would be closed. There would be no more opportunity for surprises and 
counter-surprises, intrigues, and underhand work. Working above ground 
we should come to qpen negotiation, and it can only be by negotiation 
that the African question between the two countries can be ultimately 
settled.
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At present the French have nothing particular to gain by 
negotiation, for they are playing the game their own way, and we are mking 
no serious attenpt to interfere with them, but the position would be 
reversed if we had the Oil Rivers in our hands. Then negotiation would 
be the only escape from the situation. Hesitation on the part of the 
French to treat would probably be overcome if they were to understand 
that the question of the Gambia would enter into the discussions. The 
remarks made by Admiral Sir F. Richards in his comments annexed to the 
Admiralty letters of the 31st Ma.y are pertinent to this point. 
belief," he says, "is that the real Naboth’s vineyard of the French in 
Africa is the Gambias. " This view apparently represents correctly 
the opinion on the Coast.
On the other hand, the consensus of opinion seems to be unanimous 
among the best instructed that British interests on the Oil Rivers are 
incomparably superior to those on the Gambia. This being so, if we 
should be in the position of having in our hands what we chiefly want, 
and of being able to offer to the French what they chiefly want, a 
settlement should not be impossible, and public opinion in both countries, 
when duly enlightened, might fairly be expected not to be opposed to it.
If we could surrender the Gambias, and obtain in exchange the Gaboon, 
the acknowledgement of our already existing Protectorate over the Lower 
Niger, and the retirement of the French from the Gold Coast, leaving 
the question of VL de Brazza, wliich it v^ould not be safe to touch, to 
solve itself, the African sommercial policy of the two countries w> u H , 
with this exception, have separate fields, ample for both, in which 
there need be no collision and no petty rivalries. Relations would thus 
be placed on an amicable footing, with every prospect of permanency.
To sum up; I venture to suggest that a remonstrance against the 
Porto Novo Protectorate should be siddressed, as the Colonial Office 
suggest, to the French Government; that we should be prepared for an 
unsatisfactory answer; that, on receiving it, we should take steps for 
assuming the Protectorate of the Oil River Coast; and that, when 
established there, we should endeavour, by negotiation on the basis of 
our retirement from the Se ne gambias, and the French retirement from the 
Gaboon, the Lower Niger, and the Gold Coast, to define the respective 
fields of the future commercial enterprise, of the two countries.
H. PERCY ANDERSON.
Foreign Office, June 11, 1885.
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B I B L I O G R A P H Y .
PRI^AARY SOURCES —  UNPUBLISHED.
I. British.
1. Official (contained in the Public Record Office, London).
A. Foreign Office Records^ (despatches and minutes thereon,
memoranda, and other records, arranged 
in chronological order, and bound 
together in volumes).
F.O. 27/ France.
2099 - 2102 (inclusive) 1876)
2154 - 2159 ft - 1876)
2228 - 2233 It - 1877)
2297 - 2303 tt - 1878)
2354 - 2360 If - 1879)
2419 - 2425 ft — 1880)
2483 - 2487 ft 1881)
2553 - 2558 ft . - 1882)
2615 - 2617 It - 1883)
2659 - 2662 II - 1884)
2725 - 2727 II - 1885)
2791 - 2793 II - 1886)
2852 - 2853 It - 1887)
2103 - 2118 (inclusive): 1875)
2160 - 2171 It - 1876)
2234 - 2245 It — 1877)
2304 - 2318 II - 1878)
2361 - 2376 It - 1879)
2426 - 2438 II - 1880)
2488 - 2499 II - 1881)
2559 - 2572 II - 1882)
2618 - 2625 II •_ 1883)
2663 - 2668 II - 1884)
2728 - 2735 It — 1885)
2794 - 2800 t t - 1886)
2854 — 2858 II - 1887)
To F. 0., despatches from the 
British Ambassador in Paris 
and the British charge 
d ’affaires.
The foregoing volumes were used exhaustively. Reference was also made 
to the volumes of ’Domestic* correspondence (communications between the 
F. 0. and the French Embassy in London), of Telegrams (to and fro the
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British Embassy in Paris), of Consular despatches (especially to and 
fro New Caledonia), and of ’Domestic Various’ papers.
Case volumes (all the papers which could conveniently 
be brought together, dealing v/ith a particular issue}.
The original P.O. titles have been preserved in the 
following lists.
2226 - 2227 - 1869-76. Exchange of Territory on West
Coast of Africa, 2 vols.
2413 - 1877-78 ).
2414 - 2418 - 1879 )
2480 - 2481 - 1880 )French Encroachments on West
2551 - 1881 )Coast of Africa, 10 vols.
2614 - 1882 )
3448 - 1825-85 British Claim to Sovereignty over
Island of ^ttacong.
2266 - 2267 - 1873-77 Correspondence respecting the
(French) Treaty with Annam.
2344 - 2345 - 1878)
2409 - 2411 (inclusive) - 1879)
2474 - 2476 " - I860)
2546 - 2549 »’ - 1881)
2610 - 2611 -I 1882) Ns-wfoundland Fisheries Çand
2655 - 2656 - 1883) Raiatea].
2700 - 2703 " - 1884)
2765 - 2767 - 1885)
2838 - 2840 " - 1886)
2890 - 2892 " - 1887)
2705 - 2719 " - 1882-85) Relations between France and
2769 - 2774 " - 1885 ) China. Proceedings of the
2842 - 1886 ) ^ ench in Ton quin.
(vols 1-22 inclusive),
2720 - 2724 " - 1880-84)
2775 - 2776 - 1885 ) Western Pacific Islyids.
2843 - 2848 " - 1886 ) Relapsed Criminals (Recidivistes)
2895 - 2897 " - 1887 ) New HebrideVr etc. Ivols, 1-18
2944, 2945 - 1888 ) inclu sive ). "
(-July) )
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2777 - 2779 (inclusive) - 1878-86, ^gotiations with Burmah
(vols" "i-sy.
2780 - 2786 " - Nov. 1884 - Sept. 1885 (French)'
Hostilities against China. 
Foreign Enlistment Act, 
Contraband.. ♦ etc. (vols 
1-7 inclu sivey.
% %  I 1 2.
F. 0. 48Afadagascar.
36 - 38 (inclusive) - 1880-82)
4 0 - 4 5  " - 1883 ) French Eroceedings in
4 9 - 5 0  - 1884 )
53 - 1885 )
F.O. 69/Siam.
105 - 1881-85. Kra Canal
108 - 1886 ) Draft despatches from F. 0. to British
114 - 1887 ) representative.
i S  : S ?  (inclusive) : Bes£_atchgs.to,,F^.
F. 0. 78/Turkey.
3188 - 1875 ) Egypt: claims to sovereignty in the Red Sea,
3189 - 1876-77) Africa, and Arabia (Somali Coast).
3190 - 3193 (inclusive) - 1878-80)
3364 - 3366 " - 1881 )
3496 - 3497 - 1882-83) ClAms to sovereignty in
3725 - 3728 " - 1884 ) the Red Sea. Africa and
3857 - 3862 " - 1885 ) Arabia (Somali Coast)~
5971 - 3975 " - 1886 )
4077 - 4083 " - 1887 )
P. 0. 83/Great Britain and General,
814 - 1870-84 ) „ „ „ . ^
1328 - 1885-94 ) Ooianunications to Newspapers.
910 - 1884-86 )
1108 - 1887-90 ) SES.*
1109 - 1809-90 Foreign Newspapers.
XXX.
1079
1080 
1081 
1082
1083
1084 - 1089 (inclusive) -
1865-77 ) Guano and other islaids, 
1878 ) questyns of sovereignty,
1879-80 ) etc. ^laiatea, New 
1881-84 ) Hebrides, Glorioso,
1885 ) Gambier, Cook, etc.J, vols.
1886-87 J 1-11 inclusive.
F. 0. 84/ Slave Trade.
1589 
1614
1636
1664
1704
1754
1831
1637
1665
1705
1755
1832
1643
1676
1722
1644
1677
1723
1879 -
1880 -
1748 -
1881 )
1882 )
1883 ) From F, 0. (Draft despatches). France>
1884 ) Vols, for 1881 and 1882 include
1885 ) despatches to F. 0.
1886 )
1887 )
1666
1706
1756
1833
1883 )
1884 ) To F.O. France. (Despatches from Paris
1885 ) and from British Consulates in varioa s
1886 ) French territories.)
1887
1883 )
1884 ) From F. 0. (Draft despatches).
1885 )
Zanzibar.
1645
1680 (inclusive) 
1729 "
1883 )
1884 ) To F. 0. Zanzibar.
1885 )
1886 87 ) for National African Company.
1886. Treaties between I&tional African Company 
and Chiefs.
F. 0. 102/ Tinis.
Ill
124
127
131 - 133 (inclusive)
1878 ) From F. 0. (Draft despatches).
1879 ) Vols, for 1879 and 1880 iic lude
1880 ) despatches to F.O. from British
1881 ) representatives in Tinis.
134 - 1881. Telegrams and extending despatches.
137 - 138 - 1881. Domestic and various.
123 - 1875-78. Financial Commission, vol.II.
143 - 146 (inclusive) - 1880-82. Bnfida Estate Claim of
Mr. Levy, vols 1 to 4.
XX.
154 - 1883. Mr. Reilly’s Correspondence.and Memoranda.
Consular Jurisdiction. French TrilTunals.
159 - 160 - 1882-84. Abolition of the Capitulations an d cf
Foreign Consular Jurisdiction, 
vols. 1 to 2,
161 - 1883-84. British Claims on Tunisian Government.
170 - 171 - 1885-84. Claimcf Sid lîamida Ben-Avadet against
the Tinisian Government,
F.O. 146/ France. Embassy archives.
1786
1860
1941
2019
2109
2204
2308
2410
2511
2603
2699
2799
2901
1805 (inclusive) 
1888 
1971 
2054 
2143 
2242 
2343 
2447 
2539 
2633 
2736 
2836 
2931
1806
1889
1972
2055
2540
2654
2737
2396 - 2397 
2499 - 2501 
2586
1875
1876
1877
1878
1879
1880 
1881 
1882
1883
1884
1885
1886 
1887
1820 (inclusive) 
1899 
1980 
2066 
2054 
2642 
2749
1875 )
1876 )
1877 )
1878
1883
1884
1885 )
- 1881 )
From F. 0. (despatches æ  d 
enclosures). Besides 
instructions on inportant 
aspects of foreign policy, 
of which drafts are to be 
found in F. 0. 27/, these vols, 
contain the despatches 
dealing with routine diplo­
matic matters and those 
covering information^largely 
in the form of confidential 
prints of despatches and 
telegrams and often in great 
bulk, about current British 
policy with regard to various 
diplomatic questions. Since 
there are apparently no 
surviving drafts of tie se two 
types of despatches, these 
vols, give a more comprehensive 
picture of the duties of the 
British Ambassador in Paris 
than the F. 0. 27/ vols.
To F. 0. (draft despatches and 
receipt for monies rece ived, 
etc.), (Occasional reference 
was also made to volune s from 
1879 to 1882 inclusive, amd 
from 1886 to 1867. )
(inclusive)- 1882 ) From F.O, Slave Trade.
- 1883 ) ------------
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2588 - 2592 (inclusive) - 1883. From F.O. Africa.
2398 - 1861 )
2502 - 1882 ) To F.O. Slave Trade. )
2587 - 1883 ) ) draft despatches.
2593 - 1883 To F.O. Africa. )
Material in the foregoing eight classes of F.O. papers was 
used extensively. Occasional reference was also made to the 
following classes 
F. 0.1/ Abyssinia.
30 - 31 - 1880-85. Frontier Question with Egypt. Admiral
Hewett’s Mission and Treaty, etc., 
vols. I and II.
F.O. 17/China.
Draft despatches from F. 0. and despatches to F. 0. from 
British representatives in China, 1875-87.
946 - 1883. Mr. Hosie ’s Report of a journey through the
Provinces of Ssu-chuan, Yun-nan. and Kiei-chon.
1059 - Oct. - Dec. 1885. Affairs of Burmah.
F. 0. 45/ Italy^ especially:-
334 - June - Dec. 1878. From F. 0. (draft despatches) .
340 - Aug. - Oct. 1878. To F.O. (despatches).
F. 0. 64/ Germany, especially:-
985 - 1881. Telegrams to and from Berlin (for Tinis esH on)
F. 0. 65/^ssia.
F.O. 99/k{orocco.
217 - 219 (inclusive) - 1881-84.)
233 - 1885-86 ) Designs of France.
241 - 1887 • )
XXll,
F.O. 170/ Italy, Embassy archives, especially:-
263 - 264 - May-Dee. 1878. From F. 0, (draft despatches).
F. 0. 181/ Russia, Embassy archives.
B. Colonial Office record^
C. 0. 15/ South Australia,
133 - 143 (inclusive) - 1875-85. pespatches. Çcorrespondei ce
betweerl Public Offices, and 
Mscellaneous.
C. 0. 18/ Western Australia.
"Public Offices" correspondence and minutes, 1875 - 1885 
inclusive, 11 vols.
C. 0. 87/ Gambia.
)
) Riblic Offices and 
) Miscellaneous (xncluilng 
) some Despatches).
108 - 110 (inclusive) - 1875-■77
112 - 1878
114 - 1879
116 - 1880
117 - 1881
119 - 1882
121 - 1883 )
123 - 1884 )
126 - 1885 )
129 - ‘ 1886 j
131 - 1887 )
0. 0. 96./ Gold Coast.
117 - 1875 )
119 - 1876 )
122 - 1877 )
125 - 1878 ) Hihlic Offices and Miscellaneous.
129 - 1879 ) ■
133 - 1880 )
136 - 1881 )
145 - 146 - 1882 )
153 - 154 - 1883 )
161 - 162 - 1884 ) Rihlic Offices.
169 - 170 - 1885 ) — —
177 - 1886 )
186 - 1887 )
XXlll.
0.0. 129/ Hong Kong.
172
176
180
183
186
191
196
204
214
218
223
229
235
- 1875 )
- 1876 )
- 1877 )
- 1878 ) Public Offices and Miscellaneous.
- 1879 )
- 1880 )
- 1881 )
- 205 - 1882 Riblic Offices.
- 1883 Offices and Individuals.
- 219 - 1884 )
' - 1886 I EUblic Offices.
- 1887 )
C. 0. 147/ Lap;os.
31 - 32 - 1875-76. Despatches. Public Offices and I&scellanous,
34 - 1877 )
36 - 1878 )
43 - 1880 ) Offices and Mscellaneous.
46 - 1881 )
52 - 1882 )
53 - 1883 Despatches, Offices and Individuals.
0. 0. 201/ New South Wales.
) 
j
578 - 1874
580 - 1875
582 - 1876
584 - 1877
586 — 1878
588 - 589 -, 1879
593 - 1880
596 — 1881
597 - 1882
599 — 1883
602 - 1884
604 - 1885
605 - 1886
606 - 607 — 1887
Riblic Offices (including some Despatches 
and letters from Individuals).
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O.P. 209/ New Zealand. 
234 - 241 (inclusive) 
242
244
245 - 247 "
- 1883
- 1884
 ^ ----'
and Mscellaneous.
Despatches, Offices and
Individuals.
Offices and Individuals.
Despatches, Offices and
Individuals.
C.0. 225/ Pacific Islands.
1
4
6
9
11
13
16
19
23
27
29
17
21 (inclusive)
- 1878 )
- 1879 )
- 1880 )
- 1881 
- 1882
- 1883 ) Public Offices.
- 1884 }
- 1885 )
- 1886 )
- 1887 )
- 1888 )
0. 0, 254/ Queensland.
35 - 42 (inclusive) - 1875-82. Despatches, Public Offices and
îvh scellaneou s.
43
45
4 6 - 4 8
- 1883 Despatches, Offices and
Individuals.
- 1884 Offices and Individuals.
- 1885-87 Despatches, Offices and
Individuals.
0.0. 267/ Sierra Leone.
328 1875 )
330 mm 1876 )
332 - 333 - 1877 )
336 - 1878 )
339 — 1879 )
342 — 343 — 1880 )
346 - 347 - 1881 )
350 — 1882 )
354 - 1883 )
357 - 1884 )
361 - 1885 ) Offic
366 - 1886 )
369 - 1887 )
XXV.
0.0. 509/ Victoria.
113 - 114 - 1875-76. Despatches, Public Offices and
Miscellaneous.
116 - 1877 )
118 - 1878 ) Riblic Offices and Mscellaneous.
120 - 1879 )
121 - 1880. Despatches, Riblic Offices and Mscellaneous.
123 - 1881 Riblic Offices and Mscellaneous.
124 - 1882 Despatches, Riblic Offices and Mscellaneous.
126 - 1883 ) ^
1^8 _ 1884 ) and Individuals.
129 - 131 (inclusive) - 1885-87. Despatches, Offices and
Individuals.
Material in the foregoing twelve classes of Colonial Office
papers was used extensively. Reference was also made to the
following classes :-
0. 0. 273/ Straits Settlements.
0.0. 806/ 0.0. Confidential Prints, African.
(The titles given to these numerous volumes of printed 
correspondence afe often significant, e. g., 203 - 
"Trade on Niger. French Proceedings. 1882-3". )
0.0. 808/ 0.0. Confidential Prints, Australian.
Occasional reference was made to Admiralty papers, especially 
to Admiralty 1/6454 (for the Admiral of the Pacific Station’s 
reports in 1878).
XXVI,
2. Private.
A, Be aeons field Papers (Hugjienden Manor).
XII. Letters from various correspondents (A-E), including 
Sir Mchael Hicks-Beach, Lord Carnarvon and Lord 
Derby,
XIII. Letters from various correspondents (P-Z), including 
Lord Salisbury.
XXI. 5. Draft letters, notes, etc,, in Disraeli’s hand, 
including letters to W ,  Gladstone.
XXIV. Official Papers.
7. Miscellaneous (official), 1866-80.
Royal Correspondence.
I. Correspondence with the Queen, 1875-81.
II. 5. Letters from the Queen, Jan. 1879 - April, 1880.
B. Carnarvon Papers (Riblic Record Office), G,D. 6/
(Reference was made to correspondence covering the period 
Feb. 1874 to Feb. 1878, when Lord Carnarvon was Secretary 
of State for the Colonies).
C, Dilke Papers (British Maseum).
B.M. Add. MS. 43934 - 43935 - Dilke Political Diary,
1880-85.
B.M. Add. MS, 43936 A and B - Dilke Political Diary,
1886-92.
D. Gladstone Papers (British Miseum) B.M. Add. MS /
44087 - Correspondence with Lord Aberdare (1871-93).
44113 - ’’ ” John Bright (1872-87).
44147 - It ft Campbell-Bannerman.
44125 - 44126 ’’ " Joseph Chamberlain (1873-93).
44129 - 44132 (inclusive)
Correspondence with H. C.E. Childers (1875-95).
44141 - 44142 " ’’ 15th Earl of Derby (1850-86).
44149 " ’’ Sir Charles Dilke (1870-94).
44172 - 44180 (inclusive)
Correspondence with Lord Granville (1880-91).
44145 - 44148 (inclusive)
Correspondence with Lord Hartington (1879-96).
44225 - 44228 (inclusive)
Correspondence with Lord Kimberley (1873-86).
44266 - 44267 " ’’ Earl of Northbrook (1868-85).
44217 ” » Sir Stafford Northcote (1856-86).
44288 - 44269 " »♦ 5th EarY of Rosebery~Tl872-92).
44297 - 44298 ’’ ’’ 1st Earl of Selbopne (1874-92).
XXVll.
44544 - 44548 (inclusive) - Letter Books, 1880-87.
(Copies of letters from Gladstone).
44624 - 44634 (inclusive) - Original Papers including
Cabinet and P. 0. Memorai da.
1880-87.
E. Granville Papers (Public Record Office), G.D. 29/
22 - Correspondence, Cabinet, Political and Various.
28A - " ,  including Cabinet and Political.
29A - " , Argyll, Bright, Dilke, Gladstone, etc.
31 - 45 (inclusive)
Correspondence, Queen and Personal Staff, ... etc.
47 - " , Prince of Wales.
117 - " , Cabinet, 1880-85.
1 1 8 - 1 1 9  " , " " (especially Childers).
120 - " , Derby, 1885-85.
121 - 122 " , Dilke, 1880-85.
123 - 129 (inclusive)
Corresixjndence, Gladstone, 1880-85,
131 - 134 (inclusive)
Correspondence, Partington, "
135 - 136 " , Kimberley, "
137 - 140 (inclusive)
Correspondence, Northbrook, "
143 - 145 (inclusive) , Correspondence and Memoranda
Cabinet opinions 1880-85.
171 - 174 (inclusive)
Correspondence, Lord Lyons, 1880-85.
175 " , Riris Embassy Secretaries.
176 " French Embassy in London.
193 " , Lord Tenter den, 1880-82.
194 " , Sir Julian Pauncefote, 1881-85.
202 - 204 (inclusive) - Drafts to Embassy in P^ris, 1880-85.
205 - H tt French Embassy in London,
1880-85.
213 - Mscellaneous Correspondence, 1885-86.
F. Csir Henry] Layard Papers (British Liisuum) B.M.Add. MS./
38962 - To Lord Hammond, 1879-81.
39139 - Political Letters (including letters from Lord 
Salisbury) 1879-1880.
G. (Lordj Tenterden Faper^ (Public Record Office) F. 0. 565/
1 - 4  (inclusive) - Correspondence, 1873-82,
5 - Mscellaneous, 1873-82.
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Draft despatches to and 
despatches from the French 
Ambassador in London, with a 
few private letters and copies 
of telegrams.
II. French. (official).
A. Archives du IvHnistere des Affaires etranperes (Quai d ’Orsay, Paris),
Angleterre, Direction Politique;-
768 - 770 (inclusive) - 1875 )
771 - 773 " - 1876
774 - 775 " - 1877
776 - 778 " - 1878 )
779 - 782 " - 1879 )
783 - 788 " - 1880 )
789 - 793 " - 1881 )
794 - 797 " - 1882 )
798 - 802 " - 1883 )
803 - 807 " - 1884 )
808 - 813 " - 1885 )
814 - 820 " - 1886 )
821 - 826 " - 1887 )
B. Archives du Mnistere des Colonies. (Paris).
Dossiers:-
1. A. P. 1022. Somalis 1884-87.
2. " " Accord Anglo-francais, 4 juin 1887 (Somali Coast).
5, Senegal VI 10 and 10b.
4. " " 13.
5. Madagascar. Correspondence générale, 1861-77 - 189, 29, 32.
6. " 84. 1®^® Direction, Bureau de l ’Afrique, 1878-83 -
M.I1 189, 84.
7. Madagascar 87, 1®^® direction. Bureau de l ’Afrique, 1883-87 -
M.H. 189; 87.
8. Océanie (2 general dossiers, including material on labour
recruitment).
9. " Possessions britanniques, 1378 - Australie, 1884-1901.
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PRIMARY SOURCES —  PUBLISHED.
A, Accounts and Papers (presented to Parliament by Command of the 
Queen, and published by Her Majesty’s Stationery Office).
(1881], XGIX, (C.2887), Correspondence with regard to Tinis.
" " Correspondence regarding Mr. Levy’s Claim to the
Enfida E^ate in Tunis.
(1884], LXXXVIlV 10.5845], Correspondence regarding French 
administration in Ohnis, 1882-5.
(18843, LXXXVII, [C. 410^, 'Treaty between Great Britain, Egypt
and Abyssinia signed at Adowa,
5 June, 1884.
Q.884-53, LXXXIX, (C. 44171 ) Correspondence regarding Ports in the 
’’ " ^0.4423}) Red Sea and the Gulf of Men, and the
Province of Harrar. 
p.804), XOVI, (C. 7380, Agreement between... Great Britain aid
France with regard to the Somali Coast, 
February, 1888.
(1880, XLVIII, Correspondence with regard to Madagascar.
" LXXXII, Report on the British Visit to the Queen of 
Madagascar, 1881.
0.880, LVI, Correspondence with regard to Madagascar.
0.884-g), LV, ’’ " ’’ " "
p.876] , LII, (C. 1409}, Correspondence with regard to ... Gambia
and the proposed exchange with France.
" " (p. 1498], Petition from the inhabitants of 1he
Gambia against French possession.
0.884-0, LIV, (C. 4290], Memoranda of Conversations at Berlin 6n
Colonial Matters between Mr. Meade... and 
Prince Bismarck and Busch '(Î885> ~
O-BOO], LI, (C. 5905], [Anglo-French West Africa ^Agreement of
10 Au trust 18801
[1884-53, LXXXVII, Correspondence regarding the Franco-Chinese War... 
[i860, LXXIII, Correspondence regarding the French Treaty with
■Annam and the negotiations betv/een France ai d 
China.
[1880, L, (jC. 4610 Correspondence relating to Burmah since the
accession of King Theebaw in October, 1875.
" " [C. 4880 Firther Correspondence relating to Burmah.
[1867], LXril, (p. 496^“ " " " "
" " (c, 5140 Correspondence respecting the Ruby Mines
of Upper Burmah,
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[1883], XLVII, [c. 3610, Correspondence respecting New Guinea,
the Nev; Hebrides and other islands.
" " Cp. 36911, do. do.
" " [C. 381<0, do. do.
(1884], LV, (C. 3860, New Guinea and the Western Pacific Islands.
Coirespondence. Also the Convention at 
Sydney of the Representatives of the 
Mstralasian Colonies.
" " {C. 58391, [continuation of above).
(1884-0, LIV, [C. 4217) , (continuation of above),
" " [C. 4273J , Further Correspondence regarding
N3w  Guinea.
" " fc.4580, [contimation of above).
[1888], CIX, (0.5256], The New Hebrides Agreement between France
and Great Britain, November, 1887.
" " (C. 5572], Declaration for the Abrogation of the 184-7
Declaration. TV M y  1888; (Re garding the 
Pacific Leeward Islands.)
" " (C. 5581], Correspondence regarding the expulsion of
Rev. J. Jones' from Loyalty IslandsT...
by the French Authorities.
B, Documents Diplomatiques (Livres Jaunes) (published by the 
Minist^re des Aff aires '3 trangere s).
Affaires de Tinisie 1870-81 (l88l).
" " " supplément, avril-mai 1881 (l88l).
Organisation du protectorat français en lUnisie (l885).
Affaires de Madagascar, 1881-83 (l883).
" " " 1882-,83 "
" " " 1884-86 (1886).
Affaires du Congo et de 1 VAfricfue Occidentale (l8S4),
H t» tf t! H « ti (1885),
" de l ’Afrique - Conventions, 1881-98 (l898).
Affaires du Tonkin. Premiere partie 1874-82 (1883).
" " " Deuxième partie, d^c. 1882 - hov. 1883 (l883).
" " " Expose de la situation, oct. 1883 (1863).
’’ ’’ " Convention de Tient Tsin (1884).
" " Chine et du Tonkin, 1884-85 (1885).
/
Affaires des Nouvelles Hebrides et des Iles sous le Vent de 
Tahiti (1887)7
C. Gv P. Gooch and IL Tenp>erley (eds. ) ; British Documents on the 
Origins of the War.vol. I,(London, 1927% ^
XXXI.
D. Mnistere des Affaires étrangères. Commission de publication 
des documents relatifs aux origines de la guerre de 1914: 
Documents Diplomatiques français (1871-1914), 1®^® Série 
(1871-1900), vols.ï - VI5(paris. Imprimerie Nationale, 
1930-34).
E. Die Crosse Bolitik der Europâischen Kabinette, 1871-1914; 
Sammlung der Diplomatischen Akten des Auswârtigen Am te s»
^eriin, 1922-27), vol. III, "Das Bismarck’sche Bundnissystem", 
(1922).
E. T. S. Dugdale (éd.); German Diplomatic Documents, 1871-1914^ 
(London, 1928-30), vol.I, "Bismarck’s Relations with England, 
1871-1890. " (Tnis 4#volume work is a translated and annotated 
selection of documents from Die Crosse Politik.)
SECONDARY SOURCES,
I, Speeches.
A. Hansard; Parliamentary Debates. Third Series.
QZhe vols, chiefly used were CCLIV (beginning 9 July 1880)
to GCLXXIX (-June 1883) ].
B. Public Speeches.
C. S. GL/iRKE (ed. ) ; The Defence of the Enpire. A Selection
from the Letters and Speeches of Henry liow^ ard Ivlolyneux^
Fourth Earl of Carnarvon, (London, 1897)'.
Jules FERRY; Discours ^ et Opinions (ed. by Paul Robiquet), 
vols. Paris, 1897). (Vol. V. contains speeches on 
foreign and colonial policy.)
Arthur Berriedale KEITH; Selected Speeches and Pom me nts on
British Colonial Policy 1763-1917, (2 vois. , Oxford, 1918).
Henry~w] LUCY (ed. ) ; Speeches of the Riglit Bon. Joseph 
Chamberlain, M. P. , with a sketch of his Life, 
(London,1885),
Henry W. LUCY (ed. ) ; Speeches of the Ivfercpis of Salisbury, 
(London, 1886).
Archibald P. PRIMROSE, Fifth Earl of Rosebery; Lord 
Rosebery’s Speeches (1874-1896), (London, 1896).
E.ILS. STANLEY, Fifteenth Earl of Derby; Speeches and 
Addresses (ed. by H. Sanderson and Els. Roscoe),
(London, L894).
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II. Collections of Letters.— e*5aesa;g"trg.'i.'.'i n,,^. - ■ . ,ai ' ira
Lady Betty BALFOUR i Personal and Literary Letters of
Robert First Earl of Lytton. (2 vols., London, 1906).
G. E. BUCKLE (ed. ) : The Letters of Queen Victoria. A
Selection from her Majesty’s Correspondence and 
Journal, Second series, vols. 2 and 5, (London] 19^,
1928), and Third Series, vol.1, (London, 1930).
Baron A, MEYENDORFP; Correspondence diplomatique de M  de 
Staal 1884-1900, (2 vols. / Paris, 1929%.
F. WADDINGTON: "Lettres inédites de Jules Ferry a W.H. 
Waddington", Revue d ’histoire diplomatique, 
juillet 1937.
III. The Press.
A. Newspapers. Files of various newspapers (kept in the 
British lAiseum Newspaper Library, Col indale) were 
sampled for expressions of contemporary opinion during 
different phases of Anglo-French relations. The journals 
chiefly consulted were ;-
The Daily News,
The Daily Telegraphy 
The Morning Post.,
The Pall Mall Gazette,
The Standard, and 
The Times.
B. Periodicals. From the aftermath of the Berlin Congress 
to the time of Britain’s Iviediterranean alignment with 
the Central Powers (1879-87) , British periodicals 
included many articles dealing with various aspects of 
Anglo-French relations, especially French colonial 
development. The periodicals chiefly consulted for this 
thesis were:-
The Edinburgh Review.
The Fortniphtly Review.
Macmillan’s Magazine,
The National Review,
The Nineteenth Century, and 
The ^Quarterly Review.
In the history of British political thought, the appearance 
of the Political Science (garterly in 1886 is noteworthy. 
The issue of March 1866 (vol. l) 'contains an interesting 
article by Daniel de LEON on "The Conference of Berlin",
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which discusses the Anglo-Pcrtuguese Treaty of 1884.
For information on international commerce, V. The Board 
of Trade Journal of Tariff and Trade Notices ^ d  
Miscellaneous Commercial Information, vol. I (July - 
December 1886) et, seq.
Of particular interest on the French side is;- 
L ’Economiste français, esp. articles, 1883-84, criticising 
the Australian attitude to the Western Pacific.
IV. Contemporary books, i.e. published between 1870 and 1890.
1. General.
John Douglas S. Campbell, Duke of ARGYLL; Imperial Federation 
(vol. 1 of co-operative work entitled "The Imperial 
Parliament’^ ], (London, 1885).
Philip H.D. BAGSNAL: The Tory Policy of the Marquis of
Salisbury, (London, 1885). (a  eulogy/ Contains long 
extracts from Salisbury’s speeches and a sketch of 
the statesman’s career. )
Rev. A. G^  BURNETT: France since the War. A Lecture delivered.., 
on December 20th 1871^ (London 1872). (A public lecture 
giving impressions gained from a recent stay in Fræce,
The author was pleased to note the French, though still 
’gay’, were not so ’Popish’ as before the war.)
Rt, Hon. Charles W. DILKE: Tlie Present Position of European
Politics, (London,188777
Rt. Hon. Charles W. DILKE; Problems of Greater Britain, (London, 
1890).
The Marquis of LORNE: Imperial Federation,(London, 1885).
J-L. de LANES SAN (député^ de la Seine); L ’expansion coloniale de 
la France. Etude économique, politique et géographique 
sur les établissements f ranimai s d ’outremer, (Pari s, 1886).
G. L. MOLESWORTH: Imperialism and gT ee Trade", (London, 1886).
E.C. G. MURRAY: Men of the Third Republic, (London, 1873),
(short biographies of French politicians. )
C.B. NORÏÆAN: Colonial France, (London, 1886).
Sir Raws on W. RIWSON, President of the Statistical Sociefy :
British and Foreign Colonies: The Inaugural Address, 
delivered 18 November 1884, (Londion, 1884). (Deplores 
differential colonial duties of Holland, Spain, Portugal 
and France).
Magnus C. KENDALL; Gladstone’s Foreign and Colonial Policy; An 
address delivered in Edinburgh on 1st February 1884,
(Leith, 1884). (Deplores alleged emti/annexationist policy 
of Gladstone in the face of French expansion.)
George Augustus SALA: Paris Herself Again, (2 vols., London, 1880) 
(a  descriptive, illustrated account of life in Paris.)
Frederick YOUNG; On the Political Relations of Mother Countries
and Colonies. A paper read at the "Conférences et Congres
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Scientifiques” of the Exposition Internationale 
Coloniale et d ‘Exportation Générale at iiinsterdajn, 
September 19th, 1883, (London, 1883).
2. Specific areas.
(a) West Africa.
Emile Le partage politique de 1*Afrique,
d ‘après les tr^sactions internationales les 
plus récentes (1885 a 1888H (Bnisseïs, 188ÏÏ). 
(published documents used. Contains an up-to-date 
map. )
John Mf HARRIS: Annexations to Sierra Leone and their 
Influence on British Trade with West Africa,
(London, 18837.
C. Graham-ROSENBUSH (Manager of the late Commercial
Bank in Sierra Leone): Sierra Leone; its commercial 
position and prospects, (London, 1881). (Written in 
1874. Urges opening-up of Sierra Leone for 
commercial purposes).
K.M. STAHLEY: The Congo and the Rounding of its Free State. 
(2 vols., London, 1885). (The author‘s traveïs in the 
Congo area from 1879.)
Thomas TOIviLIESON: The Congo Treaty, (London, 1884). (Opposed 
to the Anglo-Portuguese Congo Treaty, which is given 
in an appendix.)
(b) The par East and the Indo-Chinese peninsula.
A. R. GOLQUHOUN: English Policy 3n the Far East, (London,
1885).
A.R. GOLQUHOUN and HOLT S. HALLETT: Report on the Railway 
Connexion of Burmah and China, (London, 1888]! 
(Advocates railway ïinïcs with China through Burma 
and an Anglo-Chinese alliance. Submitted to ILM.G. 
and British Chambers of Commerce, some of which 
supported the author by passing resolutions. )
H. CORDIER: Le Conflit entre la Prance et la Chine, (Paris, 
1883).
Portescue PCX: Observations in China (reprinted from 
Friends‘ Quarterly Examiner) /(London, 1884).
(Criticises French action in Tongking. )
Sir Alexander HOSIE: Report on a Journey through Ssu-ch‘an, 
Yunnan and Kiei-chon7(LondonV 1883). (a  Foreign Office 
publication. )
C. B. NORI'ÆAN: Tonkin. France in the par East. (London, 1884),
James G. SCOTT: France and Tongking. A Narrative of the
Campaign of 1884 and the Occupation of Farther India. 
(London, 1885). (%ie author visited Hanoï'in 1884. )
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(c) The Pacific.
H. Stonehewer COOPER: The Islands of the Pacific; Their 
Peoples and their Products. (London, first edition, 
1880; new edition, 1888). (Discursive chapters 
written from commercial angle. Advocates extension 
of British rule over Polynesia. Supports 
missionaries.)
Walter COOTE: The Western Pacific, (London, 1883).
(Descriptive. Criticises French policy in îfew 
Caledonia as bureaucratic. Appeals for a greater 
measure of British control in the area to check 
labour exploitation of the natives,)  ^ ^
Paul DESCHANSL: La politique française en Oceanie a propos 
du canal d^Panama (with a T.e^t^ Wr'dirTand de 
Les seps)*, (pa?ÎG^i^884), (Appeals for French 
annexation of the pacific Leeward Islands. )
Paul DESCIIANEL: Les intérêts français dans 1 ‘Ocean Pacifique, 
(Paris, 1888% (An account of recent diplomatLc events 
based on sources available at the time.)
G. HAITRIGOT:, Les établissements français dans 1 ‘Inde et
en Oceaniel (Paris, 1888).
Rev. John INGLIS: In the New Hébrides. Reminiscences of 
Missionary Life and Work, especially on the Isl^d 
JhieTtyum, from 18^ 50 till 187% (London, 1887% 
(exposes French annexation of the New Hebrides. )
Charles LË2ÆIRE; La colonisation française en Nouvelle 
Caledonie et Dépendencë% (Paris, 1878).
(Commander) A. H. MARŒAM: The Cruise of the Rosario amongst 
the New Hebrides and Santa Cruz Islands, exposing 
the recent atrocities connected with the Ki(gapping 
of natives in the South Seas, (London^ 1873).
H.H. ROLŒLLT: The Western BUcific and New Guinea, (London,
1886). (Experiences in the""Pacific).
Julian THOMAS: Cannibals and Convicts. Notes of personal 
Experiences in the Western Phcific, (London, isss).
(By an Aistralian journalist. Valuable for a 
contemporary description of the penal system in 
New Caledonia. )
V. Biographies, Autobiographies and Memoirs (general).
Sir Tliomas BARCLAY: Thirty Years: Anglo-French Reminiscences,
1876-1906, (London, 1914). ("Ëie author was" Chairman of the 
British Chamber of Commerce in Paris.)
Lady Victoria Hicks BEACH; Life of Sir Michael Hicks Beach,
Earl St. Aldwyn, (2 vois., London, 1932).
Henri Stephan de BL0WIT2: My Memoirs, (London, 1903).
George E, BUCKLE : TLie Life of Benjamn Disraeli, Earl of Be aeons field, 
vols. V and V %  (London, 1920%
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Lady Gwendolen CECIL; Life of Robert, Istoquis of Salisbury,
(4 vols., Londoii, 1921-32),'
E. S. C. CHILDERS; Life and Correspondence of Hie Right Hon.
High C.B. Childers, %2^vols. , ïx^ndonV 1901%
Winston S, CHJRQFIILL: Lord Randolph Churchill, (2 vols., London,
1906).
(Robert 0. A. C. Mines) Marquis of CREWE: Lord Rosebery (2 vols. ,
London, 1931).
Paul DESŒIANEL: Gambetta. (New York, 1920).
Erik EYCK: Gladstone (translated by Bernard Mall), (London, 1938).
Lord Edmond PITZMAJRIGE; The Life of Granville George Leveson
Gower, Second Earl Granville, K. Gk , 1815-1891, (2 voTs. , London, 
Charles de PREYCINET; Souvenirs, 1878-1893 /(Paris, 1914), 1905j.
J. L. GARVIN: Tlie Life of Joseph Chamberlain, vols. I and I I ,
(London,1932-33).
Charles GAVARD; Un diplomate a Londres, (Paris, 1895).
Stephen GWYNN and G.lvL TUCKWELL: The Life of The Right Hon. Sir 
Charles W. Dilke, Bart. , M. P.. (2 vols., London, 1917)." '
Sir Arthur HARDINGE: The Life of Henry Howard i/blyneux Herbert 
Fourth Earl of Carnarvon, 1831-1890^ (3 vols.^ Oxford,
1925). Edited by Elisabeth Countess of Carnarvon.
Sir Edward HERTSIEX: Recollections of the Old Foreign Office,
(London, 1901).
Franlc TURD; H. M. Stanley. The Authorised Life, (London, 1935).
S. G^  HOLLAJŒ) (Viscount Khutsford) ; In Black and White. (London, 1926). 
/ilex JOHNSTON; The Life and Letters of Sir Harry Johnston. (London,
1929) .
Sir Harry JOHI'^TON: The Story of My Life^(Indianapolis, 1923).
T.W. LEGH (Lord Newton): Lord Lyons: A Record of British 
Diplomacy, (2 vols%London, 1913).'
Sir Edward MALET: Shifting Scenes or Memories of Many Men in Many 
Lands, (London% 1901 )..
John MORLEY; Tlie Life of William Ewart Gladstone, (2 vols.,
London, "l 908 )'.
Alfred R/JvCBAUD; Jules Ferry, (Paris, 1903).
Stuart J. REID ^ed. V* Memoirs of Sir Edward BLOUNT (H.M. Consul
in Paris 1871, and later President of the British Chamber 
of Commerce in ParisJ, (London, 1902).
Lady Dorothea WELLESLEY; Sir George Goldie* Founder of Nigeria*
(London, 1934).    '
Mrs. Rosslyn WEMYSS: Tlie Letters and Memoirs of Sir Robert Ivbrier,
(2 vols., London, 1911%
Sir Algernon WEST [appointed Gladstone ‘s private secretary, 186^ ;
Recollections 1832-86, (2 vols., London, 1899).
Frederic WHYTE; The Life of W. T. Stead (Editor of the Pall Mall 
Gazettel  ^ (2 volsT", London, 192^.
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VI. Historical works.
1. Published.
A. General.
(a) Books.
W. 0. ATDELOTTE; Bismarck and British Colonial Policy, 
(Hiiladelphia, 1957%
C. G. BODELSEN; Studies in Md-Victorian Imperialism, 
(Copenhagen, 1924%
J. L. P. M. BONNASSIEUX: Les grandes compagnies de 
commerce, (Paris, 1892%
D.W, BROGAN: The Development of ivbdern France, 1870 - 
1959, (London, 19407%'
J.P. T. BüEÏ: France 1814 - 1940, (London, 1949).
G»A.R. CALLENDER: Bibliogranhv of Naval History (iBstoricail 
Assoc. No. 58, 6Î%
The C M  BRIDGE, History of British Foreign Policy,
(3 vols. , Cs^mbridge, 19Z3), vol. Ill, 1866-1919.
The CAjVIBRIDGS History of the British Empire, (8 vols. , 
Cambridge, 193^7
C. E. CARRINGTON: The British Overseas* (Cambridge, 1951 ).
E. M. CARROLL: French Biblic Opinion and Foreign Affairs
1870-1914*(American Historical Association, New York, 
i95l). ^
S. R. CHOW: Le contrôle parlementaire de la politique
e^trangere en Angleterre, en France, et aux Etats Unis, 
(Paris, 'l920).
Sir John CLi\PHAM: The Economie Development of France and 
Germany 1815-1914, (Cambridge, fourth edition,1956).
Shepard Bancroft CLOUGH: ^ance. A History of National 
Economics, 1789-1959, (New York, 1959),
A, COVniE and H. TEilPERLBÏ (eds. ) : Studies in Anglo- 
Ftench History, Eighteenth to Twentieth Centuries, 
(London, 1935% %Esp. J. P. T. BURY: ’’Gambetta and 
England”, and L.M. Pfil'JSON: "The Foreign Policy of 
Lord Salisbury 1878-80”. )
S. E, CROWE: The Berlin West African Conference 1884-5, 
(Royal Empire Society, Li^erial Studies No. 19)',
(London, 1942).
A  DUCHENE: La politique coloniale de la France,(Paris, 
1928).
H. E. EGERTON: A Short History of British Colonial Policy, 
1606-1909* (London, ^ 1897%' (ninth edition, 1932%
Harold EVANS: Men in the Tropics. A colonial anthology, 
(London, 1949% ("selected passages fron travel books; 
part 1 - West Africa, part 5 - Pacific Islands).
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Sir George V. FIDDSS [Permanent Colonial Under­
secretary, 1916-21]: The Dominions and Colonial 
Offices, (Whitehall Series, London, 1925),
FOREIGN Office Handbook No. 35; German Colonization* 
(confidential, issued for use at the Peace 
Conference, February, 1919), (Useful factual outline,)
C. J. PUCKS; The Trade Policy of Great Britain and her
Colonies since 186b* '(translated by C.H.M. .Archibald), 
Çondon, 1905).
John and Stephen GASELEE; The Foreign Office.(Whitehall 
series, London, 1933).
Arthur GIRAULT: The Colonial I'ariff Policy of France, 
(London, 1916).
ILL. HALL: The Colonial Office, A History^ (Royal
Empire Society, In^erial Studies No. 13, London, 1937). 
Gabriel HANOTAUX: La France Contemporaine (4 vols.,
Paris ).
G. HANOTAUX et A. MARTINEAU; Historié des colonies
françaises et de 1 ‘expansion de la France dans le 
mond?, (6 vols., Paris, 1929-34).
Georges HARDY: Histoire de la Colonisation française, 
(Paris, 1928%
Vincent HARLOW: The Historian and British Colonial 
History. An Inaugural Lecture delivered in the 
University of Oxford on 16 November 195ÔJ(bxford,1951),
F. W, HIRST: The Six "Panics [including the ‘Navy Scare ‘ 
of 188437 (London, 1913).
J. A. HOBSON: Imperialism*(London, 1905).
H.L. HOSKINS: British Routes to India. (London, 1928).
J. E. HOWARD: Parliament and Foreign Policy in France*
(London, 1949%
Paul KNAPLUND; Gladstone and Britain‘s Imperial Policy^ 
(New York, 1927%
Paul KNAPLiAND: Gladstone‘s Foreign Policy^ (New York, 1935), 
J. -  L. de LANESSAN: Histoire de 1 ‘entente cordiale 
franco-anglaise,(Paris 1916).
W.L, LANGER: European ^.liances and Alignments* 1870-90, 
(New York, 1931), (second edition, 1950),
W. L. LANŒR: The Diplomacy of Imperialism. 1890-1902 ^
(2 vols. , New York% 1935% (Esp. vol. I,ch. 3 - an 
analysis of motives and attitudes in the British 
Imperialist movement).
Ernest LAVESSE: Histoire de la i^ance Contemporaine,
(vols. 7 and~8, î^ris, 192l).
Dwyght E. LEE: Great Britain and the Cyprus Convention 
Policy of 1878~* (Harvard Historical Studies No, 38, 
Harvard University Press, 1934.
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Sir Charles LUCAS: A Historical Geography of the 
ü^itish Colonies. (15 vols.. Chef ord 1687-1931. )
(Vol. I - The Mediterranean and Eastern Colonies;
Vol.Ill - West Africa.)
Sir John A.R. ÎÆARRIOTT: The Eastern Question* (Oxford, 
new edition, 1940),
Sir John A. R. MARRIOTT: Anglo-Russian Relations 1689- 
1943^(London, 1944).
W. N. IVIEDLICOTT: The Congress of Berlin and After, A 
Diplomatic History of the Near Eastern Settlement,
1878 - 1880. (London, 1958).
W. H. MILLS: Ihe Manchester Guardian. (London, 1921).
Pearl Boring MITCHELL: The Bismarckian Policy of
Conciliation with France. 1875 - 1885* (PhiladeIphia, 
University of Pennsylvania Press, 1935). (Esp. ch. VI.- 
"French Expansion with German Support").
A. P. Î4EWT0N and J. E\'/INC; The British Enpire since 1785.
Its political and economic development, (London, third 
edition, 1939). ^
H.H. 0 ‘FARRELL: The Franco-German War Indemnity and its 
Economic Results, (London, 1913%
L.M. PSNSON: The Colonial Background to British Foreign 
Policy, (Inaugural Lecture", London, ' 1930)”
Thomas P. POWER: Jules Ferry and the Renaissance of 
French Imperialism, [New York, lOM*)^
A. P. PRIBRAIvI: England and the International Policy of 
the European (Great Powers, 1871 - 1914 ^ (Oxford! 1931 ). 
Herbert Ingram PRIESTLEY: France Overseas. A Study of 
Modern Imperialism^ (American Historical Association, 
New York, 1938),
L. J. RAGATZ: Tie Question of Egypt in Anglo-French V' 
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(2 vols., London, 1908).
Ralph E. Drake BROCKMAN: British Somaliland, (London, 
1912).
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the Rise of Is lain' to ivbdern Times, (lindVn,""l948%
Stephen H, LONGRIGG: A Short History of Eritrea,
(Oxford, 1945).
Stephen H. LONGRIGG: A Short History of Ethiopia, 
(Oxford, 1945).
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W.W. CLARÎDGE: History of the Gold Coast and Ashanti,
(2 vols., London, 1915% (Authorised by the Gold Coast 
Government.' Mainly military. Vol. I covers period up 
to 1872.)
xliv.
Helen P. CONOVER: French Colonies in Africa. A List of 
References, (compiled for the Division of Bibliography, 
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Jean DARCY: France et Angleterre, Cent /Innees de 
rivalité' Coloniale. L ‘Afrique, (Paris, 1904).
Pierre DELONGLE: L ‘Afrique occidentale française.
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xlv.
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Sir Harry H. JOHNSTON; A History of the Colonization of 
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Arthur Berriedale KEITH: TI_e Belgian. Congo and the Berlin |
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Mary KINGSLEY: West African Studies, (London, 1899). 
(Reminiscences and reflections by a famous woman 
explorer.)
Ethelreda LEV/IS (ad:): The Life and Works of Alfred 
Moysius Horn; I. The Ivory Coast in the Earlies,
(London, 1927% With a foreword by John Galsworthy.
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Lady LUCARD (Flora L. Sliaw) : A Tropical Dependency. An 
CXitline of the Ancient History of the Western Soudan 
with an Account of the libdern Settlement of Northern 
Nigeria, (London! 1905). (includes a chapter on 
Britain and Prance in the Lower Niger.)
Lord LUCARD; The IXial Mandale in British Tropical Africa, 
(London, 1922%
Sir H. C. LUKE (Colonial Secretary, Sierra Leone] :
Bibliography of Sierra Leone, (Oxford, 1925). (Comprehensive).
Gas ton MARY; Precis historique de la colonisation française 
en Afrique occidentale depuis les premiers siècles 
,iusqu 'en 1910 (a l 'usage des candidats aux carrières 
coloniales). (Paris, 1937), (Useful chronological tables).
Allan McPHEE: ^ e  Economic Revolution in British West Africa, 
(London School of Economics Studies in Economics and 
Political Science, No. 89; London, 1926). (includes a 
useful chapter on the development of trade in the 
nineteenth century).
E,D. MOREL: The British Case in French Congo. The Story of 
a Great Injustice!"its Causes! and its Lessons, (London, 
1903% (criticism of the exclusive commercial policy 
adopted in the French Congo).
xlvi.
(Capt. ) IL 0. NBWIiAND: West Africa. A Handbook of prac tical 
information for the official, planter, miner, 
financier, andF fo^ ader, (London! 1922), (Useful for 
the commercial development of natural resources.).
(Capt. ) C. W. J. ORR: The Making of Northern Nigeria*
(London, 1911). (chiefly about Nigeria under the 
Chartered Company. )
Sir Alan W. PIM: The Financial and Economic History of
the African Tropical Territories! (Oxford, 1940).
[Beit Lectures for 1938. Useful survey#. îUllest on 
twentieth century developments).
L. J. RAGATZ: A Bibliography for the Study of African 
IHstory in the Nineteenth and Twentieth Centuries, 
[Washington, 1943).
Fernand ROUGET# (Rédacteur au Ministère des Colonies];
L'expansion Coloniale au Congo français^(Paris; second 
edition, 1906). (942 pp. ïïïus. 3heface by Albert 
Buchêne, sous-directeur at Ministère des Colonies.)
Harry RUDIN; Germans in the Cameroons, 1884-1914.
A Case Study in Modem Imperialism, (London! 1938). 
(Written from material in British and German arcliives. 
Very useful for British attitude to Cameroons, 1880-85).
A. TERRIER and Charles M0UREÏ: L'expansion française et 
la formation territoriale - L'oeuvre de la Troisième 
République^ en Afrique occidentale! (Paris, 1910). 
(ruiDlished under auspices of Gouvernement-générale 
of A  0. F. Rillest on local administrative and military 
history. )
Robert S. Tîi0!MS0N: Foundation de l 'Etat independent du
Congo. Un chapitre de l'histoire du partage de l'Afrique* 
(Brussels, 1933%
J, - L. Georges TUAILLON: Bibliographie critique de 
l 'Afrique occidentale française, (paris! ^936).
W, B. F. WARD; A History of the Gold Coast, (London, 1848),
Leonard. Sidney WOOLF; Empire and Commerce in Africa,
(London, 1920). (classic left-wing treatL»e.)
V. Tlie Far East and the Indo-Chinese peninsula.
P. BOUDET and H. BOURGEOIS; Bibliographie de Indo-Chine 
française, (2 vols., Ihris, 1929 and 1933).
C. A. BUSS: War and Diplomacy in Eastern Asia, (New York, 
1941). (An analysis of the political situation with 
historical introductions to the current interests 
of the various Powers. )
Alfred CUNNINGrlAM: The French in Tonkin and South China,
(Hong Kong, 1902).
Sir Robert K. DOUGLAS; Europe and the Far East, (Cambridge, 
1904).
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Thomas ENNIS; French Policy and Developments in pido-
China, (University of Chicago Press, 1936). (Fillest 
on modern administration. The three historical 
chapters begin at 1625.)
Foreign Office Handbook No. 78; French Indo-China^ 
(Confidential, 1919),
Foreign Office tiandbook No, 87: Siam, (Confidential^ 1918).
D. G. E. liALL: Europe and Burma. A Study of European
Relations with 3^rma to the Annexation of Thibaw's 
Kingdom, 1886, (Oxford,1945). (Includes chapter on 
ihiglo-French relations, 1879-1885. )
E. V. Gv KIERNAN; British Diplomacy in China, 1880-1885,
(New York, 1939%
P. LEIIA.ÜLT: Appel aux Chambres de commerce. Avenir de
1 *Indo-Chine. Extrait d'un livre sous presse; La 
j^ance et l 'Angleterre en Asie] (Paris, 1892),
(Advocates expansion against ^ i t a i n  in Indo-China 
to gain access to potential market in Western China. ) 
Charles LBîÆERE; La France et le Siam 1662-1903. (Paris,
1903).
liosea Ball am MORSE and Harley Farmsworth I4acNAIR; Far
Eastern International Relations, (Cambridge, Mass.,1931), 
Nathan A. PELCOVITS: Old China Hands and the Foreign
Office, (New York, 1948). (Published under auspices 
of the American Institute of Pacific Relations. )
P. R. PEARN: Burma Background. (London, 1943). (A history of
Burma. )
Sir John PRATT; The Expansion of Europe into the Far 
East, (London, 1947%
Virginia THOIVIPSON: French Indo-China  ^(London, 1937).
(a  history, mainly about nineteenth and twentieth 
century developments. )
W. A.R. WOOD (former British Consul-General, Chiengmai]; 
History of Siam* (Bangkok, 1933). (Brief Court and 
diplomatic history, fhllest on Anglo-Siamese relations. )
vi. Australasia and the islands of the Pacific.
Pierre BENOIT: L*Oceanie française. Illus. by Philippe 
TASSIER, (Paris, 19^3). (Primarily a travel book, 
with a brief disquisition on the history of the New 
Hebrides and Higginson's role in it.)
Augustin BERITARD: La Nouvelle Calédonie (Paris, 1895). 
Originally a doctoral thesis (1886). A geographical 
and economic description, with three chapters on the 
penal system. )
Jean Ingram BROOKES: International Policy in the Pacific
Islands, 1800-1875! (Berkeley, University of California 
Press, 1941). (a  unique work, based on British and 
American archive material. )
xlviii.
Wilfred G  BURCHETT; Pacific Treasure Islands New
Caledonia, (Melbourne, first edition 1941; second 
edition, 1944). (primarily a travel book, but 
useful for an account of the penal system. )
A.C. Eugene CAILLOT: Histoire de la Polynésie Orientale,
(paris, 1910). (includes a detailed account of 
the internal history of the Leeward Islands. )
James COLWELL (ed. ) ; A Century in the -Pacific, (London,
1914). (a  Survey of the development of Australia.
New Zealand and the British Pacific Territories. )
Ernest DAVILLE; La colonisation française aux Nouvelles- 
Hebrides, (Paris, 1895%
Alfred DEAKIN; The Federal Story. The Inner History of 
the Federal Cause, (Melbourne] first published 1944). 
(Contains a useful account of the London Colonial 
Conference of 1887, which the author attended, and 
the speeches on the Western Pacific given there. ) 
FOREIGN OFFICE Handbook No. 138: Gallapagos Islands,
(Confidential, 1919),
No.139; Discoveries and Aguisitions 
in the Pacific*(Confidential, 1920). 
No, 140; British Possessions in 
Oce ani a, (Gonfidential, 1920).
■ No. 143: British Possessions in the 
pacific^(confidential, 1919).
No. 144: French Possessions in the 
Pacific, (Confidential, 1919),
No. 145.* French Possessions in 
Oceania^(Confidential, 1920),
No. 146A: New Hebrides.(Confidential, 
1919).
J. C. FURNAS: Anatomy of Ibnadise. Hawaii and the Islands
of the South Seas (written in co-operation with the 
American Institute of Pacific Relations), (London,
1950), (An antliropological liistory. )
Henry L. HILL: Australia and England, (London, 1934).
(Based on Colonial Office records. A discussion of 
Australian foreign policy in the nineteenth century 
vis-à-vis Imperial control. )
Tom HARRISSON: Savage Civilisation. (London, 1937).
(a  description of the New Hebrides by an anthropologist, 
who lived among the inhabitants. Includes historical 
sections, for which P.R.O. material was used.)
Paul HUGUENIN; Raiatea la Sacree, (Neuchatel, 1902). (An 
illustrated geographical and anthropological account 
of the island by a former Directeur des Ecoles des 
Iles-sous-le-Vent. )
Edward J AC 0MB; France and England in the New Hebrides. The 
■Anglo-French Condominium, (1919% (Advocates British 
ownership of the New Hebrides. Fullest on New 
Hebrides history after 1888,)
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Charles LELCCRS: Les intérêts français dans le Pacifique, 
(Paris, 1904)! (Discusses effects of Panama Canal. 
Includes brief account of the acquisition of the 
Nev; Hebrides. )
K.L.P. MARTIN; ^Missionaries and Annexation in the 
Fhcific, (London, 1924).
A.P. IvIAUDSLEY; Life in the Pacific Fifty Years Ago,
(London, 1930% (Remini scencesT%^
PACIFIC Islands Year Book, (Sydney; fourth edition, 1942).
I.fe.ggie Miiteoross PATON^wife of the missionary, Dr. Jolin 
G  PatonJ ; Letters and Sketches^frpm ^the New Hebrides, 
(London, 1894%
G  RSCELSPÏÏRCER, etc,; L'Oceanie française, (Notre Domaine 
Coloniale, vol. X), (Paris, 1922). "
Henri RUSS1ER; Le Partage de 1 'Océanie, (Paris, 1905).
Guy SCHOLSFIELD; The Ih.cific,%%ondon, 1919). (a  general 
account of international relations in the Fhcific, based 
on published sources. The author deplores alleged 
insufficiency of British acquisitions. )
Ernest SCOTT; Short History of Australia, (London, 1956), 
({includes a brief account of the New Hebrides and 
récidiviste questions.)
H. Morse STEPHENS and Herbert E. BOLTON (eds. ) : The
Pacific Ocean in History: Papers and Addresses presented 
at the Panama-Pacific Historical Congress held in 
1915 at Sanfrancisco, (Nev; York, 1917). paper by
H.M. Stephens: "The Conflict of European Nations in 
the Pacific".)
John M. WARD; British Policy in the South Pacific
1786-1895. A Study of British Policy towards the South 
Pacific Islands orior to the Establishment of 
(^ vernments by the Great Powers, (Sydney, 1948).
(Some unpublished material was used. )
W. A. YOUNG: Christianity and Civilisation in the South 
Pacific. The influence of IvHssionaries upon European 
Expansion... during the Nineteenth Century. The Robert 
Hart Memorial Rrize Essay, 1920, (Sxford, 1922).
(Mainly concerned with New Guinea; includes a few pages 
on the I'few Hebrides. )
vii. Newfoundland.
R-A. MACKjVY (ed. ) ; Newfoundland (compiled under auspices of 
the Royal Institute of International Affairs), (Oxford, 
1946). (sections by various authors on different aspects 
of Newfoundland history and economy, including one on 
the Anglo-French Newfoundland negotiations of the 
nineteenth century. )
1.
(b) Articles. A. C.V. îvîELBOURNS; "The relations between
Australia and New Giinea up to the 
establislmient of British rule in 1888", 
Journal and Proceedings of the Royal 
Australian Historical Society, vols. XII 
and Ylll! (sydney. 1927-28).
La Science Sociale, 2 période, Fasc. 16-20:
'!La crise coloniale en Nouvelle Calédonie", 
(Paris, 1905). (includes brief account of 
the economic history of New Caledonia. )
Robert Gale WOOLBSRT: "Italian Colonial Expansion
in Africa. Bibliographical Article", Journal 
of Itodern History, vol. IV, (Nev/ York, 1932)!
2, Theses (unpublished).
Margaret ADAMS; "The British Attitude to German Colonisation, 
1880-1885", (London M. A,, 1955). (a  precis was given in the 
Bulletin of the Institute of Historical Research, vol. XV, 
November, 1957.)
Margaret M. LAW; "The Qrov/th of British Influence in Abyssinia and 
on the African Coast of the Red Sea from 1840 to 1885",- 
(London M. A., 1931).
W. H, SCOTTER; "International Rivalry in the Bights of Benin and 
Biafra, 1815-1885", (London Ph.D,, 1955).
R. E.P. IfVASTELL; "British Imperial Policy in relation to j^üadagascar, 
1810-1896", (London Ph.D., 1944).
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